Is Truth Man-Made?
Malcolm Rae
Liberal Studies 420
January
22, 2001 (revised in 2004)
Malaspina University
College
Inspirational
Psalm: "...it is He
who made us, and not we ourselves..."
Inspirational
thought: A defense of God: God does
no care, you say? Well in
what way did you expect
Him to
One thing that Friedrich Nietzsche
seems to be suggesting in Beyond Good and Evil is that truth is
non-existent − it is only an idea of the individual, hence there is no
certain universal truth as it is simply a mirrored figment of the fictions of
others (Plato and Kant, for example) or a constructed imagination (that may be
appealing, even helpful, yet false) of the individual himself. There is here a
somewhat Romantic notion that Nietzsche puts on the table (particularly evident
in his view of the "supra-morel egoist"): that the greatest and most "noble"
people work hard to create their own truth. However, it is increasingly
clear that although Nietzsche is right to some extent in attacking the so-called
"Enlightenment" program, since it seemed to generate notions that to generate
notions that at times appeared to indicate only an imitated truth, I
would suggest that genuine truth is not simply an idea of the individual,
nor is it rightly imitated, and it is certainly not just created by
one.
Perhaps the major
driving force behind Nietzsche's "modern" thinking in part lies within the
hypocrisy of the Enlightenment. It seems that truth was at times only imitated,
and then taught without a consistency in the lives of thinkers themselves. More
falsehood Nietzsche saw was the idea that humankind was progressing due to the
increasing accuracy of man's reasoning skills. Had some of the ideas of the
Enlightenment not been abused (and were these ideas not abused by some esteemed
philosophers themselves - as Nietzsche points out) then there would be
considerably less ground for Nietzsche's arguments. Evidently there are tones of
bitterness and cynicism in Nietzsche's criticisms. According to Nietzsche,
certain thinkers have caused much offence. But is bitterness or cynicism the
right response? Such cynicism combined with hostility presents an obscure
perception of truth.
The commencement of
Beyond Good and Evil is filled with attacks on "truth" that indicate an
obscured perception of truth. "The will to truth... that famous truthfulness of
which all philosophers so far have spoken with respect" [9]! In observing this
remark one can see that Nietzsche suggests that one's truth is only the result
of one's will, therefore the truth is simply one's ideal that is reached for by
the desire and creative powers of one's will. It is as if Nietzsche is saying:
"Why is the ‘truth’ famous, and why is it respected, since it is simply the
results of the wills of philosophers who created it? This long respected truth
has so far been spoken of with respect, but I will be the first who dares to
challenge it!" What Nietzsche does not examine, however, is the unquestionable
coherence, and domination of a deeper reality that some have previously tried to
brush aside, yet the on-going force of a revealed truth in all things is such a
force that it cannot be halted.
Nietzsche indicates in
his criticism that it was one thing for thinkers to declare what they considered
true, however it was something else for thinkers to live by the principals they
instructed. This "truth," as far as the skeptical Nietzsche is concerned, is
indeed marred in that it is often very different to examine the lifestyles of
the thinkers themselves. What is particularly noticeable in Nietzsche's writing
is his merciless tendencies to quickly hack down, accuse, even mock, thinkers
such as Plato, and Kant. The trouble with many philosophers, as Nietzsche found, was that
their lifestyles were often not in agreement with the ways they promoted as
true. For example, Nietzsche accuses Plato and Platonist that "they are all
actors, there is nothing genuine about them" [14].
Nietzsche also
attempts to hack down Kant's view of truth: "live according to nature" [15] (a
truth perhaps seeming less dreadful and convenient than expositions of other
philosophers, yet perhaps quite feasibly revealed in Kant's work here - an
exposition of truth in the form of nature) and his suggestions that are derived
from this view in which Kant was claiming universal, coherent, findings, and
then applying them in a social context. To start with, Nietzsche strongly
disagrees nature is orderly (he says it is "uncertain" [15]), nature when
respected sides with people (Nietzsche says it is "indifferent" [15]), and the
idea that nature exists without, as well as within, people's psychology
(Nietzsche suggests that such views exist only in people's
psychology).
The notion that
Nietzsche indicates, when he refers to the psychological needs of people, is
that truth is merely one's convenient idea. According to Nietzsche, there is no
particular order in the universe - it is just that people impose this order. Hence, there is no universal truth. He suggests that
the idea of anything "reasonable" is just a crude way to mask over one's fears,
and this simply reassures one of "fictional" ideas. What Nietzsche seems to be
indicating, is that those who accept such ideas (such as the ideas of "false"
philosophers of the past) can never become great. One who is a great person,
according to Nietzsche is one who achieves this greatness not by enlightenment
or revelation, but in a "supra-moral" sense (201). In other words, a "noble" man
for Nietzsche is beyond good and evil. He is "beyond" a society's morals.
"The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does
not need approval... it is value-creating" (205). Nobleness for Nietzsche
is "to live with tremendous and proud composure; always beyond - . To have and
not to have one's affects, one's pro and con, at will; to condescend to them as
on a horse, often as on an ass - for one must know how to make use of their
stupidity as much as their fire" (226). For Nietzsche,
"...egoism belongs to
the nature of a noble soul..." (215). In other words, what Nietzsche is claiming
is that a noble soul is, in a way, self-centered, and that it would say "it is
justice itself" (215).
Yet, these kind of suggestions are, in a way, nothing new at all,
because they follow a certain Romantic ideal. This ideal insists that people
ought to create
their own truth rather than imitate. However, although people might think something in their minds, it does not necessarily mean that it is real.
Nietzsche's claims based from his idea of the "supra-moral," "egoist" suggest
that the Enlightenment and "reason" were nothing but idealistic fictions
concerning "the truth." However, Nietzsche seems to attack "truth" to the point
were he lacks authority in his own claims. What is particularly limiting about
Nietzsche's "supra-moral," "egoist," for example, is that here we find Nietzsche
trying to promote something as "beyond" and idealistic, despite the fact
that he previously attacked the Enlightenment for the very idealistic notions
that it proclaimed.
If the Enlightenment
was wrong, and if the Romantic's and Nietzsche's "modern" ideals were wrong,
then these errors beg the question: does truth exist? The answer to this
question does not go beyond "good and evil." It does, however, go beyond mere
words, and further, beyond anything we merely see, touch taste, feel, smell or hear. The Enlightenment, Romantic, and Modern ideals
are to some extent all wrong in their claims. In short, one can draw the
conclusion that genuine truth has such a deep, overwhelming, living, and
enduring, richness, that in order to experience something more of it, one must
necessarily have faith.
Cited Work
Nietzsche,
Friedrich. Kaufmann, Walter (ed.). Beyond Good and
Evil. Random
House, Inc., New York, 1966.