The First Anglo-Afghan War - the Causes, Russian and British moves in the Great Game

Few, few shall part, where many meet! The snow shall be their winding sheet, And every turf beneath their feet Shall be a soldier's sepulchre. Campbell

Nelson's Legacy

It was in 1805 when Lord Horatio Nelson, that battled-scarred veteran lacking the arm and the eye he had given in the service of his country, won his stunning victory over the combined fleets of France and Spain. Off Cape Trafalgar, at the southern tip of Spain, he sliced into the enemy line of battle. A few hours later, dying on his flagship HMS Victory, the news was brought to him that the French had been vanquished. Nelson passed away soon after, leaving a yet-to-be constructed eponymous column in a London square named in honour of his triumph and an aura of invincibility that clung to the Royal Navy for more than a century. In more practical terms his victory ensured for the British a command of the seas that was to go unchallenged till the Battle of Jutland in 1916 and not given up till the Washington Treaties six years later. This command of the world's oceans made the British Empire, in effect, invulnerable and beyond the reach of the jealousies of the European great powers. It meant Britain had a free hand to do what it liked in its far-flung possessions stretching from the Caribbean to Australasia.

In only three places was there a land frontier of potential danger. One was the border between Canada and the fledgling United States. Incredibly long, ill-policed if policed at all, and militarily wide open to any kind of determined threat. It was, however, secure. Since the aberration of the War of 1812, Britain and the United States had grown progressively closer; as was seen in Britain's unwillingness to become involved in the war between the states. Indeed the Monroe Doctrine which stated the U.S.'s refusal to tolerate any new European incursions in the Western hemisphere was in fact if not in spirit guaranteed by the Royal Navy. No-one could play any games in the western hemispere without the permission of Her Majesty's government. War with America then as ever since, was if not unthinkable definitely something to be avoided. There was another land border, with China, in the north-east of India but the Chinese empire was so decrepit and internally weak that no forseeable threat was apparent there. That left only the north-west frontier of India and here the potential for conflict seemed great. Tsarist Russia, itself an expansionist power of great resolve, was slowly pushing eastwards and southwards. It was only a matter of time, people believed, until the Russians crossed swords with the British and Afghanistan was the likeliest venue for such a meeting.

India

India was the jewel in the British imperial crown and one of the pillars of British greatness. Years later at a meeting of the Imperial General Staff, Britain was described as a naval, Indian and colonial power (in that order). Control of India gave Britain the use of a large mercenary army bigger than the British army itself and so many of Britain's overseas possessions were simply way-stations on the sea routes to India or naval bases with which to protect them. So important was India to Britain's position in the world and so great a prize did the British feel it to be, that they were unable to think of Russia's expansion in central Asia as anything other than a push towards the ultimate gaol of a Russian domination of India. And so was born the forward policy which reflected Britain's deep-seated fears of the Russian bear's intentions and dictated British eastern policy almost up to the Second World War. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, the Russians were firmly established on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and casting covetous eyes at the great Central Asian oasis cities of Merv, Khiva and Bokhara. They also had a strong presence in Persia and in a precursor of the Great Game the rival British and Russian missions in Teheran vied with each other to maximise their influence at the court of the Persian Shah. In 1837, a Persian army stiffened by 'unofficial' Russian advisers entered Afghanistan and laid siege to the city of Herat, long claimed by the Persians as theirs. Luckily for the Heratis, a British officer by the name of Eldred Pottinger chanced to be in the city incognito when the siege began. He offered his services to the Herati Grand Vizier and soon assumed control of all Herat's defences. With great skill, energy and personal courage he held off the Russian-backed Persian besiegers.

It was then that Henry Rawlinson, a young British subaltern from the mission in Teheran, made an alarming discovery. One day near the eastern border of Persia, on a journey to the Shah of Persia's camp on the way to Herat, he glimpsed a group of mounted men ahead of him that seemed to be in European uniforms. Later when he caught up with the group, he found them to be a Russian officer and his escort of Cossacks. The Russian greeted Rawlinson with a correct politeness but it soon became apparent that he was being evasive. Rawlinson addressed him in French, then English, then Persian and the Russian replied in Russian, of which Rawlinson knew nothing, and then Turcoman of which Rawlinson knew only a few words. The Russian officer claimed he was taking gifts to the Shah of Persia, but the language barrier meant Rawlinson was completely unable to ascertain if what the Russian said was true. Rawlinson was understandably suspicious and after a few pipes smoked with the Russian officer, continued on his journey to the Shah. When he arrived, he requested an audience with the ruler at which he relayed his news. The Shah informed Rawlinson the gifts were not for him but for Dost Mohammed, the ruler of Afghanistan. Indeed, the Russians had even asked the Shah for safe conduct for the party through the Shah's domains. Just then the Russian and his Cossacks rode into the camp. The Russian's name was Vitkevich, he spoke both French and Persian as well as Turkish and other central Asian tongues and he was indeed headed for Kabul. Rawlinson, who had just ridden 700 miles from Teheran, promptly turned his horse around and rode back to raise the alarm. When the news reached Calcutta and London that's exactly what it caused.

When Vitkevitch arrived in Kabul he found that a British officer of great repute was already there and had the ear of Dost Mohammed. That officer was the redoubtable Alexander Burnes, who was something of a hero in England. A few years before he had managed to enter the closed city of Bokhara and on his return to England had been feted as 'Bokhara Burnes' and even spent a few hours with William IV, briefing the king on this amazing journey. On his outward journey he had stopped in Kabul and was there befriended by Dost Mohammed, Emir of Afghanistan. Now, at the request of his political masters in Calcutta, he was back in Kabul trying to arrange a treaty with the Emir.

Afghanistan

Known to Europeans since the days of Alexander, Afghanistan is a land of mountains, ferocious warriors, uncompromising Islam, vicious tribal rivalries and a political complexity that entwines bloodlines, religion, history, opportunism and treachery into a mix as incomprehensible to the outsider today as it has ever been. In the early 19th century it was also a land of great mystery. Few Europeans had penetrated its interior and little was known of its rulers other than that, in the previous century, they had sacked Delhi in a most complete manner. Geography, however, laid it squarely in the path of the two most expansionist powers on earth and soon its topography would be read of in newspapers from London to St.Petersburg to Calcutta. Since the collapse of the great Durrani empire founded in the 18th century the country had been in an almost constant state of anarchy but the current ruler, Dost Mohammed was an impressive man by all accounts and promised to bring a measure of stability to a land which had seen little in previous years. He had shown great skill and strength in overcoming his elder brothers on the way to the throne and now had only two possible opponents to worry about. One of these was Kamran Shah, ruler of Herat and the other Shah Shujah deposed twenty years before. Shujah had first been a refugee at the Punjabi court of Ranjit Singh and then a pensioner of the British. Comfortably lodged in the city of Ludhiana, he implored anyone who would listen to help him regain his lost throne. Dost Mohammed had two external problems. The Persians wished to seize the province of Herat on Afghanistan's western border and Ranjit Singh held the province of Peshawar, taken from Afghanistan by his armies, in the east. Dost Mohammed desperately wanted Peshawar back.

On his first visit to Kabul, Alexander Burnes had become very close to Dost Mohammed and such was the trust between the two men that Burnes had even been offered the command of Dost Mohammed's armies. Burnes, with his eyes on Bokhara, had politely refused and continued on his ride to glory and fame. The Dost had been greatly saddened by his friend's departure. Dost Mohammed wanted to come to some kind of accommodation with the British but the stumbling block was the province of Peshawar. It could only be returned to Afghanistan at the expense of Ranjit Singh, the one-eyed ruler of the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab and Ranjit had no wish to give the rich, fertile province up. Ranjit Singh was a trusted ally of the British and the government in Calcutta would do nothing to jeopardise that friendship or weaken the Sikhs' position. As such, in 1835 Dost Mohammed made overtures to the Russians and it was in response to these that the Vitkevitch mission was despatched. Vitkevitch entered Kabul on Christmas Eve, 1837 and found Burnes happily ensconced there. With the politeness that characterised so many of these direct Anglo-Russian meetings of the 'Great Game', Burnes invited his new rival to Christmas dinner. What marvellously guarded conversation they must have had that night. Burnes still had the favour of Dost Mohammed and for a while Vitkevitch must have felt his mission was going nowhere. Then in January of 1838 Lord Auckland, Governor-General in Calcutta, wrote a letter to Dost Mohammed that completely undermined the efforts of Burnes. It was designed to make Dost Mohammed give up both his claims to Peshawar and his flirtations with the Russians. It was written in such a style that left no doubt as to the threatening nature of the message. Burnes was devastated. All his work was in ruins for Dost Mohammed could only accept the conditions of the letter by making a humiliating climbdown. In April of 1838 Burnes was asked to leave Kabul. He and Dost Mohammed parted amicably and in sadness, but now Vitkevitch had the ear of the Emir of Afghanistan.

In the west of the country the siege of Herat continued with little success and eventually Count Simonich, the head of the Russian mission in Teheran, took personal control of the Shah of Persia's army and planned a great assault. Once more Pottinger and the Heratis were able to beat the attackers off. This was all too much for Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary. British troops were landed on Kharg Island at the head of the Persian Gulf, and the Shah was informed, in no uncertain terms, that a continuation of the siege would mean war with Great Britain. On September 9th, 1838 the Shah mounted his horse and rode off in the direction of Teheran. The siege was over. Palmerston also pressured the Russian government in the person of Nesselrode, the Tsar's foreign minister. The evidence of Russian machinations was impossible to refute and in order to save face the Russian government insisted its subordinates had been acting without authorisation. Nesselrode was dismissed, Simonich recalled and disgraced and Vitkevitch ordered to return to Russia. In St. Petersburg in late 1838, Vitkevich committed suicide. Some whispered that the British had assassinated him.

Auckland and Macnaghten

All's well that ends well, or so it should have been. Herat was safe, the Shah and his army had returned to Persia and the Russian government was apologetic. Lord Auckland, however, was still upset over Dost Mohammed's rejection of his letter of January 1838. He decided to settle the Afghan matter once and for all and listened to the words of William Macnaghten. Macnaghten was a political officer and a highly talented linguist and he had a plan. Ranjit Singh and his Sikh armies would be persuaded to invade Afghanistan, depose Dost Mohammed and instal Shah Shujah on the throne. In return Shah Shujah would give up all Afghan claims to Peshawar. Ranjit Singh, whose western frontier bordered Afghanistan and who had a healthy respect for the fighting spirit of the Afghans, refused to allow his troops to be used in such an adventure. Still Macnaghten pushed his plan and Auckland was all ears. In June of 1838, Ranjit Singh, Shah Shujah and the British signed a secret agreement whereby Shah Shujah would relinquish his claim to Peshawar and in return be assisted in his desire to regain the throne of Afghanistan. There was no mention of Sikh troops in the agreement. Ranjit Singh must have smiled that day, for he had received Peshawar in perpetuity and wasn't obliged to commit a single bayonet to Shah Shujah's quest for the throne. Burnes was horrified. In his mind Dost Mohammed was much the better man to have as Emir of Afghanistan. Burnes was overruled. On October 1st 1838, Auckland issued the Simla Manifesto. It stated that in the light of Dost Mohammed's dalliance with powers other than the British, he had shown himself to be unfriendly and would therefore be removed from the throne and replaced by Shah Shujah. This disgraceful meddling in the affairs of a sovereign nation reeked of hypocrisy of the highest order. What the British had found so unacceptable when practised by the Russians they were now prepared to do themselves - and worse.

The force chosen to effect Auckland's grand design was called the Army of the Indus. It was led by a General Keane, who would conduct a soldierly advance that would see at least one daring coup-des-armes. There seemed little doubt that the army would succeed in its endeavours but, as the old Duke of Wellington was to remark, the political problems would begin where the military successes left off. Attached to the army as envoy to the court of the yet-to-be-installed Shah Shujah was Macnaghten, confident and eager to see his plan succeed. His deputy would be Alexander 'Bokhara' Burnes. Together they would lead their countrymen to one of the most humiliating debacles in the history of their island race.

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