While
the British reaction to the Pakistan demand came in the form of the Cripps
offer of April, 1942, which conceded the principle of self-determination
to provinces on a territorial basis, the Rajaji
Formula (called after the eminent Congress leader C.Rajagopalacharia,
which became the basis of prolonged Jinnah-Gandhi talks in September, 1944),
represented the Congress alternative to Pakistan. The Cripps offer was
rejected because it did not concede the Muslim demand the whole way, while the Rajaji Formula was found unacceptable since it
offered a "moth-eaten, mutilated" Pakistan and the too appended
with a plethora of pre- conditions which made its emergence in any shape
remote, if not altogether impossible. Cabinet Mission, the most delicate as
well as the most tortuous negotiations, however, took place during 1946-47,
after the elections which showed that the country was sharply and somewhat
evenly divided between two parties- the Congress and the League- and that the
central issue in Indian politics was Pakistan.
These
negotiations began with the arrival, in March 1946, of a three-member British
Cabinet Mission. The crucial task with which the Cabinet Mission was entrusted
was that of devising in consultation with the various political parties,
constitution-making machinery, and of setting up a popular interim government.
But, because the Congress-League gulf could not be bridged, despite the
Mission's (and the Viceroy's) prolonged efforts, the Mission had to make
its own proposals in May, 1946. Known as the Cabinet Mission Plan, these
proposals stipulated a limited centre, supreme only
in foreign affairs, defense and communications and three autonomous
groups of provinces. Two of these groups were to have Muslim majorities in the
north-west and the north-east of the subcontinent, while the third one,
comprising the Indian mainland, was to have a Hindu majority. A consummate
statesman that he was, Jinnah saw his chance. He interpreted the clauses
relating to a limited centre and the grouping as
"the foundation of Pakistan", and induced the Muslim League Council
to accept the Plan in June 1946; and this he did much against the calculations
of the Congress and to its utter dismay.
Tragically
though, the League's acceptance was put down to its supposed weakness and the
Congress put up a posture of defiance, designed to swamp the League into
submitting to its dictates and its interpretations of the plan. Faced thus,
what alternative had Jinnah and the League but to rescind their earlier
acceptance, reiterate and reaffirm their original stance, and decide to
launch direct action (if need be) to wrest Pakistan. The way Jinnah maneuvered
to turn the tide of events at a time when all seemed lost indicated, above all,
his masterly grasp of the situation and his adeptness at making strategic and
tactical moves.
Partition Plan By the close of 1946, the communal riots had flared up to murderous heights, engulfing almost
the entire subcontinent. The
two peoples, it seemed,
were engaged in a fight to the finish. The time for a peaceful transfer of power
was fast running out. Realizing the gravity of the situation. His Majesty's
Government sent down to India a new Viceroy- Lord Mountbatten. His protracted negotiations with the
various political leaders resulted in 3 June (1947) Plan by which the British
decided to partition the subcontinent, and hand over power to two successor
States on 15 August, 1947. The plan was duly accepted by the three Indian
parties to the dispute- the Congress the League and the Akali
Dal (representing the Sikhs).
In recognition of his singular contribution, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was
nominated by the Muslim League as the Governor-General of Pakistan, while the
Congress appointed Mountbatten as India's first Governor-General.
Pakistan, it has been truly said, was born in virtual chaos. Indeed, few nations in the world
have started on their career with less resources and in more treacherous
Circumstances. The new nation did not inherit a central
government, a capital, an administrative core, or an organized defence force. The Punjab holocaust had left vast areas in
a shambles with communications disrupted. This, alongwith the en masse migration of the Hindu and Sikh business and
managerial classes, left the economy almost shattered.
The treasury was empty,
India having denied Pakistan the major share of
its cash balances. On top of
all this, the still unorganized nation was called
upon to feed some eight million refugees who had fled the insecurities
and barbarities of the north Indian plains that long, hot summer. If all this
was symptomatic of Pakistan's administrative and economic weakness, the Indian
annexation, through military action in November 1947, of Junagadh (which had
originally acceded to Pakistan) and the Kashmir war over the State's accession
(October 1947-December 1948) exposed her military weakness. In the
circumstances, therefore, it was nothing short of a miracle that Pakistan
survived at all. That it survived and forged ahead was mainly due to one
man-Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The nation desperately needed a charismatic leader at
that critical juncture in the nation's history, and he fulfilled that need profoundly. After all, he was
more than a mere
Governor-General: he was the Quaid-i- Azam who had brought the State into being.
In the ultimate analysis, his very presence at the helm of
affairs was responsible for enabling the newly born nation to overcome
the terrible crisis on the morrow of its cataclysmic birth. He mustered up the
immense prestige and the unquestioning loyalty he commanded among the people to
energize them, to raise their morale, to raise the profound feelings of
patriotism that the freedom had generated, along constructive channels. Though
tired and in poor health, Jinnah yet carried the heaviest part of the burden in
that first crucial year. He laid down the policies of the new state,
called attention to the immediate problems confronting the nation and told the
members of the Constituent Assembly, the civil servants and the Armed Forces
what to do and what the nation expected of them. He saw to it that law and
order was maintained at all costs, despite the provocation that the large-scale
riots in north India had provided. He moved from Karachi to Lahore for a while
and supervised the immediate refugee problem in the Punjab. In a time of
fierce excitement, he remained sober,
cool and steady. He advised his excited audience in Lahore to concentrate on
helping the refugees, to avoid retaliation, exercise restraint and protect the
minorities. He assured the minorities of a fair deal, assuaged their inured
sentiments, and gave them hope and comfort. He toured the various provinces,
attended to their particular problems and instilled in the people a sense of
belonging. He reversed the British policy in the North- West Frontier and
ordered the withdrawal of the troops from the tribal territory of Waziristan,
thereby making the Pathans feel themselves an
integral part of Pakistan's body-politics. He created a new Ministry of States
and Frontier Regions, and assumed responsibility for ushering in a new era in Balochistan. He settled the controversial question of the states of Karachi,
secured the accession of States, especially of Kalat which
seemed problematical and carried on negotiations with Lord Mountbatten for the
settlement of the Kashmir Issue.