Modern societies, where sophisticated technologies are routinely used
widely, and where economic and political power require the constant
invention and deployment of new technologies, impose a particular ethical
responsibility on scientists.1 Technologies that underlie
mass production, mass consumption, and mass destruction are constantly
being created, transformed, and exploited. Scientists, as people capable
of creating such technologies, and who have exclusive knowledge of the
workings of such technologies and the potential impacts thereof, are
privileged in such a setting.2 And privilege, as Noam Chomsky
has reminded us, confers responsibility. Meaningful democratisation
of societies where science and technology are such dominant forces necessarily
requires that people with expertise on these subjects, scientists among
others, intervene actively in the public interest, speaking truth to
power as it were.
For those scientists who do take this responsibility to society seriously,
nuclear weapons, arguably the greatest threat to all life on this planet,
offer a particularly compelling requirement for intervention, aimed
at bringing about the elimination of these horrendous weapons. Historically
one reason that has been advanced for this intervention has been that
nuclear weapons were designed and manufactured by scientists, who also
made the plans that resulted in the wholesale destruction of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Since then the complexities involved in analysing nuclear
weapons and the policy issues surrounding them have grown tremendously.
These issues have technical aspects that have to be addressed through
technical means [Feiveson 1982]. Whether there can be early warning
of nuclear attack, what kinds of events could trigger an accidental
nuclear explosion, or whether any kind of ?civil defence? measures will
protect significant sections of the populace from the destruction wreaked
by a nuclear explosion, are just a few questions that require detailed
technical knowledge to answer. Similarly, technical knowledge is needed
to put forward possible transparency and arms control measures that
India and Pakistan could adopt to lower the danger of nuclear war.3
When it comes to actually influencing nuclear policy, two broad avenues
for the participation of scientists are available to those interested
? the inside and the outside routes. Simply put, the term inside refers
to people who work within the formal system of decision-making ? the
various branches of the government and its advisory bodies. Working
outside refers to addressing oneself primarily to the public, with the
hope that public pressure will force the government into policy change.
We first look at the some of the structures that limit effective advancement
of nuclear disarmament through the inside route in India.
Indian nuclear policy-making at the official level has generally been
dominated by a small coterie of advisors surrounding the prime minister
(PM). Unlike most policy matters, nuclear affairs come under the direct
charge of the PM and the cabinet is essentially bypassed. Scientific
input into this process has largely come from the Department of Atomic
Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO),
usually through their heads or other top leaders or retired senior personnel.
The part played by these organisations in advocating nuclear weapons
and moving Indian nuclear policy in a hawkish direction has been extensively
documented [Abraham 1998; Perkovich 1999; Ramana 2003]. Since the 1998
nuclear tests, these organisations have also been rewarded through copious
budgetary increases. Given this history and incentive structure, it
makes little sense to expect someone within these organisations to effectively
further nuclear disarmament.
The government also receives advice on security issues, including
on nuclear weapons issues, from the National Security Advisory Board
(NSAB), which has usually included one or more scientists. There seems
to be no specific criterion required to being inducted as a member of
the NSAB, especially with respect to expertise, but agreement with the
broad lineaments of official nuclear policy appears to be an implicit
prerequisite. The NSAB?s recommendations have typically been even more
aggressive than official policy. For example, in early 2003 it recommended
abandoning the No First Use agreement, usually touted as proof of the
moderate nature of India?s nuclear policy [Anonymous 2003].
An informal scientific network that has been active through the cold
war in advancing nuclear arms control and disarmament between the US
and the Soviet Union is the Pugwash network. Though this is a non-governmental
network it operates partially on the ?inside? due to the prestige of
its members and the access to government leaders that they enjoy. In
both India and Pakistan, Pugwash has been dominated by scientists and
strategists who toe their government?s line, and Pugwash meetings in
south Asia have largely stayed at the level of platitudes about the
dangers of nuclear weapons around the globe and the perfidy of nuclear
weapon states in not pursuing nuclear disarmament, but carefully avoided
criticising, even mildly, the nuclear activities of their own countries.4 Last
year, an attempt by some newer Pugwash members to change focus was thwarted
because the Indian government refused visas to foreign invitees to a
proposed meeting in Goa [Malhotra 2003].
Another set of scientific groupings that has played a role in shaping
nuclear policy-making elsewhere, partly through activities on the ?inside?,
are national professional societies of scientists. Such societies in
the US, UK, France, and the Soviet Union have on occasion mobilised
the research and analytical capabilities of their members to inform
either policy-makers or the public about nuclear questions. An example
is the US National Academy of Sciences study on the technical issues
related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) [National Academy
of Sciences 2002].5 Governments have also turned to them
for advice or for populating various official scientific committees.
However, no such society of scientists in India has attempted to intervene
in nuclear policy-making, nor has the government turned to them, even
as a counter-balance to the parochial advice offered by the DAE or the
DRDO.
One can speculate about why official scientific organisations have
not tried to promote independent studies of nuclear weapons issues.6 For
decades the ?strategic enclave?, namely, the laboratories and institutions
involved in defence research and nuclear science and engineering [Abraham
1992], has received the bulk of government research funds.7 As
a consequence they have tremendous financial influence over researchers,
especially in the physical sciences. This has been a major constraint
on independent criticism of nuclear policies, certainly at an organised
and official level.
This phenomenon has only become more acute since the 1998 nuclear
tests, which increased the economic and political power of the strategic
enclave. The enclave has also been engaged in developing an indigenous
military industrial complex involving defence laboratories, technical
institutions, universities and public and private sector firms. As was
the case in the US with its much older and larger military industrial
complex, this phenomenon is beginning to implicate larger numbers of
scientists and shape their thinking on nuclear and security issues.
More generally, most scientists in India are dependent on the government
for their funding. Though they might resent being so termed, in effect
this dependence on the state makes scientists into government servants,
which in turn has led to progressive bureaucratisation. Like bureaucrats
everywhere, there is therefore a tendency to follow the dictates of
the government. Some evidence for this can be found in a 1996 elite
poll, which showed that 54 per cent of the scientists and other academics
polled supported the official policy then which called for neither foreswearing
nor acquiring nuclear weapons [Cortright and Mattoo 1996: 117]. Once
the official policy changed with the 1998 nuclear tests, many scientists
switched to supporting overt acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The last few years have also seen the emergence of a few think tanks
focusing on strategic and security issues. Many of these have played
a role in shaping nuclear policies. But they have generally been populated
by retired defence personnel, bureaucrats and strategists; none have
concentrated on scientific and technical issues. This is unlike, for
example, the case of environmental issues where there are at least a
few illustrious non-governmental organisations that have done significant
technical work of high quality.
Thus the existing structures offer little hope of advancing nuclear
disarmament through ?inside? routes.8 The only choice for
the concerned scientist then is to participate in efforts at changing
nuclear policy through the ?outside? route.
Before we discuss the ?outside? route, it is worth mentioning that
it can sometimes be a stepping stone to an ?inside? role. However, for
this to be the case there should be significant pressure from popular
social movements. In south Asia the peace movement is not yet at this
stage. If it does become strong enough, then one may see the government
inviting the more moderate elements of the movement into advisory bodies
and policy-making circles as a way of marginalising the more radical
elements of the movement. This has been the case with respect to other
social movements as well. An example is the transformation of environmental
movement in the US into a much more mainstream direction by selective
incorporation [Gottlieb 1993; Stauber 2002]. A similar strategy of ?the
soft embrace? was adopted in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
by the ruling classes to split the growing and militant labour movement
and isolate the radical elements [Hobsbawm 1989: 101-03]. The purpose
of the strategy is to maintain business as usual, with at best cosmetic
changes, while marginalising the radical members of the movement that
call for systemic and fundamental change. As long as the peace movement
is not strong enough, to offer oneself as an inside advisor would only
force one to make compromises and simultaneously weaken the movement.
There is a long and honourable precedent for scientists trying to
influence nuclear policy through ?outside? means. Ever since the dawn
of the nuclear age, scientists have played a leading role in educating
the public about the horrors of nuclear war. In many nuclear weapon
states, the US and the UK in particular, scientists have also offered
public criticisms of various nuclear policy matters, for example, ballistic
missile defence. One significant feature of such participation is that
many of them were unlikely to have worked in a professional capacity
on any of the technical details in the policy matter that they were
debating. In other words, they developed expertise on the policy matter
due to the importance of the issue and contributed to the debate. The
same conditions are likely to prevail in India since the strategic enclave
has tried to monopolise technical knowledge on nuclear and other security
issues.
The greatest challenge any scientist interested in advancing nuclear
disarmament in south Asia is to sensitise the public at large to nuclear
perils. With the many concerns that people have, nuclear weapons are
not seen as ?a clear and present danger?. Indeed, the majority may not
be even aware of them, as illustrated by an exit poll conducted during
the 1999 national elections. Despite the massive official propaganda
effort extolling the tests, 54 per cent of those polled had not even
heard of the nuclear tests conducted the previous year [Yadav, Heath,
and Saha 1999]. Even among those cognisant of nuclear issues, few feel
they have adequate information about the nuclear programme. The 1996
poll mentioned earlier found that only 13 per cent thought that information
on nuclear issues was easily available [Cortright and Mattoo 1996: 119].
Spreading awareness about nuclear issues from a pro-disarmament perspective
is clearly necessary.
Technically trained people are especially crucial in spreading such
awareness because within the existing structures of society professional
credentials largely determine how a person?s opinion is perceived and
received. Thus, a scientist, who is perceived as knowing how the bomb
works or what level of radiation doses are fatal, is automatically authorised
to pronounce opinions on nuclear policy. This is especially true of
the media, which looks for professional credentials before quoting someone
and which is a primary vehicle for spreading awareness of nuclear dangers.
Flashing professional credentials is a double edged sword. The establishment
can and does field large numbers of scientists to support their policies.
Their prominence is why many people believe in profoundly wrong ideas
at times. Some examples of such mistaken ideas are nuclear weapons preserve
peace; the command and control of nuclear arsenals is an easy task;
nuclear reactors generate cheap electricity; and dealing with nuclear
waste is not a problem. Many of these claims have been disproved by
other scientists.9 But because scientists from powerful institutions
like the DAE have much greater access to the media and are sometimes
the only scientists that most people ever hear about, anti-establishment
scientists face an uphill battle.
One way to fight this unequal battle is for scientists to not limit
themselves to nuclear weapons issues but also challenge the power of
the establishment that manufactures and peddles these weapons in a variety
of ways, including on ethical, moral, economic, environmental, and public
health grounds. This includes, for example, critiquing the nuclear energy
programme and its failure to provide cheap and plentiful electricity
as promised, or exposing the adverse health consequences due to uranium
mining and milling on the inhabitants of the Jaduguda area. This may
not be easy for an individual scientist and may require collective effort.
Fortunately this is no longer so hard a task. One result of the 1998
nuclear tests is the emergence of a vibrant peace movement working for
nuclear disarmament. Both Pakistan and India now have national coalitions
with hundreds of citizens groups publicly opposed to the acquisition
and continued build-up of nuclear weapons. Scientists have been prominent
in their activities.
These movements also require technical expertise. For example, the
Indian Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace charter includes
demands for complete transparency and independent monitoring of governmental
activity on nuclear development and energy matters, and compensation
and reparation to all victims and their families for damages to health
and local environment by activities related to all aspects (from uranium
mining to reactor operation to waste disposal) of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Both of these demands have significant technical components.
The peace movement is, however, not just focused on nuclear weapons,
but sees this as a manifestation of the larger social and political
malaise that grips the country. Many of the citizens groups that have
joined the movement are also involved in a variety of democratic issues
? women?s issues, education, human rights, environmental issues, and
so on.10 Their opposition to nuclear weapons and nuclear
energy is therefore situated within a larger social, economic, and political
framework.
Within such a movement, the involvement of scientists and engineers
in opposing to nuclear weapons or energy must be part of developing
alternative sources of technical expertise, grounded in local realities
and reflecting the aspirations of the vast majority of people. The emphasis
then would be on a just peace, i e, systemic change and not simply the
control or elimination of nuclear weapons while leaving everything else
unchanged [Ramana 1999].
Address for correspondence:
[email protected]
Notes
[I would like to thank Andrew Lichterman, Zia Mian,
Satyajit Rath, Achin Vanaik, and my colleagues at the Centre for Interdisciplinary
Studies in Environment and Development, Bangalore for useful discussions.]
1 I use the term scientists to denote both people
involved in the creation and practice of science in particular, and
technically trained people in general. This is both for convenience
and because even if scientists, in the narrower and more precise sense
of the term, are not themselves directly involved in developing or deploying
technologies, they are technically trained and therefore have the skills
required to intervene in the kinds of ways that I describe in this essay.
2 The involvement of scientists in organising and abetting the power
structures and perpetrating dominance of the weaker sections in society
is the subject of a vast literature. However, that is somewhat outside
the scope of this article.
3 These are, of course, the kinds of issues that scientists interested
in advancing nuclear disarmament, the only route to ensure that nuclear
war does not occur, could grapple with. Those who are, for one reason
or the other, interested in aiding states to develop the quantitative
and qualitative enhancement of nuclear destructive capability could
and do get involved in a different basket of technical issues.
4 The early history of Indian scientists with regard to Pugwash is
even worse. In the 1950s, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru supported
Bertrand Russell?s initiative to foster contact between American and
Soviet scientists and for a time, it seemed that the Indian government
would sponsor what eventually became the Pugwash conferences. New Delhi
was in fact chosen as the first conference site and in June 1956 Russell
dispatched invitations for a conference there in January 1957. But Homi
Bhabha, the physicist and founder of the Indian nuclear programme, made
sure that this was not to be. As Russell lamented: ?[Nehru] had been
exceedingly friendly. But when I met Dr Bhabha, India?s leading official
scientist, I received a cold douche. He had profound doubts about any
such manifesto, let alone any such conference as I had in mind for the
future (Pugwash). It became evident that I should receive no encouragement
from Indian official scientific quarters.? Not a single Indian nuclear
scientist signed the famous Russell Einstein manifesto. See [Wittner
1997: 100, 34]; as cited in [Sharma 1988].
5 The study argued, inter alia, that the test ban treaty was verifiable,
in direct contrast to the position advanced by some nuclear weapons
laboratory officials and many republican politicians.
6 This is despite a small but significant genealogy of anti-nuclear
and anti-military thinking among prominent scientific figures, such
as Meghnath Saha and C V Raman [Murthy et al 1998].
7 In the late 1950s, over a quarter of all resources devoted to research
and development in science and technology went to the DAE. Though it
was subsequently overtaken by the Department of Space, the total amount
spent on the DAE, the DRDO, and the Department of Space as a fraction
of all government research and development budgets remains at over 60
per cent [Abraham 1993: 177].
8 Even in the US where the structures are more conducive to insider
influence, George Kistiakowsky, a senior Manhattan project scientist
and science advisor to US president Eisenhower from 1959 to 1961, in
other words someone who had tried the highest of the inside channels,
stated towards the end of his life: ?Forget the channels. There simply
is not enough time left before the world explodes. Concentrate instead
on organising, with so many others who are of like mind, a mass movement
for peace such as there has not been before? [Kistiakowsky 1982].
9 For example in the late 1980s Amulya Reddy analysed the costs of
nuclear power, showing that it is more expensive than the alternatives
[Reddy 1990].
10 For more on these ?New Social Movements? see for example [Bonner
1990] and [Omvedt 1993].
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