On the Nature of Religious
Language
The human being has
always been considered a vastly different creature from other animal species
for a very simple reason; humans are the ones doing the considering. This capacity for thought, for in depth
comparisons an categorizations, seems to be limited to the human animal alone. Though self-centered-ness and a desire to
survive at the expense of "lower" forms of life indeed shows us to be
animals, it is perhaps our arrogance and pride in our own accomplishments which
truly set us apart. Perhaps our
arrogance is not without justification, though, for even if we are not
responsible for the achievement of our greatest human tool (the advanced mind),
we alone posses it.
There are two
aspects of the human mind which are truly unique to us; the depth of our
language systems (which can include verbal, physical, and written) and our
development of religious belief systems.
Though it can be argued that other animals have forms of language, or at
the very least systems of communication, no other species has the ability to
transform the various forms of language back and forth, and to use language
with the depth of expression which we can.
We are able to use the language to create myths and legends, systems of
acceptable or unacceptable societal belief and behavior, governing laws, and
even moral codes. The use of myths and
legends to impart these moral codes has been the role of religion, and such a complex
system of creation is certainly beyond the capacity of animals. Sometimes, however, our thinking systems
(especially religious ones) may even transcend our capacity to explain them
within the bounds of our language, extensive though it may be. Thus, we come to the question: What is the
nature of Religious Language? Intrinsic
in this broad question are issues of the special senses of descriptive terms
when applied to "god" (which shall be used, for simplicity's sake, to
represent any form of deity or higher powers, be they the Wiccan Goddess or the
Muslim Allah), the functions of religious language, whether religious language
is cognitive or non-cognitive (regardless of the user's intention), and the
concept of religion as a "language game".
Views concerning
religious language can be as different as religions themselves, and a large
factor in determining how they are considered comes from the personal beliefs
held by the examiner. Medieval
theologian Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), who is perhaps best known for his
"five ways", or five proofs for the existence of god (none of which
actually proved anything), was a devout Christian, as his fallacy-laden proofs
reveal. His arguments for believing in
the Christian god ultimately were based on faith, though he tried to present
them from a logically solid foundation.
His faith also influenced his beliefs concerning the nature of religious
language. Aquinas said that religious
language is analogical, as opposed to being univocal or equivocal. A univocal word is one with exactly the same
meaning in two different situations; for example, "my shoe is black"
and "my jeans are black". In
both cases, the word "black" has exactly the same meaning; it represents
the color black (or, to be scientifically technical, the color-image the eye
sees when the entire spectrum of light is reflected back off of an object,
etc.). A word used equivocally has two
completely different meanings in different situations, despite having the exact
same spelling and pronunciation. For
example, the statement "Look at that bat" is incredibly ambiguous,
because the word "bat" is equivocal, in that it can refer to a
nocturnal flying rodent, or to the wooden club-stick which overpaid jocks use
to smack at baseballs before running around in circles to the screams and
taunts of cheering fans.
Thomas Aquinas'
claim is that religious language is an alternative to considering religious
statements as either univocal or equivocal.
If we have two statements, "Cheesecake is good" and "God
is good", then the word "good" surely could not be univocally. The connotations of "good" in the
first statement would almost certainly include arbitrary ideas about the nature
of the cheesecake; perhaps texture, certainly taste and smell, and perhaps even
the comfort it brings after a plate of broccoli. However, when Christians use the word "good" to
describe god, it is unlikely they are talking about the taste of god, or
implying that he is nice with strawberries.
Even when religious speakers talk about a "good person", they
do not intend the word "good" to be the same as when they use it to
refer to god; human good is based on arbitrary criteria such as actions,
thoughts, or adherence to moral or legal laws.
The "good" Christians speak of when they talk about god is an
intrinsic good, which is part of god, and not meant to be based on his actions
(which does create ambiguities when addressing the "Problem of Evil",
but that is another paper).
Neither, says
Aquinas, is the word "good" in reference to god equivocal. Though the goodness of god is not the same
as human goodness, according to Aquinas, they are not completely dissimilar
either. To justify his claim that
religious statements (especially those concerning the nature of god) are
analogical, he makes a downward comparison from humans. We could have a friend who is faithful, and
we could also have a dog who is faithful.
Of course the fidelity of the dog exists on a different level than that
of a friend, because the friend, as a thinking human can evaluate the
friendship and faithfulness, whereas the dog bases it's faithfulness on a very
low level of thinking; the owner feeds the dog, or gives it shelter, and so the
dog is faithful. Yet, there are still
underlying traits of faithfulness which exist whether applied to a human or to
a dog. In this same way, we can
postulate up from the goodness of humans to the higher level of goodness of
god; it is not the exact same sort of goodness, but there are similarities in
the sense of the word, perhaps only so far as to be an opposite of
"badness" or "evil".
John Duns Scotus
(1264-1308) was quick to point out the very ambiguous nature of Aquinas'
analogical theory of religious language.
If we say that the nature of god's goodness is analogically similar to
the goodness of man or cheesecake, but is different in ways we cannot
specifically or clearly state, then the theory gets us no closer to the true
nature of religious language. To Duns
Scotus, language is either univocal or equivocal, with no room for Aquinas'
analogical language. If you know the
meaning of a word in a particular context for certain, the word is univocal; if
you don't know the exact meaning, it is equivocal.
Another way of thinking
about religious language attempts to smooth out the ambiguity of Aquinas'
analogical idea of religious language.
The idea is that religious language must be negated; that statements
about the nature of religious entities or gods must be denied a label of
"true". On the surface, it
would appear that this idea would mostly be fostered by atheists or
unbelievers, but this is in fact an idea which comes from the most devout
believers. Their claim is that the
closer you get to the ultimate truth about god (or, in eastern thought,
"Satori", or enlightenment), the less efficient our language and
terms are at successfully defining or explaining the nature of that ultimate
truth. The idea is that god is so far
beyond knowing, so above our understanding, and so removed from our petty human
reason, logic, and language, that we could not hope to describe him. Thus, to say that god is good is not a true
statement, because god's true nature is far beyond anything the word
"good" could include.
The issue of whether
or not we can discuss the true nature of the divine within our limited language
systems gives rise to the question of religious language as a cognitive or
non-cognitive phenomenon. Cognitive
language statements are statements which have specific and clear true or false
values. If I point at the window and
say "It is snowing outside right now", the statement is obviously
true or false. However, some
statements, such as commands, curses, or action statements such as "I
knight thee Sir Pringle of Cheesecakedom" are non-cognitive, as there is
no truth value to "Give me ten dollars" or "Holy
Shit!".
In considering
whether religious language is cognitive or non-cognitive, it is necessary to
question whether users of that religious language intend it to be construed
cognitively or not, and also whether they are of a logical character such that
religious statements can, regardless of the user's intention, be true or false
(Hick, page 89).
In his book The Role of Knowledge in Western Thought,
John Herman Randall, Jr. (1899-) claims that religious language is indeed
non-cognitive, and is in fact a symbol.
Paul Tillich (1886-1965) also believed that religious statements are
symbols, and sets up a differentiation between signs and symbols. According to Tillich, a sign and a symbol
both represent another object, but a symbol has a connection to what it
represents which is deeper than the connection a sign has. A symbol actually participates in what it
points to. For example, a no parking
sign simply means that it is illegal to park a car where the sign is
posted. The metal sign is a
representation of the illegality of car-parking at that spot, and really only
means it because it is the meaning which has been assigned to it. A symbol, however, has a more active role in
what it represents. To a Christian, a
cross is more than just a symbol of Christianity, or of Jesus; it includes the
whole realm of ideas of Jesus' supposed sacrifice for humans, and it was an
actual object in the Christian mythology to which Jesus was nailed. The meaning of the cross and the belief
system are inextricably linked, and the connection is far deeper than a parking
sign. Tillich sees religious language
and statements, such as "god is good", to be symbolic of the concepts
of the religious belief, but on a closely linked level.
Randall takes this
idea even further, claiming that the symbol of religious language serves
several purposes. Firstly, he claims
that religious language as symbols arouse emotions and stir people to action,
while strengthening their commitment to what they believe is right (Hick,
90). To say that "god is
good" arouses a sense of love for god, and goodness inside a person, which
makes them more resolute in their actions of what they perceive as good (be it
donating to charity, or trying to convert others who want no part of their
ridiculous mythology). Further, Randall
claims that religious language stimulates cooperative action and binds
communities together (Hick, 90). This
seems easy enough to see, especially in Christianity where the conversion of
others is largely expected. From a
sociological standpoint, if everyone together believes in the same metaphysical
concepts, they are more likely to work together with an absence of dispute, and
the overall productivity of the community will increase with increasing
membership. It is no surprise the
Christian bible uses so many "flock" metaphors; if people come together
as unthinking sheep under one all-protecting "good god" the shepherd,
they are not only easier to control by those in power, but also are a tougher
force to fight against.
Randall also
believes that religious language communicates experience qualities which
regular language cannot, and it fosters and clarifies the human experience of
the divine (Hick, 90). As has already
been discussed, the term "good" cannot be applied to god in the same
way which we use it in reference to humans or cheesecake. However, even if we do not mean
"good" in the same sense, the statement "god is good" acts
as a symbol for whatever characteristics god might truly have, which in some
way are thought to resemble "goodness" as we know it. Moreover, many religious believers have
mystical experiences which they cannot explain in any sense; a Wiccan priestess
draws down the moon (or physically brings the spirit of the Goddess into her
body), or a Christian is struck with "Holy Ghost Power" and shakes in
church, or speaks in tongues. The
actual sense or feeling of these experiences (and emotions in general) are not
explained with any words which we have, but can be represented by the symbolic
statements of the form "god is good" or "the goddess is
love". In Randall's view, even god
itself is a symbol. Since believers and
non-believers alike agree that a true nature of god cannot be explained or
discussed, god becomes an intellectual symbol for the religious and spiritual
dimensions of our world.
Some believers
would be hard pressed to accept this symbolic representation of their
beliefs. If a Christian says "god is
good", or "god exists", then it cannot be only a symbol in their
mind, or a paradox of thought develops.
To claim existence for god is to say that an entity of some form
actually exists; yet, to claim that god exists while recognizing that the claim
is only a symbolic representation of other concepts and ideas would be, in
effect, to negate the very claim of existence.
Thus, it must be assumed that even if an outside observer of religious
language sees that language as non-cognitive, the users of the language
actually intend for it to be cognitive.
If a Christian claims that "god exists", even if truth value
can never be proven for certain, that Christian must not only believe that
"god exists", but also that the statement has a truth value, and is
in fact true.
An important aspect
of religious language is that of morality.
Statements of what is morally right or wrong are commonplace in many
religions, and are the defining characteristics of some. R. B. Braithwaite (1900-1990) proposed an
interesting idea of moral language as non-cognitive which bears
mentioning. Braithwaite claims that
moral language takes the form of intentional statements. For example, if a person states that
"lying is wrong", or "lying is immoral", what they are
actually saying is "I intend never to lie". Similarly, he claims that religious statements imply intentions
to commit to an overall way of life; to say that "god is good" is an
intentional statement whereby the speaker claims an intention to live by a set
of standards which are in line with that good god. The problem with Braithwaite's idea is that it necessitates the
proposition that we can never intend to act immorally, which contradicts much
of what we can observe in human nature.
If we say "lying is wrong, but I intend to lie", then
according to Braithwaite we are actually saying "I intend never to lie,
but I intend to lie", which is a blatant logical contradiction. Even if the moral statement were
"sometimes lying is wrong", the contradiction still exists, since that
statement really breaks down into individual and specific statements of when
lying is wrong. In each of the cases
where it is determined that lying is wrong, by Braithwaite's theory it would be
specific case statements of intention, which still could not logically be
contradicted with the intention to lie.
The only answer to this problem would be to claim that we cannot intend
to act immorally, which seems contradictory of many of our human
experiences.
A final theory of
religious language as non-cognitive is that of the language game, based on
Wittgenstein's philosophies and later expanded by modern thinker D. Z.
Phillips. This theory says that there
are different areas of language, such as religious, scientific, or legal etc.,
and each area makes up a different language game. Each game has it's own terms, boundaries, and set of rules for
truth. When a person uses religious languages,
such as "the Christian god exists" or "god is good", they
are language distinctly related to that particular language game, and it's
truth or falsity is only measured by internal criteria. This establishes a strength to otherwise
faulty religious proposals or ideas.
For example, the Christian bible teaches that the world, including all
people, plants, animals, land structures, and in fact everything in the
universe, was created by a god.
However, modern scientific discovery and generally accepted theories of
evolution discredit all proposals of creationism as stated in the bible. Though there is no absolute certainty as to
the origins of our world, there is far more evidence to support evolution than
creationism. With a language game
theory, though, theories of evolution have no bearing on the truth or falsity
of Christianity or creationism, because the theories of evolution are outside
of the language game of religion, and exist instead in the language game of
science. Even the word
"evidence" has different meanings in the different language
games. Scientific evidence is based on
empirical data, such as fossil findings, carbon 14 dating, and current
observations of physical phenomena in our world. Religious evidence is based on the bible (in Christianity, at
least), and therefore has no need to re-evaluate it's theories based on
physical or scientific "evidence".
It could certainly be the case that quite often certain words, phrases,
or statements can be found in two different language games, and can even have
the same meaning in each (the idea of "god is good" could possibly
exist in several different language games for several different
religions). However, they do not have
to be linked, making it unnecessary (and unsuccessful) to argue against the
statements of any particular language game.
The language game theory, if accepted, is a good reason to keep
religious ideas separate from the political arena, or the "language game
of politics", since the ideas and concepts of one do not, under the
theory, have an effect on the other.
From a broad
viewpoint, then, every subject would have it's own language game, and though
the language in each game might be considered cognitive within the confines of
the game itself (since the statements are true within each game), the overall
view of all the systems side by side makes the language in each system
non-cognitive, since there are no universals and thus no universal truths. In reality, the language game theory does a
poor job of explaining how our systems of language in general, and religious
language in particular, actually function.
Often times, a person could be classified as having membership in more
than one language game at any given time, and trying to separate them becomes
not only confusing but impractical. The
scientist who will not work with aborted fetuses because it contradicts his
religious beliefs does not think or speak in two different language games which
have no bearing on each-other. The gay
man who prays to the Christian god which made him but in a way that god does
not like, and would not make, cannot possibly separate self from self, without
partial rejection of one language game based on parts of the other. Thus, the idea of the religious language
game brings us no closer to understanding the true nature of religious
language.
So what, then, is
the true nature of religious language?
Religious believers base their beliefs on faith, which they claim is
knowing, despite knowing how or why or on what evidence they know. Sociologically, religious language serves
purposes for its users, but for those outside the realm of believers see only
false statements and assertions which often hurt society rather than help
it. It seems likely, though, that both
sides would have to agree that religion in the mind, whether it was put there
by god or we put it there ourselves, transgresses the ability of complete
understanding and expression through our limited language. We may say that "god is good", or
"god does not exist", but the entire spectrum of meaning intrinsic in
these statements will be forever limited not only by our inability to express
it in words, but even to know it in our minds.
Concepts From:
Hick, John H. Philosophy of Religion. Prentice Hall, Inc., Fourth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1990.