THE BUILDER DECEMBER 1917

THE TRIAL OF CHRIST FROM A LAWYER'S STANDPOINT

BY BRO. LOUIS H. FEAD, GRAND MASTER, MICHIGAN

Brother Louis H. Fead, the sixty-seventh Grand Master of the Grand
Lodge F. and A. M. of the State of Michigan, was born at Lexington,
Michigan, May 2, 1877, and is consequently one of the youngest
Grand Masters that ever presided over that Grand Lodge. He
graduated from the Lexington High School in 1893, attended Olivet
College two years, Detroit College of Law one year and graduated
from the Law Department of the University of Michigan in 1900;
settled at Newberry, Michigan, July 25, 1900, and was elected
Prosecuting Attorney of Luce County the same year, taking the
office January 1, 1901. Was re-elected every two years for six
consecutive terms when he was elected Circuit Judge of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit, composed of the counties of Alger, Chippewa, Luce
and Schoolcraft, in 1912, taking office January, 1913, his term
expiring January 1, 1918. He has just been re-elected for the full
term of six years commencing January 1, 1918, without any
opposition, either in the primaries or at the election. He is also
engaged in the banking business being vice-president of the
Newberry State Bank.

Bro. Fead is a member of all the various bodies of Masonry and
allied Orders.

Young in years, vigorous in health, sturdy in manhood, richly
endowed with brilliant qualities of mind and best of all a big
heart overflowing with love for his fellow man, Michigan Masons are
indeed proud of their Grand Master for 1917-18.

An address delivered before the Masonic Relief Association of the
United States and Canada at the biennial meeting held in Omaha,
Nebraska, Sept. 25-27, 1917.

RESUME OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

IT may seem to you, at first blush, that the subject of this
address is not strictly appropriate to a Masonic gathering. During
the meeting of the Relief Association, we have heard much of
Masonic relief and charity, and our minds have been tuned to that
idea. But Masonry could live without particularly teaching charity
as it might rely upon that natural impulse which prompts men of
generous natures to extend aid to those in want. On the other hand,
Justice is one of the basic principles of our institution, within
which true charity is embraced, upon which the idea of fraternity
is builded and without which there can be no true brotherhood.
Consequently, it behooves the Mason to think much on the subject of
Justice, the rendering to every man his just due without
distinction, and to learn where he can, just principles that he may
practice them. Where is there a better field for his contemplation
and study than the most famous criminal trial in the history of the
world, where all the diverse passions of humanity were loosed, the
trial of Jesus Christ? And in presenting it to you, I desire to
present the subject, stripped of religious aspects, as a legal
study, and in line with the duty of Masons to seriously consider
the Masonic principle of Justice.

Heretofore, our consideration of the trial of Christ has always
been tinged with a religious coloring. We have been taught and have
learned to look upon the tragedy as an unspeakable outrage
committed upon the Savior of Mankind, the Son of God. Its human
side has been seldom, if ever, presented to us; The divine
character of Christ has always been pre-eminent in our minds and we
have viewed the scene either in a humanitarian way, with horror at
the cruelty and vicious hatred of the persecutors of one who harmed
no man and did only good, or in a religious way, as the voluntary
sacrifice by God of his own Son for the redemption of the world.

This evening, for a few minutes, I want to consider this tragedy
with you from a different viewpoint, from its legal rather than its
humanitarian or religious side. We are not now considering Christ
as divine, but as human. The trial is not that of the Son of God
but of Jesus the man, the carpenter, and the son of the carpenter,
of Nazareth. He is the prisoner at the bar, entitled to the
protection only of those laws provided for the protection of any
person accused of crime, subject to the punishment provided for the
breach of the law, and, in all respects, having the same rights and
only the same rights as has any accused inhabitant of the country.
The justice or the injustice of the execution and the motives of
those who condemned him are entirely beside the question except in
so far as they may be pertinent to the legal phase of the
controversy. Our purpose is merely to discover whether the accused
man Jesus was lawfully condemned in accordance with the settled
legal principles of the times and land.

The proposition before us may be summed up in two questions: 1. Was
Christ guilty of a breach of the law? 2. If he was, was he
regularly convicted and executed in accordance with the provisions
of the law ? As a partial answer to the first question and to bring
the viewpoint sharply to your minds, let me say that when Jesus
said he was the Son of God, he was guilty of blasphemy under the
laws then in force and if he had been regularly tried and convicted
of that offense and executed by the legally provided punishment of
stoning to death, there could be no legal exception to the
execution, whatever one might think of its justice or propriety.
Judea, at this time, was a Roman province or dependency. As Judea
was an enlightened land, Rome, with that splendid administrative
ability which fostered self-government so long as there was
constant recognition of Roman supreme sovereignty, permitted her to
enforce practically entirely her own system of laws, through the
instrumentality of her own courts and to inflict her punishments,
except where the sentence was death, in which case Roman sanction
was required, possibly to pronounce, certainly to execute, the
sentence. Both the Jewish and Roman legal systems were admirable
and, in many respects, persons accused and tried before their
courts were much more fully protected from unjust sentence than
under our modern systems, although the punishment of the guilty was
more generally assured. And Jesus was tried, not by a mob as we
sometimes think, but before two courts of proper jurisdiction and
under both the Jewish and Roman systems of law whose enlightened
provisions are even now being gradually incorporated into Anglo
Saxon jurisprudence, from which they had been for centuries barred
by the autocratic and evil theories of the Feudal system.

In order that we may intelligently pursue the inquiry, let us
briefly state the principal provisions of the law relating to the
trial of criminal cases in Judea, the bare enumeration of which
will satisfy you, I think, that the present day system is not
immeasurably superior to the past in all respects.

The trial of the major offenses was had before the Sanhedrim, a
court of general jurisdiction, composed of 71 rulers, priests,
scribes and scholars, and having a general place of meeting in the
temple. The presiding officer was usually, but not always, the High
Priest. Upon extraordinary occasions, the Sanhedrim could meet in
the palace of the High Priest. In a capital case, that is one in
which the death penalty could be inflicted, twenty-one members were
required to be present. No Jewish court could conduct judicial
proceedings on a feast day and in a capital case, the court could
not sit at night.

A person accused of crime could be arrested only after a formal
accusation setting out the crime of which he was accused, unless he
were taken in the actual commission of crime. If arrested at night,
he must be kept in ward until the next day.

In all cases, the accused was presumed to be innocent until proved
guilty. He could be tried and condemned only if he were present. He
could not be called upon to testify nor could he be made a witness
against himself. The charge must be proved by other witnesses.
Counsel must be appointed for his defense. Evidence in his favor
was to be freely admitted.

No one could be convicted upon the testimony of a single witness;
at least two must testify in the presence of the accused and must
agree together. Their testimony was required to be scrutinized
carefully and technically and, in case of slight disagreement
between them, it was insufficient to convict. The oath administered
to the witness was an adjuration "by the living God." This was the
most solemn oath a Jew could take and, when so adjured, he was
bound to answer and to tell the truth. It was the duty of the
presiding officer of the court to call the attention of the
witnesses to the value of life and to warn them not to forget
anything they knew in the prisoner's favor.

In minor cases, counsel on both sides were permitted to make an
argument. In capital cases, only counsel for the accused was heard.

After the testimony was in, the votes of the younger members of the
court were taken first, that they might not be influenced by their
older associates. A judge who had voted for conviction could change
his vote at any time. One who had once spoken for acquittal could
not change his vote to conviction. In capital cases, a majority of
at least two was required to convict. A verdict of acquittal could
be given at once. A verdict of guilty could not be pronounced until
a day after the conclusion of the trial. That day was to be spent
by those judges who favored conviction in fasting, prayer and
religious meditation. If a verdict of acquittal was not reached on
the day the trial ended, the court was imperatively obliged to
adjourn to permit the full day of fasting and prayer.

Upon conviction, the condemned man was led away to be stoned; but
the court remained in session. An officer stood at the door with a
signal flag. Another followed the prisoner to the further point
from which he could see the signal. If any new witnesses came to
prove the innocence of the accused the signal flag was waved; and
the execution of the sentence was stayed until the new witnesses
had been heard and judgment again pronounced.

The spirit of the Jewish law was well illustrated in the precise
and technical rules protecting those accused of crime. It was a
common saying that the "Sanhedrim was to save life, not to destroy
life." It was under such a system that the Sanhedrim purported to
conduct the trial of Jesus and by that system the regularity of the
procedure is to be tested.

With this brief resume of the important legal principles involved
in the present discussion, let us take up the various incidents in
the trial of Christ and examine their legality.

I. THE COURT
No enlightened system of jurisprudence has ever sanctioned the
participation of a partisan judge in a case, of a judge interested
in the outcome of the suit. Under the Mosaic law the judges were
admonished: "Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect
persons, neither take a gift." The theory was that the judgment was
God's. The courts were merely the human agents appointed to state
that judgment. The Sanhedrim, the Supreme Court of the Jews, was
especially considered to be above partisan feelings and its
judgments were deemed to be the nearest approach to exact justice
attainable through human wisdom and divine revelation to man. The
enlightened rules and laws of Judea could have no possible place
for a partial or biased tribunal.

But the record reads:

"After two days was the Feast of the Passover, and of the
unleavened bread; and the chief priests and the scribes sought how
they might take him and put him to death.

"Then assembled together the chief priests and the scribes and the
elders of the people unto the palace of the High Priest, who was
called Caiaphas, and consulted that they might take Jesus by
subtlety and kill him."

This record shows, not a merely general enmity or personal hatred
toward Jesus, but a direct interest on the part of the judges, a
conspiracy by them to accuse Christ and to have him executed, and
their subsequent conduct shows that the manner of carrying out such
conspiracy was by a trial in which they were the judges.
Consequently, it is my contention that the court which first tried
Christ was unlawfully constituted because it was composed of judges
who had pronounced the judgment of death against him in advance of
trial and who were actually conspiring to encompass his execution.

II. THE ARREST
On the first day of the feast of the unleavened bread or the
Passover, Jesus and his disciples celebrated the feast in the
institution of what we now call the Lord's Supper. After the feast,
and in the evening, he went with his disciples into the garden of
Gethsemane to pray. He saw his end approaching and he spent his few
remaining hours in communion with his God. Three times he went
apart from his disciples and three times he returned to find them
sleeping. The third time he came out, Judas arrived, with a
multitude from the chief priests and elders of the people, and
betrayed him with a kiss. This multitude was composed of Roman
soldiers, Temple guards and some of the members of the Sanhedrim.
And they laid hands on him and took him.

A short time before this, Jesus had publicly come up from Galilee.
He had entered Jerusalem on Palm Sunday, attended by a great
concourse of his followers. He had openly taught in the temple and
confounded the scribes. Consequently, there was ample opportunity
for a formal accusation against him and his arrest in the day time.
He was not, at the time of his arrest, engaged in the commission of
any criminal act. He was not even teaching his gospel. He had been
engaged in prayer. Under no provision of the Jewish law was there
legal authority for his arrest without a formal accusation being
first made against him. Jesus knew his arrest was unlawful and he
reminded the members of the Sanhedrim present of their breach of
the law when he uttered that gentle rebuke:

"Are ye come out as against a thief with swords and staves for to
take me ? I sat daily with you teaching in the temple and ye laid
no hold on me "

I do not contend that the illegality of arrest was sufficient to
prevent Jesus' being brought to trial. It would not result in an
illegal judgment if the subsequent proceedings were in accordance
with the law. But it is important as indicating the length to which
the Sanhedrim went in furtherance of their conspiracy and as being
added proof of the disqualification of the judges for interest and
bias.


III. THE TRIAL BEFORE THE SANHEDRIM
Saint John says "They led Jesus away to Annas first, for he was the
father-in-law of Caiaphas, the High Priest." The record is not very
clear at this point. Some sort of an examination seems to have been
conducted by the High Priest Caiaphas, either privately or in the
presence of Annas, but as the examination was not fruitful, it is
of no particular consequence.

Jesus was then taken to the house of the High Priest, where the
chief priests and the scribes and the elders were assembled.
Whether this was an extraordinary occasion warranting a trial in
the palace of the High Priest is subject to grave differences of
opinion and therefore will not be dwelt upon. You will bear in
mind, however, that this was in the night-time, when no trial could
legally be had of a capital offense, and at the time of the Feast
of the Passover, when no criminal trial of any kind could be
conducted. Under the Jewish law, the whole of the proceedings of
the trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrim were invalid, as much so as
if a court in this state should try and convict a person of crime
on Sunday. The judgment would be void.

Nevertheless, Jesus was arraigned at the bar of the Sanhedrim for
trial. No formal accusation was even then made against him. But in
order to preserve the semblance of a trial, witnesses were
presented. The record reads: "The chief priests and elders sought
false witnesses to put Jesus to death." They found none because,
although there were many false witnesses, they did not agree
together. It was necessary, in order to convict, that there be two
witnesses agreeing in all respects in their testimony. Two
witnesses were finally found. Matthew's version of their testimony
is that Jesus had said "I am able to destroy the temple of God and
to build it in three days." Mark differs in the language used and
narrates it as "I will destroy this temple made with hands and in
three days I will build another without hands." Both of the
Evangelists say the witnesses were false witnesses and Mark further
says they did not agree together.

St. Mark's claim of disagreement between the witnesses is not,
according to the record, entitled to any legal weight. The record
affirmatively shows that the witnesses agreed upon Christ's
statement. The only disagreement appearing in the record is that
between Matthew and Mark as to what the testimony was.

Nor is there support in the record for the designation of the two
as false witnesses. The testimony they gave was not strictly
accurate, it is true, because what Christ had said was "Destroy
this temple and in three days I will raise it up." But he was then
speaking in the temple at Jerusalem, which was the Jewish temple of
God. And it is not to be expected that the Jews understood that he
"spake of the temple of his body" in making the remark, as it is
apparent his own disciples did not so understand his words until
after he had risen from the dead. The version given by the
witnesses, particularly as narrated by Matthew, was substantially
a correct rendition of the meaning which would ordinarily be
gathered from the words used and the place in which they were said.
Substantial accuracy is all that can be expected of a witness
narrating what was said by another at a previous time.

The record does not show that the witnesses were cautioned to
forget no testimony favorable to the accused, warned of the
sanctity of life, or that they took the oath. As these were
customary details in the trial of all criminal offenses, it is
probable there would be a presumption that they were fully
observed. It appears, however, that no counsel had been appointed
for Jesus and the judges were seeking witnesses against him instead
of in his behalf, as was their legal duty.

After this testimony, the High Priest demanded of Jesus: "Answereth
thou nothing ? What is it which these witness against thee?" And
Jesus held his peace. If this demand was a call upon him to testify
against himself, it was illegal as no accused person could be so
called upon. If it was an announcement by the High Priest, who
presided over the court, that the prosecution had finished and the
defense would be heard, Jesus had the right to hold his peace. The
requirements of the law had not been observed in his behalf, in the
composition of the court, its time of meeting or in the procedure.
Whether a crime had been charged may be doubted but it was
evidently not a very serious matter as the High Priest immediately
abandoned the charge and proceeded along another line. Christ was
not condemned by the Sanhedrim on the charge testified to by the
two witnesses.

That the High Priest was, in fact and illegally, seeking to require
Jesus to testify against himself is, I think, conclusively shown by
the fact that upon Christ's refusing to testify, the High Priest
then besought him with the most solemn adjuration which could be
put to a Jew, one which he was obliged to answer "I adjure you by
the living God that thou tellest us whether thou be the Christ, the
Son of God." Mark does not relate this incident as an adjuration
but states the question to have been "Art thou the Christ, the Son
of the Blessed?" In either case, it was a call upon the prisoner to
testify against himself and was illegal.

To this demand, Jesus answered: "Thou hast said; nevertheless I say
unto you, hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the
right hand of power and coming in the clouds of heaven."
Immediately the High Priest rent his garments saying "He hath
spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of witnesses ? Behold,
now ye heard his blasphemy. What think ye ?" And they said "He is
guilty of death."

And they jeered and mocked at him, spit in his face and buffeted
him, and, covering his head with a cloak, struck him and asked him
to prophecy who had struck him. Imagine a scene of this kind in the
highest court of the land, where the most dignified personages of
the day were in attendance, if justice were the object of the
proceeding.

The illegalities of this trial were many. The judges had denied
Christ the presumption of innocence, with which the law invested
him, and had adjudged him guilty in advance of trial; the court was
held in the night-time and on a feast day; no counsel had been
appointed for the accused; he had been convicted, not upon the
testimony of two witnesses, but upon his own testimony given upon
the demand of the High Priest and, according to Matthew, after the
adjuration which a Jew could not refuse to heed; the judges had
sought witnesses against him instead of in his favor; the vote had
not been taken in the manner prescribed by law; the High Priest,
who should have spoken last, with a dramatic rending of his
garments, expressed his opinion first and called upon the others to
confirm it; the verdict of guilty was pronounced at once, without
the intervention of the day of fasting and prayer and religious
meditation.

The Sanhedrim itself recognized the illegality of its own procedure
in holding a night session and, as soon as it was day, held another
meeting. At this meeting, as recounted by St. Luke, they all
propounded the question to Jesus whether he was the Christ. And
when he said he was, they said "What need we any further witnesses?
for we ourselves have heard of his own mouth. And the whole
multitude arose and led him unto Pilate." It is unnecessary to
point out that this day meeting was not legal. It is subject to all
the objections made against the one held during the night before
except that it was held in the day time.

IV. THE TRIAL BEFORE PILATE
The trial before Pontius Pilate, the Roman Governor, began at the
hall of judgment in the early morning. It was held in the open air
as the Jews would not enter the hall on the feast day for fear of
being defiled. This is not the only instance in history of where a
precise observance of the forms of religion or ethics has attended
an example of man's inhumanity to man. Christ was brought before
Pilate because the Sanhedrim had no power to put him to death
without the approval of the Roman Governor.

When they brought Jesus to the hall of judgment, Pilate went out to
them and said "What accusation bring ye against this man?" Thus he
made an express demand for a statement of the charges. The priests
made no specific charge but answered: "If he were not a malefactor
we would not have delivered him up unto thee." Pilate said to them:
"Take ye him and judge him according to your law." And they
replied: "It is not lawful for us to put any man to death."

This colloquy indicates that the Jews were then seeking only to
obtain the approval of the Governor to the sentence of death for
blasphemy which the Sanhedrim had determined upon. While it was the
duty of the Roman Governor to pass upon all cases where it was
sought to impose the death penalty, it was the frequent practice,
in order to avoid friction with the native authorities as far as
possible, to approve the sentence without investigation and as a
matter of form. The failure of the priests to make a definite
accusation in answer to Pilate's question was apparently a hint to
him that such a practice would be very acceptable to the Sanhedrim
in this particular case.

There are several entirely patent reasons for Pilate's refusing to
act upon the hint. He knew that "for envy they had delivered"
Christ to him. He seems to have evidenced a considerable respect
for Jesus, of whose activities he had heard. Being a Pagan, he
could hardly be expected to wax indignant over superstitious
differences. Knowing the charge was conceived in envy and not
apparently deeming the matter of any particular consequence, he had
little sympathy with their purpose. Hence his contemptuous advice
to try Jesus according to the Jewish law under which he knew the
death penalty could not be inflicted.

The priests also knew that a charge of blasphemy would meet with
little favor from the pagan Governor and, accordingly, they
concealed their true complaint and made against Christ the
accusation of treason against the Roman state.

"We found this man perverting the nation and forbidding to give
tribute to Caesar, saying that he himself is Christ, a king."

Such an accusation could not, obviously, be dismissed without
investigation by the Governor. In addition to his administrative
powers, he was a judge, with power to try, condemn and execute.
Declining to exercise his administrative and discretionary powers
in favor of the death penalty for blasphemy upon the conviction by
the Sanhedrim, he was bound, as a judge, to determine this new
charge of treason against the Roman State in accordance with the
laws of Rome for the trial of criminal cases. The record shows that
he endeavored so to do.

When Christ was so accused by the chief priests and the elders, he
answered nothing. Why ? The charge was of a triple nature, (1)
perverting the nation, (2) forbidding to pay tribute to Caesar, and
(3) claiming to be a king. The charge of perverting the nation was
too indefinite to be specifically answered. The charge of
forbidding to pay tribute was false and his accusers knew it. That
very week when the Pharisees, trying to entrap him, had asked him
whether it was lawful to pay tribute to Caesar, he had answered,
"Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the
things which are God's." The charge of claiming to be a king was o
a double nature, having both a political and a religious aspect,
and he waited for the specifications of what was meant. Pilate, as
will be seen, ignored the charge regarding the payment of tribute
and conducted the trial solely upon the charge of Christ's claiming
to be a king, regarding that as what was meant by the allegation of
perverting the people.

He took Jesus into the judgment hall, away from the others, and
examined him privately. His first question was "Art thou the King
of the Jews ?" Jesus sought immediately to know whether Pilate was
proceeding with the trial from a political or a religious
standpoint and answered by himself asking a question: "Sayest thou
this thing of thyself or did others tell it thee of me?" The
purport is whether Pilate's question referred to a king as he
understood the term and in the sense that Caesar was a king or as
the Jews understood it, as a Messiah. Pilate was not concerned with
the religious controversy. He made it plain that he asked the
question only in a political sense and, impatient at being
questioned by a Jew, peremptorily demanded: "Am I a Jew? Thine own
nation and the chief priests have delivered thee unto me. What hast
thou done ?" Jesus answered the question in both ways explaining,
in a political sense, that he was not a rival of Caesar because his
kingdom was not of this world but, in a religious sense, that he
was a king in the kingdom of truth. And Pilate, without waiting for
answer, asked that brooding question which has haunted free men
with free minds since the beginning of time, "What is truth?"
They went out of the judgment hall and, before the whole of the
assembled people, Pilate solemnly pronounced a verdict of not
guilty. "I find no fault in him at all."

In a legal way, the case was then ended. Under our modern system of
jurisprudence, we have a maxim that no man shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. That maxim was part of the Roman law
long before and after the time of Christ, was adopted from thence
into the common law of England and became the heritage of American
jurisprudence. Pilate's judgment, pronounced after investigation
and before the accusers, was final. All proceedings thereafter upon
the same charge were illegal.

But the people were not appeased. Either in reiteration of their
former charge or as a new complaint, they became "more fierce,"
saying, "He stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Jewry,
beginning from Galilee to this place."

Herod, the Governor of Galilee, was then in Jerusalem. Pilate,
finding that Jesus was a Galilean, sent him to Herod for trial.
This could be legally done. Frequently changes of venue were
ordered to the jurisdiction of the prisoner's home. The common
opinion seems to be that Pilate sent Jesus to Herod in order to
escape the responsibility of further trying him and to shift the
burden of the trouble which was gathering. Whether this is true, I
do not know. But inasmuch as the complaint then made was that
Christ had been stirring up the people of Galilee, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that Pilate, having found him not guilty of
crime in Jerusalem, might desire that the Governor of Galilee pass
upon him claimed violation of law in that jurisdiction.

Christ was taken to Herod, who was glad to see him because he
wanted him to perform some of the miracles of which Herod had
heard, to act the mountebank. Christ refused to say anything. And
the chief priests and scribes accused him before Herod. While the
particulars of this accusation are not set out, it was evidently
regarding Christ's claim to be a king, as Herod mocked him, arrayed
him in a gorgeous robe and sent him back to Pilate. Evidently Herod
did not consider the charges serious nor proved. And Herod was a
Jew.

Upon Jesus' return, Pilate summoned the chief priests and the
rulers and the people together and once more pronounced a
deliberate judgment of acquittal.

"Ye have brought this man unto me as one that perverteth the
people; and behold, I, having examined him before you, have found
no fault in this man touching those things whereof ye accuse him.
No, nor yet Herod; for I sent to him; and lo, nothing worthy of
death is done unto him. I will chastise him and release him."

From a legal standpoint, the decision of Pilate to chastise Jesus
may be justified upon only one theory. Pilate, the judge, having
found Christ not guilty of crime against Caesar, transferred the
case to Pilate, the Governor and Administrator, whose duty it was
to pass upon the sentence of the Sanhedrim. Having found that
Christ had done nothing "worthy of death," he accepted the verdict
of guilty passed by the Sanhedrim but modified the sentence and
substituted for death, the penalty of scourging, as he had the
power to do.

The non-legal and generally accepted theory, however, seems to be
that Pilate's action was taken merely for the purpose of appeasing
the people, who were insistent in their desire to punish Christ,
and his statement that he would then release him was evidently an
invitation to the people to ask his release. It was the custom at
the Feast of the Passover to release a prisoner to be selected by
the people. Pilate, finding Christ not guilty, to give force to his
implied invitation and to make the selection sure, offered them the
choice of Christ or the most vicious criminal in the prisons,
Barabas. And the people, being incited by the priests and the
elders, chose Barabas.

Pilate thereupon took Jesus and scourged him; and the soldiers spit
upon him and mocked him and crowned him with thorns.

Under either theory, the judgment was final and the case ended. If
the decision was a complete verdict of not guilty, the sentence of
scourging was unjustified and illegal. If it was an approval of the
verdict rendered by the Sanhedrim, it was the pronouncement of
sentence upon that verdict and the sentence, having been fully
executed, was a complete bar to any further proceedings.

After the scourging, Pilate brought Jesus before the people again,
wearing the purple robe which had been placed upon him in mockery
and with the crown of thorns upon his head and a third time
pronounced a verdict of not guilty.

"Behold I bring him forth to you, that ye may know that I find no
fault in him."

When Jesus appeared, Pilate, seeking to awaken in the hearts of the
people some feeling of pity for the just and blameless man,
presented him to those assembled, "Behold the man." And his efforts
to arouse pity met with that same response which has usually been
given by those who are consumed by partisan hatred, "Crucify him,
crucify him."


In this scene, however, there is one redeeming feature. The people
who, having been urged by their leaders to demand the crucifixion
of Christ, had been insistent in such demand, were silent. They
pitied him as he stood there. Only the leaders, the chief priests
and the officers, then cried "Crucify him."

Once more Pilate, angry at the insatiable vindictiveness of the
leaders, pronounced the verdict of not guilty, this time, in the
verdict, directly challenging them to themselves assume the
responsibility of executing Christ.

"Take ye him and crucify him; for I find no fault in him."

And they answered: "We have a law and by our law he ought to die
because he made himself the Son of God."

The reason for this statement by the priests is not very clear to
me. They do not now seek to have the sentence of the Sanhedrim
confirmed. They seek the punishment of crucifixion under authority
of Rome. Religious claims would have but little force with the
pagan Governor, accustomed to the worship of many gods. It may have
been an involuntary statement justifying their vindictiveness,
under the biting challenge of Pilate. But the explanation which
seems most reasonable to me that it was an argument in
justification of their attitude, addressed to the people who had
apparently begun to pity Christ, to impress upon them the fact that
Jesus had been guilty of blasphemy against the Jewish religion and
to turn their pity into antagonism. In no way could they more
surely arouse the resentment of the people than by the accusation
that Jesus claimed kinship and equality with Jehovah.

The statement had the effect of attracting the attention of Pilate.
Believing in the pagan myths of the gods and the sons of the gods
leaving the celestial spheres and commingling with human beings
upon the earth, taking the forms of humans but still retaining
their divine power, he became afraid lest Jesus be the son of
Jupiter or one of the other gods, and again questioned him in
private. While his curiosity was not entirely satisfied, he was so
impressed that "from thenceforth Pilate sought to release Jesus,"
a most proper attitude on the part of the Roman Governor and Judge,
in view of the numerous judgments of not guilty he had pronounced.

His efforts were unavailing. The argument of the leaders, appealing
to the religious instinct and teachings of the people, convinced
them that Jesus should die. With cunning malignity, they presented
to Pilate the last and convincing argument.

Pilate's administration as Governor had not been entirely free from
corruption and extortion. Investigation might disclose
irregularities. Tiberius was a suspicious Caesar, who believed
without proof and delighted to humiliate and punish. Complaint to
Caesar was practically equal to condemnation by Caesar. And Pilate
feared complaint. Caesar's friendship was a most powerful but most
unstable support.

Unable to convince Pilate as a judge and not being able to
accomplish the death of Jesus through the forms of the law, the
rulers attacked him through political argument, with veiled hint of
complaint to Rome.

"If thou let this man go, thou art not Caesar's friend; whosoever
maketh himself a king, speaketh against Caesar."

The trial was ended. The judge vacated his office, and gave way to
the time-serving and fearful politician.

Pilate took water and washed his hands before the multitude, saying
"I am innocent of the blood of this just person; see ye to it." And
"he delivered him to be crucified."

NO VERDICT OF GUILTY
There was no verdict of guilty. Even as the soldiers led him away
to the execution, the words of the judge hung on the air,
pronouncing him a just person, not guilty of the charges made
against him. He was not legally executed. He was murdered, either
judicially or politically, it matters not which.

In telling the story of the trial of Christ, I have dovetailed
together the various accounts as related in the four gospels in
such a way as to most clearly present my conception of the legal
propositions involved, each of the accounts being incomplete. The
conclusion is irresistible that Jesus was never legally condemned
by any court. In the Sanhedrim, he was tried by partisan judges,
acting at an illegal time, with illegal procedure and pronouncing
its judgment illegally. Moreover, its sentence was disapproved by
the officer having legal authority to pass upon it and another
sentence, within his power and discretion, was inflicted instead.
Before Pilate, he was four or more times pronounced innocent; he
was never found guilty of any crime and he was executed without
warrant of law. Before Herod, he had also been pronounced not
guilty of the charges made against him. He was the victim of
religious hatred, going to his death to satisfy the demands of
those who feared to let men think.

To read the story of the trial occupies only a few minutes. It is
impossible to answer all the questions which surge into the mind as
one reads. The account is short, told plainly and with almost legal
calmness. Yet the story, as it is told, is of infinite sadness. The
injustice toward the central figure is heart-rending. But what is
infinitely more pathetic is that through the whole tragic scene,
there is no man, save one, who measures up to stalwart and loyal
manhood. It may be that the story is not all told. It may be that
under the merciless glare of the white light of Christ's character,
men seem only base. Certainly, among the Romans whose ideals of
justice were of the noblest character, among the leaders and rulers
of the Jews who worshipped Jehovah with devotion, among the vast
crowds who followed Jesus, among the disciples who had lived with
him and from his own lips had heard his gospel and who afterward
endured martyrdom for his sake, there was a man. It is hard to
believe that the story has been all told.

In conclusion, let me merely suggest an idea, told in legal
language and illustrated from the trial we have just considered. 

Sometimes, people are prone to condemn the forms of procedure in
our courts. Indignant because of the circumstances or character of
a crime, they immediately pronounce the accused guilty and are
impatient with the forms and presumptions with which he is invested
by law and in which it is the business of the court to protect him.
The forms of procedure in courts are the best expression of the
settled judgment of experts in the orderly conduct of a trial
designed to arrive at the truth. They change slowly because they
should always progress, never retrogress. They must always further
protect against injustice rather than foster it. So long as they
remain, they ought to be most jealously followed. Life and liberty
are too sacred to be destroyed by the clamor or passion of the
moment. Had the forms of the law been followed in the trial of
Christ he would, in all probability, not have been condemned and
executed.

In private life, also, brethren, should we strictly observe the
forms and spirit of the law. We often try, before the bar of our
prejudices, those who do not conduct themselves strictly in
accordance with our own dogmatic views and, without proof or a
chance to be heard, condemn them and demand that they be crucified
by the Pilate of public opinion. Sometimes, we may even drag them
out of the agony of another Gethsemane at night to pronounce our
judgment and demand their social or political or civic death. And
for aught we know, they may be princes in the kingdom of truth.

Let us arraign men only before the bar of the Sanhedrim of our
consciences. Let no passion, desire or evil feeling prejudice the
court. Let us hold them innocent until proved guilty. Let the
witnesses be two, and not false witnesses, who must agree together.
Let us appoint our Charity counsel for the accused and admit
testimony freely in their favor. If our verdict be not guilty, let
us proclaim it at once and loudly. If it be guilty, let it be
pronounced only after a day of fasting, prayer and meditation. Even
after the judgment has been given, let the court of our Humanity
remain in session and the signal flags be set from the judgment
hall to the place of execution. And as the one we have condemned is
being led away to judgment, let the first fleeting witness of fact,
doubt or rumor in his favor stay the execution and a new trial be
granted. Paraphrasing what was said of the Sanhedrim, let it be
said of us "He seeks to save character, not to destroy character."

