Fishing agreements raise a lot of passions in the debate that lead actors and researchers as much as from the ACPS as from the EU. In April 1997 The World Nature Fund published a set of studies on subsidies to the fishing and its effects on stock depletion. One particular study is dedicated to the analysis economic of fishing agreements between the EU and Africa. Fishing aid has had the consequence of subsidising fleets beyond the economic and biologic optimum and therefore encouraging over-exploitation.
For the World Fund the financial compensations constitute no less than a subsidy given to African States by the UE, yet one which profits mainly the European boats. The survey highlights several phenomena while centering its analysis on two major elements of agreements, the tuna and the shrimp. Since 1994 the EU signed sixteen agreements, half of which concern tuna exclusively. Compensations given by boats vary between 3 000 and 54 000 ECU, while the cost of the license runs from 1000 to 75000 ECU.
Except in Equatorial Guinea, tuna boat companies pay less 15% of the cost of the access to the fishing ground. The table below shows the relative part of the license in the value of captures.
The analysis made of the report between cost of access and value of catch puts in evidence an under-declaration of captures achieved in the 'Exclusive Economic Zones' (EEZ) with the exception of Seychelles, who retain negotiation powers. The African countries consider that the negotiation should be based upon right of access of the order of 15 to 20% of the capture value. However, because of misjudgments of the sizes of catch and the weak power of negotiation of the African States, the ACPS are far from reaching these rates for tuna fishing. On the basis of a capture estimated at 600 tonnes per year, rights of access should be 82 000 to 109 000 ECU. The company pays only 1500 and the UE adds 9 000 thus amounting to 14 000 ECU by boat. The African state only receives 10 to 20% of access rights to which, in all fairness, it can pretend. It subsidizes European fishing therefore while giving up 80 90% of access rights to its EEZ.
On a total profit of 244 000 ECU the EU assures 46%. These numbers are some weak averages. It is perfectly understandable that a shrimp trawler can continue to work even though the productivity and captures decrease well beyond the biologic optimum. Emma BONINO recognizes this while declaring that one must share the position of those that say that the agreements of first generation destroyed stocks merely because they lacked of efficient control, as happened for example in Senegal and in Guinea.
Numbers advanced in the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) survey permits one to measure the considerable help received by tuna and other boats, at a time explicitly of the EU and indirectly of the ACPS countries themselves. These data must be an urgent priority in the redefinition of agreements. For the improvement of the situation the following measures could be considered.
African fishing organizations founded on data of the WWF to argue better, in order to better defend their resources and their rights in the setting of fishing agreements as signed by Member States.