Op-ed: Military planning and nuclear weapons

M V Ramana

The military’s desires and proclivities do not automatically translate to reality. The role of the peace movement in resisting this drive towards greater militarisation and furthering a critical debate on nuclear weapons issues is crucial

As commented upon in a previous column, the setting up of the new Indian Strategic Forces Command, which has been entrusted with the upkeep and deployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal, reflects the increasing role that the military has come to play in nuclear policy making. Now all strategic forces are to be managed and administered by a Commander-in-Chief from the armed forces; the Deputy Chief of the Indian Air Force is the first appointee. In the case of Pakistan the military has dominated nuclear policy making for two decades or more. But in India this is a new development; prior to the 1998 nuclear tests, the armed forces were largely excluded from decisions about nuclear policy. Thus it is important to think about what this development may entail.

Even prior to the creation of the Strategic Forces Command, there have been indications that the Indian military is preparing to operate the nuclear arsenal. The most spectacular has been the multiple tests of the Agni missile and the announcement that it is to be inducted into the armed forces, with a special missile regiment being raised to operate it. There have been other, less publicised, signs. According to newspaper reports, military officers have been undergoing training at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre to handle nuclear devices. During the May 2001 large-scale military exercises, Operation Poorna Vijay, Abdul Kalam, the “father” of India’s missile programme and the current President of the country, said that nuclear weapons were “being tested for military operations... for training by our armed forces.”

The military’s control is likely to increase with time. If and as India’s nuclear arsenal becomes more useable, there would be a wealth of operational practices and details that civilian leaders can control only to a very limited extent. In contrast to the civilian leadership whose job requires them to focus on a number of priorities, nuclear planners have only one task — to think about how to use nuclear weapons. So even if it does not start off that way, over time the views of military planners will exert considerable influence on operational doctrines involving nuclear weapons.

This process is also likely to be accelerated by repeated Indo-Pak military crises and mini-wars — which have become very frequent in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. During all of these, there were nuclear threats issued by high-level military personnel. More crucial is the disclosure by Bruce Riedel, formerly the Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council, that the Pakistani military, unbeknownst to then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, was preparing its “nuclear arsenal for possible deployment” during the 1999 Kargil crisis.

The US case is also suggestive. Though President Truman ordered the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he initially resisted the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s emphasis on an atomic air offensive. But this changed after the 1948 Berlin crisis. Similarly, initial control of the US stockpile was with the civilian Atomic Energy Commission. But with the Korean War, the control started shifting to the military. First, they took charge of non-nuclear components, and then of a few operational weapons, and finally the whole arsenal. As Janne Nolan observes in “Guardians of the Arsenal”, her study of the control of nuclear weapons in the US, through this process “nuclear weapons changed from being seen as extraordinary devices to being considered an integral element of the nation’s arsenal — different in degree from other weapons, but still just weapons.”

The entry of the military into nuclear policy making, especially at an operational level, is likely to have several implications. The military’s desire for greater predictability and avoidance of uncertainty — a characteristic of many large organisations — leads them to develop detailed plans for use of these weapons. The requirement for confidence in their ability to carry through these plans and fulfil set goals in the face of the uncertainties that characterise wartime, then, translates into a requirement for greater control over the weapons as well as maintaining them in a greater state of readiness. Thus, the military would likely prefer nuclear weapons being deployed, with heightened alert status during military crises. Also likely is greater emphasis on preemptive attack or launch on warning doctrines.

Another likely fallout of operational nuclear planning by the military is a demand for more weapons — both in numbers and types. Though not yet publicly obvious in India, there are some indicators. Defence analyst Bharat Karnad has reported that following the announcement of the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine, the three armed service headquarters were “involved in drawing up detailed schemes for inducting a variety of nuclear armaments and ancillary and support equipment in their orders-of-battle... [and] appropriate command and control frameworks.”

The activities of the three armed services points to another expected outcome of the military control of nuclear weapons — the role of inter service rivalry in increasing the arsenal size. To most people, nuclear weapons are tools for massive destruction. But for the different military services as well as the organisations involved in producing the weapons or their components, they represent larger budgets and more organisational clout. This means that none of the services would want to be left without nuclear weapons of their own. Even in Pakistan, where the army has an overwhelming presence compared to the other services, the navy and air force have staked claims for parts of the nuclear arsenal. In India, where the field is somewhat more level, the race is likely to be even more intense.

The military’s desires and proclivities do not automatically translate to reality. Civilian leaders can exert a significant influence on the process. But left to themselves it is unlikely that they — at least the current belligerent lot — would exert themselves in the direction of moderation. It is here that the role of the peace movement in resisting this drive towards greater militarisation and furthering a critical debate on nuclear weapons issues becomes crucial.

M V Ramana is a physicist and research staff member at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security

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