Beyond Lahore: From Transparency to Arms Control

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Following the examples set over the last fifty years by the U.S. and the other nuclear weapon states, the governments of India and Pakistan have now clearly chosen to rely on weapons of mass destruction and terror as the basis for their relationship with each other and the rest of the world. The nuclear tests they conducted in May 1998 and the accompanying political and military crisis raise genuine fears for the future of the people of South Asia. In the same way as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. did decades ago, India and Pakistan have started to turn to "transparency" measures as a way to reassure themselves, and the international community, about the dangers that they have created. These measures, however, do not confront the central fact that the two countries now have acquired the means to fight nuclear war. Nothing in the Lahore agreement changes this or even imposes any restrictions on it. The recent tests of Agni-II and Ghauri-II and references to Agni-III, Ghauri-III, Shaheen-I and II demonstrate just how little restraint the Lahore agreements impose on the two states continuing to develop their nuclear arsenals.

THE LAHORE AGREEMENTS

The agreements sketched out at Lahore are designed only to offer limited transparency and thus, it is felt, some kind of early warning that could prevent disproportionate responses from events associated with the nuclear, missile and military programs. The two sides agreed to consult on their nuclear strategies and thinking and to notify each other about planned missile tests as well as accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incidents that could create the risk of nuclear war. There were also agreements to prevent untoward incidents at sea and to review existing communication links.

Many of South Asia's hawks, who championed the acquisition of these weapons in the first place, have welcomed the transparency measures. They have followed the American example, step by step, first in believing in deterrence and now transparency measures. They have even adopted the same turn of phrase used, over a decade ago, by Strobe Talbott who described such measures as "mutually agreeable rules of the road in the arms race - rules that will make the competition somewhat more predictable." Like Talbott, the hawks see no end to the competition.

Each one of the agreements put up for negotiation at Lahore draws directly on agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the early 1970's.[1] The original agreements were little more than means to thin the fog of crisis that characterized superpower relations. The more significant arms control treaties, actually restricting the testing and deployment of weapons, such as the ABM Treaty, the Threshold test ban Treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties came later.

Moreover, the borrowing from superpower experience is partial and dangerous. As transparency measures, the Lahore agreements are limited in their scope. They do not address crucial details such as deployment patterns, command and control arrangements or early warning systems. The superpowers tried to compensate for these omissions by investing billions of dollars in spies and satellites and even more in their own early warning systems. India and Pakistan cannot resort to such expensive technological solutions both due to the lack of technological and financial resources and the fact that the geographical proximity of the two countries rules out any possibility of early warning under any circumstances.

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[1] See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements* (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990).

These constraints create an additional imperative to push beyond the transparency measures that are on the table. It is here that the hawks are likely to resist. They want to see their respective states further develop and deploy their nuclear arsenals. Their response to even moderate arms control measures is likely to be similar to their superpower counterparts and characterized by suspicion and hostility. These attitudes are what has led them to support the weapons in the first place and leads them to an obsession with the possibility of cheating and thus the need for verification of any agreement.

BUYING TIME WITH ARMS CONTROL

As a way of getting to grips with the weapons themselves and recognizing that the hawks have by and large hijacked the decision making process in both countries, we suggest some small concrete verifiable arms control measures that can go beyond the transparency agreements. Like the transparency agreements, some of these steps draw upon superpower efforts during the cold war. It is difficult to justify making proposals that are so derivative and so restricted, especially given the sorry history of the cold war and superpower arms control.[2] For decades, arms control failed to restrict the size or sophistication of superpower arsenals and showed that it takes political change to achieve real results. However, in the interim it is vital to engage in measures that could help slow the momentum that has been created by the nuclear weapons tests and set the stage for a real dis-armament process. We have no doubt that the fundamental problem is a political one and the long-term solutions, therefore, would lie in the political realm. Our aim is to help create time for the mobilization of a peace movement that can challenge the elite and its way of thinking that has led the two countries to the edge of the nuclear abyss.

In trying to assess ways of dealing with nuclear weapons, it is important to be sensitive to the constraints created by the technology as well as the larger context into which the weapons as well as the proposed forms of constraint are to work. There is no getting away from the fact that the material character of these weapons demands technical solutions of certain kinds. Just as treating these weapons as purely technical artifacts is inadequate – they are after all part of a larger social, political, scientific and military system, that creates them, maintains them and justifies them[3] – ignoring their specific technological and material nature misses out on a key way in which, as with other technological artifacts, they influence the societies into which they emerge.[4]

We divide our proposals into two - measures that would limit the potential size and destructiveness of the arsenals and measures that reduce the immediate danger to the people of the region from the existing weapons.

THE TEST BAN

One place where the awkward and difficult character of positioning oneself on arms control has been the tortured debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Recognizing the limited nature of the treaty,[5] and the fact that it allows nuclear weapon states to keep their existing capabilities while excluding other nations from acquiring the same, there are nevertheless genuine benefits that follow from a CTBT in constraining the further development of nuclear weapons.[6] It is for this reason that we, like the peace movement elsewhere, support the treaty and argue for a more serious engagement with the aspirations that guided the struggles for the treaty over the past four decades.

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[2] Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race*, (New York: Pantheon, 1982).
[3] E. P. Thompson, "Notes on Exterminism" in E. P. Thompson, *Exterminism and the Cold War*, (London: New Left Books, 1982).
[4] Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts have Politics," in Langdon Winner, *The Whale and the Reactor*, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1986).
[5] The inability of the CTBT to ban effectively subcritical tests, computer simulations and hydronuclear experiments, as well as maintaining the test sites.
[6] See for example Praful Bidwai & Achin Vanaik, "Why India Should Sign the CTBT: Returning to Our Own Agenda," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 38, 19 September 1998.

The coming into force of the CTBT should be supported and built on by committing to help force the nuclear weapons establishments the world over to stop further development of nuclear weapons. This would involve closing down the test sites, stopping subcritical and hydrodynamic tests, and research into a new generation of nuclear weapons. Closing the loopholes in the CTBT would put to rest the options that Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons scientists and their international peers are trying to create for themselves to keep conducting weapons related research and development in the hope that there would be another "day the sun rose twice.[7]"

NUCLEAR MATERIALS

FISSILE MATERIAL TREATY

The other multilateral arms control measure that is under consideration is the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT).[8] This has been a priority for the nuclear weapon states, especially the United States, ever since they stopped producing fissile materials themselves. Fully aware of the effects of the cutoff on its "nuclear option", India, for a while, blocked progress on the FMT claiming that the treaty should be firmly linked to a time-bound program for nuclear disarmament. However, in the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests, as part of its efforts to ease international pressure, India relaxed its objections and has started participating in the negotiations at Geneva and has taken a similar position as the other nuclear weapon states. As negotiations develop, hard-liners in India may force renewed objections, as with the CTBT, because of the relatively small size of India's fissile material stocks.

Currently, the main dispute is over the question of the enormous existing stockpiles of fissile material possessed by the nuclear weapon states (see Table 1).

Table 1: Estimated Stockpiles of Directly Weapons-usable Fissile Materials[9]

Nuclear-weapon state	Weapon-grade Uranium (tons)	Weapon-grade Plutonium (tons)	Reactor-grade Plutonium (tons)[10]
U.S.	580	99.5	0
Russia	1050	131	33
Britain	21.9	7.6	51.3
France	25	5	35
China	20	4	0.0
Israel	?	0.5	0.0
India	?	0.33	0.45
Pakistan	0.2	0.0	0.0

The nuclear weapon states, led by the U.S., categorically refuse to discuss these stockpiles. Earlier this year, the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, declared "we will not agree to any restrictions on existing stocks."[11] It should be obvious that leaving stockpiles untouched and banning only future production would serve no disarmament purpose at all. The non-nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned movement have recognized this; in the words of the Indonesian CD ambassador: "brushing aside the issue of stockpiles, would, once again, render the cutoff treaty a mere non-

[7] Ferenc Morton Szasz, *The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the Trinity Site Nuclear Explosion July 16, 1945* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1984).

[8] This is based on UN General Assembly resolution 48/75L, "Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices." Fissile materials, highly enriched uranium and plutonium, are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons.

[9] Frank von Hippel, "The FMCT and Cuts in Fissile Material Stockpiles," (to be published in *Disarmament Forum*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1999).

[10] Reactor grade plutonium refers usually to plutonium made in nuclear power reactors and can be used for making nuclear weapons, even though it is not custom-made for weapons use.

[11] U.S. Statement to the CD, 21 January 1999, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Vol. 34, http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym/cdholum.htm

proliferation measure...[with] no added value to date."[12] India, reflecting its new found status, has opposed any discussion of stockpiles while Pakistan insists on talking about stockpiles, pointing to asymmetries in the stockpiles within South Asia as well as conventional weapons levels.[13] It is vital that pressure be brought to bear on the nuclear weapon states to include stocks in the negotiations and make the FMT into a disarmament treaty.

AN INTERIM PRODUCTION FREEZE

Whatever be the scope of the treaty, negotiations are likely to take a long time. Pakistan and India may well use this time to pursue their ongoing arms race by building up their stocks of weapons useable fissile material with the attendant environmental and economic consequences. To avoid this, the two countries should declare, as with testing, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In parallel, they could call on the nuclear weapon-states to publicly formalize their existing moratoria on fissile material production.[14]

The easiest way to ensure that India and Pakistan are complying with the moratorium would be for them to shut down their research reactors,[15] reprocessing and enrichment plants (see Table 2 and Table 3). Without reactors to make the plutonium, and reprocessing plants to extract it for use in nuclear weapons, and enrichment plants to make highly enriched uranium for weapons, the two countries would no longer be able to increase their stockpiles of the raw materials for bombs. It would be relatively easy to verify that all known facilities are not being used by monitoring them using commercial satellites or aerial observations.[16]

Table 2: Indian Nuclear Facilities affected by a Fissile Material Moratorium

Facility	Characteristics
CIRUS, Mumbai	Research Reactor
Dhruva, Mumbai	Research Reactor
FBTR, Kalpakkam	Research (fast breeder) Reactor
PFBR, Kalpakkam	Fast Breeder Reactor, planned
Ratnahalli	Uranium enrichment centrifuge plant
Trombay, Mumbai	Plutonium reprocessing plant
PREFRE, Tarapur	Plutonium reprocessing plant
KARP, Kalpakkam	Plutonium reprocessing plant

Table 3: Pakistani Nuclear Facilities Affected by a Fissile Material Moratorium

Facility	Characteristics
Khushab	Research Reactor
Kahuta	Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Plant
New Labs	Reprocessing plant

[12] Agus Tarmidzi, Indonesian ambassador to the CD, Geneva, February 20, 1997, CD/PV.756.
[13] Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram at the Special session of the Conference on Disarmament on 2 June 1998, http://www3.itu.int/pakistan/Pak-India%20Nuc%20CD%20Special.htm
[14] Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, "A Step-By-Step Approach To a Global Fissile Materials Cutoff," *Arms Control Today*, October 1995, pp. 3-8.
[15] A term that both countries use to cover the fact that these reactors are used to produce weapon grade plutonium.
[16] Hui Zhang, "The Application of Overhead Imagery to Verification of a Fissile Material Production Cutoff," The Tenth International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, July 13-21, 1998, Cambridge, USA

In a bid to keep their facilities open, the nuclear establishments in both countries are likely to claim that these facilities serve other purposes. Pakistan, for example, will say that Kahuta is meant to supply low enriched uranium for the new Chashma reactor. However, China has signed a contract to supply this reactor with fuel; there is therefore no need for Pakistan to produce its own fuel. Likewise, it has been claimed that the Ratnahalli plant in India is not capable of enriching uranium to the extent necessary for use in weapons and is actually intended to produce fuel for India's nuclear submarine. An enrichment plant can be easily modified to produce weapon-grade uranium. Further, the nuclear submarine is a colossal waste of money, and suggests only that India, like the other nuclear weapon states, intends to deploy nuclear missiles at sea - ample reasons to oppose the project in any case.

India also operates three reprocessing plants, including the recently built one at Kalpakkam, purportedly to produce plutonium for its fast breeder reactors. Quite apart from the possibility of making weapon-grade plutonium at fast breeder reactors, there are good economic and environmental reasons to stop the program.[17] Despite these reasons, if India were to go ahead with its fast breeder program, then it could well do so by putting them under inspections. After all the Japanese and German programs were fully subject to international monitoring.[18]

Alongside this, they should agree not to manufacture, or otherwise acquire, tritium for use in nuclear weapons.[19] Tritium is used in order to "boost" or increase the yield of nuclear weapons. A ban on the production of tritium would, therefore, limit the numbers of thermonuclear weapons that could be produced, each of which would have a destructive yield many times that of ordinary fission weapons. Such a ban would also reduce the incentive for Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists to continue pursuing a thermonuclear weapon of their own and so impede the potential for larger and more destructive weapons.[20]

A BAN ON MISSILE TESTS

As the recent tests of Agni II and Ghauri II show, the ballistic missile race is on and in danger of accelerating in the near future. Just as a ban on nuclear tests inhibits the development of new weapons designs, a ban on flight testing of missiles would inhibit the development of new missiles. India has conducted one flight test and continues to work on a new version of the Agni, an intermediate range ballistic missile. It is believed to be developing the Sagarika, a sea-launched missile. Pakistan, for its part, has tested a new version of the intermediate range Ghauri and is working on a new missile called Shaheen. The limited number of tests of missiles that have been conducted so far by India and Pakistan amount to experiments with missile technology; without many more tests it is not possible to deploy them with the level of confidence that military systems usually require. More tests are going to lead to growing confidence in the missiles and thus demands to deploy these missiles with the attendant increases in tension and danger.

Table 4: Ballistic Missile Systems under Development or Production

Name of Missile	Range	Warhead Size	Development Stage
Indian Missiles			
Prithvi I	150 km	1000 kg	deployed
Prithvi II	250 km	500 kg	developed

[17] For example, R. Tongia and V. S. Arunachalam (former scientific advisor to the Prime Minister) have argued that the fast breeder reactor program is incapable of making a significant contribution to India's electricity needs. Rahul Tongia and V. S. Arunachalam, "India's nuclear breeders: technology, viability and options," *Current Science*, Vol. 75, No. 6, 25 September 1998, pp. 549-558.

[18] Germany has completely abandoned its fast breeder program and Japan is reducing its commitment to this program.

[19] Pervez Hoodbhoy and Martin Kalinowski, "The Tritium Solution," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 1996, pp. 41-44.

[20] On reasons to foreswear hydrogen bombs see M. V. Ramana and Frank von Hippel, "Does India need a Hydrogen Bomb?," *The Hindu*, December 23, 1998.

Prithvi III	350 km	250 kg?[21]	under development
Agni I	1500 km?	1000 kg?	technology demonstrated
Agni II	2500 km	1000 kg?	technology demonstrated
Sagarika	300 km?	500 kg?	under development
Pakistani Missiles			
Hatf I	80 km	500 kg	technology demonstrated
Hatf II	300 km	500 kg	technology demonstrated
Hatf III	up to 800 km	500 kg	technology demonstrated
M-11[22]	290 km	1000 kg?	in storage?
Ghauri	1500 km?	700 kg	technology demonstrated
Shaheen	700 km?	1000 kg?	displayed

There should be no illusion about the suggestions made above. These agreements in themselves do little to reduce the immediate danger to the people of the two countries from the current weapons. The most such measures could do is to restrict the potential devastation that could be wreaked upon them. They would also forestall an arms race between the two countries. Since leaders in both countries have stated repeatedly that they do not wish to participate in such a race, implementing these steps would be a way for the governments to demonstrate the sincerity of these statements.

MAKING SPACE WITH NO-DEPLOYMENT ZONES

To address the immediate dangers another set of measures should be pursued in parallel that relate to the weapons themselves. These follow along the lines of the recent Indian resolution at the United Nations entitled "Reducing Nuclear Dangers" that seeks to have the nuclear weapon states dealert their nuclear arsenals. What follows herein are, in a sense, an application of analogous steps in the South Asian context.

The greatest danger of nuclear war arises when missiles are deployed with nuclear warheads. It is believed that India and Pakistan have not yet placed their nuclear weapons on missiles or otherwise deployed them. This arrangement should be formalized as part of a verifiable treaty. This could be done by storing warheads at sites away from missiles and airbases. An additional benefit is that fears about the primitive and inadequate command and control systems that the two states may possess can be put to rest.

It is relatively straightforward to verify that a missile does not have a nuclear warhead without divulging any details of its construction by just looking for characteristic radiation patterns.[23] Since both India and Pakistan could deliver their nuclear weapons by aircraft, any arrangement would have to cover not just missile development and deployment, but also airbases. Airbases would have to be opened to inspectors, periodically and when challenged, who could look for storage sites for nuclear gravity bombs as well as observe aircrafts to ensure that their bomb bays have not been altered to allow loading of nuclear bombs. Such inspections have been conducted as part of the START I treaty by Russia and the United States.[24]

The very short flight time of missiles allows no time for any response other than immediately launching one's own missiles in the event of a warning. Thus it is important to increase the time for the two countries

[21] There are conflicting reports of the size of the warhead for Prithvi III, said to be the naval version of Prithvi. From modeling the parameters of the missile, the most probable warhead mass is 250 kg. See M. V. Ramana, "Modelling Prithvi and Agni," Talk at the VIII Summer School on Science and World Affairs, Cornell University, July-August, 1997.

[22] Said to be in storage at the Sargodha airbase.

[23] Steve Fetter, et al, "Detecting Nuclear Warheads," in Frank von Hippel and Roald Z. Sagdeev, *Reversing the Arms Race: How to Achieve and Verify Deep Reductions in Nuclear Arsenals*, (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1990)

[24] For the text of the treaty, see Regina Cowen Karp, "The START Treaty and the future of strategic nuclear arms control," *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1992).

to respond. This is made more difficult by the missiles already inducted in to the armed services, namely the 150-250 km range Prithvi and possibly the 290 km range M-11 missiles. Due to their short ranges, if they are to be deployed, there is no alternative but to put them close to the border.

Despite the claims made about them, there is little military value of relatively inaccurate missiles. Prithvi, which is said to have an accuracy[25] of 150 m when fired up to a distance of 150 km, would need to be used in extraordinarily large numbers if armed with conventional, non-nuclear warheads and used to attack the kinds of targets it is said to be intended for.[26]

Table 5: Number of Prithvi Missiles Required to Damage a Single Airbase, Command Centre, or Radar using Conventional Warheads as a function of Accuracy

Accuracy (m)	Airbase	Command Centre	Radar
50	96	16	2
100	168	63	3
150	256	140	6
250	512	393	13
300	672	558	18

There are two consequences that follow from the characteristics of these missiles. If they are deployed in small numbers, as they are currently, they are likely to be seen as carrying nuclear warheads and so elicit a similar response. If they are deployed in large numbers, even with conventional warheads, they are likely to be seen as a first strike weapon, and capable of launching a surprise attack. This may well elicit a greater determination to use nuclear weapons very early in a war, before they are destroyed - the classic 'use them or lose them' problem. In view of these dangers, Pakistan and India should agree to move their missiles away from the border to a distance greater than their respective ranges.

The control by hawks over the policy-making process in the two states makes it likely that any agreement will confront accusations that the other side is likely to cheat and the means available to detect such cheating are limited, if not absent. However, there are many ways by which compliance may be overseen. There are several technologies based on experiences with the verification of treaties like the START, INF and Open Skies treaties. One possibility would be for a single cooperative monitoring centre, or two co-located ones, with international commercial satellites[27] providing Indians and Pakistanis identical high resolution imaging data from a several hundred km wide swath on both sides of the border. The exact width of the swath could be such as to ensure that neither Prithvi nor the M-11 could be deployed close enough to the border to be able to threaten significant areas of the other state without being detected. An alternative to using satellites is to rely on joint aerial observation flights.[28]

A second more robust and economical possibility is moving all missiles to designated, monitored storage sites that are to be located outside this no-deployment zone. Sensor systems can be deployed around these sites to detect any movement of the missiles outside the restricted area.[29] These can be combined with a

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[25] The accuracy is measured in terms of the CEP, or Common Error Probable, which is the radius of a hypothetical circle about the target into which half the missiles fired would land.

[26] Z. Mian, A. H. Nayyar, and M. V. Ramana, "Bringing Prithvi Down to Earth: The Capabilities and Potential Effectiveness of India's Prithvi Missile," *Science and Global Security*, Vol. 7, 1998, pp. 333-360.

[27] Images from these satellites are available to anyone who may choose to buy them. It is even possible that these could come from Indian and Pakistani satellites. “India using satellites for military purposes: Sareen,” *Deccan Herald*, 30 December 1998 and "Satellite Badar-B completed, tested," *Dawn*, 14 April, 1999. On the use of commercial satellite images for verification see, Michael Krepon et al, ed. *Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security*, (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).

[28] John H. Hawes and Teresita C. Schaffer, "Risk Reduction in South Asia: A Role for Cooperative Aerial Observation?" http://www.stimson.org

[29] Jurgen Altmann, "Intermediate-Range Sensors for Verification and UN Peace-Keeping," in Jurgen Altmann, Thomas Stock, and Jean-Pierre Stroot, *Verification after the Cold War: Broadening the Process*, (Amsterdam: VU University, 1994).

system of electronic tags associated with each missile. The tags would send out regular signals that would allow the other party to know when one of the missiles has been moved beyond the storage site. These technologies can be complemented with a system that allows challenge inspections of these designated sites, especially if there is evidence of prohibited activities.[30]

Asking the international community for help with setting up such monitoring mechanisms would be a useful contribution to peace.[31] In contrast, attempts to obtain dual-use technologies in the case of India or purchasing expensive arms in the case of Pakistan are only likely to fuel suspicion and further the arms race at the level of research and development if not weapon systems.

CONCLUSION

At a time when the search is on for the rules of the nuclear road, it is important to appreciate that it is the hawks who have their foot on the accelerator and their hands on the steering wheel. What is a needed are initiatives from the peace movement rather than hand-wringing after every nuclear and missile test. These initiatives must recognize that at the present moment the peace movement is not in any position to try to take control the car and bring it to a stop (and put the people on a bus that goes far beyond Lahore).

Political parties, in the current climate, have little experience or technical knowledge and are surrounded by advisors and so-called experts from the nuclear-scientific-military-industrial complex who are setting the limits of the debate. Not surprisingly, they are then able to pass of the most limited suggestions as proof of their commitment to peace.
It is the responsibility of the peace movement to provide more robust and reliable measures that can gauge the reality of these commitments. The agreements suggested here also offer ways of testing the sincerity of India's offer of a No-First Use Treaty[32] and Pakistan's offer of a Non-Aggression Treaty.[33]

We recognize the limitations of the proposals listed here and intend them only as ways of buying time. Even this time will not be without risk. The only certain way to prevent the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia as elsewhere is the absolute and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons. The urgent task is to engage in the political work that will put peace at the top of the agenda.

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[30] Such schemes have been tried and tested as part of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/conweapeurope.html
[31] The U.S. based Cooperative Monitoring Center has developed several technologies for remote monitoring. See http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/tech/index.html
[32] "India offers to sign no first use pact with Pak", *Rediff on the Net* October 16, 1998.
[33] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's speech at the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 1997, http://www.unol.org/speeches/pakistan.html