There�s a Diamond in My Pocket
Heft arose from his deep sleep. As he sat up in the cot he
turned to his brother still sleeping and said with enthusiasm, �Arise Pious,
it is early morn, and we must tap the beer keg for it is fathers birthday today!
�
Pious rumbled from his slumber and arose from his cot without a word. Moving
across the dirt floor, Pious reached the closet where the family kept their
cloths-dress, grabbed a vest from the coat rack and headed out through the
wooden door, �Wait for me! � Heft exclaimed as he shuffled his massive body
following in quick pursuit.
The two brothers arrived at the cellar door a few yards from the cottage. Heft
grabbed the massive wooden mallet and swung it over his shoulder-Pious already
had the iron tap in hand. Opening the door they entered the dusty cobweb hole
that housed the beer keg and some wine bottles.
The two nomads in the cavern moved silently to their destination as driven by
some unknown force. Pious held the iron tap over the corked hole in the beer keg
and muttered, �I don�t know who is going to be happier today-me or
father.� Heft acknowledged his brothers statement by drawing back the massive
wooden mallet and hitting the iron tap with such force as to drive the cork into
the keg and replace it with the iron tap knocking Pious to he floor.
Pious looked up from the dirt floor at Heft and knew they had been successful by
the large grin on his brother�s face. A glimmer of light caught Pious�s eye
in the dark cavern. Hay look Heft, the light from the cellar door is making
something sparkle.�
�What is it?� Heft asked with curiosity.
Pious reached over from his position on the dusty floor and grabbed the
sparkling object. �Why �it�s a diamond. There�s a diamond in my pocket.
I thought I saw something fall out of it as I was knocked down!�
�Oh no!� cried Heft. �Your wearing fathers vest!�
In 1950, Alan Turing published his now famous paper, Computing Machinery and
Intelligence. The basic question of the paper is �can machines think?� The
answer to this question is yes. However, a condition set forth by Turing must be
met. It is known as the Turing Test. The test is based on a charade game people
played in which a man and woman would sit behind screens and a third person
would try to guess through there conversation who was the man and who was the
woman. Using this same scenario, Turing devised as system in which a computer
and person were behind the screen and the third would try to tell which was the
computer and which was the person. If the third person could not tell which was
the person and which was the computer-then the computer could be considered to
think. This is the Turing Test. The artificial intelligence (AI) community has
used this as a standard to test for thinking machines. Conversely, it has come
into question as whether it is valid or not.
The most dominant feature of the Turing Test is the use of language. Therefore
it would seem that the effective use of language is not only the criteria for
thinking, but also the definition. This is not the first implication throughout
history that defines thinking as to be connected with language. The philosopher
Rene Descartes argued in 1642 that machines could pass as animals; however, they
could never pass for humans. This assertion is based on the machines ability to
use language and to reason. Oxford Dictionary defines the ability to reason as
�the ability to think and draw conclusions.� This definition is incorrect?
It is known that chimpanzees think, that elephants think, and a number of
species of animal�s think. I argue this fact and others such as philosopher
Jack Copland and other professionals in various fields. Thus, language is not a
defining feature of thinking, only a measure of it. This Turing test will never
identify thinking if used in this context. In other words, the Turing test will
never work unless it is put into its proper context. And this is precisely my
objection. A good test is thought about all wrong. In addition, is the disregard
of the use of language as a proper meter stick for finding intelligent machines?
Lets look at the following first.
In the case of the Turing Test, it is the case of mistaken identity. Just as if
some one in the family has the same type and color of shirt or vest and the same
statue, it wouldn�t be to hard to mistake it for your own if you were in a
hurry out the door. The same is with language. It is the mistaken vest of
thinking. If chimpanzees can think and not speak a language suitable to pass the
Turing Test, then language does not equate to thinking. Before we look at
language further, let us turn our attention to a definition of thinking. If
chimpanzees think and humans think, then both species think. Also, if thinking
is describable and identifiable without the use of language, then thinking is
something tangible. Thus, chimpanzees think and humans think, if and only if
thinking is something tangible. Here I have defined thinking as something
tangible. Some of its properties stand out. It has a regular structure. It is
both recognizable and identifiable. It has regular and particular components. An
analogy is the properties of the atomic structure of a diamond. It has a regular
structure, and the particular components of carbon construction with a high
level of hardness. Moreover, any person on earth would recognize a nicely cut
diamond. Consider a modified Turing Test or more appropriately a new contest.
Language is a measure to identify thinking. The language
itself is a construct between individuals of a group, however indiscernible as
it may be. That is, the language may be so alien to Homo sapiens; it may only be
identified by its structure. For example, prairie dogs circle around dieing
family members and pay their last respects. This is known by behavioral
analysis. Thus, the strange sounds made by prairie dogs are a form of
communication, i.e. language. Let�s look at the following example to clarify
why. Consider the following statement. All odd numbers that are less than 29 or
all divisors of 48 are Glacks. Consider this statement to be true and equivalent
to our diamond. In other words, these conditions are met if and only if there is
a thinking machine. Now let�s test for a thinking machine. Test one: 16 are a
Glacks. This is a true statement due to 16 is a divisor of 48. We have found a
thinking machine. Test two: All Glack numbers less than 15 are odd. This
statement is a false-2 divide 48. We have found a machine that cannot think.
Test three: No odd number greater than 27 are Glacks. In this statement we
can�t tell. The statement only says that odds less than 29 are Glacks and sys
nothing about odds greater than 27, 29 etc. The statement makes no guarantee of
this. This means we are also in the dark about whether our machine is or is not
thinking. This is the crux of my argument.
In the first test we used a method that yielded a
true result that made thinking discernable, identifiable, and thus tangible. In
the second test we used the method, which yielded a false result, and produced a
tangible. However, in the third test we just can�t tell. There is nothing
describable, identifiable and thus nothing tangible. In the case of species that
populate the Earth, from insects to humans, you can find all three true or
false, or can�t tell statements. For insects and worms, they�re about their
busy work without much regard to the complexity of their behavior, i.e. not
thinking or just can�t tell. In the case of Chimpanzees, Jane Goodall sates,
�chimps are very quick to notice and interpret the eye movement of their
fellows, and Goliath (the chimp of focus) would possibly, therefore, have seen
the fruit himself. And so Figan (The interacting chimp) had not only refrained
from instantly gratifying his desire, but had also, gone away so that he could
not give the game away by looking at the banana.� Here tracking the banana and
interpreting eye movements indicate acts of thinking-something describable and
identifiable-thus tangible. So we can say chimpanzees think. For humans it�s a
given. But in the case of thinking machines and a worm, you just can�t tell
unless there is a measure. For the worm, it must be shown that there is behavior
that leads to communication among individuals of the group. For the thinking
machine, the language may be that of human language or that of 1�s and 0�s.
Otherwise the machine may look like an undersized tool shed. To avoid this, some
have suggested giving machines sense organs-maybe give them eyes. This just adds
to the complexity of the problem. However, behavior such as the chimps making
contact with their eyes, computers can make contact with binary language. Both
are adequate as measuring devices, i.e. metrics. This is a unique opportunity to
remove machine from the �can�t tell� class, simply because there is an
effective metric. We can now look for the diamond.
In looking for a thinking machine, language can reflect the
thinking process. AI already has some elements in their machines that reflect
thinking but don�t quite measure up to thinking. The machines lack
understanding even though they have complex knowledge representation of schemes.
Knowledge representation schemes such as forward and backward reasoning,
reasoning with uncertainty, non-monotonic reasoning, probabilistic reasoning,
fuzzy reasoning, reasoning by analogy, and case-based reasoning. Many of the
knowledge representation schemes are self-descriptive by their names. Though
they are separate entities now, later they will most likely be called reasoning
modalities. Parts of a larger knowledge representation scheme. Reasoning also
comes in �flavors,� induction, abduction and deduction. Induction is
something you expect, abduction is reasoning back from something, and deduction
is mechanical-what happens if I set this tool here. All these things can be
found in AI machines, which are shared by humans, and cannot be tested for by
the use of language. But whether a machine is thinking by fooling a person into
thinking they are talking to another person is a facade. It has been done. Is
this a measure of thinking as stated by the Turing Test? No. Instead, language
needs to be used to test for understanding, the modalities I spoke of earlier
and possibly some other yet unidentified properties as part of a larger
knowledge representation scheme. The thinking machine must be able to make
critical connections between applications and apply their knowledge scheme to
situational platforms. Not the mechanical application of a knowledge scheme,
guided by a human to situational platforms.
�What do you have there Lorn, � Pluvial said in a
breathless tone.
�Well let me tell you about who I have here first,�
replied Lorn
�Have you gone mad?� Pluvial scorned.
I purchased a cottage up in the mountains last summer. In
fixing up the place I had to put a composite foundation under the cottage to
replace the old cement. When I lifted the cottage off the old foundation with
the Graviton, I found this diamond in the far right corner of the house near the
cellar.
The story goes that two brothers, Heft and Pious, had
stumbled on to their father�s only possession of wealth. It�s a diamond the
father found while clearing the property for the original cottage. He took it to
town and had a local cutter shape the diamond. I think Pluvial they became
friends after that. Unknown to his sons and the towns people, he carried the
diamond in his vest pocket.
Apparently, on their father�s birthday, they got him so
drunk he couldn�t remember the day. Later, when he realized the diamond was
missing, he approached the two brothers and told them the story of the diamond.
He then asked the two if they had seen the diamond around or near the cottage.
The two brothers convinced the father that he must have lost it in his
drunken stupor. For whatever reason, they hid it in the corner of the house.
They never sold it for money; they were probably terrified someone would tell
the father.
�It�s a wonder that the thing was not lost eternally in
the five renovations that have been made to that cottage over the centuries.�
Pluvial commented.
�I don�t think it wanted to be lost eternally. And I don�t believe the
brothers could sell this diamond. I believe it lives there at the cottage and
will return home this summer when I go on vacation.� Lorn returned.
Pluvial stood breathless and motionless before the diamond sparkling in Lorn�s
hand.
�That�s right, we have to give this diamond the New
Turing Test. We can�t use the language setting. The hardware it possesses is
quantum mechanical. It�s embedded in the electron cloud of the carbon atoms no
more than atto-femtometer in length. Well be using the Schrodinger thinking equation today.
Mania 234 Marduk
Copyright
08/16/2005