The
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ended on Friday, April 19, 2002, without
producing anything significant except for a procedural document dealing
with future preparatory committee meetings in Geneva (2003) and New York
(2004) and the next review conference (New York 2005). With considerable
differences between the participating states, a “factual summary” by the
chair of the meeting, Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden, was all that
could be salvaged from the substantial discussions. The world of diplomacy
being what it is, this method of avoiding disagreements or other obstacles
was felt “reasonable” by many delegates.
Most states involved have
been becoming increasingly frustrated at the changes in nuclear weapons
policies in the nuclear weapon states (NWS), in particular the USA, and
the dissonance between these policies and the commitments made by these
states under the NPT itself, as well as during various review conferences.
Of particular concern were the lack of accountability and transparency
needed to evaluate the treaty’s operation, “existing nuclear arsenals, new
approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, and possible development
of new generations of nuclear weapons”, “the decision by the United States
to withdraw from the Anti Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty, and the
development of missile defense systems,” and the ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Not surprisingly, the
nuclear weapon states tried to move the focus from their disarmament
commitments to compliance and strengthening the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s safeguarding powers. In fact, the US, France and Britain
went as far as to complain that nuclear disarmament was given greater
prominence than nuclear safeguards or energy. Ambassador Eric Javits of
the USA also made it clear that his country can “no longer support some of
the Article VI conclusions in the Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review
Conference.” Two examples that he cited were the ABM Treaty and the CTBT.
The US position represents a retreat from the non-proliferation and
disarmament agenda. After all, the ABM treaty has for long been considered
one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime whereas the CTBT has
been a long-sought goal of those interested in nuclear disarmament.
Hypocrisy and double-speak figured prominently in the negotiations
at the prepcom. Referring to the Chair’s mention of many countries calling
on Israel to give up its nuclear weapons, the US criticised the naming of
individual countries. At the same time, it went on to explicitly mention
Iraq and regret the inclusion of Iraq’s assertion of its compliance. An
older, and more amusing, example is from the NPT review conference in 2000
during which France was prepared to give an unequivocal undertaking only
to the “ultimate” elimination of nuclear weapons, but not to the actual
elimination of nuclear arsenals. When non nuclear weapon states complained
that such a position was no advance on earlier decisions, France
reportedly argued that its former commitment had been equivocal, so that
an unequivocal undertaking to the ultimate goal was a step forward. The
distinction bears testimony to the diplomatic art of demonstrating how
finely a hair can be split.
The recalcitrance of the nuclear
weapon states was sufficient to even provoke Jayantha Dhanapala, the
United Nations Undersecretary General for Disarmament, to remark: “We meet
in cheerless times. The fact is that the gulf between declarations and
deeds, especially in the field of disarmament, is alarming.” He also
pointed out, “Pursued without progress on disarmament, nonproliferation
will inevitably become an exercise in futility.” Not surprisingly
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been more blunt. Speaking on
behalf of a number of them during the NGO presentations to the delegates,
Emily Schroeder of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
said “Today’s clear and present danger to the future of the NPT and the
wider regime comes from the United States”. The lack of progress
towards disarmament through the machinery of the NPT represents a deep
dilemma to those interested in abolishing nuclear weapons. On the one
hand, there seems to be no way - certainly no easy way - to make the
nuclear weapon states honour their commitments. For decades non-nuclear
weapon states and other pro-disarmament groups were strung along by the US
and the USSR by pointing to the other as the reason for holding onto their
weapons. Now, a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the cold war, the US continues to rationalize its huge nuclear arsenal
by pointing to the so-called rogue states, states of concern or, in the
terminology of President George W. Bush, the axis of evil. And judging
from various policy documents, the US intends to hold on to this arsenal
for the foreseeable future. The other nuclear weapon states, including
India, use the US arsenal, in one way or the other, as their rationale for
continued possession of nuclear weapons. The dilemma is that at the
same time the NPT is the only commitment given by the nuclear weapon
states to disarm their nuclear weapons. This commitment has been
pronounced “legally binding” by the International Court of Justice in
1996; the ICJ also stated that this obligation requires states “to bring
to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control” (emphasis
added). International law thus provides the rope to hopefully pin down the
nuclear Gullivers and force them to disarm their hugely destructive
arsenals. But as with the inhabitants of Lilliput, such a strategy
requires concerted, united and joint action on the part of the
international community. That may not be forthcoming.
