Links to other sites on the Web>
SAW REUNION GROUP
OTHER SAW UNITS
SAW UNIT DECORATIONS
SAW UNIT CAMPAIGNS
SAW HOME PAGE
555th SAW HISTORY
564th SAW HISTORY
566th SAW HISTORY
573rd SAW HISTORY
563rd SAW BATTALION ETERNAL
563rd SAW MAILING ADDRESSES
563rd SAW AIR CONTROLLERS
563rd MEW (738th SAW Co) 
Date Phase
June 6th to June 30th D Day Operations
June 31st to July 1st The Normandy Landing
July 2nd to July 31st Air Defense of Cherbourg
August 1st to August 13th The Breakout
August 14th to August 25th The Exploitation
August 26th to September 15th Pursuit to the West Wall
September 16th to December 15th Winter Operations
December 16th to February 7th Ardennes Campaign
February 8th to March 19th Rhineland Campaign
March 20th to March 28th Rhine River Crossing
March 29th to April 4th Reduction of the Rhur Pocket
April 5th to April 18th Advance to the Elbe River
April 19th to May 7th Final Operations
This Version Three of the unit history of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion modifies the original version published in 1993. Additions were made from feedback from the men of the battalion. As time went on more sources of unit history become known. The unit history was written long after the facts and memory runs thin. There is a compensation for a late start because a lot of history has been published by the Army and others and a more detailed picture can be painted. It is fortunate that I still had some of the original maps used in operations by the 563rd that showed the old grid system used in combat. Since then the grid system was changed and the modern maps have a very different grid system. Without these old maps it would have been difficult to find a location since only the grid coordinate was invariably used in official records. In presenting the graphical data the original maps were used when at all possible. The names of towns on the original maps are sometimes different than they are now, particularly in Germany. It was decided to use the names on present maps in the text when known. In the initial phases of combat, Lt. Harold E. Waeckerle kept the Battalion Operations map posted. Later the Battalion S-2 group kept hour by hour track of the movement of the Third Army ground forces on the Battalion operations map. As S-2 WO Vernon O. Mills maintained the monthly historical report which he called "Following the 563rd". This historical report was consolidated monthly by him and forwarded to the XIX TAC. He plotted the ground situation extracted from the combat operation reports received from higher headquarters message centers and teletype messages from higher headquarters. The accurate and timely data WO Mills provided were the basis of the timely movement of the FDP's. Consistent and talented writers supplying the monthly historical report for the Companies were Lt. Wesley J. Howard for Company A, Lt. John C. DiLeo for Company B, Lt. Charles A Stewart for Company C, Lt. Jack F. Roberts for Company D and Lt. Norman H. Morse for the 738th Signal Air Warning Company.
[Editors Note 1---The historical record was a time consuming chore and it was required from all units monthly. Now we find out that these records is all we have left because the memory fades. Now, fifty years later I wish to belatedly thank the men who prepared these reports for their superior performance in preparation of the Unit Historical Reports and all others who participated in this activity whose names were not recorded. The company officers who were designated as Historical Officers were:
Lt. Wesley J. Howard A Company
Lt. John C DiLeo B Company
Lt. Charles A. Stewart C Company
Lt. Jack F. Roberts D Company
Lt. Norman H. Morse 738th SAW Company
When a person is referred to in the text it was attempted to give that rank the person had at the time of the action. It proved impractical to record all the promotions because many times the promotions were reported as a group with no names attached. During the operations in combat it was interesting to watch the progress of the Third Army and it did not take long to notice that when extremely fast progress was being made you could count on the 4th Armored Division as being in the spearhead. I always admired the men of that division and thought that the commanding general of that division was one of the more outstanding division commanders. His name was Maj. Gen. John S. Wood. He was the kind of leader that Gen. Patton's style of combat needed. He had the same attributes of boldness and skill that Patton had. Later on in the campaign Maj. Gen. Hugh Gaffey who was Patton's chief of staff was put in command of the 4th Armored.
We know the locations of most the units and the dates of movement because they were recorded for the S-3 operations report analysis. These locations were logged as grid coordinates along with the date. The 563rd was in combat from July 3, 1944 until May 7, 1945 or 331 days and in that time there was 645 movements of units. That includes the movement of all FDP's, LW's, BACU's, GO's and Headquarters. There were other movements which were temporary in nature and movement of groups to higher headquarters for confer- ences and to schools for training. In the history that follows the grid coordinates were mostly taken at face value and that position looked up on a map to find the town to identify with the location. There were several coordinates in the records which had obvious typographical errors which were corrected in the history. A few others were questionable and also had to be located by judgement.
In retrospect the 563rd had all the characteristics that were needed to fit into the Patton Army. For a small unit, the 563rd had responsibilities for an operations in a large area (the same size as the Third Army) which normally had three Corps. When in the Third Army one learned very quickly that we had to move practically before the smoke of battle had cleared. There were times when being one day late would put you a hundred miles behind. It was fortunate for the higher command that we were geared up to Armored operation. The Battalion was completely mobile and could therefore move rapidly. This mobility greatly aided the Airplane Groups to support the ground forces with the aid of fighter control Radar reporting into the Fighter Control Center.now and that he did self-confidence, speed and audacity. His army and air support modeled their behavior on that of their chief and they now found a situation perfectly suited to the expression of combat. The many staff officers who toiled in relative obscurity made it possible for the leaders to direct complex operations with appearant ease.
All the tactical capabilities of the 563rd would have been diminished if it were not for dynamic supply operations. This was superbly accomplished in the 563rd Signal Battalion under the direction of the S-4, Capt. Mac Ray and his staff. After the breakthrough, when the Battalion entered active combat supply became a harder and harder task. The supply installations could not move as rapidly as the combat units and soon supplies had to be transported for great distances. Later on the supply of gasoline became acute and when it was necessary to haul it in from the ports by trucks a significant part of the new gasoline was consumed by the trucks who were delivering it. The Supreme Headquarter also allocated priority to the British Armies operating in the northern sector to the extent that finally the Third Army was halted. The rapid advance of the Third Army always made the supply of material was a herculean task.
The S-1 is an important staff officer. He is the one who procures our pay. Lt. Jack Reynolds group kept higher headquarters informed and supervised the maintenance of records of the attached units. The superior performance of his group was a major factor in the superior rating the 563rd received from our higher headquarters. Now we come to Command. Nothing at all could have been done without the very best commander and the Battalion commander Lt. Col. William L. McBride epitomized this. In late 1943 he was in command of the 4th Signal Air Warning Training Battalion at Drew Field responsible for training overseas units. With his seniority and power he realized that the War Department request for a unit to make up the Allied Expeditionary Forces in England was a prime assignment. He therefore put himself on the list and then picked his staff and Company commanders.
A word on our higher command. The XIX Tactical Air Command was commanded by Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland and was assigned to support the Third Army. Under the XIX TAC the 100th Fighter Wing, commanded by Brig. Gen. Homer L. Sanders was the Air Operations headquarters for the Tactical Fighter Groups. The 19th Tactical Control Group (TCG) was the tactical operations command for the Signal and Air Corps units working into the Tactical Control Center (TCC). This was a provisional unit which was formed and organized during combat and was commanded by Col. Mayhue then later by Col. Harry A. French. Under the TCG was the 312th Fighter Control Squadron, commanded by Maj. L. Noble Hull and they ran the Filter Center and terminal communications. Also there was the 316th Fighter Control Squadron, commanded by Maj. John Kersch who ran the air-ground communications and air-ground direction finders. Finally there was the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion which had a Signal Repair Detachment attached who were specialists in British Radar and they supplied parts and also did Radar repair.
Gen. Patton, knowing how dependent his own success was on air support, shrewdly singled out the airmen for special attention and friendly treatment. He drew Gen. Weyland, the debonair and brilliant young commander of the Tactical Air assigned to his Third Army, into his personal circle. Fanning their friendship at every turn and promoting Gen. Weyland's good will with well deserved praise and gratitude, he gave him and the whole XIX TAC a feeling of importance and a keen sense of belonging. There was nothing Weyland and his airmen would not have done for Patton in return. See also the epilogue on page 353 for biographies of the General's Weyland and Sanders.
1942
SEPTEMBER 1942
Sep 28
The 563rd Signal A. W. Battalion was formed at Drew Field, a little north of Tampa, Florida. It was activated on Paragraph 1 of General Order 44 of the Headquarters Army Air Base on 28 September 1942 and was stationed at Drew Field as a training unit and as such processed many inductees and placed them in units under the orders of the Fourth Signal Air Warning Training Battalion. The original TO&E was 11-440 which authorized 45 Commissioned Officers, 17 Warrant Officers and 592 Enlisted men.
OCTOBER 1942
Oct 1
The 563rd was quartered at Drew Field, Tampa Florida.
Oct 10
Capt. Merl Crowley of the 501st Signal Air Warning Regiment and five Lieutenants were recent graduates of the Eastern Signal Corps Officer Candidate School were assigned and joined.
Oct 13
Capt. Merl Crowley assumed command of the 563rd. Eight-one enlisted men from the 551st Signal Air Warning Battalion were assigned to the battalion.
Oct 21
The battalion was moved from Drew Field, Tampa, Florida to Plant Park, Tampa, Florida.
Oct 30
On 30 October 1943 the battalion issued a Historical Report. It covered the period from 25 September 1942 thru 25 December 1942 as follows;
Oct 31
The strength of the battalion was Commissioned Officers 10, Warrant Officers 0 and enlisted men 96.
NOVEMBER 1942
Nov 19
The 563rd lived in the hutment area at 10th and F Streets on Drew Field.
Nov 20
A detachment, later to become Company C, departed for the Sarasota Air Base, Sarasota, Florida for Field Training."
Two hundred and twelve men were assigned from the 501st Signal Air Warning Regiment. The unit was moved to Drew Field and were quarter in the hutment area at 10th and F Streets on Drew Field.
DECEMBER 1942
Dec 1
Lt. Col. Robert W. Maloney assumed command on.
Dec 3
Lt. Col. Maloney was transferred out and Lt. Col. Ron T. Richards assumed command of the 563rd.
Dec 27
The Battalion was reorganized on General Orders 72 Par 1 Headquarter Army Air Base, Drew Field, Florida to consist of a Headquarters and Plotting Company, Company A, Company B, Company C, and Company D.
31 Dec
The strength of the Battalion was increased to Commissioned Officers 75, Warrant Officers 0, enlisted men 585.
MAY 1943
MAY 31
Capt. Roger F. Detman assumed command of the 563rd.
AUGUST 1943
Aug 3
Capt. Alfred A. Foard assumed command of the 563rd.
Aug 31
Maj. Charles F. Smithson assumed command of the 563rd.
OCTOBER 1943
Oct 1
Maj. Thomas F. Fitzgerald assumed command of the 563rd.
Oct 6
Lt. Col. William McBride was the Commanding Officer of the 4th Training Battalion when he was transferred into the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion on 6 October 1943. He issued 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion General Order 11 assuming command and relieving Maj. Thomas F. Fitzgerald. Maj. Maurice E. Byrne was also transferred into the battalion on this day but the new commanding officer of the 4th Training Battalion who replaced Lt. Col. McBride, on the recommendation of his Executive Officer, would not release Maj. Byrne at that time. The Executive Officer of the 4th Training Battalion had also been Lt. Col. McBride's Executive Officer in the 4th Training Battalion. The reason given for the delay in transferring Maj. Byrne to make him responsible for breaking in the new S-4 of the 4th Training Battalion. This delay went on for several weeks.
Oct 7
Lt. Col. McBride issued General Order 11 transferring himself into the Battalion from units in the Fourth Signal Air Warning Training Battalion where he was the Commanding Officer.
The 4th Taining Battalion supervised the unit organization and training of Air Warning Signal Units designated for overseas shipment. At that time the unit was designated for shipment to England for assignment to the invasion of the continent. Lt. Col. McBride was a American Telephone and Telegraph executive in civilian life and was an officer in the Massachusetts National Guard. He had served in combat in the famous "Yankee" Division in World War I as a First Sergeant. Although he was commissioned as an Infantryman his expertise in communications dictated his assignment to the Signal Corps.
He selected his headquarters staff and company commanders from personnel in the Training Battalion. The Signal Corps orga- nizations were team oriented. A battalion with company commanders would be assigned teams which became platoons in the companies. Within several weeks all the teams were assigned and the Battalion was full strength. They were then moved out into a maneuver area for unit training. Maj. Byrne was appointed Executive Officer and S3 of the Battalion, just previous to this he had been S-3 of the Fourth Training Battalion. In civil life he was an Electrical Engineer for the Idaho Power Company and was a Reserve Officer inducted into the Air Corps as an Aircraft Engineering officer at Hamilton Field near San Francisco, California. Later the Air Corps transferred all that were Electrical Engineers to the Signal Corps for duty in Radar units and subsequently sent to Harvard University for advanced electronics and then to the RAF radar School in Clinton, Ontario, Canada. Lt. Robert O. Schurke was assigned to the 563rd as Adjutant. He also had served as adjutant for the Fourth Training Battalion as Battalion Adjutant to Lt. Col. McBride.
Oct 18
On 18 October Lt. Col. McBride issued the first Training Schedule himself, with the aid of Lt. Schurke and the following Schedule was issued to be effective during the period 18 October to 23 Oct. At the time the Battalion was still short Company B. Note that the training week ended with inspection by him. This was always an inspection of troops and a retreat parade. Other training schedules during this period just prior to the starting of final operations training in the field were not preserved. Note the adherence to basics in the training. Lt. Col. McBride's idea was to start out with finished soldiers then let them apply what they had learned in technical schools.
The Operational Field training was put into motion in November and several of the Training Situations were preserved. The operational training was a simulation of combat operations which were set in motion by the issuance of a Field Order. These field orders were written in the same form as an actual combat field order and contained the plans the units were to follow in the simulated training. These field orders were issued along with appendices, some of which were detailed maps of where the units were to bivouac and the placement of the radars.
Most of the history of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion that has been related in the history and in these transactions occurred after the Battalion was designated to serve in the Task Force for the invasion of the Germany.
On 18 November the following Training Order No 1 was issued and this started the final operational training of the Battalion in the field. Training was under the supervision of the Battalion Plans and Training Staff and Lt. Paul E. Rapp was the S-3. The Battalion was operating for training from the 563rd Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) manual written by Maj. Byrne while still assigned to the 4th Training Battalion. During the operational training period this document was updated and finished up by Lt. Rapp. This document was well received by the Overseas Shipment Inspection Team and the 4th Training Battalion adopted it for future units receiving operational training for overseas's assignments. The Operational Training Schedule follows for the period of 18-23 Octonber follows on the following pages and on the same day the Training Directive was issued by Lt. Rapp under Lt. Col. McBride's direction. The Battalion was located in the Bivoac area north of Drew Field where the temporary headquarters Unit Training ScheduleUnit Training Schedulewere located. Following it the Training Order:
TRAINING ORDER
NO 1
1. INDIVIDUAL SPECIALISTS TRAINING
a. The individual specialists training for personnel will be completed on 20 November 1943. By that time all individuals will have had sufficient training as individuals to enable them to conform with the standards prescribed in AAF Training Standards 10- 2-1, the teams will have been formed and functioned as teams and each team member will understand his function within the team.
b. On 21 November 1943 unit training will begin. For this phase all individuals will eat and sleep in the field, instruction and operations will be carried on, on 24 hour a day basis with full field equipment at close in distances. This phase will continue until 26 November 1943.
2. CLOSE IN OPERATIONAL UNIT TRAINING PHASE
a. In this phase stress will be put into instruction of teams in the SOP, the set-up and takedown of equipment and facilities, continuation of certain Basic subjects, and actual operations. No emphasis will be put on camouflage and defense of an area. During this phase practice will be conducted in the installation of defensive measures only inasmuch as the teamwork is involved. Consequently, any defensive measures will be in the nature of instruction and demonstration. Instruction will be carried out on the basic subjects listed in Par 4a Warning Order 1 and shifts will be arranged in accordance with Training Schedule 23 November to 26 November so as to include medical training listed thereon which will be conducted in the Battalion Mess by the Battalion Surgeon.
b. Radar Platoons will stress takedown and set-up of radars. Each set will be taken down and set up by each crew a minimum of three times one of which will be in a blackout. instructions will continue in SOP for reporting and familiarization with the SOP for preventative Maintenance. Whenever possible, radars will report into the I.C. by reduced power radio. Radio teams will work actual field nets instructions and will continue on SOP for preventative maintenance. Great stress will be put on set-up and take down All members of teams will practice setting up, tuning and take-down. Radio operators will perform simple 1st echelon maintenance on actual sets. Repairmen will do trouble shooting.
c. Filter teams will set up three filter and operations rooms in accordance with Annex A and B Warning Order 1. Stress will be put on setting up and taking down ICS equipment. Plotting and filtering will be carried on from information sent in by radars when operating and by cannery when they are not operating.
d. Ground observers will continue instruction in voice proce- dure, recognition and will stress set-up and take-down of radio equipment and laying field wire. Each member will practice set-up, tuning and breakdown of radios and will perform simple 1st echelon maintenance on radios.
e. Administrative personnel will continue to process records and complete all files and records. Unit files will be shaken down to the point where they are left with minimum essential equipment as authorized in POW 4k (4) and will prepare their excess records for storage as per POW 44w, WD cir 28/43 and AR 345-19.
By order of Lt. Col. McBride
Robert O. Schurke
1st Lt. Sig C
Adjutant
OFFICIAL:
Paul E. Rapp
1st Lt. Sig C
S-3
Oct 29
In a letter from General (Hap) Arnold to the CG 3rd Air Force the 555th, 566th and 573rd Signal Air Warning Battalions were to be prepared for overseas shipment by 15 November 1943 and the 563rd and the 564th were to be prepared for overseas shipment by 1 January 1944.
NOVEMBER 1943
Nov 12
Following is Field Order 2 which set up the training situation for the operational training:
Field Order
No 2
Maps Operations Map (annex 2)
Sectional Aeronautical Charts M8 and C8
Hillsboro County FSR Dept 1936 1/63,000
Polk County FSR Dept 1936 1/63,000
USC and G Survey 14 January 1943 1,500,000
1. a. An enemy task force has assembled off the north coast of SOUTH AMERICA and is steaming towards the west coast of FLORIDA. It is believed the enemy will attempt a landing in the vicinity of TAMPA. The strength of the enemy force is unknown.
b. The 563rd Signal AW Battalion is attached to the 2nd Air Division for air Warning. The 2nd Air Division is in direct support of the II Corps and will operate within the boundaries of the II Corps. Boundaries of the II Corps are a line from BRADENTON to FROSTPROOF on the South and a line from TAMPA to HAINES CITY on the North. The I Corps is in the north sector and the III Corps is in the south sector. The I Corps is supported by the 1st Air Division and the III Corps is supported by the 3rd Air Division. The Command post of the 2nd Air Division is at LAKELAND, II Corps Command post is located at BARTOW.
2. The Battalion will move in four columns into pre reconnoitered operational positions in the vicinity of BARTOW (U7087). Provide aircraft warning for the sector. The head of the first column will pass the IP at 1500 27 November and the remaining columns will pass the IP at 10 minutes interval in the following order.
Column 2 1500
Column 3 1510
Column 1 1520
Column 4 1530
The IP will be the intersection of MEMORIAL HIGHWAY and HILLSBORO AVENUE. Column 1 will consist of the 4th Reporting Platoon Company A Column 2 will consist of Headquarters Company Column 3 will consist of the Headquarters platoon 2nd Reporting 3rd Reporting Platoon of Company A, and VHF team from 4th Training Battalion. Column 4 will consist of the 1st Reporting Platoon of Company A. (Annex 2 Route of March). Each echelon will set up operations immediately on arrival at their operational site.
3. a. Headquarters and Plotting Company will set up 3 combined rooms in the woods 3 miles north of BARTOW (UC6891) (Warning Order 1 Annex A and B Radio Nets and Filter Room arrangement), Ground observer system will be set up as follows:
Relay Station
Post Number Location Letter Location
1 UC4863 A UC4560
B UC4563
C UC4567
2 UC5273 A UC5072
B UC4571
C UC5076
3 UC5283
A UC5185
B UC5176
C UC5185
4 UC5287
A UC5085
B UC5187
C UC5184
5 UC5396
A UC5196
B UC5053
C UC5298
6 UC5696
A UC5399
B UC5257
C PX5401
b. Company A with a VHF team attached from the 4th Signal AW Training Battalion will set up their radars as follows:
Platoon Location Initial Sweep
1st Platoon EW UC7763 220 to 340 deg
2nd Platoon GCI UO9772 215 to 320 deg
3rd Platoon GCI UC0179 240 to 325 deg
4th Platoon CHL PY9421 215 to 310 deg
VHF equipment and Company headquarters will be superimposed on the 2nd Platoon. One pair of field wire will be laid from the 3rd Platoon to the VHF equipment for control channel.
c. Company B is attached to the 6th Training Battalion. The Commanding Officer Company B will make reconnaissances before 3 December so that double sections of SCR-602 may be set up during darkness 4 December in the vicinity of the following points
1st Platoon Section 1 and 2 PX6603
Section 3 and 4 PX4803
2nd Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC4857
Section 3 and 4 UC4897
3rd Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC3886
4th Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC4268
Section 3 and 4 UC5360
5th Platoon Section 1 and 2 UC5360
Section 3 and 4 UC5360
Company headquarters will be superimposed on the 1st Platoon. At 0900 on 3 December the Commanding Officer Headquarters and Plotting Company will dispatch a 1 1/2 ton truck to BRADENTON to pick up 12 radio operators from Company B. these radio operators will be attached to Headquarters and Plotting Company to operate the NCS for the SCR-602 nets. On 3 December 1943 the filter center will be converted into 1 Ground Observer Filter room, 1 Radar filter room, and 12 combined room (Annex 3, Arrangement of Rooms)
4. a. The gasoline dump will be located in the bivouac area of Headquarters and Plotting Company. Each day empty gasoline containers will be brought to the dump and exchanged for full ones. effort will be made to furnish enough containers to furnish each installation enough fuel to last for a period of 48 hours. The initial supply of gasoline will be taken from this station in the containers now provided. The individual installation commanders will be responsible thereafter to furnish information regarding the daily consumption of fuel to the company supply officer. Company supply officers will be responsible to see that each installation in the company is properly supplied.
b. Rations will be drawn from kitchen PDO, Drew Field. Company supply officers will be responsible for the hauling of rations from Drew Field and for the break down of rations to the various kitchens within their companies. Company Commanders will be responsible to see that an accurate ration return is submitted daily.
c. Requisitions for clothing,clothing exchanges, salvage, and shoe repair will be turned in to the battalion supply officer not later than 1200 each Tuesday. Requisitions for supplies and equipment other than those mentioned above will be submitted to the Battalion supply officer not later then 1200 Thursdays. Only emergency requisitions will be submitted at other times. The battalion supply will be located in the vicinity of Headquarters and Plotting Company.
d. MESSAGE CENTER SCHEDULE
0600 Leave Battalion Headquarters at Bartow for Drew Field
0830 Arrive Drew Field (Fourth Training AWUTC, AAB, Drop Mail
0930 Return to Battalion Headquarters (Bartow)
1200 Arrive Battalion Headquarters
1230 Distribution and Pick UP Hq and Plotting Company
1300 Leave for Drew Field
1530 Arrive Drew Field Pick Up and make necessary distribution
1630 Return to Battalion Headquarters (Bartow)
2030 Distribution and pick up Headquarters and Plotting Co
2100 Leave for Company A Headquarters for distribution and pickup
2230 Arrive Company A Headquarters
2400 Arrive Battalion Headquarters (Bartow)
e. MORNING REPORTS AND ALL REPORTS due the following day will be submitted on the following pickups
Headquarters and Plotting Company at 2030
Company A 2230
f. COMPANY MAIL CLERKS will pick up and deliver mail once daily at Message Center. This run will be coordinated with Paragraph c regarding fuel.
g. SPECIAL MESSENGER SERVICE will be operated as needed
h. THREE runners will be supplied daily from Headquarters and Plotting Company on the following schedule.
0600 to 1200 (1 runner)
1200 to 1800 (1 runner)
1800 to 2400 (1 runner)
5. a. (1) See Index no 2 to SOI
(2) All nets will open 2400, 27 November. If contact is not made, each 1/4 hour on the 1/4 hour all stations will call for five minutes until contact is established. (Annex 4 Nets to be established 2400, 4 December)
b. (1) Command Posts: Battalion Headquarters Closes at present location 1500, 27 November and opens at the same time at the head of Column 2. Headquarters and Plotting Company 3 miles North of BARTOW (UC5488) after 1900 27 November
(2) Axes of signal communications rout of march
c. An advance information center will be established at woods 4 miles West of BARTOW (UC5488) and will open 2400, 4 December.
By Order of Lieutenant Colonel McBRIDE
MAURICE E. BYRNE
MAJ. SIGNAL CORPS
Executive
OFFICIAL:
PAUL E. RAPP
1st Lt. Sig C
S-3
Annex 1 Location of Sites
Annex 2 Routes of March
Annex 3 Arrangement of Rooms
Annex 4 Nets to be established 2400 4 December
DISTRIBUTION A
All the men of the battalion had previously had technical training and experience in their specialty and after several weeks of Unit training the 563rd received an excellent rating from the Training Command headquarters inspectors.
Following is Field Order 5 which is the order to govern the boarding of the trains to the New York Port of Embarkation:
FIELD ORDER) NO 5)
1. No tactical situation
2. The Battalion will entrain with all personnel, baggage and impedimenta at D time.
3. A. Train No 1
(1) Train Commander Capt. Glassow
(2) Train Transportation Officer Lt. Pohanish
(3) Train Mess Officer Lt. Drown
(4) Personnel of Headquarters and Plotting Company
Less (a) Executive Officer, S-3, Motor Officer to train #3
(b) Dental officer (to train #2)
(c) 8 officers and 30 men 3rd Filter Platoon train #2)
(d) 2 Medic enlisted men (to train #2)
(e) 2 Medic enlisted men (to train #3
(f) Battalion supply Sergeant (to train #3)
(5) Total officers 26 (1 car)
(6) Total enlisted men 351 (9 cars)
B. Train No 2
(1) Train Commander Lt. Slattery
(2) Train Transportation Officer Lt. Irwin
(3) Train Mess Officer Lt. Carr
(4) Personnel Reporting Company A 8 officers and 30 enlisted men 3rd
Filter Platoon, Dental Officer and 2 Medical enlisted men from Hq
and Plotting Company, 12 enlisted men from Reporting Company B
(5) Total officers 23 (1 car)
(6) Total enlisted men 276 (7 cars)
C. Train No 3
(1) Train Commander Capt. Root
(2) Train Transportation Officer Lt. Wilson
(3) Train Mess Officer Lt. Donton
(4) Personnel Reporting Company B less 12 enlisted men (to car #2) 1
Medical Officer (Attached) 2 Medical enlisted men, executive
officer, S-3, Motor Officer, Battalion Supply Sergeant from Hq
and Plotting Company
(5) Total Officers 20 (1 car)
(6) Total enlisted men 312 (8 cars)
X. Each Train Commander will line up the members of his train in a column of three files by platoons. The column for train 1 will be Column 1, the column for train 2 will be column 2 and the column for train 3 will be column 3. When marching to the train these three columns will march abreast and will be formed by the executive officer so that the columns will not cross when these columns separate to march alongside their respective trains. On the parade to the train, the columns will march in close order abreast the Battalion Commanding Officer and Battalion Executive Officer in front of the Column.
4. A. OFFICERS BAGGAGE. Twenty four hours before D time all officers will have brought their trunks and bed rolls to their company supply. Previous to bringing baggage to the company sully, it will have been marked according to instructions. This Baggage (bed roll and foot lockers) will not be sully again until the train is unloaded, therefore it will be necessary to put all your necessary clothing and equipment in your Hand Baggage and Field Bag. The field bag and hand baggage will be put in the coaches and the trunk and bed roll will be put in the baggage car. Two hours before D time, all officers will turn in their hand luggage to the company sully.
B. OFFICERS CLEARANCE. Forty-eight hours before D time one officer from each company will be assigned to obtain clearance for all the officers in the company. Of the officers who can not be cleared, a note will be made of the branch and the reason a clearance could not be obtained. Clearance will be obtained if at all possible twenty four hours before D time.
C. HAULING BAGGAGE. As soon as the baggage cars are spotted, the officers bed rolls and trunks will be hauled to the baggage cars along with the duffle bags of the enlisted men, as soon as the coaches are spotted. The officers hand luggage bags will be loaded in the officers car. When possible, the duffle bags of the enlisted men will be piled in sections of the car by platoon and by company.
D. UNIFORMS. Helmets, leggings, pistol or ammunition belt, harness, field bags, weapon, trench knife, gas masks will be worn. Carry overcoat on arm. Put necessary toilet articles, towels, 2 pairs clean wool socks, 2 handkerchiefs, 2 pairs clean underwear, mess kit, and gloves in field bag.
E. MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT. Will be earmarked immediately after receipt of movement order. Excess equipment will be turned in to property branches under supervision of the S-4. Excess company records will be turned in to the Base under the supervision of the Adjutant, see POM 4k,44w, WD Cir 26/43 and ARS 345-10.
F. DUTIES OF TRAIN OFFICERS
(1) TRAIN COMMANDERS (see AR 55-145 par 14)
(2) TRAIN TRANSPORTATION OFFICER (see AR 55-145 par 15)
(3) TRAIN MESS OFFICER (see AR 55-145 par 16)
(4) TRAIN COMMANDER will appoint a car commander for each car. He will reserve an officers car or part of a car. Reserve a train dispensary, Reserve a cooks section near the kitchen
G. Each train commanding officer will be responsible for installing his own kitchen, arranging for the kitchen police and cooks, drawing his mess funds, securing a stock of rations. Each Company Commander will be responsible for the loading of baggage of individuals in his company.
H. Previously to lining up for the parade to the train each train commander will obtain capacities to each car and divide his column up so that when the column marches abreast the train the correct number of men will peel off at each car starting at the rear of the column. When the head or the column reaches the end of the train all groups should be ready to mount and the first man just outside of the door for his car. Three groups will be arranged so there will be one officer with each car to supervise loading and repeat the commands. He will load last. The train Commander will load the train by blowing a whistle and each car will load simultaneously one file at a time, the inside file first. When the last man has loaded the Train Commander will have given the signal to the Conductor to move out the train.
I. Headquarters and Plotting Company will load its baggage in cars in Train 1, Company A on Train 2 and Company D on train 3.
J. Mail will be collected by the train commander and held until arrival at destination where it will be turned over to the Battalion Executive Officer for disposition.
K. Immediately after entraining, Platoon Officers will give one hour instruction on safeguarding military information.
L. No one will leave the train at any time without direct permission of the Train Commander.
5. A. Battalion Headquarters OP will close at present location at D time and open the same time at Train no 1.
B. There will be no communications whatsoever except official business by the Train Commanders.
BY ORDER OF LT. COL. McBRIDE
MAURICE E. BYRNE
MAJ. SIG CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OFFICIAL:
PAUL E. RAPP
1ST LT. SIG C
S-3
JANUARY 1944
Jan 12
The Battalion was given movement orders to move by special train to Camp Shanks in New York which was the European Theater staging center for the New York Port of Debarka- tion. After some administrative, medical and supply checks the 563rd was assigned to board the Cunard Line Steamship the Queen Mary to England and sailed from New York harbor on January 22. Many thousand troops were to be carried on the trip including some Canadian troops, Antiaircraft Artillery and General Hospital units. There was also on board the 555th Signal Air Warning Battalion which would later be assigned to the U.S. First Army. Lt. Col. McBride was assigned to supervise the mess operations for the voyage which was the biggest job on board and set up serving lines in the swimming pool area. Maj. Byrne was appointed the B deck commander. The staterooms and salons of the Mary all had four to over six deck bunks installed depending on the ceiling height. The bunks were in rows and very little space was open.
The mess served two meals a day and each group was as-signed a time to eat. Once a day there was boat drill where each group proceeded by a scheduled route to the deck and lifeboat area where they were as- signed. Boat drill were the only time (other than going to meals) that the troops were allowed out of their living area. On deck was the only time smoking was permitted. The ship's plumbing used ocean water in order to conserve the fresh water for cooking and drinking. The fresh water was turned on for about an hour a day for brief showers and to fill the canteens of the passengers for drinking water.
The Queen Mary traveled solo through submarine infested waters because of its great speed. To increase safety it would zigzag its course. It was smooth sailing the first half of the voyage and especially when going through the gulf stream. When it approached the North Sea the going became very rough and the large waves coupled with the zigzagging made it quite unpleasant. At times the estimated height of the waves was a fifty feet. The Mary docked in the Firth of Clyde at Greenock in Northern Scotland.
The troops were shipped in two serials, by railway, to Remnham Haunts Station near Henley on Thames where they located in the Park. The station was also housed the 573rd Signal A. W. Battalion and Lt. Col. McBride assumed command of the station and Lt. Col. Oscar E. Everett who commanded the 573rd battalion was the station executive Officer. The area was enlarged by British erecting personnel and work and equipment tents were installed adjacent to the 573rd Battalion. Days were spent in draining and improving the muddy grounds and in building sidewalks and roads. During the month of February one half of the battalion personnel were transferred out, absorbed in general by the 555th, 564th and 573rd Signal A. W. Battalions. This personnel was replaced by 26 officers and 450 enlisted men. Most of the remaining personnel were sent to British RAF schools in their various specialties. Four LW teams, one GCI team and CHB team went to Number 21 school at Renscombe Downs for study in field operations.
Radio personnel attended radio school at Yatesbury, Wiltshire for technical and operational training. The filter platoons and filter officers studied the newest systems at the RAF Filter School at Bawdsey. Twenty three Enlisted men and five Officers from ground observer platoons were sent to Chigwell, to learn assault training. The remaining ground observer personnel was studying aircraft identifi- cation and procedure with British instructors at the Remenham Haunts station. The two GCI platoons and one CHB platoon went into operational training in the field near the advanced site. Soon after this the 563rd Advanced Headquarters was sent to camp in a location near an English Air Base near Andover. The 563rd was to operate British Radar and the teams were sent to training schools. The plan was to send the teams to schools for further deployment and to have these teams replaced with teams who had already been trained. The result of this plan is that most of the operating platoon's would be new
to he battalion and the new men would be the ones who would go into combat. There was some delays caused by supply of some radio equipment. Instead of moving the unit to Andover the high command ordered the 563rd assigned to the 100th Fighter Wing which was designated to be the Tactical Air operators for the Third U.S. Army. At this time Top-Secret Operations "Over- lord" was divulged to those who needed to know. The 563rd head- quarters moved to Lashenden a few miles south of Headcorn which is about ten miles south of Maidstone where the 100th Fighter Wing had their command center. Next the company's went out to practice sites along the Southern coast of England.
The XIX Tactical Air Support Command was activated in England on 29 November 1943. It was redesignated the XIX Tactical Air Command on 24 April 1944. It was located at Aldermaston Court in England February 1944. It was commanded by Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland. The headquarters moved to France in July 1944.
The 100th Fighter Wing was activated in England on 24 November 1944. On 15 April they were located in Lashenden, England which is several miles south of Headcorn and about 45 miles south east of the center of London. The headquarters landed in France and located at Criqueville on 1st of July and it was commanded by Brig. Gen. Homer L. Sanders until V.E. day.
The 19th Tactical Control Group was a provisional unit set up at Rennes about 6 August and was part of the 100th Fighter Wing headquarters. In December 1944 Col. Harry French assumed command. See Appendix X for a more detailed structure of the Tactical Control Center and personnel operating it.
The 312th Fighter Control Squadron was commanded by Maj. Noble L. Hull and just prior to D-Day they were stationed at Headcorn, England.
The 316th Fighter Control Squadron was commanded by Maj. John Kersch.
The 563rd battalion organization was normal and consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters company with three Operating Com- panies (A,B and C). Each Company operated a Forward Director Post (FDP) and had a platoon of Light Radar (LW) and a platoon of Ground Observers (GO). On the landing the strength of the battalion was 69 officers, 6 warrant officers and 948 enlisted men. The battalion was authorized on TO & E 11-400. The battalion had variations in strength due to transfers and attachments and on October 1944 the strength was 67 officers, 6 warrant officers and 943 enlisted men. Initially the operating units of the battalion were as follows:
Company A Company B Company C
Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq
IC 1 IC 2 IC 3
FDP1 FDP2 FDP3
LW1 LW2 LW3
GO1 Posts GO2 Posts GO3 Posts
Able George Mike
Baker How Oboe
Charlie Jig Peter
Dog King Queen
Fox Love Roger
Headquarters Co Company D
IC4 Co Hq IC = Information Center
FDP4 LW31 FDP= Forward Director Post
LW4 LW321 LW = Lightweight Radar
GO3 Posts LW332 GO = Ground Observer
Sugar LW343
Tare LW354
Uncle
Victor
William
FDP4 functioned like the other FDP's except that GO4 Ground Observer Platoon did not report into the FDP as in the other FDP's. GO4 went into combat attached to Company A and reported into FDP1. All of the Ground Observer Platoons were attached to the Company that best suited the then current operations Headquarters Company Communications Platoon was tactically under the Battalion Headquarters command. There was also a radar repair unit attached to provide parts and repair signal equipment and particularly for the British Radar units that the Battalion operated. This was a Depot Aviation Repair Crew from the 925th Signal Company.
All Companies had the normal company supply, mess, motor and communications sections, as well as a FDP radar platoon commanded by an electronics officer which included a plotting, filtering and communications operations center, a LW (light weight) platoon commanded by an electronics officer and a Ground Observer Platoon commanded by an Infantry trained officer.
A special note must be made for Company D. Before D-Day Co- mpany D consisted of 12 Light Warning platoons and were detached from the 563rd Battalion and assigned to the AAA command of the 9th Air Defense Command. During operations in central France the composition of the radars changed to five platoons of LW radar. They functioned superbly on that assignment until late in the winter of 1945 when they were returned to the 563rd in more a less a piecemeal fashion. The men were retrained for operation of the BACU units. Not many of their operational locations are known and details of their combat operations are abbreviated because most of the time Company D was under functioning in another command. There is an account of their operations in Appendix XIII. All other operations in conjunction with the 563rd Battalion are included in the history of the Company and unit the men were re-assigned to in 1945.
In September 1944 the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was attached and designated FDP5. It also had normal supply, mess, motor and communications sections and a MEW radar operating platoon and a plotting and filtering and communications section. FDP5 had no LW platoon or GO platoon.
Later in the campaign the battalion received state of the art microwave radar which were SCR-584 Anti Aircraft gun laying radar modified for close control of aircraft called BACU units (Battle area Control units). They were sometimes attached to the companies and in the final battles were employed directly by the Army Corps Air Liaison Officer at Corps headquarters. These units were manned by men from Company D who were retrained for that purpose.
The Battalion headquarters had the following staff.
Adjutant and headquarters administration
S1 Personnel and pay records
S2 Intelligence, mail and message center
S3 Operations and Plans
S4 Supplies, Ration and Headquarters transportation.
Surgeon with Dental Officer and Medical staffOrganization at Beginning of CombatOrganization at Ending of CombatChaplain
The Battalion Executive Officer also functioned as the S3 and when appropriate as the Commander of the Advanced Echelon and conducted advanced site reconnaissance.
As the campaign developed there were changes, for example the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was added on the 19th of September 1944 and then functioned as FDP5. Also Light Warning Radar Company D was detached from the 563rd and attached to an Army Antiaircraft Artillery unit.
The Command and Staff of the 563rd at the time of the channel crossing is listed below: (see Editors Note 2 below)
Commanding Lt. Col. William L. McBride
Exec Maj. Maurice E. Byrne
Adjutant Lt. Robert O. Schurke
S3 Lt. Harold E. Waeckerle
Operations Chief Tech/5th Alfred Madl
Battalion Sgt/Maj William A. Hunziker
Chief Clerk Sgt Robert Wesley
Operations Chief Sgt Robert Norton
S1 Lt. John J. Reynolds
Personnel Operations Tech Sgt. Chester R. Kasczynski
TCC Filter Officer Lt. Godfrey A. Welham
TCC Filter Officer Lt. Robert S. McSpadden
TCC Filter Officer Lt. Loyal W. Crosby
S2 & Message Center WO. Vernon Mills
Chaplain Capt. Arthur T. Engell
Hq Communications Officer Lt. Lewis F. Janek
BACU Platoons (added later)
BACU1
Commanding Lt. Emre T. Altman
Commanding Lt. Cobbs
BACU4
Commanding Lt. Jack F. Roberts
BACU2
Commanding Lt. Lloyd G. Martinsen
BACU3
S4 Capt. Mac Ray
Supply operation chief M/Sgt Charles E. Pollina
Motor Officer WO John J. Sappington
Surgeon Maj. Yashar A. Venar
[Editors Note 2--- The list cannot be guaranteed to be accurate because the records sometimes did not
have the proper rank designations. Some of the listing had to be supplied from memory which may not
be accurate. It was tried to give the rank that the person had at the time of the record]
Dental Surgeon Joseph D. Goldberg
Special Unit
HQ MW LW (joined in June)
Commanding Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill
Radar Officer Lt. Robert Homan
Headquarters Company
Commanding Lt. Paul E. Rapp
Mess Sgt S/Sgt Herman Messinger
Motor Sgt T/Sgt Joseph G. Bates
Co Supply Lt. Charles (NMI) Pohanish
Commanding FDP4 Radar Platoon Lt. Frank Van Camp
FDP4 Radar Platoon Tech WO. Stark
Radar Platoon Admin Officer Lt. Woodrow W. Cole
Commanding LW4 Platoon Lt. George B. Dorroh
Commanding GO4 Platoon Lt. Jimmie V. Duncan
FDP4 Filter Officer Lt. Delbert Cole
FDP4 Filter Officer Lt. Thomas J. Walker, Jr.
FDP4 Filter Officer Lt. Godfrey A. Welham
Company A
Commanding Capt. Thomas Slattery
Company Exec Lt. Richard T. Goncher
First/Sgt Matthew C. Bertrand
Mess Sgt S/Sgt Frank M. Rocco
Supply Sgt S/Sgt John F. Kiser
Company Supply Officer Lt. Hubert W. Scott
Commanding FDP1 Radar Platoon Lt. Will McAdam
FDP1 Radar Platoon Tech WO. Gantzhorn
Commanding LW1 Platoon
Commanding GO1 Platoon Lt. Lawrence A. Keefer
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. John L. Nolan
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Wesley J. Howard
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Willfred T. Smith
Lt. Carl V. Lazarone
Lt. Joseph J. Faro
Company B
Commanding Capt. Claudius G. Farrow
Company Exec Lt. Wayne C. Hayward
Commanding FDP2 Radar Platoon Lt. David A. Pritchard
FDP2 Radar Platoon Tech WO. William F. Church
Commanding GO2 Platoon Lt. Charles W. Root
Surgeon Capt. John P. Michaels
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Loyal W. Crosby
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. John C. DiLeo
FDP1 Filter Officer Lt. Neal Rabogliatti
Lt. Frederick H. Fahner
Lt. James H. Carr
Company C
Commanding Capt. Franklyn A. Glassow
First/Sgt Jack Goodman
Company Administrative Officer Lt. Benjamin F. Guttenberger
Company Supply Officer Lt. Thomas W. Kenyon
Commanding FDP3 Radar Platoon Lt. Robert K. Slaven
FDP3 Radar Platoon Tech WO. Theodore A. Malkin
Commanding LW3 Platoon Lt. James D. Tate
Commanding GO3 Platoon Lt. David R. Schultze
FDP3 Filter Officer Lt. Donald W. Hobbs
FDP3 Filter Officer Lt. Charles A. Stewart
FDP3 Filter Officer Lt. Clair B. Watson
Company D
Commanding Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr.
Company Supply Officer Lt. Gordon R. Wilson
Commanding LW30 Lt. Jack F. Roberts
Commanding LW31 Lt. Oliver H. Smith
Commanding LW32 Lt.Edgar A. Franz
Commanding LW33 Lt. Lloyd G. Martinsen
Commanding LW34 Lt. Curtis E. Owen
Commanding LW35 Lt. Thomas J. Walker, Jr.
Lt. Donald P. Burns
Lt. Robert P. Feldman
Lt. Martin Dworshak
738th Signal Air Warnming Company (Joined Sep. 1944)
Commanding Capt. John A. Easton
Company Exec Officer Lt. Thomas L. McInturff
Company Adjutant and Personnel Officer Lt. Norman N. Morse
Senior Radar Tech Officer Lt. Allen B. Reppert
Senior Filter Officer Lt. Godfrey A. Welham (563rd SAWB)
FDP5 Chief Air Controller Capt. Clarence Long (316th FCS)
FDP5 Chief Filter Officer Lt. Temple Smith
Company Medical Officer Capt. Kaufman
During Combat from June 28th 1944 through May 7th 1945 the following changes were made in command and staff of the 563rd Bat- talion. Here again most of these changes had to be from memory which can be inaccurate. The changes recalled were:
Maj. Julius L. Levy replaced Maj. Yashar A. Venar as Battalion Surgeon when Maj. Venar transferred to a Fi eld hospital to do surgery.
Maj. Grigsby was in and out as Battalion Surgeon
Capt. Claudius G. Farrow was put in command of Hq. Co. and later he was transferred out of the 448th Signal Construction Battalion as Commanding Officer
Lt. Wetherill's SCR-582 platoon was transferred to Company C
Maj. Walter N. Levin replaced Maj. Levy as Battalion Surgeon
Lt. William A. Wright was put in Command of Hq. Co.
Lt. John L. Nolan was promoted to Capt., transferred to Company B and placed in command of Co. B
Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr. was put in command of Co C
Capt. Glassow was transferred to Battalion Headquarters as S3
Lt. Waeckerle was put on duty with the XIX TAC Signal section
Lt. Richard T. Viergever was appointed Hq. Communications Officer when Lt. Lewis P. Janek was in the Hospital
Lt. Paul E. Rapp was put in command of FDP4 (Provisional) and later was transferred to the 738th Signal Air Warning Company when FDP4 was deactivated.
Lt. Lewis F. Janek was reappointed Hq. Communications O.
Lt. Clair B. Watson was transferred to Hq. Co. TCC Filter O
An inquiry was sent out to several Headquarters Platoon members in December 1994 and on 19 April 1995 Woodward C. Carlile (then Sgt) answered as follows;
"John E. Phillipo was Col. McBride's driver and I can verify that Spears L. Tipton and Clyde Grubb were drivers for the Message Center. I was a Buck Sergeant in the Platoon Headquarters and along with general clerical duties, I was also the Battalion File Clerk. However, the sergeants at Battalion Headquarters also served as Sergeant of the Guard, assisted in retreat ceremonies, made roster posting, etc. We did not have a First Sergeant. I be- lieve Sgt/Maj William Hunziker with the help of Sgt Chester Kasczynski and Sgt Robert Wesley took care of the duties normally performed by a company First Sergeant.
I was with the 563rd from the beginning and I was present on the 30 November 1943 roster. (see Editors Note 3 on the following page) I also worked in the processing line at Drew Field, processing other units for overseas (Service Records, Medical Shots, Training Records, etc), before Col. McBride was the 563rd Commander. I always assumed that I was working under him, while doing the processing duties.
Over the long haul, Sgt/Maj Hunziker, Sgt Kasczynski, Sgt Wesley and myself comprised the makeup of Battalion Headquarters. Of course, we were under the very capable leadership of Capt. Robert O. Schurke.
I think we were somewhat "family" and I look back on the Battalion Headquarters association with a great deal of warmth, and deep appreciation of Col. McBride, Capt. Schurke and the Sergeants and acknowledging the others handled the operations in a superb manner while was left to us."
FDP1, FDP2,FDP3 and FDP4 were equipped with British made Type 15 and Type 11 Radar and LW1, LW2, LW3 and LW4 were equipped with British made LW units. FDP5 had American made MEW Radar and several British made Type 11 Range Finding Radars. The BACU units were equipped with American made SCR-584 radar which were rede signed from the mission of Anti Aircraft gun laying to accurate, automatic tracking radar. There was a Headquarters SCR-582 microwave unit for highly mobile situations.
In order to give several more slants on the technical operations of the Battalion, here follows the report of the XIX TAC sig- nal Section History and the 19th Tactical Control Group SOP. It is thought that our unit history along with the following documents would more completely explain the operations of the Battalion in combat.
The Signal Section of XIX TAC had a great fascination of the FDP operations and reported in "Signals", the XIX TAC Signal Sec- tion History and this is what they reported:
FDP and MEW control is both complex and fascinating. It is here at the small consoles, kept dark to show up the florescent figures, that the drama of air and ground unfolds. Here the con- troller's responsibility is to take the orders of the TCC and convert them into R/T instructions to the pilots above. Here on the PPI scope (Planned Position Indicator) is the actual moving
"blip" which indicates a flight of fighters on the way to intercept an enemy raid, or a flight being steered back to its field through an overcast. Or it may be a flight of Bombers out to
past a German oil target or a marshaling yard. Or it may be a
line pilot badly hit by flak or by a Jerry ME-109, trying to push his plane just that on mile more to get behind our lines before bailing out. Or, it may be a "Black Widow" P-61 of the 425th Night Fighter Squadron flying through pitch blackness searching
out enemy raiders, or on his way to do a little "intruding on Jerry, bent on raising all the possible hell he can before he
turns home.
[Editors Note 3--- The 30 November 1943 roster was made when the Headquarters Company was organized as a Headquarters and Plotting Battalion Headquarters company. It contained practically all the Officers and the Combat Headquarters and Headquarters Company but the men in the Plotting Platoon were transferred out to other units. Those in Battalion Supply and Motor Pool section, Mess Section, Personnel and Pay Section, S-2 Intelligence section, S-3 Operations section also remained in the Headquarters Company. I can verify the members of the S-3 Section and that was Tech/5th Alfred W. Madl and Lt. Waeckerle for several months until he was put on duty at XIX TAC Signal Section.]
At the FDP itself, there are two radars, British type 11 and type 15. While one set was being used by the controller, the other one sweeps its area of coverage, to provide early warning. Technical personnel of the 563rd SAW Battalion have ingeniously made the facilities of both sets to the controllers, thus allowing thee latter to switch from one set to the other, without moving out of the working van.
Regardless of the pilot's mission, the controller, in the darkened van has, and feels, an obligation to help the flight in every way possible. He will warn him of flak areas. He will warn him of approaching aircraft with his "Bogeys one o'clock, 8 miles", or, "Heads up. Bandits in the area". He will "sweat out" every single mile of the trip back with the pilot of a damaged ship. He will try to position fighters advantageously for an interception, try to get relative heights and distances. and take as much pride in a "kill" or other successful job as the pilot himself. And he is probably more reproachful to himself, for any error on his part, than is the leader of the flight. He is one of God's unhappiest creatures when, in the middle of an important mission, his scope as well as FM radio lines are suddenly "blanked out" by jamming devices such as "Carpet", "Window" or "Chaff", used by our bombers on their way into enemy territory. He will then try, by "D.R" (Dead Reckoning"), to help his
mission, using D/F and quickly switching to the less affected type 11 PPI scope for control. Often, however, valuable time has been lost before the controller can "see" his flight on the scope once again, and the anguished fellow is by then fit for admission to the "Home for Prematurely Gray Controllers".
Light Warning (LW) units of the SAW Battalion are positioned so as to cover areas that are blind to the radars at the FDP, and to give auxiliary coverage. Most important of these blind spots is the one created by the ground ray of the Type 11 and Type 15. To give continuous 24 hour operation, the LW's work in pairs and thus the LW's supplement the work of the FDP's. The FDP can then "track" many targets that otherwise would be lost.
Each FDP also has an Information Center (I.C). These are so- called because they get there the information from the radars, type 11 and 15, the LW set attached to each FDP and the visual observa- tions made by the Ground Observers. The information appears on a filter table, and is than passed on to the TCC, via land line or FM radio. The main plotting table at the TCC thus represents the latest plots from all the components of the Control System.
The Battle area control units were SCR-584 radar units which were built for antiaircraft artillery gun laying duty. They were modified so that the radar antenna was electrically connected to an X-Y plotter. The electronics could be latched on to the radar echo from an aircraft to be guided (or tracked) and the plotter would automatically follow the target so its path could be plotted on the board. The controller could guide an aircraft to a predetermined location and the automatic bomb laying electronics would determine the flight elevation and signal when to release the bombs. When first put into commission the sites areas to cover were assigned by the XIX TAC and the 563rd battalion S3 would make a reconnaissance with the BACU commander then the BACU would contact the Corps Air Liaison and carry out the missions assigned. Soon the TAC altered this procedure and assigned the units directly to the Corps Air Officer. There is therefore few battalion records of who the units were employed but the
BACU's did report in their location so their location's are known but their accomplishments were sometimes kept by the Air Officers at The Corps that had operational control of them.
Having said this let us get several more slants on BACU op- eration. The Signal Section of XIX TAC had a admiration of the BACU operations and reported in "Signals", the XIX TAC Signal Sec- tion History and this is what they reported:
Of all the Radar devices which have been pouring from our scientific laboratories since America rolled up its sleeves and went to war, few are as intriguing to both layman and technician alike, as the BACU--Battle Area Control Unit, better known as the modified SCR-584. Originally designed to work as gun-laying radar for Ack-Ack batteries, the SCR-584 was given some plastic surgery by BBRL (British Branch Radiation Laboratory), to perform an add- itional job. This was to display the location of any airplane in the area as a small moving spot of light on a map, using a gadget affectionately termed "the bug". This phenomenon is known as "automatic tracking", and is achieved as soon as the Radar "locks on" to the ship up above.
This highly mobile Radar is thus capable of determining with an amazing degree of accuracy the location of any given plane. For tactical purposes the possibility of a piece of equipment that will allow a controller to see the exact geographical spot over which a flight of P-47's is flying are enormous. To be able to control any number of aircraft and guide them to a pinpoints, regardless of weather, or the pitch-blackness of night, opens up a huge new horizon for Combat Operations. The advantage of being able to bomb an enemy target through a ten-tenths overcast, without having the pilot do more than fly level and release his two 500 ponders as soon as he hears the order over the radio, cannot be overrated. Night-photo missions which require coverage of specific hard to find areas are a "natural" for the BACU. And day-photo ships can be likewise vectored accurately along a particular line of flight. A flight of fighter bombers looking for an inconspicuous little village, which houses a vital
pickle factory or liverwurst dump, can be vectored to a point directly over the targets without the need for a "visual". Black Widows or A-20's of the 425th Night Fighter Squadron can bring their "intruder" work up to peak performance. These are but a few of the things the 584 can do.
Obtaining this excellent information on range and azimuth with the SCR-584 is like looking through a 10 foot pipe which is only 1 inch in diameter. This feature, which is the result of using a very narrow radar beam, often makes it difficult for the set to find the airplane. This weakness is overcome by having the controller at the FDP nearby call in the ship's "track" to the BACU controller, and also by taking D/F bearing at the BACU. Once the ship is picked up ate the SCR-584, the set is put on automatic control. The SCR-584 is thus "locked on" to the particular plane, and the controller has merely to watch the little light move along the lighted map spread out on the plexiglass covered Operations table. To have the flight correct its course to the target, all he needs to do is to call the leader over his VHF.
Then, using targets given by Corps, the BACU controller will vector the plane into their bomb-run, and call out the exact second for "bombs away".
The origins of BACU at XIX TAC began in October 1944, when the red tape difficulties of acquiring and transporting the sets from England to the Third Army front along the Moselle were finally overcome. Two complete SCR-584's, with a year's supply of spare parts arrived, and Lt. Edmund Austern set about to organize the first unit, BACU1. When the many problems of communications, supply, control and liaison were at length solved, Lt. Austern went on to do the same job for BACU2. These 2 BACU's covered the Third Army area from Luxembourg to the Seventh Army boundary and unsuccessfully controlled XIX TAC planes on blind bombing and nav- igational missions.
During the Battle of the Bulge, both sets moved north with Patton's Army, to add their close control facilities to the general effort. All this took place in very poor radar country, and in the middle of winter, which made living and operating conditions extremely hard. Still, communications were put in and maintained, in heavy snow and zero weather; and when the ships could not find targets to dive-bomb visually, the BACU's helped them drop their eggs blind, on suitable Jerry objectives. More than one enemy CP was violently disturbed by the unexpected arrival of bombs out of completely overcast skies.
The BACU operated in very close conjunction with the FDP's and Tactical Air Liaison Officers at Corps. When the FDP controlling a mission could not find satisfactory targets in bad weather, it would turn over control to one of the BACU's, and stand-by on both the VHF and radar, to give radar warning coverage which the BACU cannot provide. This system of "Foxhunts" was utilized with good results, and much of the credit for its success must go to Mr. Arnold McLean, of the Office of Operational Research, who was attached to XIX TAC Hq for many months.
In February 1945, a third BACU was organized, using the many lessons learned in the previous months. In the first three days of the week following its entry into operations, 16 BTO (bombing through overcast) missions were successfully controlled.
The 19th Tactical Control Group (prov) issued Standard Oper- ations Procedures on 2 March 1945 which contained the procedures for the BACU units. The procedures were as written up in the 19th Tactical Control Group Unit history as follows
I GENERAL
1. This memorandum will supplement Memorandum 100-49, XIX Tactical Air Command, dated 16 February 1945, subject "Standing Operating Procedure for Battle Area Control units". All control personnel will be thoroughly familiar with the duties and procedure specified by both memoranda.
II TARGETS
1. Daily Field Order will include list of BACU targets sit- uated along Army front. TCC controllers will assist those targets to BACU's according to the coverage of the BACU, maximum range of which were consistent with coverage. He will then notify each BACU of the targets that have been assigned to them for day's opera- tions.
2. BACU will continue to pick up daily Field Orders from the Corps TALO (Air Liaison Officer). FDP's will receive their Field Orders by teletype, courier from Corps, or the most easily available method.
III RENDEZVOUS POINTS
1. Rendezvous (R/V) Points will ordinarily be the position of the BACU's at the time (Judicious use of D/F equipment may co- ordinate R/V points, only requiring flights to be brought into their general areas).
2. When either FDP's or BACU's move, the new locations will be given to all concerned by TCC.
IV COMMUNICATIONS
1. VHF:
a. At FDP's
"A" - Group concerned, as per Field Order assignment.
"B" or "D" - For Corps Cooperation. (This applies to those FDP's having only 2 channels VHF. Those FDP's having 4 channels, "C" to be set up in addition)
b. At BACU
"A" - All Groups within XIX Tactical Air Command, plus additions thereto.
"B", "C" & "D" - Those common channels will be kept available.
2. FM
a. Net common to all FDP,s, MEW, BACU's and TCC will be maintained and monitored at all times by all stations. In event any station cannot contact any other station at a given time, TCC will be asked to relay the message, one of the other stations, who can do, will relay it.
3. LAND LINES
To be provided when possible.
V COOPERATION AND LIAISON
1. Presently no more than two FDP's will work with each of the BACU's. The stations cooperating with each other will change from time to time, and notification of each change to all concerned is the responsibility of the TCC. Proximity and communication will ordinarily determine which FDP's work with which BACU.
2. The linking of 3 stations together (2 FDP's and BACU) requires close cooperation and timing and all concerned must become a team to guarantee efficiency.
3. In future, additional equipment will make possible a BACU with each FDP, providing greater simplification. Until then, teamwork, liaison and cooperation is imperative and watch station full cognizant of the other's problems.
VI PROCEDURE
1. Groups will be assigned to FDP's or MEW by TCC controller each day in record with Field Order, radar coverage, etc., as normal. Missions will be controlled by FDP's as normal until the situation as outlined in Par 3, below arises.
2. Weather Data
a. Barometric readings corrected for the target area are available at all times in the TCC for use of FDP controllers and BACU controllers in aiding control of the missions.
b. All Bomb Through Overcast (BTO) missions will be run, when possible, with aircraft at 10,000 feet above sea level (ASL) and maintaining on Indicated Airspeed of 210 mph.
3. If weather prevents any Group from completion of bombing missions by visual methods, the leader of the flight will notify the FDP controller of this fact on "A" channel. If the leader wishes to work with a BACU, he will so state to the controller by use of the code-word "FOXHUNT", the following perhaps being of typical request: "Hello RIPSAW THREE, YELLOWHAMMER LEADER here. Cannot see my target, request FOXHUNT. Upon receiving the code- word, FDP controllers will proceed to vector flight toward the BACU R/V point or area. At the same time the FDP controller, or his duty, will call the TCC, giving the duty chief controller there the information that a certain flight is going to perform a FOXHUNT mission,and requesting the corrected barometric pressure for the target area at the time. Upon receiving this reading, he will instruct the leader of the flight to set the reading upon his altimeter and go to 10,m,000 feet altitude, making an IAS of 210 mph. While the flight is approaching the R/V, the
FDP controller will contact the BACU controller over FM or land-line, telling him YELLOWHAMMER is being vectored to R/V for turnover. BACU control- ler will immediately set up correct "A" channel and begin sweeping R/V area to pick up flight, taking over control from the FDP when "lockon" is made. The FDP will stand by on "A" channel continuing to monitor and follow the flight and warn of bogeys approaching. The FDP will take over complete control of the flight once more when the flight has completed their bombing, or, if the BACU controller so requests, at any time during the mission.
4. In cases where a FOXHUNT request is received during the time the BACU is already working a mission, the duty controller will take the second flight to R/V point and orbit there until BACU can take them over in their turn. Or, with prior permission of the TCC duty controller, he will turn the flight over to another FDP for a FOXHUNT in its area.
The XIX TAC Signal History had this to say about the Tactical Control system.
When Battalion Headquarters was selected then the Headquarters and Headquarters Company would also locate in the same area and often the Battalion Headquarters would be located near the 19th TCG and the TCC. The Company Headquarters commanding the FDP's would also locate in the near vicinity of their FDP radar installation. The GO platoon and the LW radar platoon or platoons would be located by the FDP Commander and report in by radio to the FDP operations and communications center. The FDP operations center would filter and report everything back to the TCC Control. A detachment of Air controllers were stationed at each FDP who were attached from the 312th Fighter Control Squadron. The control of fighter missions was done by the controllers located at the FDP's. The missions were assigned by TCC. Deputy controllers at the TCC monitored the VHF radio channels on which the airplanes were controlled. The filter officers at the TCC were supplied from Headquarters of 563rd Battalion.
Usually FDP movements would result from Battalion Field Orders sometimes after the Executive Officer had made a reconnaissance to determine if the vicinity was free of enemy troops. Other movements were made by verbal orders from the Senior Controller of the TCC. Much of the routine procedures associated with technical and tactical operations were outlined in the battalion's book of Standing Operating Procedures. See Appendix XI for a discussion of siting radars.
The division of responsibility between the 563rd SAWB, the 312th FCS and the 316th FCS was as follows. The 563rd would op- erate the FDP's, operate Air Warning Radar, furnish the TCC Filter Officers and operate the H.F. Radio at the TCC. The 312th would operate the TCC, operate the TCC communications and furnish the FDP air controllers. The 316th would operate the D/F stations and assist the 312th operate the TCC communications.
The 19th Tactical Control Group commanded the 563rd, 312th and 316th. There was also technical channels for signal matters from the 563rd Headquarters directly back to the Signal Section of the XIX TAC and on occasion direct back to the SHAEF signal section.
The TCC was operated by the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and Capt. Greenberg of the XIX TAC gave a graphic description of TCC operations and his action filled picture is as follows:
"At the TCC, there is available the Ground Liaison Officer (GLO), who has the latest information on ground force positions and activities. Here is the "Y" officer with data on enemy aircraft, which has been put together by listening in on the German radio transmissions. Through the radio loud-speakers at the center, also, come the "hot news" flashes from the tactical reconnaissance ships, observing enemy activities of all kinds.
"400 plus motor transports at L 2255"
would be a typical flash, which the TCC would forward via "hot" phone line to Combat Operations at XIX TAC Hq for very prompt "remedial" action. All information from the radar sites and ground observer posts funnels into the TCC, by telephone and teletype (when available), by FM radio (SCR-1498 and SCR-1505), and by courier. Data on enemy and hostile airplane formations pours in. Enemy ground movements are noted. Flight plans of all the Tactical Air Commands, IX Bomber Command, Eighth Air force, Fifteenth Air Force, RAF and First TACAF are constantly received. Maj. Norton, the AAA liaison Officer can, on a moments notice order "Fire" or "Cease Fire" to all the heavy antiaircraft artillery batteries in the Third Army area. Into the TCC is routed all the latest data on intelligence and operations, and on the main plotting board all these facts and figures are accurately noted. Other status boards give the controller up-to-the minute data on call signs, airfields, groups available, homer's,
VHF and FM communications, weather, radar coverage, enemy airdromes and anti-aircraft positions. In the corner is locate the very important D/F table, along with the Intercept and navigational tables, where the deputy controller and his capable assistants stand ready to take "fixes" on aircraft lost or in distress."
As an example of SAW operations, a very graphic picture was painted of what happens at FDP5 operating the MEW radar in combat and was narrated by a XIX TAC Signal staff member and it follows:
"Four off-center PPI scopes set side by side in the FDP5 op-eration tent, with a trained controller following a mission on each one, where almost constantly in use. And on Armed Reconnaissance or escorts, where groups were going out by squadrons, each controller might have three separate missions on his scope.
For example, a squadron of Col. Laughlin's 362nd Fighter Group, on an armed reconnaissance in the St. Vith area, during January 1945, spotted several hundred s of Germans motor transport withdrawing from the "Bulge" area. They passed this information to TCC immediately. Very soon, the other two squadrons of the 362nd Fighter Group were being vectored into the area by Lt. Smith, MEW Controller. As soon as the P-47's had dropped their "babies" and strafed, they returned to base, reloaded-and took off again to continue the party. At noon, Lt. D.L Tedrick took over control of the group. Lt. Tedrick spent all afternoon vectoring the three squadrons to their targets, giving homing's to base-passing all information to the planes about movements of the German convoy and motor transports. Many of the ships were badly hit by anti- aircraft fire, and Lt. Tedrick would give first a snap vector to carry the plane across friendly lines, then a steer to an emergency field. The results of that day's activity, from the one scope, for one group, netted 800 enemy vehicles destroyed! The deputy controllers, working alongside each other, are often able to help each other, by passing information from flight to flight. One day last January Capt. W. H. Godbout was controlling "Elwood" squadron of the 365th Group when they encountered a flock of German ME-109's and FW-190's far out over Germany. As Elwood closed with the Germans, Capt. Godbout turned to Lt. John Clements.
"Hey, Clem, I've got some Jerries. Where are your boys, can they help?".
Lt. Clements was handling "Plastic" squadron of the same group., on an Armed Reconnaissance about 40 miles from the "Elwood" squadron. He spoke quietly into his microphone:
"Hello, Plastic, this is Rip 5, Elwood has some bandits, turn to 130 degrees and pour on the coal."
As "Plastic" took up his new course, Lt. Clements relayed all possible information about the bandits over the radio. When "Plas- tic" entered the area, they saw three German planes sneaking away. Results of this little job of cooperation: For Elwood 10-0-3; for "Plastic 3-0-0.
The MEW has often been called upon to direct fighters to a pin-point target. Such was the case when, before the fall of Metz, the Germans were using a 280 mm railway gun to shell Nancy and Pont-a-Musson. It was suspected that the gun was being concealed during the daylight hours in a certain railway tunnel. It was urgent, therefore, to close this tunnel. "Scooner" squadron of the 405th Fighter Group, lead by Col. Jackson, took off on the mission. Lt. A. K. Appleby, at MEW, vectored the squadron to the target area, but the planes could not find the right tunnel. Then Appleby went on the air:
"Okay Schooner, take a port 095 degrees, Ripsaw 5, over" And five seconds later,
Schooner leader, you're 6 miles from target, 12 o,clock"
Then
"Schooner leader, Ripsaw 5 here, look for target under your port wing".
"Roger. Rip 5, Scooner here. I see that tunnel under my left wing. Out"
"Okay Scooner squadron, arm your babies"
For some mysterious reason, the nights around Nancy became very peaceful and quiet after that.
Bomber escort missions are usually handled on two VHF chan- nels: a common one for use between fighters and bombers, and the fighter group's "A" channel,s to get the fighters to the rendezvous point, and to warn them of bogeys and bandits. Many of these missions are handled in this manner by Lt. K. M. Renz, and Lt. T. G. Butler. The 367th Fighter Group was once assigned to escort three groups of mediums, by squadrons. As the fighter squadrons were airborne, Lt. Renz on there "A" channel, would direct them to their rendezvous point. At the same time, Lt. Butler, on the bomber fighter channel would check with the mediums to make certain they would reach the rendezvous point at the correct time. The two controllers working on adjacent scopes can by checking with one another frequently, bring the flights together, give them warnings, vectors to target, and then give homing's.
The Reconnaissance of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group have rendered invaluable service in spotting targets and calling them in to fighter control. One day "Dumpling Purple" called in a large number of enemy motor transports west of Prum, Germany.
"Dumpling Purple, how about orbiting till I can get some fighters to you?"
queried the MEW controller. The latter then called the 354th Mustang squadron who were in the general vicinity, and vectored them to a rendezvous with the reconnaissance planes. The P-51's were led directly to the target by the reconnaissance planes. While Trolley was "working over" the motor transports, Dumpling Purple found another "fat" target some 25 miles east, so the con- troller soon vectored the fighters on to the new victim. This teamwork between the squadrons, reconnaissance and controller has paid off in many profitable targets with a minimum of time and effort.
About October 1944, FDP5 began night control operations, working with the 155th Night Photo Squadron (code King Kong) and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron.
Normally, the 155th pilot didn't require close control. Ex- pert navigation, coupled with the latest radar aids designed es- pecially for photographic work, took them straight to their tar- gets, in most cases. But the assistance given by FDP5 to them took many forms.
"You're approaching a "hot spot", K 72, shall I take you around it?"
"Roger, Rip 5, give me a vector, please".
Whereupon the controller would take over just long enough to clear the anti-aircraft zone and then restore the airplane to the pilot and navigator.
Lt. J. V. Mills was watching "King Kong" on his scope one night. Flight plans , clearances, and maps beside him, he watched the progress of each airplane as it took off and checked in. All seemed to be going well things were checking out, the pilots were going right for their targets. Lt. Mills would warn of bogeys or hot spots., but it looked as though that was all the help that would be needed. But then something didn't quite check. One of the pilots was orbiting Bastogne. There was not any pictures to be taken there. Lt. Mills watched for a moment and was sure that all was not right.
"Hello King Kong", he said, "Can I give you some help?"
"Roger, Rip 5, my weapon seems to be bent, can you take me to my target?"
Lt. Mills could and did. He not only took him to the target, but he took him right over it, and King Kong got the picture.
Handling of Black Widow night fighters sat FDP5 provided splendid opportunity for close control, to say nothing of a lot of thrills, and some tense moments. Designed as a night fighter, the P-61 Black Widow was the answer to a controllers prayer, for when he asked for a right turn, it was really right. When he asked the pilot to gain altitude quickly, the Empire pilots could take the airplane almost straight up.
It was during the "break through " period that the 425th Squadron had its greatest number of "kills".
The Germans were flying in a few JU-88's and JU-188's, and on occasion ME 110. They were flying out a few less. At 1740, on the afternoon of December 26th, Empire 22 was on patrol. Lt. Robert Moffatt vectored him out to the patrol line, keeping a sharp look out for "bogeys". There were a number of tracks on the screen, some C-47's in the "bulge", a squadron of fighters-bombers returning from a mission, everything was identified as friendly by the TCC said that there were no friends in that area, it must be hostile
"Bandit 15 miles, Empire 22", said Lt. Moffatt on the radio, "Starboard 185 degrees."
"Roger", came back 22 and the chase was on.
"Range now 12, angels 11.5."
"Roger"
"Range 8, bandits speed 200, on a heading of 275 degrees", continued Lt. Moffatt,
as 22 began to close in.
"Range 6, starboard 230, bandits now at angels 10", Moffatt announced.
"Range 4, starboard 250", Moffatt announced.
"Roger." then 15 seconds later,"starboard 270 degrees, bogeys course"
"Roger contact."
22 had picked up his quarry with his airborne radar and was taking over. And then followed seemingly interminable moments of silence. Empire 22 was on inter-com. Pilot and R/O were closing in for the kill, the job from the ground had been done, at least for the time being, and while two airplanes fought in the sky some 40 miles away, controllers, scope readers, plotters, tellers, radio men--the scores of personnel required to keep FDP5 functioning, were sweating it out. And then at 1925, actually only three minutes had elapsed.
"Hello Rip 5, Empire 22. Murder"
"Roger. Congratulations 22 what was it?'
"A JU-88, and now how about taking me home, my gravy's getting low."
The second kill that night came about four hours later, and provided a special thrill in the closing moments because there was not only a Radio "blackout", but sa visual blackout as well. Empire 43 came up for patrol at four minutes after 2300, and was assigned to Capt. M. J. Berlow for control. At 2315 contact on a bogey was made, but it turned out to be friendly. And then at seven minutes to 2400 a bogey appeared south and east of FDP5 moving west. As it moved in, Berlow started to vector 43 on to it. The range was about 30 miles, and it looked as though the intersec- tion could be made south and west of FDP5. 43 started to close in, range 25, range 20--bogey heading 280--angels 8--speed 200--and then for some reason which we'll never know, because the German didn't live to tell it to us, the bogey turned around, and starter back east--no, it was northeast, he was coming toward us.
"Bogey has changed direction 43, make your vector 150."
The 180 degree turn had cost the German distance, and the range was now only 10 miles.
"Make it 090 now, 43. Range 6, bogey's angels now 6"
"070 now, 43. Bogeys course--range 3"
"Roger--contact." and then again radio silence.
But this time the airplanes were getting so close to the station that within two minutes they were in the "ground ray". Not only was there no radio contact, but they could not be seen on the scope. All they knew at FDP5 was that target and fighter were approaching the station. At 5 minutes past 2400, two airplanes flew overhead , and then at 0006:
"Hello Rip 5, Empire 43 calling. Murder".
"Roger 43--you damn near put him in our lap". and he had, for at that very minute the guard at post no 3 was calling to say that about 2 miles away he had seen a plane go down in flames. Another JU-99 had felt the sting of the Black Widow.
With German night flying limited almost to the vanishing point, the Black Widows began to devote more and more of their flying time to what controllers and pilots referred to as "gang- ster" missions.
Fixed positions, known as "fiddle-points", were chosen for their recognizable terrain features. The controllers would take the fighters to these positions and from there they would fly over road junctions, railways, marshaling yards, blowing up trains, motor convoys, and generally harassing German night movements.
The night of February 24th furnished a good example of the type of air-ground teamwork that went into a "gangster mission". Lt. Gene Nelson had taken over control of Empire 22 at 2004, and had taken him to Fiddle Point 4. When Lt. Nelson took a plane to a fiddle point, he not only took him there, he set him down the right on it. As soon as he had 22 through the "hot spots", he starter letting him down.
"You can go to angels 8 now 22"
"You can take it down to 5 now."
When 22 got to Fiddle 4 he was at angels 2.
"You're right at Fiddle 4 now, 22."
"Roger Rip 5, I see the bend in the river, I'm going down"
At 0011 Empire 22 was up again, and reappeared on the scope.
"Hello Rip 5, this is Empire 22. I stopped a train. Shoot up the locomotive 2 miles on a 240 from Fiddle 4. It's a helluva long trains--about 70 cars. Can you send someone else up to help me?"
At that moment Lt. Edward Vojak was controlling Empire 49, Lt. T. G. Butler had Empire 38 on a patrol. While Lt. Nelson kept 22 orbiting the target, Lt. Vojak and Lt. Butler took 38 and 49 to him, and then with the three airplanes on the same radio channel, first 49 and then 38 getting instructions from FDP5 on the ground 50 miles away, and from 22 in the air, right over the target, all three went in and finished off the trains. No one knew exactly where that train was heading one thing, however, was a certainty, it didn't get there. Nor did six others. Lt. Vojak, Lt. Butler and Lt. Nelson kept knocking out trains until five in the morning, when weather conditions made it necessary for the Empire pilots to return to home, having completed a good night's works.
And so it goes day and night one shift of controllers rel- ieving another shift, night controllers sometimes having night fighters airborne before the days fighters have landed, and in the morning, day fighters airborne before the night fighter have all landed controller at number one scope handling all the missions of one group has "fat" targets and keeps airplanes there, until the controller at number two scope with the missions of another group and not-so-far targets can get airplanes to take up where the other group left off. And so on with the controllers at number three and four scopes and the groups they are controlling. All hoping that they are doing some little part to help in the big job.
To further amplify the TCC operations the following is the SOP for the MEW operations of the 738th Signal Air Warning Company which was published by the 19 TCG and is included in Appendix XVIII on page 687.
The ground observer platoons were infantry trained signalmen. Their main mission was to report aircraft locations in areas which were not covered by the radars. They also often served this duty in addition to providing perimeter security for the FDP's or LW's. When the terrain was right they were located on high ground and served the same as artillery spotters, except they reported ground targets back to the TCC through the FDP control and communications center. Lt. Col. McBride took a great deal of pride in their operations, after all he was an infantry man himself. The ideal spot for a GO was on high ground just behind the Main Line of Resistance. This kind of a position would give them good observa- tion ground activity, a clear vision of incoming aircraft and a line of site location for radio communications to the rear.
In "Signals", the history of the XIX TAC Signal Section the recognition was given to the small units of the 563rd Sig Bn.
The radio men of Lt. Col. McBride's 563rd Signal Air Warning Bat- talion besides taking care of the all important radar sets, also had the job of running all the HF radio links in the control sys- tem, using SCR-188's and SCR-399's under the direction of Lt. Janek of the 563rd.
And then there are the Ground Observer Posts, up in the front areas, often more exposed and advanced than the forward Infantry units, constantly working under the most hazardous conditions and subject to attack by enemy patrols and artillery fire. The posts occupied the highest point of terrain, to get 360 degree coverage. Identification of aircraft and information on enemy ground moves are radioed to the RDP's, and relayed from there to the TCC. All this information is obtained using no technical equipment save for a pair of field glasses. Yet the data turned in by these observ- ers, both on hostile and friendly planes, and on enemy ground activity, has resulted in the destruction of many German troops and much equipment. In many cases the ground observers have acted as Infantry, and aided in repelling enemy counter-attacks. They have captured prisoners, inflicted casualties, and in turn have suffered losses themselves. To those who gave their lives so valiantly only the deepest homage and ptribute can be rendered, with the knowledge that they shared in the sacrifices that were made, to rid the world of the Nazi plague.
Col Harry French Commanding 19th Control Group (Prov). He was graduated from West Point in 1940 and was Execitove Officer of the 100th Fighter Wing. before assuming command of the Control Group in December 1944
7
Major John F. Kraft, Chief Controller at XIX Tactical Control Center, was one of the first Fightger Control officers of th present campaign. he came to XIX TAC the hard way, having completed a tour of dutyh with the 9th Air Force in Africa in 1943
Lt Col. William L. McBride, Commanding Officer of 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion was National Guard Infantry Bn Commander transferred int Signal Corps because of experience as an executive in the American Telephone Company
Maj Maurice E. Byrne, Exec Officer 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion was Reserve Corps graduate of Univ. of Ideaho inducted as Air Corps Engnr then transferred to Signal Corps as Electronic Engineer.
The unit history gave coordinates of the locations in the U.K. operational practice sites and locations could not be pinpointed at the time this history was started. The grid map used has not yet been identified. All the sites were shown in the history records as coordinate block "R" when actually the military maps showed the part of England we were located as in grid blocks "Q" and "U".
Only two references recorded the coordinate with the town where the site was located. The editor knew the location of these two sites with respect to the town and they were 563rd Battalion Headquarters at Lashenden and FDP3 site at Cousleywood. These two points were used in connection with mathematics to determine the location on present maps. A study of the two sites showed that the new grid was a rotation 8.53 degrees from the old grid and offset in the X direction by 4959.736 meters and in the Y direction by - 1613.576 meters.
The results of this transformation is used directly to locate the positions on the new UK Ordnance Survey Maps now in existence. The maps in the Map Location Annex are plotted on their translated basis. Also shown are some location reported that were known but no coordinates reported and have known historical connection, for example.
Site Map Remarks
A Location of 563rd Bn Hq on April 17,1944 in the woods just South of Lashenden. The 100th Fighter Wing headquarters was in the manor house at Lashenden.
C The first 563rd Bn Hq near Henley on Thames. The campment was located in the woods near Remenham.
D Location of the 563rd Advance Headquarters near Weyhill. The encampment was located in a woods near there.
E Location of the RAF Filter School at Bawdsey where the Filter Officers received advanced training.
F Location of the Port of Debarkation on the Firth of Clyde where the Queen Mary docked on completion of the crossing from New York Harbor. The dock was in the Port of Glasgow near Greenock. The troops were loaded on passenger trains which took us to Henley on Thames.
A key map showing the relation between the old grid and the new grid is shown on the page 57. Following that page a map of UK towns and cities is shown that has the old grid overlaid on it. This Town map is of a more recent date than the maps we were working with in 1944 but it will assist in locating points on the current UK Ordnance Survey maps. The UK Ordnance Survey Map grid is the basis of current tourist maps of the UK and also it conforms to the current International Grid System.
FEBRUARY 1944
Feb 8
Company C was formed for combat at Henly on Thames in Southern England on GO1 563rd SAW Bn. Capt. Franklyn A. Glassow assumed command and the following officers were appointed as follows
Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaum Company Supply O
Lt. Donald H. Hobbs Filter O
Lt. Clair B. Watson Filter O
Lt. Charles A. Stewart Filter O
Lt. David R. Schultze GO3 Platoon Commander
Feb 14
Company C reported their strength as 14 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 201 men. Most of the personnel were away at this time to various schools in different parts of England. >p>MARCH 1944
Mar 5
Company C reported that most of their personnel that had been away to Filter School at Bawdsey had returned to duty. Lt. Stewart noted that the days at Bawdsey would be remembered by the men and officers of Company C. as many a pleasant hour was spent at the RAF Filter School there and in the town of Folkstone. He said the officers learned a few customs of England the hard way.
Mar 16
Company reported that 2 officers and 28 men returned to the company from temporary duty at Renscombe Down. The CHB and half of a "U" team arrived at sites in preparation for Operational Training.
APRIL 1944
The 563rd Battalion Headquarters was located Lashenden which is about 5 miles south of Headcorn. As fast as the units had their equipment they were put into operations along the southeastern part of England. The units moved to their first location on the following dates:
FDP1 and LW1 13 April FDP3 and LW3 15 April
FDP2 and LW2 13 April FDP4 and LW4 15 April
In the UK operations of the battalion there was no tactical or strategic responsibility because the British had a network of Radar, Ground observers connected with Civil Defense and Royal Air Force operating centers. The sites desired were to be operated for pre battle training and were tentatively selected by the battalion staff. The permission to get the sites was through the British Ministry of Agriculture who coordinated the need of the armed forces with the ability to raise agricultural farm products and cattle for food. The British did a remarkable job coordinating the requirements of the troops. For Radar sites alone there were at least two or more units of our size also needing sites. To train properly we were allowed to make one move and that was sixteen sites for the four FDP's and four LW's. The second training positions were as follows.
FDP1 26 May
FDP2 8 May
FDP3 21 May Cousley Woods near Tunbridge Wells
LW1 15 May
LW2 8 May
LW3 30 Apr
A third position was occupied by the following units.
LW1 26 May
LW4 26 May
Battalion was represented by Maj. Byrne who checked out maps for the invasion and selected initial operational sites in France.
The Headquarters and Headquarters Company bivouac was located in a field near Lashenden. The manor house at Lashenden housed the 100th Fighter Wing headquarters. This camp was labeled Station 410. The 312th Fighter Control Squadron was located near Headcorn which is near by. During May and June plans were made at the SHAEF headquarters in London where Top Secret plans were given to the units. For signal preparations the 100th Fighter Wing and the 563rd
Before being assigned to the 563rd, the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was activated at Drew Field Florida on March 15th 1943. On December 16th they were shipped to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey for shipment to England from the New York port of embarka- tion on the S.S. Brazil. They sailed on December 29th and arrived in England on January 7th 1944. They were then shipped to Start Point, in Devon, England in January 1944. They were the first field unit to be assigned a MEW radar. They were given the primary mission of acting as a Fighter Director Station. As such, it was the only radar which would cover the D Day invasion area, and an exposure was taken every minute of a PPI tube. (see Editors Note 4 on the following page) The next job that the MEW took on was to handle Ground Control Interception missions in the fight against the German V-1 "Buzz Bombs". As a result of these interceptions, 131 were shot down before reaching the British Shore.
MAY 1944
In 1994 the following report was sent in by Col. David Schultze on a phase of operation in England. GO3 In Coastal Operations in England
"I am sending a couple of pictures I have found. One is or Lt. Janek and myself working over one of our radios. The site was in England and you will notice the crumbling rock wall in the background. This was Pevensey Castle which was built during the Norman invasion. It took considerable persuasion to get an outpost in there but there were a couple of rooms in the castle what we occupied. There was an old caretaker there (his name was Mr. Bodel, I'll never forget him) and I guess he was afraid the Yanks would somehow deface the place. We had our radio up on the ram- parts and on D Day we could see wave after wave of aircraft and ships in the channel all heading for France. Pevensey Castle was, and probably still is, a tourist attraction and for a small fee you could get a tour of the place. In fact, I have one of the tour books they sold at the gate. Picked it up on occasion I had to visit there in the 50's. On the last page the book said;
"During WWII, the castle was occupied by a group of U. S. Signal- men" and that was of course us. A further comment on this. Lt. Col. McBride visited at Pevensey Castle a couple of times and would spend a little time with the platoon and the rest of the time across the street in the village of Pevensey as there was a lovely old English Antique Shop there with a lot of old china, silver, furniture, etc., and he really liked to browse through the shop. The other picture is a shot of several members of GO3 taken somewhere in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge.
The site of Pevensey Castle is at the new grid coordinate of Q645048. This is one site that was not recorded in the unit his- tory, however GO3 Post Oboe was reported nearby on 26 May 1944 at Priesthowes at location Q610060.
To add historical interest to this site the editor furnished the following history.
"Pevensey Castle near Portchester (historians call Pevensey Bay therefore denoting it as a Roman port) in Hampshire. The Normans built a castle inside of a Roman Fort (Anderita). Both were for the protection of the Harbor (now silted up and built over by the town of Pevensey). It served as a beachhead for the invading armies. Here fought the savage battle in 961, when the Saxon's attacked and slew all that dwelt therein, nor was there a Briton left. William the Conqueror landed in Pevensey in 1066 before advancing to attack King Harold at Senlack 9 miles northeast and near the site of the present Abbey at Battle. Before the battle of Hastings, which occurred just southwest of the abbey gate, William of Normandy vowed he would build an Abbey should the day be his. here, now part of a school are the remains of the abbey he built and the high alter is exactly over the actual place where King Harold is buried."
See page 64 for the vicinity map of the southern coast of England which was part of the area assigned to GO3 for Air Warning which extended roughly from Eastbourne to Bexhill. During this time Gen. Eisenhower made an appearance to inspect the training setup where the Tactical Control Center were conducting an "canned" exercise and he also visited FDP3 radar site. Lt. Harold Salfen (FDP3 controller attached from the 312th FCS) was the controller and he had just showed Ike a radar scope and pointed what we did on an aircraft intercepted an enemy plane. He walked out of the van and said "That is very interest ing. I really don't understand radar, but there is something I do understand". He pointed at a manure spreader standing nearby.
[Editors Note 4--- Although I have not seen the media, I believe that there is a graphic presentation of the Normandy Landing as viewed from the PPI of the 738th Air Warning Signal Battalion. I would guess that this could be located at the Signal Corps School at Fort Monmouth. It is not known whether this was presented with motion pictures or pages in a book.]
JUNE 1944
During June a new mobile radar SCR-582 microwave unit was assigned to the Battalion with Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill and 2nd Lt. Robert A. Homan and their crew who assembled the unit in the U.S. at the radiation labs at M.I.T. Radiation labs.
Jun 1
Company C which now consisted of a FDP, a LW Platoon and a Ground Observer Platoon moved to Marden and went into operation. This move was a leap frog and was made during the night.
Jun 3
Company D was put on attached service direct to the Ninth Air Defense Command for administration and tactical operation per Par 6 of SO 154 Headquarters Ninth Air Force dated 3 June.
The D-Day operation phase extended from June 6 to June 27
JUNE 1944
The description of the Normandy Landing Phase for the 563rd started June 28th and the Cherbourg Defense Phase started about July 1st. During this time the 563rd battalion was operating in a defensive role and marking time until the Third Army went into combat. The Third Army was not to be activated until August 1st.
From D-Day on 6 Jun until July 2 the 555th Signal Air Warning Battalion landed radar and troops. They went into operations on D- Day and operating in the First Army Area with the IX Tactical Air Command.(see Editors Note 5 below). In order to fill in what happened from 6 June to the 28th, Chart A and Chart B is the situation map on D-Day on Utah and Omaha beach respectively. The 555th made the landing on D-Day on Omaha beach and encountered some difficulties in landing the heavy radar in rough sea.
Following is the Invasion Phase situation shown on page 74 with a time frame of June 6th to 12th when the VII Corps commanded by Gen. Collins landed on Utah Beach, the V Corps commanded by Gen. Gerow landed on Omaha Beach. At the same time the British Second Army, commanded by Gen. Dempsey landed on Gold, Juno and Sword beaches with the XXX British Corps commanded by Gen. Buckhall on the left, the I British Corps commanded by Gen. Crocker on the right. By the 12th of June the V Corps had advanced to Caumont, near Cury-Marcourt about 10 miles south of Omaha beach. Page 85 shows the situation map for the Capture of Cherbourg with the time frame of the 13th to 30 June. The VII and VII Corps advanced west from Omaha beach and by the 30th of June had cleared the Cherbourg Peninsula. Page 76 shows the situation map for the map for the Phase to Expand the Beachhead
[Editors Note 5--- After the 563rd went into combat on 1 August Brig. Gen. Sanders, the 100th Fighter Wing Commander and superior headquarters to our operations expressed concern about our employment of Ground Observer Platoons. He said that the D-Day landing phase of Signal Air Warning troops at Omaha Beach that the Ground Observer platoons went into action and were deployed on or near the Line of Resistance. As I remember he said that there were enough Ground Observer casualties to disturb the high command of the Air Force units and their idea was to abandon the Ground Observer activities because of the inherent danger to the men. Col. McBride asked him to reconsider and reminded the General that our Ground Observers were Infantry Trained, that both the Battalion Commander and the Executive Officer of the Battalion were Original- ly trained and functioned as Infantry Officers. The General agreed to release the Ground Observers for combat and they soon became experts. From the first day of combat Col. McBride himself supervised their operation personally.]
where the entire front was straightening out and advances all along the front were on a line through St. Lo or about 20 miles deep from the Gulf of St. Malo to about 5 miles east of Caen. Gen. Montgom- ery was in command of the invasion force with the First Army Commanded by Gen. Bradley on the right and the British Second Army commanded by Gen. Dempsey on the left.
Jun 6
Company C was given orders to close down and cease operations and prepare for the Invasion of France.
Jun 12
Company C brought LW3 Platoon in to FDP3 and the Company was received orders to de-waterproof their vehicles after they had almost been completed. The order was a mistake, and the following day they had to waterproof again. At Lashenden, England 563rd SAW Battalion Headquarters, Capt. Claudius G. Farrow, Company B Commander was presented the Legion of Merit for previous service in the Pacific Theater. The presentation was made by Col. Homer L. Sanders, Commanding Officer of the 100th Fighter Wing, before a formal review of the troops of Headquarters and Headquarters Company.
Jun 17
Company C reported their first German Robot Bomb or "Buzz Bomb" came over their camp. They manned their .50 Cal machine guns and fired on all bombs that passed overhead or nearby. Lt. Stewart reported that their last days in England were hectic ones because of the Buzz Bombs. They had to stop firing after a few minutes when their daily allotment of ammunition ran out.
WO Vernon O Mills in the unit history reported the following in June.
"The primary mission of this battalion in England was opera- tional training. Many flights and raids on the continent were controlled during this training. Great anxiety was shown by the troops knowing that soon we would all be in France and using our operational training and our unit becoming a part of a real combat team.
Mid month from the enemy skies came a flood of the paper hanger's (Hitler) newest secret weapon, known to him and his malicious cohorts as the V-1, but to us it was just a nuisance known as the "doodle-bug". Even Hitler's V-1 weapon did not catch the Allied troops asleep. The first appearance of the new weapon over England received a continuous burst of gun fire from the smallest of firearms to large coastal guns. To my knowledge the first one was brought down within a mile and a quarter of our headquarters. As viewed by troops at one of our outposts con- trolling the valley it seemed that the entire valley was lit up by gunfire as if floodlights had been turned on. Number three was brought down in the valley and a loud roar was heard all over the entire valley from the troops knowing that Hitler's secret weapon could be destroyed.
At first, it caused a considerable disturbance, due mostly to the novelty of the situation and also to the fact that we had been working in a very quiet atmosphere for quite some time. Within a week's time this uneasiness wore off and operations continued in a norman vein. There was little cause for worry for the Ack-Ack batteries working hand in hand with the Air Force had the situation well in hand. Most of the bombs continued far past our positions and stuck farther north, presumably London. It is admitted that the projectiles have taken effect amongst the civilian populace but our heavy retaliatory blows made on the German home front can never by matched by any of Adolf's devices. There were several near misses, however, giving the men a temporary scare and on one occasion at 2320B, 25 June 44, one of our units was strafed by 20- mm's and machine gun fire from an Allied airplane which was endeavoring to deliver the knockout blow to a buzz bomb. No casualties were suffered however."
About the same time the German's also launched V-2 missions. These were high trajectory rockets fired with a preset range. There was no warning and no anti weapon to use against them. The British people took the rockets stoically. It was a different case with the V-1's as they were also a preset range and they could detected by early warning system and had a loud engine noise that could be heard miles away. When they got to the preset range the engine was automatically cut off. There was than silence for seconds before the missile crashed and exploded at an unpredictable distance from where they were heard. Even after the years of air raids the civilians dreaded them to the point where the morale of the civilians was definitely affected. This also affected the strategy of the allied forces because a lot of priority would go to the British Armies who were to attack in the sector where the launching was occurring.
During June preparations were being made for the crossing and the troops engaged in waterproofing the vehicles for the landing. The Battalion was divided into 13 echelons for the crossing. The makeup of the echelons was not reported in the unit history.
The Normandy Landing Phase for the 563rd extended from June 28th to July 1st
JUNE 1944
In the 21st Army Group, in the First Army's VIII Corps the 9th Infantry Division prepares to attack the Cap de la Hague. The 79th Infantry Division is assigned.
Jun 28
On June 28th the first echelon of the 563rd with Maj. Byrne in charge set out for the marshaling area at Southampton. On the following day other echelons of the Battalion also got the port call.
Maj. Byrne gave this account of the landing of the advanced echelon.
"The advanced echelon had the Battalion communications men and equipment and were needed to get on shore and set up communi- cations. When the ship arrived at Omaha Beach everything was quiet and the weather clear. The beach master asked us by blinker who we were and what was our mission. I answered that we were supporting the Third Army which was the wrong thing to have said. (It was not till later that I found out the Third Army was not to go into action for a month and thus had a low unloading priority). Right off the beach master informed us by blinker that we had a lower priority and others would be unloaded ahead of us. I was fit to be tied. We sat and fumed over being ignored and kept heckling him until he finally permitted us to unload several vehicles. I had Lt. Jenek and his communications men load up a truck and some jeeps and got them unloaded. Since I was the senior officer I had to sweat out unloading the remainder of the troops including several units that I was not familiar with. The Liberty ship which transported the advanced headquarters had accumulated a large amount of rations of various classes which it had accumulated on previous trips as emergency supplies. The ship's Captain informed that the beach master had refused to unload the rations and asked me to do what I could with them. I gave the beach master a chance to unload them and he refused. I then asked the various units and our own men to load as much of the rations on their trucks as they could and they did. Although we were packed for shipment with a weeks rations we thought the extra handout could be used for handout's to the French civilians.
We were kept on the ship for several days, there was no enemy action, but occasionally a German observation would fly over and do nothing. Also there was no guns being manned on any of the ships and if there was any guns ready on shore they did not bother firing. Finally the beach master unloaded us all and we drove our trucks through about four feet of water and up the hill to Criqueville. The waterproofing behaved superbly and there was no trouble. When we arrived at the Battalion headquarters we were disappointed that we, who were supposed to land first were practi- cally the last part of the Battalion Headquarters to arrive. But Lt. Janek, with his head start had communications up and going."
Jun 29
In the First Army the VII Corps the 9th Infantry Division attacks to clear Cap de la Hague and halts at Greville
In the First Army the VIII Corps the 101st Airborne Division starts to Cherbourg
In the First Army the XIX Corps the first elements of the 3rd Armored Division enter combat and reduce Villers-Fossard and the 29th Infntry Division renews the attack on St. Lo.
Jun 30
In the First Army's VII Corps the enemy defense at Cap de la Hague collapses and the 39th Infantry Division begins exploring the peninsula.
In the First Army's XIX Corps the 3rd Armored Division gains its objective and is relieved by the 29th Infantry Division.
On June 30th the remainder of the Battalion headquarters was scheduled to go and WO Vernon Mills gave this graphic account of the 563rd Headquarters rear echelon's crossing.
"At approximately eight o'clock on June 30th our serial number came blaring out over the public address system, and we knew that we would soon be on our way. Upon arrival at the docks in Southampton, we registered and then retired to a corner of the dock to await a call to board the ship. While waiting we ate and then sat around speculating as to what kind of a ship we were to make the crossing in.
Finally, the call came and we found ourselves filing up the gangplank onto a Liberty Ship named the "Empire Battleax". As each man stepped onto the gangplank, he received two doughnuts from an attractive Red Cross Girl. After dropping our equipment in the compartments assigned to us, we all managed to find our way up on deck. While we there all of us caught a glimpse of David Niven, the former Cinema Star, who was also on board. Some enterprising G.I.'s even approached him to get his autograph.
Early in the morning of July 1st the Empire Battleax nosed out into the channel in the direction of France with its barrage balloon hovering overhead. Most of us on seeing the balloon were reminded of a child at the fair parading down the midway with a silver balloon in tow.
The trip across the channel was quiet and uneventful. The day wore on, gray with the threat of rain. Occasionally a plane flew over or a corvette sped by us as though we were standing still.
In the middle of the afternoon the coast of Normandy loomed up ahead of us. As we drew closer the more visible effects of the greatest military operation in history became apparent to us. The hulks of many boats were barely seen jutting above the water. Off to our left was a long line of ships evenly spaced, listing, some to the port, others to the starboard. It seemed incredible that this could have been the result of enemy action. We were then informed by one of the ship's officers that this had been done deliberately to form a breakwater and permit smaller craft to operate inside it.
After what seemed we were finally loaded unto landing craft and speeding toward the beach. The beach was littered with landing craft of all descriptions. In the cliff facing the channel could be seen former German Gun emplacements. These, coupled with the blasted and wrecked landing craft gave us some idea of the Hell that raged up and down this beach on "D" day. Jerry had been attacked and defeated at this point, fantastic and impossible as it seemed.
We disembarked on floating docks, marched up these and onto the Omaha beach. Once on shore we marched parallel to the channel about 100 yards and then turned right to ascend a steep hill. By this time it was raining, and the path leading up was turned into a greased sliding board. After much slipping and sliding, and cursing our packs we finally negotiated the hill. When we finally caught our breaths every man was struck with the same thought, "we only had to climb it, but the infantry had to climb and fight up it."
That night we pitched our pup tents at the transit area and opened our "K" rations, and settled down. The next morning was July 2nd 1944 and we entrucked and were driven to Criqueville, which was also the Airdrome of the 70th Fighter Wing. Certain elements of the 100th Fighter Wing to whom we are assigned were already there. During the next week, the remaining echelons of the 563rd joined us at Criqueville."
Company A echelon consisting of Company A Headquarters, FDP1, LW1 and GO1 Platoons departed Tenterden, Kent, England.
On June 30, 1944 General Bradley commanded the First U.S. Army under Gen. Montgomery's 21st Army Group. It was the First Army that cleared out the Cherbourg Peninsula.
JULY 1944
The 563rd companies crossed the channel in "Victory Ships" in company sized units. Each company plus the advanced headquarters formed a convoy to take the vehicles and equipment to the port of debarkation. The 563rd was designated mobile and it meant exactly that because all in all there were almost as many vehicles as there was Men. The Supreme Headquarters directed the flow of vehicles to the port and each convoy had timed check points. When we arrived at the port the vehicles were loaded onto the "Victory Ships" which were manned by the U.S. Merchant Marine. Each such ship may take one or more convoys and transport them across the channel. At the time of unloading there were whatever extra rations of food that the unit could handle. The transports would cross the channel to the assigned beach and the beach master under the control of the U.S. Navy would control the unloading. The transports would provide the crane's but the beach master would control the unloading and the traffic on the beach. The 563rd was designated as a U.S. Third army unit and did not have high priority as they were not scheduled to participate in combat until about August. Before starting the convoy to the ships the vehicles had been waterproofed so the engines would work under water and the exhaust run through an elevated snorkel hose. The vehicles were unloaded in about four feet of water and went on their own power up to the beach. At that time the weather proofing was removed and discarded and the vehicles went on to their first rendezvous point. The 563rd units all landed at different times and the landing point was near St. Laurent.
Jul 1
In the First Army's V Corps the 2nd Infantry Division is committed.
In the First Army's VII Corps enemy resistance ceases on the Cherbourg Peninsula.
In the 563rd elements of the Battalion started landing on Omaha beach. Sometimes the men were waiting in their landing ships for unloading priority.
The Air Defense of Cherbourg Phase extended from July 2nd to 31st
JULY 1944
While waiting for the Third Army to begin attack operations the 563rd was designated to set up a radar warning system for the Cherbourg Peninsula which was more or less coordinated by the Hq staff of the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The men were disap- pointed at the defense assignment because they had expected to be controlling combat flights.
Jul 2
In the First Army the V Corps commanded the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions and the 101st Airborn Division. The VIII Corps had the 4th, 8th and 83rd Infan- try Divisions. The VIII Corps commanded the 72nd, the 82nd and the 90th Infantry Divisions. The XIX Corps retains the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions.
On July 2nd Company B and Company C left Lashenden, Kent for France and FDP1 landed on July 2 and moved to a location near Criquevile about 6 miles inland from Omaha Beach.
Jul 3
In the First Army the VIII Corps, in a driving rain which prevents air support attacked toward La Haye-Du-Puits with the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 82nd Airborne Division.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters arrived and set up communications near Criqueville. FDP3 landed and set up near Mandeville-en-Bessin about 8 miles west of Bayeux and 7 miles inland from Omaha Beach. The radar operations was a reserve operation for the First Army. Sites occupied were preselected from three dimensional maps in England several months before D Day. FDP1 and FDP2 were planned to be in position to be a back up the First Army/IX TAC team.
Jul 4
In the First Army VII Corps the VII Corps the 83rd Infantry Division is in action for the first time. The VIII Corps the 82nd Airborne Division takes hill overlooking Haye-Du-Puit.
In the 563rd Headquarters Company left for France.
Jul 5
In the First Army the VII Corps closes in on Periers and the VIII Corps overruns the RR station at Haye-Du-Puit
In the 563rd Company C arrived on Omaha Beach on July 5th and made the trip over on a LST and reported they were well treated by the Navy.
Jul 6
The Third Army headquarters is set up in France at Nehou and the VIII Corps is assigned from the First Army. The XII, XV and XX Corps are assigned but they will be under the operational control of the First Army until the Third Army is operational..
In the 563rd Company C arrived at Mandeville-En-Bessen near Rubicy. While there they suffered their first casualties when two men were injured when a German Gernade they were examining exploded.
Jul 7
In the Third Army the XIX Corps opens an attack with the 30th Infantry Division.
In the 563rd Pfc Clyde Clark and Pfc Douglas Voll of Company C were handling a hand grenade when it exploded. Pfc Clark was injured seriously with burns on the hands and was evacuated. Pfc Voll was only slightly injured and was returned to duty after one week in the hospital.
Jul 8
In the Third Army XIX Corps the 3rd Armored Division and the 30th Infantry Division and they attack to Le Bernardrie.
Jul 9
In the Third Army the XIX Corps a strong German Counter Attack is checked near St. Lo
In the 563rd the remainder of Company C made the crossing to Omaha Beach.
Jul 10
In the Third Army XIX Corps the 30th Infantry Division reaches Belle-Lande.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters moved to near St. Pier Eglise where the 100th Fighter Wing was located. Company A and FDP1 was moved to Helleville about 11 miles southwest of Cherbourg and about 3 miles inland from the west coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula and LW1 was sited near Jobourg which is about 12 miles northeast of FDP1 and in the northwest corner of the Cherbourg Peninsula and deployed GO1 along the coastline. Company B and FDP2 moved to Ravenoville about 9 miles southeast of Valognes and about a mile inland from the east coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula also they moved LW2 to Morsalines which is about 1 mile inland from the east coast of Cherbourg and about 8 miles north of FDP2 and deployed GO2 along the coastline.Company C moved to Portbail and LW3 set up at Morville on the Cherbourg Peninsula. GO3 took occupied positions surrounding Portbail. Cherbourg was clear of enemy down to a line from La Haye-Dupits to Carantan. Maj. Yasha A. Venar had an accidental fall and broke one of his legs and was evacuated to the 12th Field Hospital. FDP4 was moved to Gouberv- ille. GO1 moved Post Able to Grunchy, Post Baker to Thet, Post Charley to Samson, Post Dog to Nicolle and Post Fox to Pte Jardeheu. GO2 moved Post George to Dedainville, Post How and Jig to St Martin, Post King to Jonville and Post Love to Montebourg. GO3 moved Post Mike to Beaubigny, Post Oboe to Girot, Post Peter to Cap de Flamanville, Post Queen to Pte De Rozei and Post Roger to Hameau.
Jul 12
In the XIX Corps the 29th, 30th and 35th Infantry Divisions are in the vicinity of St. Lo.
In the 563rd FDP4 occupied site near Gouberville near the north shore of the Cherbourg Peninsula about 16 miles east of Cherbourg. Maj. Julius L. Levy, Medical Corps was assigned to the battalion to replace Maj. Yasha A. Venar who was hospitalized and serve as Battalion Surgeon until Maj. Venar's release.
Jul 13
In the Third Army the 4th Armored Division lands in France amd the XIX Corps the costly battle for St. Lo continues.
In the Ninth Air Defense Command Company D (attached) moved using its own organic equipment for transportation to a port of embarkation in order to move to the continent. The trip across the Channel to Omaha Beach was made under adverse conditions. Because of the very rough water and storms the unloading at Omaha Beach had been broken up. After 36 hours of waiting for the weather conditions to improve unloading of equipment started. Two barges were being used and after being partially loaded with equipment and personnel, broke away from the ship in which the Channel crossing had been made. These barges with equipment and personnel were unable to make shore for 15 hours and considerable difficulty was experienced in the saving of men and equipment. The entire company personnel and equipment was unloaded and on shore within 96 hours after the channel crossing. From Omaha Beach, the Company moved to Levast, France in accordance with verbal orders of the Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force. Company D was to work in the Levast area with the 71st Fighter Wing and the 566th Signal Air Warning Battalion.
In the 563rd LW1 was relocated about 1/2 mile south east of their Jogbourg location. LW4 was moved to Valognes. GO1 moved Post Able to Greville, Post Charley to Sampson and Post Fox to Pte Jardeheu. GO4 moved Post Tare to Cap Levy, Post Uncle to Le bequt, Post Victor to Pte de Barfleur and Post William to Les Manes.
Jul 14
In the Third Army Area the XIX Corps the 30th Infantry Division captures Pont Herbert.
Jul 15
The XV Corp headquarters arrived in France on 15th July and was to be assigned to the Third Army.
Jul 18
In the 563rd Lt. Lewis F. Janek, Tech/Sgt Allen D. Kimmel, Tech/Sgt Elmer M. Mapp and Tech/4th Robert L Hinman, Jr. hit an anti-tank mine at near Langlois which is about 3 miles north of Barneville-sur-Mer near the west coast of the Cherbourg peninsula. T/Sgt Allen B. Kimmel and Tech/4th Robert L. Hinman were killed instantly and later buried at 2200 on July 18th at the La Farge Cemetery near St. Mere Eglise. Lt. Janek and Tech/Sgt Mapp were seriously injured and taken to the 101st Evacuation hospital. Lt. Janek had managed to make contact by walking five miles to Company C even though seriously injured at the time. With disregard to personal safety. GO4 Post Sugar was relocated to near Jubourg. Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaum of Company C went through the mined area and brought out Tech/Sgt Mapp. Later on Lt. Eichbaum would be awarded the Soldiers Medal (see citation on August 14th page 129). GO4 moved Post Sugar to Canteloup and Post Tare to Valognes.
Jul 19
In the 563rd Cpl John J. Kills-in-Water while returning from battalion headquarters to his ground observer site, hit a soft shoulder on the road at a curve and his three-quarter ton truck overturned. He was pinned under the truck for fifteen minutes before help arrived. He was diagnosed as having a serious injury and transferred to the 12th Field Hospital. GO4 Post Tare was moved to near Valognes.
Jul 20
In the 563rd Sgt Ernest R. Scott, Company A, on occupying a site previously used by enemy forces accidentally set off the fuse of a 20 mm detonator causing serious injury to his abdomen and he was transferred to the 12th Field Hospital.
Jul 21
In the 563rd Lt. Harold E. Waeckerle, Tech/5th Alfred W. Madl and Maj. Maurice E. Byrne were injured in a fire in the Battalion operations van caused by a defective gas fired heater and igniting the acetate covers of the situation maps on the wall. Lt. Waeckerle was seriously burned on the face and hands in his determination to put out the fire and save the map posting he tried to beat out the flames with his hands. Lt. Waeckerle was hospital- ized for ten days and returned to duty. (see Editors Note 6 below)
Jul 22
In the 12th Army Group, General Bradley issued a directive that the Third Army could become operational on July 24.
Jul 24
The XX Corps headquarters opened.
Jul 26
In the Third Army the 28th Infantry Division was assigned to the XIX Corps.
Jul 27
In the Third Army's XIX Corps the 28th Infantry Division was put on line.
Jul 28
General Patton was given verbal orders that he would assume operation control of the Third Army. The Forward Echelon of the Third Army Headquarters, named Lucky Forward by General Patton, made their first of many moves to a position five miles west of Coutances. Gemeral Patton's arrival in France was kept secret, since his supposed presence in England furthered the hoax that there would be another landing near Calais.
As yet the 563rd Battalion was not controlling any flights and the information reported into the 100th Fighter Wing Tactical Con- trol Center had no tactical use.
[Editors Note 6--- At one point one of the FDP's reported an enemy flight probably near Rennes which had such a high flying speed that it was not believed at the filter center. The radar operator said it went across the screen (120 miles) in minutes. I remember I had reports that the Germans had a rocket interceptor with about Mach 1 speed and I believe this was one of them. In any event a picture is shown below. The source of the picture is unknown. I also sent home an aviators helmet made very light which I picked up at the Rennes airport which I believe the rocket pilots used. It was my understanding that the rocket made one pass at a target (usually another aircraft) and the pilot and the rocket parachuted down to earth. On page 84 is a photo of one class of German Rocket interceptor.]
Jul 31
In the 563rd during the month incoming personnel included Tech/Sgt Eugene Kiimalehtro and T/Sgt William N. Miller.
After arriving by airplane Gen. Patton prepared to assume control of Bradley's western most divisions. Gen. Patton's go into action. A reconnaissance south discovered that armored divisions were gathering along the hedge rows, and nervously waiting for the attack. The prospect of going into action improved the morale of the men who were tired of our defensive position.
In the First U.S Army's VIII Corps the 6th Armored Division overran Granville and moved to Avranches. The 4th Armored Division secured a crossing of the Selune River near Pontaubault. In the VII Corps area the 3rd Armored Division secured a crossing of the See River. In the XIX Corps area the 35th Infantry Division advanced toward Vire.
The Third Army Staff at noon 1 Aug was
Commanding General Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey
Asst Chief of Staff G-1 Col. Frederick S. Matthews
Asst Chief of Staff G-2 Col. Oscar W. Koch
Asst Chief of Staff G-3 Col. Halley G. Maddox
Asst Chief of Staff G-4 Col. Walter J. Muller
Asst Chief of Staff G-5 Col. Nicholas W. Companole
Adjutant General Col. Robert E. Cummings
Antiaircraft Artillery Col. Frederick R. Chamberlain
Artillery Col. Edward T. Williams
Build up Control Col. Redding F. Perry
Chaplain Col. James H. O'Neill
Chemical Warfare Col. Edward C. Wallington
Engineer Col. John F. Conklin
Finance Lt. Col. Charles B. Milliken
Headquarters Commandant Col. Rufus S. Bratton
Inspector General Col. Clarence C. Park
Judge Advocate Col. Charles E. Cheever
Medical Col. Thomas D. Hurley
Ordnance Col. Thomas H. Nixon
Provost Marshall Col. John C. Macdonald
Public Relations Col. Charles C. Blaklley
Quartermaster Col. Everett Busch
Signal Col. Elton H. Hammond
Special Service Lt. Col. Kenneth Van Buskirk
AUGUST 1944
The Breakout Phase extended from August 1st to 13th
Aug 1
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley relinquished command of the US First Army in order to take command of the 12th Army Group. He had only to take his jeep from the First Army headquarters near St. Lo to his 21st Army Group headquarters at Coutances.
General Patton flew in on 1 August and at 12:00 noon the Third Army Headquarters became operational near Coutance, near the headquarters of General Bradley's 12th Army Group which also opened that day. General Weyland opened his XIX TAC command headquarters at noon the same day. Note that I said Patton flew in from England in an army observation plane. He was irritated that he had to fly in because he thought the a Field General should drive into camp in his jeep like a combat soldier.
Command and General Staff School and traditional U.S. Army - tactical doctrine indicated that an attack should start with a maneuver of Infantry Divisions to find a soft spot and develop a coordinated tank attack through the hole. At this point Patton was short on Infantry Divisions but had two Armored Divisions the 4th Armored and 6th Armored. For the first time in the history of warfare Patton used Tank Divisions as Infantry Divisions and used the forward points of the Armored Divisions as spearheads.
Under Patton's command were the VIII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton the XII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Gilbert R. Cook, the XV Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip and the XX Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker.
Immediate plans were laid with the participation of IX TAC Commander Maj. Gen. Elwood Quesada. Quesada remembered the conver- sation with general Bradley this way. (see Editors Note 7 below)
Quesada said: "Look, Brad, if you will concentrate your armor, I'll tell you what I'll do. I will keep over every column that you establish a flight of bombers from daylight until dark."
Bradley answered: "You will?"
Quesada affirmed: "Yes, I will."
Bradley queried: "For every column that I establish?"
Quesada said: "Yes, and further than that, Brad, we'll do something else that I think will be of tremendous help. We will put in the lead tank of every column an aircraft radio and fix it so they can talk to the flight that is above them which will be there from dawn to dusk."
[Editors Note 7--- The books referred to above were;
August 1944 Campaign for France Robert A. Miller Presidio Press
Battle of the Generals Martin Blumensen Morrow Press
Patton's Third Army Charles M. Province Hippocrene Books
Bradley answered: "Terrific. You'll do that? Can you do it?"
Quesada explained: "Yes. Furthermore, in order for that talk to be meaningful to the pilot, I'll put an aviator in the tank."
When Bradley ordered a couple of tanks sent to the IX Tactical Air Force headquarters so that the radio installation could be worked out, the officer on the receiving end thought the general must have made a mistake, and he sent the tanks to the 9th Infantry Division instead. What would the air force want with tanks? When the 9th Infantry said the tanks were not for them, the officer called the General back. When the orders were repeated--IX Tactical Air Force--he could only comment, "well, I'll be damned."
In this time frame the XIX TAC was under the IX TAC and it is obvious that time on that Maj. Gen. Otto Weyland who commanded the XIX TAC agreed fully with Maj. Gen. Quesada.
In mid afternoon Bradley went from the First Army Hq to the Third Army Headquarters to settle the border between the First and Third Army. As soon as Bradley left, Patton took off to his VIII Corps headquarters. He directed that the 8th Infantry Division was to back up the 4th Armored moving south towards Rennes and the 79th Infantry to backup the 6th Armored moving towards Brest.
In the Third Army area it was quite common to have "scuttle- butt" filter down the command. This was quite easy to get in the 563rd because we were on the teletype net direct from TAC and had data passed through from Third Army. Several days after the 1 August operations I remember the "scuttlebutt" passed down for that day which stated that one of Patton's generals asked him for the attack orders and Patton answered him "Attack straight ahead". Historians state this more diplomatically by saying that Patton instructed his Generals to seek out the enemy and attack.
On 1 August Company A of the 563rd was located near Helleville which is about 10 miles southeast of Cherbourg and they were on alert for immediate deployment. 563rd Battalion Headquarters was located at St Pierre Eglise. (see Editors Note 8 below) At this timet in time the provisional 19th TCG was made up of the 563rd SAW Bn and the 100th Fighter Wing and 312th FCS personnel and commanded by Col. Don Mayhue. Maj. Nash was the TCC Senior Controller. The TCC and the 100th Fighter Wing were also located at St. Pierre Eglise. The plan was to have Company A function as the Tactical Control Center (TCC) when they moved to to their first site.
[Editors Note 8--- This period of combat in August the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion really "earned their spurs". Before 1 August the 563rd were sitting on the Cherbourg Peninsula doing Air Defense and reporting in to the RAF radar center. There was a feeling among the men of the battalion that we were being left behind. In saying this I think that at this very time General George Patton was also feeling the sting of being left behind as he was the object of political complaints from Eisenhower.]
The 563rd was under the 100th Fighter Wing and staffed with Wing Headquarters officers plus the At this time the allied forces were pretty much slowed down by the hedge rows of France and the swamps in northern France about on line with Caen.
Maj. Gen. John S. Wood commanding the 4th Armored moved rapidly to Rennes and waited for the 8th Infantry to join the attack. He then swung the 4th Armored Division around to the west and south of the city.
At noon on August 1st the 12th Army Group, under General Brad- ley became operational and Gen. Patton's Third Army came to life. Patton took command the XV Corps headquarters, which had arrived in France on 15 July and XX Corps which was rapidly approaching Brittany. Behind the front headquarters, which had arrived on 24 July, were ready for action. The XII Corps headquarters was staging the movement of Third Army units from England to the Continent and processing them from the beach forward and part of the headquarters reached Normandy on July 29th and the remainder on August 7th.
To give close air support to the Third Army, Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command, which had been operating as part of the IX TAC, became operational. At their disposal they had the 365th, 368th and 371st Fighter Groups who were under the 84th Fighter Wing. They also had the one squadron of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group that was based in Normandy.
During the operations shown on the map close air support was superb. So effectively were bridges, roads and railroads destroyed that the Germans were reduced to moving troops by night and their supply deficiencies became acute.
The XIX TAC take-off, scheduled for August 1st was delayed until later afternoon because of bad weather. In the short time they operated that day they flew 147 sorties and dropped 22 tons of bombs. The 365th Fighter Group bombed 3 German 88-mm Guns. The 37th Fighter Group dropped four 500 lb bombs in a field with guns positions reported Other claims were 32 Motor vehicles, 9 Armored vehicles, 1 fuel dump, 9 motor transports, 1 marshaling yard and 6 other gun positions.
The Third Army had launched operations early and in the hours remaining before dusk, the airmen were able to knock out both German armor and trucks. After the ground forces broke through at Avranches the XIX TAC really had its work cut out for it. Groups were assigned to hang over the armored columns of the Third Army, to prevent attack by enemy planes and to knock out stuff holding up the columns. The armed reconnaissance squadrons had the long range jobs of isolating battlefields, and to spot and break up any concentrations and keep the enemy constantly off balance. There was also the job of protecting a bottleneck at Avranches through which the Third Army men and material were pouring and some work to be done on ships in the harbor of St. Malo. American pilots were going on three and sometimes five missions a day. Almost daily new groups were being added to the XIX TAC as its functions were broadened.
Patton drove the VIII Corps westward, spearheaded by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions into Britanny. They moved through the Avranches gap straight south of Avranches and the primary effort of the Third Army was Britanny.
On August 1st the 6th Armored attacked South at Avranches and turned west and 4th Armored attacked south from Avranches and they were in Rennes the same day. The 8th Infantry Division occupied Rennes on August 1st.
Situation Map I shows the thrust of the 4th and the 6th Arm- ored Divisions westward to clean out the Brest Peninsula. The 563rd was prepared to follow west. The thrust of the Third Army was so powerful and quick that they cleaned it up in such a short time that following was not necessary. They did this but bypassed the German garrisons at St. Malo, Brest, and Lorient. As it turned out it would be months before these garrisons would surrender. This changed the plan of the 563rd Battalion because the thrust would now turn eastward. The battalion was deployed so it could go either way.
Situation Map II shows the detail of the eastward thrust which was being carried on by ground forces at the same time as the thrust in Situation Map I.
Following is a detailed account of the battles which sub- stantially started on 1 August 1944 when the Third Army became active.
It was part of the Allied plan that when the US First Army broke out of the Corentin and pivoted to the east about Caumont, a corps would be sent into Brittany to secure the ports considered so vital for logistical support. The Third Army was to take command of this corps. Accordingly, when the U.S. VIII Corps broke into the open south of Avaranches on 1 August, the Third Army became operational and the 12th Army Group was formed.
While engineers labored on the restricted road network at the Avaranches bottleneck, the flamboyant General Patton drove the VIII Corps (spearheaded by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions) westward into Brittany. His other corps, (XV,XX and XII) he moved through the gap straight south of Avaranches. Brittany was quickly overrun (most of the German field forces formerly stationed there had been destroyed in the defense of Normandy), except for its major ports.
During these operations Close Air Support was superb. Tank columns had direct communications with the aircraft flying column cover, thus ensuring immediate tactical support and reconnaissance. The lines of communications were interdicted by both tactical and Strategic air power to isolate the battlefield. So effectively were bridges, roads, and railroads destroyed that the Germans were reduce to moving troops by night and their deficiencies became acute.
Allied air power rallied to the support of the ground troops. On August 8th the attack was halted when the Germans realized that it was more important to try to contain Patton's threat from the south.
The 12th Army Group (General Bradley) became operational and took command of the U.S. Divisions engaged in France being divided between the U.S. First Army (FUSA) and the U.S. Third Army (TUSA). General Montgomery (British) was to retain command of all ground forces through the month of August. The XIX TAC of the U.S. Ninth Air Force became operational this date with the mission of supporting the Third Army. The IX TAC continued to assist the First Army.
The Third Army (General Patton) became operational with 4 corps under its command (VIII, XII, XV, XX) as well as FFI (French Forces of the Interior). Operating on the right of the First Army and on the extreme right of the Allied forces. The mission of the Third Army is to secure Brittany Peninsula and its valuable ports. VIII Corps, consisting of 4th and 6th Armored Division and the 8th and 79th Infantry Division, passes from First to Third Army command; with 4th and 6th Armored Division spearheading, pours through the narrow Avranches corridor and fans out to S, SW and W. Crossing Le Selune River at Pontubault, 6th Armored Division swings W into Brittany in 2 columns and reaches Pontorson-Antrain area. 4th Armored Division drives southward to cut off the peninsula and reaches positions near Rennes. XV Corps (Maj. Gen. Wade Haislip), consisting of 83rd and 90th Infantry Divisions and 5th Armored Division is concentrating between See and Selllune Rivers to block enemy movement toward Avaranches.
The First Army, command of which passes from General Bradley to Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges, directs all but V Corps to drive southeast. The V Corps is to take heights N of Vire and remain there until pinched out. VII expands Brecey bridgehead on right flank with the Division reinforced by CCA of 3rd Armored Division. 4th Infantry Division, reinforced with CCB of 34rd Armored Division pushes forward toward St. Pois, 9th Infantry Division moves southward on left flank of corps. XIX Corps overruns Percy and Tessy, Percey falling to she 28th Infantry Division and Tessy to CCA, 2nd Armored Division. The V Corps continues southward toward Vire on a 2 Division front after 5th Infantry Division is pinched out on right flank by British and assembles in rear in Army reserve.
Aug 2
Third Army Forward Headquarters was located at Beauchamps which was 11 miles north of Avranches. The VIII Corps command post was at Sartilly, a few miles north of Avranches. Bradley went to the VIII Corps command post and after unsuccessfully trying to reach Patton he countermanded Patton's orders for the 79th Infantry Division and ordered the 79th to Fougeres to build up there. Bradley was concerned about his left flank. The traffic through Avranches became a nightmare. It was a small bottle neck with everything trying to get through. The "scuttlebutt" had it that Patton planted himself in the middle of the main highway and personally directed traffic through Avranches. Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges arrived at his new First Army command post about three o'clock which was about 5 miles southwest of St. Lo. Hodges had taken over command of the First Army from Bradley the day before. (See Situation Map on p 12)
The XIX TAC took command of the 100th Fighter Wing. The 405th and 363rd Fighter Groups were under XIX TAC operational control. The 363rd was grounded all day on account of weather. The remaining Fighter Groups were able to operate after 1000 hours. Seven Tiger Tanks were destroyed with 500 Lb bombs delivered by the 405th Fighter Group. The 371st Fighter Group put 16 500 Lb bombs on 8 gun positions and silenced them. The 358th Fighter Group on armed Reconnaissance bombed railroad targets. In all 23 combat missions comprising 223 sorties were flown and 35 3/4 tons bombs dropped. Two planes were lost to flak. The claims were 1 locomo- tive destroyed and 3 damaged, 35 motor vehicles destroyed and 24 damaged. 7 Tiger tanks and one half track destroyed, a marshaling yard and 5 troop concentrations were attack.
Aug 3
12th Army Group in order to exploit success of VIII Corps, orders Third Army to secure line St. Hiliare du Haarcourt-Fougeres- Rennes and then clear Brittany Peninsula, bypassing St Malo if it cannot be taken easily. Bradley directed the Third Army to complete capture of Brittany Peninsula with minimum forces, clear region W of Mayenne R and N of Loire R, and secure crossings of the Mayenne. First Army is to extend its operations to Mayenne- Domfront area. Bradley changed the primary mission of the Third Army to driving eastward.
In First Army VII Corps area, 1st Infantry Division and attached elements of 3rd Armored Division speed southward and overruns Mortain. The 4th Infantry Division continues toward St. Pois. The 9th Infantry Division cuts road NE of Villedieu. The XI corps advances steadily SE from Percy-Tessy area against moderate opposition from retreating enemy. In V Corps area, continuing S toward Vire and 35th Infantry Division on W and 2nd on E., corps crosses the Vire and Soulevre Rivers.
In Third Army VIII Corps area, continuing W along Brittany Peninsula, 6th Armored Division bypasses Dinan to S when strong opposition develops there. The 83rd Infantry Division is attached to corps to follow 6th Armored Division, replacing the 79th Infantry Division. The 79th Infantry Division is transferred to XV Corps for drive on Fougeres. TF A (TD's,cavalry and engineers), under Brig. Gen. Herbert Earnest, is formed to clear bypassed resistance along N Coast of Brittany Peninsula. Task Force A (TFA) moves forward to clear bypassed resistance in St. Malo area. The 4th Armored Division gains additional ground near Rennes, 13th Infantry of 8th Infantry Division motorized moves forward to Rennes area. Forward elements of 6th Armored Division get to within a few miles of Loudeac, about 60 miles west of Rennes, when the attack is halted upon order to return and reduce Dinan and at the end of the day they were in contact with the Germans at St. Malo. The 13th Infantry reverts to 8th Infantry Division from attachment to 4th Armored Division and begins assault on Rennes, while 4th Armored Division continues S passing W of Rennes. In XV Corps area, the 79th Infantry Division reach Fougeres. The 9th Infantry Division reaches positions just NW of Foret de St Sever. XIX Corps, continuing steadily SE, reaches St Sever-Calvados on right and is about half way to Vire on left. The V Corps meets stiffening resistance as it approaches Vire.
In the Ninth Air Defense Company D LW team number 3 which included Lt. Cobbs section and Lt. Altman's section were relieved from attachment with the Ninth Air Defense Command and attached back to the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion on Par 13 of GO 187, Headquarters Ninth Air Force dated 27 July 1944. This group was sent back to the U.K. for the purpose of studying a new type of Radar Set (SCR-584)
In the early morning of August 3rd the Advanced Headquarters of the 563rd under command of Maj. Byrne advanced from Ste Pierre Eglise to Bruz which is about 5 miles south of Rennes and secured the Chateau Blossac for the 100th Fighter Wing Headquarters. Mid morning Advance Headquarters sent a messenger back to 563rd Main Headquarters advising that the area of Pontorson was substantially clear for the planned movement of FDP1. Advanced Headquarters was set up in the park east of the Chateau in Bruz. Company A was on alert for the penetration and were equipped with Air/Ground radios borrowed from the 312th FCS and were ready to function as a Tactical Control Center manned by the FDP1 Information Center (IC).
The XIX TAC covered armored and infantry columns is spite of bad weather. Only 6 missions of eight aircraft each were able to take off, 4 missions were unsuccessful and aborted, the other 2 missions destroyed or damaged 40 motor and horse drawn vehicles including ammunition trucks. Total sorties were 48 and 3 1/4 tons of bombs dropped. One aircraft was lost. Twenty-four recon and 2 photo sorties were flown.
Aug 4
On August 4th a major change in the Overlord plan took place. Hodges' First Army was to continue the swing eastward, and Patton's Third Army, leaving Brittany to the VIII Corps advanced toward Le Mans. The Allies quickly implemented the new plan but late on August 6th a powerful German Counterattack at Mortain forced a reconsideration. The 20th Division (VIII Corps) caught the full force of the blow and reeled backward, but Bradley quickly stopped two of Patton's divisions in the area, and adding two more from the First Army, reinforced the 30th Infantry Division. (see Editors Note 9 below).
In Third Army VIII Corps area, planned attack on Dinan is canceled and 6th Armored Division continues toward Brest instead. Advancing though night 4-5, 6th Armored Division reaches vicinity of Carhaix, which supporting FFI forces report strongly held. TF A and elements of 83rd Infantry Division reach enemy stronghold of St Malo, where prolonged struggle ensues. Rennes falls to 13th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division is driving toward Vannes.
In the 563rd Company A, FDP1,and GO1 and GO4 moved to a loca- tion near Ardevon about 4 miles north of Pontorson. LW1 stayed in position at Juborg for backup coverage. GO1 moved Post Able to St Germaine, Post Baker to Cumburg, Post Charley to Clayes, Post Dog to Becherel and Post Fox to Littre. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Romange, Post Tare to St. James, Post Uncle to Troyes, Post Uncle to Montangen, Post Victor to Montangen and Post William to Longsols. These location's were the sites where Company A earned a Presidential Citation for their part in the devastating fighter bomber action on the German Seventh Army and reduction of St. Malo port. This FDP1 location was a very good radar site because they could look east, west and south and fighter-bomber sorties were being run in all these directions and vectored in by the FDP! controllers.
[Editors Note 9--- At this time the provisional 19th TCG was set up under the 100th Fighter Wing with Col. Don Mayhue as commanding officer and Major Nash was named Senior Controller. Personnel came from the 53rd SAW Bn, the 312th and 316th FC Squadrons. The TCC was first set up near Rennes on 8 August. From Aug 1 to 8 The TCC responsibilities were handled by Company A by the FDP1 Informatin center, some radio and D/F borrowed from the 312 FCS and extra controllers. Security was provided by Company A GO1 Ground Observer platoon reinforced by Headquarters GO4 Ground Observer Platoon who were attached to Company for the operation.]
GO4 platoon had been recently assigned to the 563rd and was attached to Company A for this operation. Company A was commanded by Capt. Thomas J. Slattery. GO1 Ground Observer Platoon was commanded by Lt. Lawrence Keefer and GO4 Ground Observer Platoon was commanded by Lt. Jimmie Duncan. Platoon Ground observer Platoons are attached as a team to the Company where they will function for a given operation. Lt. Will McAdam commanded the FDP radar platoon and Lt. John Thomason commanded LW1 Light Radar. FDP1 information center (IC) functioned as the TCC (Tactical Control Center) in addition to their mission of FDP (Forward Director Post) and reported directly into the XIX TAC Command Center. It is normal for the attached Ground Observer nets, the LW radar and the FDP radar to report to the FDP information center where the information is filtered by the FDP filter Officer and used by the FDP controllers and also reported back to the TCC. At this time the 19th TCC had not as yet been formed. Ground observer posts supporting FDP1 moved in on 4 August and included Company A GO1 platoon with Headquarters Company GO4 Platoon attached. The ground observer posts were located as follows:
GO1 GO4
GO Post Location GO Post Location
Able Germaine Sugar Romange
Baker Cumburg Tare St. James
Charley Claynes Uncle Troyes
Dog Becherel Victor Montangen
Fox Lirttre William Longsols
Post Victor (GO4) reported they had a shootout with a group of Germans in a farmhouse. The Germans disabled their guns or threw away the parts. Later on the men of Post Victor men were going over the remains of a German payroll in a crashed airplane. The action of Company A can best be described by quoting the Battle Honors issued By Maj. Gen. Vandenberg, Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force and published on later on November 28th, 1944.
1. under the Provisions of Section IV, Circular Number 333, WD, 1943, the following named unit of the ninth Air Force are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy from 3 to 8 August 1944. During this period the members of Company A, 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism in the face of the enemy when, after having been charged with the mission of establishing a forward Battalion FDP in the Mont St. Michael area, the company found itself in hotly contested territory, under fire from enemy artillery and constantly harassed by enemy scouting parties and snipers. Although the company was not equipped or prepared adequately to meet opposition of this nature, the members of the unit nevertheless so located its Light Warning and Ground Observation Posts that the company was immediately able to furnish radio control to aircraft in the area, directing them to targets of opportunity and furnishing early warning of enemy aerial and ground activity to Air Corps and Anti Aircraft Artilleryunits in the area, as well as serving as a relay point for many signal activities in the sector after existing land lines had been destroyed through enemy action. Throughout this period, the fortitude, spirit and improvision, and high Esprit de Corps evidenced by the members of Company resulted in the rendition of distinguished service to the Armed Forces during an important phase of the campaign in northern France."
Chart 1b on page 110 is the situation during the Breakthrough phase from August 3rd through August 10th. This shows the west flank and the disposition of Company A during this phase showing the location units. The Company Headquarters was very near the FDP1 location. Chart 1a on page 109 shows the east flank and the location of the enemy front on August 3rd and the extent of the penetration of the German Seventh Panzer Army on the 7 August Counterattack. The arrows show the furtherest penetration of the 2nd SS Panzer Division.
The XIX TAC with 4 Groups available could not operate until 1330 Hours because of low ceiling, then activity rose sharply to 30 missions comprising ----sorties. On an urgent request of the VIII Corps the 358th Fighter Group dropped 16 500 Lb bombs on the target area with good concentration on 15 German tanks. Some of our planes were damaged by flak but none lost. The 405th, 365th, 356th and 471st Fighter Group dropped 32 tons of bombs on targets and results including claims of 1 rail line cut, 6 freight cars destroyed, 57 motor vehicles destroyed, 5 supply and 1 fuel dump destroyed. --- armored vehicles 1 fuel vehicle,1 Naval vessel,-- --troop concentrations and 15 bivouac attacked.
In First Army releases 5th Infantry Division to XX Corps, Third Army. In VII Corps area, 1st Infantry Division, to which 39th Infantry of 9th Infantry Division and CCB of 3rd Armored Division are attached, improves positions in Mortain area on right flank of corps and patrols probe southward toward Mayenne. 4th Infantry Division, which releases CCB of 3rd Armored Division to 1st Infantry Division, battles vigorously but indecisively for St Pois and heights above the town. 9th Infantry Division pushes into Foret de St. Sever against strong opposition. XIX Corps is almost halted by stiffening resistance and mine fields. The V Corps reaches its objectives above Vire. 2nd Infantry Division continuing advance through night 4-5, and halts to permit XIX Corps to cross its front to take Vire. The 4th Armored Division advanced to Chateaubrient on August 4th and advanced from Chateaubrient to Lorient and attacked west to Vannes. On August 4th the XV Corps area the 79th Infantry Division attacked from their position at Fougeres south and east and occupied Le Mans on August 8th. The 4th Armored Division was driving toward Vannes and Rennes is captured by the 8th Infantry Division.
The XIX TAC kept the enemy away from the advancing columns while attacking motor vehicles, gun positions and an enemy headquarters and performing fighter sweeps in the St Malo area. On an urgent request of he VIII Corps the 358th Fighter Group dropped 16 500 Pound bombs on the target area with good concentration on 15 German tanks. Some of our planes were damaged by flak but none lost. The 405th, 365th, 356th and 471st Fighter Groups dropped 32 tons of bombs on targets and results including claims of 1 rail cut, 6 freight cars destroyed, 57 Motor Vehicles destroyed, 5 supply and 1 fuel dump destroyed. -- armored vehicles, 1 fuel vehicle,1 Naval vessel, -- troop concentrations and 15 bivouac areas attacked
Aug 5
In Third Army area, The swift aggressive tactics of the Third Army resulted in a widespread disorganization of the German Army. The XV Corps secured the city of Mayenne. VIII Corps is attacking west, southwest, south and southeast simultaneously. The 6th Armored Division continues west toward Brest, bypassing Carhaix and reaching Huelgoat area. The 83rd Infantry Division attacks outer defenses of St Malo; TF A continues west along the north coast of Brittany, Brittany Peninsula is cut off as CCA, 4th Armored Division, reaches Vannes. In the XV Corps area, 90th Infantry Division TF seizes Mayenne, 79th Infantry Division is approaching Laval.
First Army adjusts boundary between U.S. and British forces and gives new mission to V Corps. In VII Corps area, 1st Infantry Division, reinforcements continues to consolidate positions in Mortain area and probe southward with patrols. The 4th Infantry Division overruns St Pois and advances slightly beyond there. The 9th Infantry Division pushes on through Foret-de-St. Sever. The 30th Infantry Division is transferred to VII Corps from V Corps. In XIX Corps area, 29th Infantry Division progresses toward Vire despite strong opposition. The V Corps is to drive through Vire to take the region between Tinchebray and St Jewan-du-Bois, employing 2nd and 29th Infantry Divisions. The 29th Infantry Division is to remain under XIX Corps until it captures Vire, 35th Infantry Division reverts to Third Army.
From August 5th through August 9th the XV Corps advanced 75 miles from the St. Hilaire-Fougeres line to Le Mans with very little cost. The VIII Corps was attacking west, southwest, south and east simultaneously and in the XV Corps area the 90th Infantry Division seized Mayenne and the 79th Infantry was approaching Lavel.
XIX TAC kept the enemy away from the advancing columns while attacking motor vehicles, gun positions and an enemy
Aug 6
In the 12th Army group Bradley ordered the establishment of bridgehead over Sarth R in Le Mans-Alecon area.
In First Army VII Corps area, the 1st Infantry Division, re- lieved by 20th Infantry Division in Mortain area, continues swiftly SE with 3rd Armored Division to Ambrieres-le-Grand and Mayenne, relieving elements of the 90th Infantry Division (XV Corps) at Mayenne. The 4th Infantry Division is pinched out W of St Pois and the 9th Infantry Division pushes southward toward Sourdeval against strong resistance. In First Army XIX Corps area, the 29th Infantry Division breaks into Vire and clears the city. With fall of Vire to XIX Corps the First Army V Corps is out of contact with enemy.
In the Third Army zone of operation now included a total of 119 towns and a population normally numbering 3.5 million French people. There was a scarcity of bread, but there was also a wheat harvest under way which would alleviate that situation. The first signs of possible gasoline shortage showed up in the attack of the Maj. Gen. Lansford Oliver's 5th Armored Division operating on the far right of the Third Army. He had fueled up several Infantry Divisions and saw the transportation problem poised by the delivery through the Avranches bottleneck. They managed to reach the Mayenne River at Chateau-Gontier about 30 miles south of Laval and had to put the brakes on their advance until sufficient gasoline could be obtained. The eastward moving elements of the Third Army upon securing Mayenne, as usual, did not stop. Patton often had instructed his men that "too many battles have been lost because of stopping on the wrong side of a river." If the Third Army would keep advancing continually, hitting the enemy with everything it had, the enemy would have no time to stop and organize an active defense. Third Army units were again spearhead ing the advance and driving to the east, with Le Mans as the objective. Supply lines were lengthening rapidly and putting a strain on the truck companies. During the night, a stick of bombs was dropped on the army headquarters at Beauchamps. Ammunition Depot No 1, near Granville was bombed, with a loss of approximately six hundred tons of badly needed ammunition. Unit commands and staffs took the supply problems in stride, but in looking back I realize that our supply personnel worked like dogs keeping us in food, ammunition and
oline. Late in the day a powerful German counterattack at Mortain forced reconsideration by the Supreme command. On August 2nd, Hitler himself had ordered this attack designed to isolate the Third Army. This did not slow the progress of the Third Army troops as there was supreme confidence that our forces were unstoppable. The First Army was responsible for the area to contain the attack and the Third Army completely ignored the threat and continued the attack as if it did not exist.
In VIII Corps area, CCB on right flank of 6th Armored Division, overcomes opposition S of Morlaix and at Lesneven: CCA makes slow progress along secondary routes to S. 83rd Infantry Division continues to hammer at St Malo stronghold. TF A gets beyond St Briesux as it continues W along N coast of Brittany. RCT 121, 8th infantry Division, is attached to 83rd Infantry Division for attack on Dinard, W of St Malo. The 4th Armored Division is advancing on Lorient
In the XV Corps area major elements now across the Mayenne, is driving rapidly on Le Mans. 79th Infantry Division takes Lavel.
In the XX Corps (Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker), consisting at present of 5th Infantry Division is reinforced by the 35th Infantry Division in order to protect S flank of Third Army.
In the 563rd Battalion headquarters (Main) moved from Ste. Pierre Eglise to near Bruz which is about 5 miles west of Rennes, to consolidate with Battalion headquarters (Advanced). Company B moved to Molgue which is a few miles west of Rennes. The 563rd Battalion plan was to have Company B (FDP2) follow the Third Army units moving west into the Brest Peninsula. The plan also called for Company C to follow the Third Army units moving east towards Le Mans and set up FDP3 and LW3. It soon became apparent that the rapid movement of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions would either mop up their objectives in the Brest Peninsula or bypass them. (See XV Corps 6 August on page 113). GO4 was transferred from Headquarters Company to Company C and they moved to new sites on the Brest Peninsula near Fougeres. Their mission was to cover the road network around Fougeres and warn the Third Army flank of low flying hostile aircraft. On this same date the platoon captured 5 enemy prisoners. The Germans were fortified in a small clump of woods. After a few bursts of a sub-machine gun fire they surren- dered. Also on August 6th the 563rd Main headquarters moved to the position of the Advanced Headquarters near Rennes. When they went passed through a strong point of the 8th Infantry Division at Rennes the point commander told Lt. Col. McBride that they saw the 563rd Advanced Headquarters party that ad headed south of Rennes two days before and never been seen again and were probably destroyed since they were ahead of the Infantry. Of course the Third Army and XIX TAC air-ground attack had been so devastating and thorough that there was no Germans left and the ad- vanced headquarters never was in danger. Also on August 6th FDP2 moved to a site near Moigne which is about 5 miles south west of Rennes near the Vilaine River opposite the Rennes Airfield.
The Third Army XV Corps was attacking on the axis of Laval to Le Mans and then north toward Alecon to put the squeeze on the German Fifth and Seventh Panzer Armies trapped in the Falaise and Argentan area.
The XIX TAC air power was shifted to the eastern front and the Loire Valley with patrols over the danger area in the Avranches corridor. In this new phase one P-47 was lost, while strafing tanks, it "mushed in" and exploded. Combat sorties totaled 293 and 35 1/2 tons of bombs dropped. Claims included 9 locomotives, 20 freight cars, 135 motor vehicles, 7 armored vehicles, 6 field guns destroyed, 3 locomotives, 46 Motor Transports, 14 armored vehicles and 6 small boats damaged. In addition 26 successful tactical and photo recon missions were flown. At the request of XIX TAC the IX Bomber command attacked the defenses at St Malo. During the night German nocturnal bombing stuck close to the Third Army and XIX TAC command post. Flares illuminated the area and bombs were dropped causing some damage but no harm.
In the 563rd the current mission of FDP4 and LW4 on August 6th was to provide warning for the vicinity of Rennes where the Headquarters of the 563rd SAW Battalion and 100th Fighter Wing were located. GO4 was reporting into FDP1 as well as GO1 where security was critical.
Aug 7
In the First Army area, Germans open strong counterattack with massed armor toward Avranches early in morning in effort to break through to the sea and split U.S. forces. Attack penetrates line at junction of XIX and VII Corps, over running Mortain and rolling on to Juvigny and Le Mesnil-Tove before it can be stemmed with assistance of aircraft. In VII Corps area, 39th Infantry Division bears brunt of enemy counterblow and elements are isolated in Mortain area. To help stabilize the center of corps line, 4th Infantry Division and CCB, 3rd Armored Division, are attached to the 30th Infantry Division. Progress is made on flanks of enemy penetration. The 9th Infantry Division advancing slightly near Mortain and 1st Infantry Division crossing the Mayenne and reaching St Fraimbault-de-Prieres on the south XIX Corps pushes southward to relieve pressure in Mortain.
In the Third Army area the XIII Corps headquarters arrived in France. The Germans started a strong counter attack through Mortain. It soon became apparent that main thrust was to be east toward Le Mans. On page 111 is a situation map of the German Counterattack at Mortain on 7 August.
In the 563rd when the Counter attack started GO4 Ground Observer platoon Post Tare was cut off but remained undiscovered, and was able to maintain communications until the following day when the enemy was driven back. During the time GO4 Post Tare reported several German Aircraft flying west at 2000 feet altitude. Company C moved from Portbail to Bruz near Battalion and Wing Headquarters. FDP3 and LW3 moved to a site near Bruz which is about 3 Miles south of Rennes and LW2 moved to a location near Trefendel which is about 15 miles west of Rennes. The GO platoon of Company B was concentrated at a location near Plelan which is about 21 miles west and 6 miles south of Rennes. They were in this position from August 7th until August 26th. This was in anticipa- tion of the support of an operation westward to reduce the Brest Peninsula. As it turned out the action was completed quickly and the residue of the German installations in the ports of Lorient, St. Nazaire and Brest were bypassed.
The XIX TAC continued to cover all columns moving to the west, south and east, while also attacking troops in Brittany. The XIX TAC strength was augmented and the strength is nine Fighter Groups which are the 36th, 358th, 362nd, 371st, 373rd, 405th, 406th, all equipped with P-47's and the 354th, 363rd flying P-51's. The 100th and 303rd Fighter Wings are assigned for logistical support. The enemy's air was growing more aggressive. It was a day of hard fighting and our claims included destruction of 33 aircraft (14 destroyed, 1 probably destroyed, 3 damaged in the air and 19 destroyed and 4 damaged on the ground). Sorties hit a new high with a total of 601 with 62 tons of bombs dropped. Claims included 2 locomotives, 106 freight cars, 12 tanks, 98 motor transports,90 horse drawn vehicles, 1 highway bridge and 5 barges, all destroyed. Also 19 freight cars, 9 motor transports,10 armored vehicles were damaged and a marshaling yard attacked. Thirty-two Tactical Reconnaissance sorties were flown. Part of the bag of enemy aircraft was obtained when information was received that Chartes airfield was ripe for attack. Twelve p-47's of the 36th Fighter Group were ordered to attack the field. Eight bombs were dropped, with resulting destruction of 3 ME-109's and 2 JU-52's and damage to 3 more FW-109's. Another Squadron of P-51's in the Mayenne area was vectored to intercept 12 ME-109's and they destroyed 5 and damaged 2. In one attack seven P-47's of the 405th Fighter Group claimed destruction of 112 tanks, 5 staff cars, 4 half tracks (three of them carrying flak guns, 4 light flak positions and damaged 4 other tanks. Several trains and a power plant were attacked.
During the night the enemy initiated a strafing and bombing attack on their own troops held in the POW enclosure at Marcey, about a mile north of Avranches, killing twenty-one German POW's and wounding sixty-two. Due to this raid, the Third Army started a policy of lighting the prisoner of war enclosures only in emergencies.
The previous night the 116th, 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions started a counter attack. During the day the attack failed and Hitler himself ordered his commander to throw in the 1st SS Panzer Division but in spite of this the attack was contained. (See Mortain Counterattack August 7 on page 111).
The 4th Armored Lorient on August 7th. In Third Army, VII Corps area, 6th Armored Division closes in on Brest. Rear elements arrive outside the city too late in day to begin concerted assault, thus giving enemy time to strengthen defenses and bring up reinforcements. TF A is approaching Morlaix. The 83rd Infantry Division continues battle for St Malo. The 4th Armored Division invests Lorient. XV Corps is rapidly approaching Le Mans.
Aug 8
At 12th Army Group, in bold disregard of the German threat at Mortain, Bradley then turned Patton's XV Corps north toward Argentan to blunt that attack.
In the Third Army area Patton ordered the XV Corps to advance north from Le Mans to secure the Sees-Carroughes line and close the Argentan-Falaise gap. The 6th Armored made contact at St Bruiec on August 8th
In The Third Army's VIII Corps area, ultimatum calling for surrender of Brest is ignored. The 6th Armored Division prepares for all-out assault on the city on 9th until enemy threat to rear forces a change in plan. An Enemy division is found to be moving toward Brest via Plouvien. Bitter fighting continues in outskirts of St Malo. RCT 121, attached to 83rd Infantry Division, meets strong opposition as it advances on Dinard. In the Third Army's XV Corps area the troops envelop and overruns Le Mans and crosses Sarthe R in that area. The 79th Infantry Division enters Le Mans. The 2nd French Armored Division is attached to corps to help it secure line Sees-Carrouges, both inclusive.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 80th Infantry Division is to take over Le mans bridgehead and the 5th Infantry Division invests Angers and Nantes.
In the 563rd FDP4 moved from Gouberville to Dunloup which is near Chateaugiron and several miles southeast of Rennes. LW1 who were covering from Juborg moved up to Louvigne. GO3 Platoon was moved to the following locations; Post Mike to Planches; Posts Oboe and Roger to Orgeres; Posts Peter and Queen to Chatillon. LW1 moved to a location just south of Louvigne which is about 5 miles south of St Hilaire du Harcouet. FDP4 moved to a location 3 miles south east of Rennes near Las Faroulais and LW4 moved to a location near Acigne which is about 6 miles east of Rennes. Also on August 8th the GO platoon of Company C was deployed around the perimeter of FDP3 as security strong points Post Mike was moved to Planches, Post Oboe and Roger to Orgeres, Posts Peter and Queen to Chatillon.
The 100 Wing moved to the Chateau Blossac in Bruz which is 8 miles south of Rennes and in the vicinity near the 563rd Head- quarters.
The XIX TAC struck a new high peak of activity by flying 717 sorties. Five enemy aircraft were destroyed and 11 of our planes were lost. Strafing and dropping 94 1/2 tons of bombs. Destroyed 29 locomotives 137 freight cars, 205 motor vehicles, 10 fuel and ammunition vehicles, 16 horse drawn vehicles, 17 tanks or other `armored vehicles, and 11 flak positions. Damaged 2 locomotives, 59 freight cars, 28 motor transports and 26 armored vehicles. Cut rail lines at 7 points and attacked a troop concentration and 5 fuel dumps, one of which was completely destroyed. Recon planes flew 45 tactical, 1 photographic and 6 artillery recon missions. The recon sorties were flown to gain aerial superiority and knock out German Airdromes north and east of Paris. The 362nd Fighter Group lost four P-47's on a 40 plane armed recon north and east of Paris but accomplished the following:
Put four 500 Lb bombs on a gun position; gun was silenced. Dropped two frag clusters on another gun position: gun was silenced.
Put eight frag clusters and two 500 Lb bombs on 40 boxcars Destroyed 40 boxcars and 1 locomotive by dropping frag clusters and four 500 Lb bombs on marshaling yard. Damaged eight railroad cars by dropping eight 260 Lb frags on a second marshaling yard. Damaged 25 freight cars at another point.
Dropped two frag clusters on an airdrome
Destroyed seven motor transports
Strafed 15 freight cars loaded with 155-mm guns
Later, on their third group mission of the day the 362nd Fighter Group put 26 bombs on 7 Tiger tanks, claiming 3 destroyed, 4 damaged and put 16 bombs on a marshaling yard hitting a workshop. With .50 cal machine guns they bagged 2 armored cars, 2 ammunition trucks, 1 gasoline truck and a dozen miscellaneous vehicles and an enemy operated jeep. The 373rd Fighter Group on an armed recon with 32 planes near Paris reported "34 bombs in fuel dump; totally destroyed". On another mission in the same area spotted 30 freight cars, mostly oil tankers, entering a marshaling yard in which there were 50 more freight cars. Results: 8 direct hits, 6 near misses, 6 heavy black smoke fires, 25 cars destroyed and 50 damaged. The cars were also strafed. Before they went home for more bombs and gas they put eight 500 Lb bombs on a train, destroying the locomotive and three cars and cutting the tracks. They dropped 8 more 500 Lb bombs on 25 railroad cars in a marshaling yard, destroying 10 and damaging 10 railroad cars and cut tracks in three different places. While the 405th Fighter Group was destroying some 60 motor vehicles and 8 freight cars, Three ME-109's attacked and only one of the German fighters escaped. Increasingly the enemy began operating in groups of 20 to 40 and attacking only when they could achieve surprise or local superiority. Armed reconnaissance sorties were flown to gain aerial superiority, knocking out German Airdromes north and east of Paris.
At 10:00 AM Bradley called Patton. Patton's XV Corps was close to Le Mans and could be expected to be in the city later in the day after its rapid three-day advance of almost eighty mile.s. With the center of gravity of the German army shifted to the west as a result of the Mortain attack, Lt. Gen. Wade Haislip's XV Corps was now obviously well to the east of the enemy's main forces. The opportunity was all too clear, and Bradley intended to seize it.
First, he told Patton that he was releasing to the XV Corps the three divisions he had withheld the day before to protect against the German attack. The 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd French Armored Divisions were to join the one armored and two infantry divisions already near Le Mans as quickly as possible. The combined force was to change direction ninety degrees and attack to the north. The line of attack was to be from Le Mans to Alecon to Sees. Bradley did not have to explain to Patton the reasoning behind this change in direction. Later in the day the order stated "The purpose of the operation is to surround and destroy the German Army west of the Seine."
On August 8th in bold disregard of the German threat at Mortain Patton's XV Corps was turned north toward Argentan. Then much to Patton's disgruntlement, Bradley, fearing an Allied mix-up, ordered a halt. To the south, Patton's XX and XII Corps were assembling near Le Mans, preparatory to driving on to Chartes and Orleans.
According to Forago (author of Patton-Ordeal and Triumph) When Bradley ordered the halt it was Pattons intent to continue his attack north and destroy the German armies in the Falaise gap and thus prevent their escape. In retrospect after the War General Bradley said that it may have been a mistake to halt as a large number of the German troops did escape to the East and I heard that many of these fleeing troops were stopped by Panzer officers at Metz and formed a garrison which had to be contended with the following winter. The gap contained as many as 100,000 German troops and it was later estimated that 40,000 to 50,000 of them escaped to the east when the XV Corps was halted. On August 13th the gap was 15 miles between the U.S. XV Corps and General Dempsey's Canadian Army. At 12:15 PM Patton called 12th Army Group, talking to Maj. Gen. Levin Allen who was Bradley's Chief of Staff
"Lev, listen," he said, the high pitch of his voice betraying his nervous excitement. "Haislip (Gen. Wade Haislip CG XV Corps) is on the Argentan-Sees line as directed. He has reconnaissance beyond it. It/s perfectly feasible for XV Corps to continue the operation. Did you speak to Brad?"
"Yes George," Allen said. "The answer is still no."
Then he repeated the order. Haislip's corps was to halt on the Argentan-Sees line and consolidate.
They hung up.
Patton turned to Gaffey (Maj. Gen. Hugh Gaffey CG, Patton's Chief of Staff).
"The question why XV Corps halted on the east west line through Argentan is certain to become of historical importance" he said "I want a stenographic record of this conversation with General Allen included in the History of the Third Army".
Later Patton wrote: "This halt was a great mistake, as I was certain that we could have entered Falaise and I was not certain that the British would". U.S. Army historians seemed to agree with Patton that "Halting the XV Corps at Argentan" was "a tactical error, ta failure to take full advantage of German vulnerability". Patton had in mind the annihilation of the German Armies in the gap. The principle was a known part of the Eisenhower strategy to put inhalation of enemy troops had highest priority, so those German troops would not have to be fought again at another location. Blumensen (historian) concluded that Bradley had made the decision to halt the XV Corps probably on five interrelated grounds:
(1) General Montgomery, the overall force commander at that time, apparently refused to move the boundary and thus appeared to be opposed to further American advance.
(2) Bradley was not convinced that American troops could move through or around Argentan in the face of increasing enemy resistance.
(3) The closing of the gap would have exposed XV Corps, which had none of its flanks protected.
(4) Bradley was misled by estimates of his G-2 which "inclined to the incorrect view that the bulk of the Germans had already escaped the pocket."
(5) The Canadians were about to launch their second attack to Falaise. As far as the Canadians were concerned, "the evidence suggests," according to Wilmot (Historian), "that the thrust from the north was not pressed with sufficient speed and strength."
While Bradley was made the butt of the controversy. Blumensen suggested that Eisenhower must, in the end, bear the responsibility for the failure to close the gap.
"If Patton, in a subordinate role, could only rage," Blumensen wrote, "and if Bradley thought he might offend a sensitive Montgomery, Eisenhower, who was in France and following combat developments, might have resolved the situation had he thought it necessary to do so. Yet Eisenhower did not intervene. Interfering with a tactical decision made by a commander who was in closer contact with the situation was not Eisenhower's method of exerci- sing command. Long after the event Eisenhower did state that the gap might have been closed, which he thought "might have won us a complete battle of annihilation".
Aug 9
In the First Army Bradley ordered a turn NE toward Argentan to meet British working southward toward Falaise to trap enemy in Vire-Mortain-Domfonsts-Ger region.
In the First Army's VII Corps area, enemy counter offensive toward Avranches loses its momentum but heavy fighting continues. The 39th and 9th Infantry Divisions are detached from 4th Infantry Division.
In the First Army's XIX Corps area, 28th Infantry Division is unable to advance in Gathemo region, but the 29th Infantry Division moves slowly forward below Vire. The V Corps orders the 2nd Infantry Division, whose mission is still primarily defensive, to move southeast.
In the Third Army's area the VIII Corps area, the 6th Armored Division, leaving a small force to contain Brest, moved North to meet the threat to its rear and virtually destroys enemy divisions in the Plouvien area, then makes contact with TF A near Brest. The 83rd Infantry Division continues assault on St Malo, where resis- tance is now confined largely to the Citadel. The 4th Armored Division is still containing Lorient and sends elements towards Nantes.
In the Third Army's XV Corps area units are busy mopping Le Mans and then they swing North toward Alecon, 5th Armored Division on right and French 2nd Armored Division on left, followed by infantry. The 80th Infantry Division, temporarily attached to corps, is mopping up near Le Mans.
In Third Army's XX Corps area the 5th Infantry Division closes in on Angers.
XIX TAC flew 72 missions and 780 sorties A rocket carrying squadron was placed into operation. In the busiest day yet nineteen enemy planes were destroyed; 13 destroyed, 2 probably destroyed in the air and 6 destroyed, 2 damaged on the ground. Nine of our planes and pilots were lost. The 378th Squadron of the 362nd Fighter Group were flying cover for the XV Corps northeast of Le Mans and encountered 12 ME-109's at 300 feet altitude and they destroyed 7. Continuing the mission they destroyed 11 motor transports and 9 horse drawn vehicles. A rocket squadron (513th Squadron of the 406th Fighter Group) launched 16 five inch rockets against ground targets, in addition to 58 1/2 tons of General Purpose bombs and numerous .50 Cal Machine Gun rounds. Seven strafing P-51's of the 363rd Fighter Group reported they destroyed 50 motor transport vehicles and damaged 80, destroyed 25 horse drawn vehicles and killed 200 German troops. Eight more P-51's reported they strafed column of 200 plus motor transports and horse drawn vehicles. The 362nd Fighter Group reported two ME-109's at 1000 hours at 700 feet altitude, one destroyed and the other revaded and no losses. Another squadron of the 362nd Fighter Group was attacked by 25 ME-109's and two of them were destroyed with no loss and the enemy broke away to the east. Twelve P-47's of the 362nd Fighter Group reported "Squadron going south at 7,000 feet altitude saw 12 ME-109's going east at 300 feet altitude; shot down 7. Bombs had been jettisoned for the flight but afterward the squadron went back to work against ground targets, its guns destroying 20 vehicles, most of which exploded. The Germans were using red panels on their vehicles to masquerade as American and in the vicinity of Angers eight P-47's of the 405th Fighter Group gave a red paneled German column the works with bombs and guns. Far ranging P-51's of the 354th Fighter Group on armed recon sighted 30 plus JU-88's on Reims Airfield and flew low to strafe the field from 6,000 feet elevation to ground. Six JU-88's were claimed as destroyed, 2 light guns and a flak tower were knocked out and one P-51 was lost to flak. In the Alecon area, 34 P-47's of the 373rd Fighter Group encountered 25 to 30 single engine fighters and claimed 3 destroyed and 2 probable's.
Aug 10
In Third Army's VIII Corps area the troops continued to attack Dinard and the Citadel at St Malo and to contain Brest and Lorient. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Division, is attached to CCA, 6th Armored Division, in preparation for attack on Hills 95 and 105 at Brest. Elements of 4th Armored Division drive rapidly E, forcing enemy back into Nantes. In XV Corps area, armored toward Alecon and Sees.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area, the 5th Infantry Division overruns Angers and the 7th Armored Division is attached to corps.
In First Army's VII Corps area, the corp has regained the initiative is slowly driving enemy back toward Mortain. The 9th Infantry Division improves positions NW of Sourdeval. Stubborn enemy defense of Mortain limits progress of 30th and 35th Infantry Divisions toward that town. The 22nd and 4th Infantry Divisions, are committed to right of 35th Infantry Division in Le Teilleul area. The 2nd Armored Division repels counterattack NE of Barenton. In XIX Corps area, CCA of 2nd Armored Division and the 28th Infantry Division make co-ordinate attack on right flank of corps, over running Gathemo; armor then drives eastward along road toward Tinchebray. The 29th Infantry Division, attacking toward St. Sauveur-de-Chaulieu on narrow front, is hard pressed by enemy and makes little headway.
In the Third Army's V Corps area, the 2nd Infantry Division begins limited attacks to SE while continuing to defend Vire. The 9th Infantry Division advances to Maisoncelles-la-Jourdan area where it is ordered to halt.
In the 563rd LW1 moved to Tremeheuc which is about 2 miles north east of Combourg. GO1 Platoon moved Post Able to Lanheim, Post Baker to Plesiders, Post Charley to St. Domineuc, Post Dog to Miniac-Morvan and Post Fox to Bercherel.
The XIX TAC was not stopped by bad weather conditions and they provided strong support to the Third Army operations. Enemy resistance was now centered in the Dinard peninsula across the Rance estuary from St. Malo. Operations were somewhat reduced because of low clouds but 54 missions comprising 659 sorties were flown with 46 1/4 tons of HE dropped on targets and 4 enemy planes were shot down. Six of our aircraft and pilots were lost. The main weight of the day's attack fell on railroad targets with claims of 12 locomotives, 254 railroad cars, 22 tanks, and other armored vehicles, 91 motor transports,2 horse drawn vehicles, 5 bridges destroyed or damaged, 7 gun installations, 1 radar installation, 1 troop concentration, 1 ammunition dump, and a marshaling yard were attacked and 7 rail lines cut. Eight P-47's of the 371st Fighter Group reported dropping one bomb on 25 horse drawn artillery pieces and 100 troops and many horses and men were killed. Nobody likes to kill horses but these were pulling artillery. The 362nd Fighter Group reported in assisting the First Army reported that "Fourteen 500 Lb bombs were dropped on mortar positions at T6413 (Mortain), 4 aircraft from the 371st Fighter Group also reported "Seven 500 Lb bombs on gun position T-6712 (Mortaain) . The area was marked with smoke and bombed accurately. No results observed, the 2nd Armored Division reported the guns were silenced. Forty two railroad cars and a flak battery were knocked out at Lorient, south of Paris, 12 P-47's of the 36th Fighter Group dive bombed the yard in the teeth of intensive, accurate heavy and light flak after receiving the 4th Armored Division OK. All returned, though one plane was badly damaged by flak. Thirty tactical recon sorties were flown by the recon P-51- 's, usually 2 plane patrols.
Aug 11
Patton ordered the XV Corps o push on in the direction of Falaise after the capture of Argentan. When Falaise was reached and captured, orders from Bradley were to contain the situation and wait for the British forces to close the gap, which they failed to do.
FDP2 advanced to Astille which is which is about 4 miles south of Laval.
The XIX TAC had good VHF communications and the 36th Fighter Group hit many targets assigned by ground control, various squadrons reporting destruction of tanks, 88-mm gun positions, transport and other targets. One was a camouflaged house and tower assigned as a target by the 79th Infantry Division and the house and tower were destroyed by 5 direct hits with 500 Lb bombs.Ten miles northeast of Alencon enemy tanks were holding up an American column Fifteen 500 Lb bombs were dropped and results were not observed except the US column moved forward. Another feature of the day's operations was the successful bombardment of an enemy railroad gun position which was holding up progress of the 5th Infantry Division near Angers. Forty minutes after the request for air attack on this position was received at Combat Operations , Fighter Control at 303rd Fighter Wing had vectored the 367th Fighter Group to the target and the position was destroyed by two direct bomb hits and four near misses. The 373rd Fighter Group was on an armed railroad recon of the area of Paris. Attacking rail facilities 9 different points, the group destroyed 5 locomotives and 50 railroad cars and cut railroad tracks at three or more places. For the loss of 4 planes, our Groups claimed a total of 10 locomotives, 243 railroad cars, 15 tank cars, 42 horse drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged. Successful attacks were made on 6 marshaling yards, 5 field gun positions, 1 troop concentration, 1 headquarters, 1 ammunition dump, 1 storage building, 1 airfield and 10 railroads were cut. Of the 13 recon sorties flown, 10 were tactical, 3 photographic and 2 for artillery adjustment. During the afternoon 273 heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force attacked strong points and heavy gun positions in Brest Harbor, 643 tons of bombs were dropped with results classified as "good to excellent". One bomber was lost to flak. In the evening 36 B-26"s of the IX Bomber Command dropped 53 1/2 tons of bombs on the German gun defenses of St Malo with results classified as "good to excellent".
Aug 12
In the Third Army's VIII Corps area the 6th Armored Division was operating on the Brest Peninsula. Patton's XX and XII Corps were assembling near Le Mans, preparatory to driving on Chartes and Orleans. Against increasing resistance the XV Corps had reached the army group boundary just south of Argentqan.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area The Corps took command of the 4th Armored Division who were driving east with an objective of Orleans.
In the Third Army's XV Corps they reached Argentan and were halted by Bradley who feared a mixup with the British and Canadian Armies to the north.
In the 563rd GO4 post Victor reported 4 German ME-109's overhead going west. These airplanes were destroyed by XIX fi- ghters. LW2 moved to Nuille which is about 3 miles south of Laval.
XIX TAC patrolled the Loire River area and prepared the way to the French capital of Paris. Forty-one missions comprising 481 sorties were flown. No planes were lost and no claims of enemy aircraft. The day's claim included destruction or damaging of 6 locomotives, 247 freight cars, 16 tanks, 201 motor vehicles, 7 horses drawn vehicles, 1 gun carriage, 1 naval vessel, 1 barge and 4 buildings. Eleven rail lines and a highway were cut, 16 field batteries, 6 flak batteries, 2 troop concentrations, an ammunition dump and 4 buildings attacked and 24 fires started.
Aug 13
In the Ninth Air Defense Command Company D was attached to the 564th Signal Air Warning Battalion per Par 2 GO 36, Headquarters Ninth Air Defense Command
In the 563rd Post Victor was strafed by a German ME-109 but no damage resulted and the airplane was driven off by XIX TAC fighters. The current mission of FDP4 and LW4 is to provide air warning for the vicinity of Rennes where the Headquarters of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion and of the 100th Fighter Wing are located. Ground observer platoon GO4 is reporting into FDP1 as well as GO1 Platoon where ground security is critical. Maj. Yasha A. Venar was returned to duty. The SCR-582 mobile microwave radar commanded by Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill was assigned to Company C from battalion headquarters where it was used to aid in siting radar because of its high mobility and accuracy. The assignment was to give FDP3 added coverage.
The XIX TAC had the biggest motor transport killing of the month was made by 37 P-47 pilots of the 36th Fighter Group when they found 800 to 1,000 enemy motor vehicles of all descriptions milling about in the pocket west of Argentan. Pouncing on them with both bombs and guns, they claimed 400 to 500 enemy vehicles burned or blown up. One pilot dropped his belly tank on 12 trucks and the resulting explosion left them all on fire. All the days bag in aerial combat fell to the 382nd Squadron of the 363rd Fighter Group which scored 12 destroyed 2 probable's and 1 damaged with a loss of one plane. Over Le Mans, 8 P-51's of the 382nd Fighter Group bagged 4 aircraft destroyed with 1 probable and 1 damaged. On an evening mission 8 pilots of the 382nd Fighter Group sighted approximately 25 ME-109's and FW-190's strafing our troops. The Mustangs destroyed 8 enemy planes and another was probably destroyed and the rest flew away. Claims for the day by all groups included destruction or damaging of 12 locomotives, 227 railroad cars, 45 tanks and other armored vehicles, 781 motor vehicles, 10 motorcycles, 1 barracks,1 oil storage tank and 10 strong points. Fourteen railroad lines were cut and a railroad bridge damaged. Successful attacks were made on 2 troop concentrations, 6 marshal- ing yards and 1 ammunition dump (4 hits). Combat sorties totaled 718 and recon sorties 38. Claims against enemy aircraft were 12 destroyed, 2 damaged and 1 probable in the air and 1 destroyed and 8 probable's damaged on the ground.
The Exploitation Phase extended from August 14th to August 24th.
AUGUST 1944
During the Exploitation and Pursuit phase in August the XIX TAC had been given three major tasks: (1) flying cover for the mechanized spearheads, together with air reconnaissance ahead of the ground advance; (2) sealing off the battlefield; (3) protecting the lengthy and exposed right flank of the Third Army. This combination of missions required considerable dispersal of XIX TAC squadrons; for example, on September 1st the XIX TAC was flying missions as far apart as Brest and Metz, while still other forays were being made 150 to 200 miles south of the Loire River. The events on the battlefield necessitated that the 563rd Signal Battalion radar units advance as rapidly as possible and as far as communications permitted. At the same time the situation demanded depth in the radar locations since attacks were being by the fighter-bombers eastward and westward on the forts on the Brest Peninsula. Historians said that the speed and extent of the Third Army advance presented numerous problems in the matter of air- ground co-operation it also provided a wealth of targets for our fighter-bombers.
Aug 14
In the Third Army the ground situation was two divisions of the XV Corps were left at Argentan and Gen. Bradley authorized Patton to employ the remainder of the Corps to attack eastward where they were ordered to establish a bridgehead over the Eure River at Dreux.
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the troops were operating in the Brest Peninsula.
In the Third Army's XII corps the troops were attacking toward Sens with the 4th Armored Division spearheading.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the troops were attacking north and east to gain towards Chartes and to gain bridgeheads at Melun with the 7th Armored Division on the left and the 5th Infantry Division on the right.
In the 563rd FDP3 moved to Le Pin which is 4 miles north west of Cande. Much to the disappointment of Capt. Glassow, FDP3 would be kept in this position until late September in order to support the airfields that were in the Rennes and Le Mans area. On August 14th XIX TAC on General Order 23 awarded a Soldiers,s medal to 1st Lt. Joseph Henry Eichbaum of Company C with the following citation.
"For heroism at Portbail, France on 18 July 1944. Upon rec- eiving information of a explosion resulting from a U. S. vehicle setting off a mine, Lt. Eichbaum led a rescue party to within sight of the accident, and when members of the party cautioned him to go no further without a mine detector, he personally lead two medical corps men to a seriously wounded man and expeditiously transferred him to a hospital. The danger and risk of life involved in Lt. Eichbaum's act was later substantiated by a search of the area through he passed, revealing anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines within inches of his path. Lt. Eichbaum's heroic action undoubtedly saved the life of the wounded man since he nearly died from loss of blood and severe shock."
On the beginning of this phase on 14 Aug the Ground Observer Platoons for Company A, Company B and Headquarters Company remained at their location shown in the Breakout Phase and were in those positions on August 14th. Both post Victor and William of GO4 reported a small group of German Soldiers attempting to get food near their sites. A patrol was sent from FDP1 Tactical Control and managed to trace and capture two of them, these were officers including a Lt. Col. equipped with military maps and were taken without a struggle. They were turned over to the at Fougeres along with the information of other German groups were later captured by a security patrol.
The XIX TAC conducted its now famous flank protection of the Third Army left flank which was completely exposed. Gen. Patton appreciated the possibility that the German troops at the Loire River might make sorties against the underbelly of the Third Army and become nuisances to his lines of communications. He therefore requested Gen. Weyland to have the XIX TAC patrol the Loire Valley constantly. For the 24 hour coverage that was subsequently pro- vided a Squadron of night fighters augmented the daylight opera- tions of the XIX TAC fighter bombers. FDP3 assisted the air units by vectoring those flights. So effective was the sweeping air flank, that a German force of 20,000, moving up from southern France, surrendered, without any ground action, to the Maj. Gen. Weyland the XIX TAC commander. This was an event without precedent in military history. The pilots really appreciated the homing service of the 563rd Signal Battalion FDP control centers. The fighter command also appreciated the good coverage as it promoted the effectiveness of flying units and maintained high pilot morale. Brig. Gen. Sanders stated the appreciation when he requested holding back FDP3 for this purpose.
XIX TAC operation netted approximately 400 German troops surrendered by waving white flags from their positions. Fighter control was given the locations so the nearest ground troops could pick up the prisoners. The only group to meet enemy air opposition was the 405th Fighter Group, flying close support to the 7th Armored Division in the Dreux area. Five P-47's and pilots were lost against claims of 4 enemy destroyed, 2 damaged and 1 probable. Four of the losses were suffered when 4 P-47's were bounced from above while at 3,000 feet elevation by 16 FW-190's from below. Three of the attackers were claimed destroyed, 1 probable and 1 damaged.The XIX flew 70 combat missions with 665 sorties. In addition there were 18 recon missions flown involving 36 sorties. Destroyed or damaged were 6 locomotives, 175 railroad cars, 39 armored vehicles, 88 motor vehicles and 1 motorcycle. Twelve gun positions, 3 marshaling yards, 1 radar installation, 1 ammunition dump and a supply depot were attacked. Two railroad bridges were damaged and 2 railroad lines and a highway was cut.
Aug 15
In the Seventh Army, under the Command of Lt. Gen. Lucian Truscott, an assault landing was made in Southern France on Cavalaire, St. Tropez, St. Maxime, St. Raphael and Cannes with the 3rd Infantry Division on the left, the 45th Infantry Division in the center and the 36th Infantry Division on the right. There was surprisingly few casualties.
In the XII TAC control was passed over to the Ninth Air Force. The fighters were based in Corsica and their use was divided between Italian and French operations. The operations were limited to direct support to area concentrations using simple bomv-line methods, a system whereby aircraft bombed or strafed just forward of a map line that marked the forward elements of the Allied ground units.
In the 582nd Signal Air Warning Battalion assault landings were made at Gelna. D day was 15 August and sparse historic records gave the following landings:
Unit Radar Landing
Michigan Dive Bomber Control D+3
New York SCR-602 D+3
Maine SCR-602 D+3
Ohio SCR-602 D+3
Texas SCR-602 D+3
Alabama SCR-584 D
Wyoming SCR-602 D
Vermont SCR-602 D
The 582nd SAW Bn Command and Staff were:
Lt. Col. Wilbert Speir Commanding Officer
Capt. Harold L. Long Executive Officer
Lt. Gardner D. Friedlander S-1 and Adjutant
Capt. William A. Frazier S-2
Capt. George W. Schiff S-3
Lt. Roger K. Rockwell S-4
WO Edwin W. Norman Personnel Officer
Capt. Ben C. Ross Surgeon
Lt. Melvin A. Armstrong Mess Officer
Capt. Milton A. Taylor Commanding Hq Company
In the Third Army Patton ordered the XII corps to seize Chaeaudun and Orleans and protect the right flank along the Loire. Patton changed the objective of the XX Corps from the task of taking Dreux to establish a bridgehead across the Eure river at Chartes and ordered the XV Corps to seize a bridgehead across the Siene.
In the Third Army XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division followed by the 35th Infantry Division pushed rapidly toward Orleans.
In the Third Army's XV Corps area a provisional Corps consisting of the French 2nd Armored Division and the 90th Infantry Division was put under the command of Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, the Third Army Chief of Staff.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 7th Armored Division reached the edge of Chartes where heavy fighting ensued.
In the 563rd LW4 was moved to Noyen Sur Sarthe which is about 18 miles southwest of Le Mans. FDP3 suffered a disastrous fire which destroyed one of their Diesels which furnish power to the radar.
The XIX TAC reported that enemy single engine fighter activity rose sharply to an estimated 350 sorties. When 8 P-47's of the 373rd Fighter Group were bounced by 8 ME-109's at 9,000 feet altitude over Brittany our pilots destroyed 5 and damaged the other 3. On the ground the Thunderbolts destroyed a FW-190 and damaged 2 JU-88's. The days claims against the enemy aircraft totaled 13, destroyed and 3 probable's on the ground. Five of our planes were lost. There was 659 combat sorties and 40 recon and artillery adjustment sorties flown. On the ground the haul included 5 locomotives, 114 railroad cars, 36 armored vehicles, 97 motor vehicles and 5 barges destroyed or damaged. Nine gun positions, 4 airfields and a marshaling yard were successfully attacked.
Aug 16
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 83rd Infantry Division is battering St Malo and the 8th Infantry Division are in the Brest Area.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area Orleans falls in an assault of the 4th Armored Division and the 35th Infantry Division reaches Chateaudun.
In the Third Army's XV Corps the troops established a bridgehead across the Eure River and Dreux falls to the 5th Armored Division.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the troops established a bridgehead across the Aunay River and assembles near Chartes.
In the 563rd FDP2 moved to Etival Les Le Mans which is about 6 miles south west of Le Mans and on the same day LW3 moved to Maumusson which is 6 miles south west of Cande and about 20 miles west of Angers.
XIX TAC air activity was curtailed by low stratus clouds. At 1545 hours 70 plus FW-190's with bombs were engaged by 8 P-51's if the 354th Fighter Group west of Paris and 2 German planes were shot down and 2 P-51's were lost but the enemy dispersed south. Half an hour later another patrol of 8 P-51's sighted 20 plus ME-109's south of Dreux at 11,000 feet. Orbiting in elements of two, the squadron climbed to 14,000 feet and attacked from above. At the same instant 60 or more ME-109's joined the combat, in the next 15 minutes our 8 planes--outnumbered 10 to 1--embattled from 11,000 feet to the deck. When it was all over our pilots destroyed 11 and damaged 2 against losses of 2 planes and pilots. Because of the weather only 260 combat sorties and 36 recon sorties were flown. Thirteen enemy planes wee destroyed and 4 damaged. Five of our planes were lost. Five tanks, 25 motor vehicles and 55 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged, 2 airfields and 2 gun positions attacked and 3 railway lines cut.
Aug 17
In the Third Army VIII Corps St. Malo surrendered and the XII Corps mopped up at Orleans and Chartes. In the XV Corps the 5th Armored Division and the 79th Infantry Division moved elements through their bridgehead across the Aunay river toward Mantes- Gassicourt. In the XX Corps the 7th Armored Division mopped up Chartes.
In the 563rd Company C Ground Observer Platoon was moved to the vicinity of LW3 and Posts Mike, Queen, Peter and Roger occupied strong points within 6 miles of LW3, which was sited at Maumasson. GO3 moved Post MIke, Peter and Queen to near Angers, Post Oboe moved to near Saffre and Post Roger to St. Augustin.
The XIX TAC reported that 8 P-47's of the 373rd Fighter Group spotted 100 or more tanks and 200 Plus motor transports ten miles Southwest of Lisieux. The target had already been bombed and strafed by 4 p-51's and 8 Typhoons and 50 or more fires were burning. The p-47's dumped their two 500 Lb bombs and 24 frags smoke was too thick to see results. There were 331 combat sorties, 50 recon sorties. Two enemy planes were destroyed in combat with no losses. Ten tanks, 57 motor vehicles, 2 locomotives and 25 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged. Seven railroad lines were cut and 4 gun positions, a strong points and 4 marshaling yards were attacked.
Aug 18
In the Third Army area Bradley now removed restrictions on any advance beyond the Dreux to Chartes to Orleans line and all of Patton's Corps, aided by emergency air supply, continued the eastward drive. On August 19th Eisenhower ordered the exploitation beyond the Seine.
In the 563rd LW2 moved to Prevelles which is 16 miles north east of Le Mans and about 3 miles south east of Bonnetable.
The XIX TAC area the targets were mostly in the British Army Area and the XIX was ordered not to attack The RAF flew 1500
sorties and lost 25 aircraft, and had very large claims. Our groups accounted for 17 tanks, 206 motor transports, 30 horse drawn vehicles, 7 locomotives and 218 railroad cars, 2 troop concentra- tions,1 motor transport park, 5 gun positions and 3 marshaling yards were attacked. Combat sorties totaled 679 and 5 planes were destroyed and 2 damaged in the air. Our losses were 5 planes. Paris falls to the Allies 19 Aug through 24 Aug
19 Aug
In the Third Army the XV Corps had seized a bridgehead at Mantes. Eisenhower directed Bradley to support the British advance with the U.S. First Army and Patton, much to his dismay was to advance only if supplies would permit after First Army needs were met.
In the XIX TAC area the air operations were sharply curtailed by a cold front. Successful missions were flown in the morning but the front closed down our bases in the afternoon. Combat sorties totaled 212 and recon sorties totaled 34. Twenty river barges were destroyed and 91 damaged. Other claims were 18 motor vehicles, 1 armored vehicle, 2 locomotives, 9 railroad cars and 2 power launches. Two gun positions were attacked and a rail line cut. Sharp aerial combat occurred and 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed (8 of them in the air) against losses of 5 planes and pilots. Eight P-47's of the 371st Fighter Group chased away 18 enemy fighters and destroyed 2 with no loss. While strafing FW-190's on the ground near Pontoise, the 513th Squadron of the 406th Fighter Group was bounced by a number of enemy fighters, the 513th Squadron tried to help and in turn was bounced by 30 to 40 enemy planes at 8,000 feet altitude. The enemy kept some of his aircraft above the overcast, sending them down in twos and fours to fight. Final claims were 5 enemy planes destroyed and 1 probable in the air and 1 destroyed on the ground with a loss of five.
Aug 20
In the XV Corps area the 5th Armored Division continues north towards Louviers. The XX Corps attacks east with the 7th Armored Division on the north flank and the 5th Armored Division on the south flank in an effort to establish bridgeheads at Melun and Montereau. The XII Corps established a bridgehead across the Yonne River at Sens with the 4th Armored Division in the spearhead.
In the XIX TAC area rain and low ceiling limited combat sorties to 368 and recon sorties to 36. Road and rail transport provided the principal targets and claims included 65 motor vehicles, 33 armored vehicles, 12 locomotives and 150 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Seven rail lines were cut and 2 marshaling yards, 3 ferry landings and 1 machine gun nest attacked.Claims for aerial combat were 6 destroyed and 1 probable with 3 losses. The 362nd Fighter Group flew cover for the 7th Armored Division. With frags, 500 Lb bombs and strafing they destroyed 2 tanks and attacked troops. They planted delay-fused bombs at ferry landings on the Seine River and accounted for all the day's claims against enemy aircraft. They also suffered all the losses. Eight P-47's of the 378th Fighter Group were bounced by 12 ME-109's and 20 FW-190's at 3000 Feet elevation about 12 miles southwest of Paris at 1545. Despite the odds of 4 to 1, the Thunderbolts destroyed 6 and damaged one for a loss of 2 planes and pilots. A third P-47 was lost on a later mission. The 358th Fighter Group destroyed or damaged several tanks, shot up barges carrying enemy tanks across the Siene, chased away two FW-190's and scored a direct bomb hit on a machine gun nest marked by white smoke. Armed Recons by the 371st and 406th Fighter Groups caused the enemy considerable havoc in crowded marshaling yards and along his road and rail communica- tions to the south and east.
Aug 21
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 4th Armored Division captured Sens and the 35th Infantry Division attacks through Pithivers. The XV Corps area is advancing along the Seine River towards Louviers. The XX Corps the 7th Armored Division drives to the Arpajon-Rambouillet area and the 5th Armored overruns Etampes. The XIX TAC combat aircraft of the command were grounded throughout the day
Aug 22
In the Third Army the VIII Corps the 29th Infantry Division is moving west towards Brest. The XII Corps the 4th Armored Division attacks Villeneuve.
In the XV Corps area the 5th Armored Division continues north toward Louviers against strong opposition.
In the XX Corps area the 7th Armored Division is speeding toward Melun.
The XIX moved their advanced headquarters to Etain. In combat operations the XIX destroyed 20 enemy fighters with a loss of one. Complete claims were 16 destroyed, 3 damaged and 1 probable in the air and 4 destroyed and 4 probable on the ground. Fifteen P-51's of the 354th Fighter Group destroyed 12 ME-109's without loss. Eight were destroyed in the air and 4 on the ground by strafing. On an armed recon the 358th Fighter Group ran into 25 or more ME-109's west of Chalons and claimed 4 destroyed, 2 damaged and 1 probable for a loss of 1. Later on a special mission the 358th Fighter Group destroyed two ME-110's in the air and damaged 3 more on the ground.Flying 333 combat sorties, our aircraft dropped 16 3/4 tons of GP bombs and 26 frag clusters, plus 18 leaflet bombs. Claims were 10 gun positions, 1 ammunition dump, 120 railroad cars, 2 locomotives, 53 motor vehicles, 5 tanks destroyed or damaged and 1 marshaling yard attacked. Recon sorties totaled 60.
Aug 23
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 35th Infantry Division overruns Montargis.
In the Third Army's XV Corps the 5th Armored Division is clearing the region west of the Siene river.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 5th Infantry Division takes Fountainebleu and the 7th Armored Division takes Melun.
In the XIX TAC the P-47's of the 362nd Fighter Group had just dropped eight 500 Lb bombs on a gun position east of Joigny when CCA 4th Armored Division reported it was strafed north of Sens. the remaining bombs were jettisoned and the Thunderbolts, from 9,000 feet, bounced five ME-109's at 6500 feet, shooting down 2 and probably another for no loss. In all 463 combat sorties and 70 recon sorties were flown despite poor visibility, cloud and showers during the day. The bag of ground targets included 114 motor vehicles destroyed, 38 others damaged, 63 horse drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged, 4 tanks stopped or fired, 4 gun positions, 2 ammunition dumps,and a marshaling were successfully attacked, 11 locomotives and 64 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. 1 railway roundhouse and four railway lines cut.
The book Battle of the Generals by Martin Blumensen outlined the lost opportunity to destroy the German forces in Normandy in the Falaise Gap and at the Seine Crossing. In the 563rd SAW Transactions 2 of History of the 563rd the operations of the Battalion during the days of the Falaise gap and the German Counter attack at Mortain were outlined. Blumensen's book should be read for the details of the early opportunities for the Allies to destroy the German combat troops trapped for a while in Normandy and encircled from the south by the Third Army. Inspired by the book following is a short amplification of the activities of the Battalion during the Seine River Crossing.
When the Falaise Gap operations failed to entrap all the German Armies Patton moved toward Dreux with the XV Corps (2 Divisions) on 14 August he ordered his XII and XX Corps to drive east also. The XIX Corps moved toward the Seine 20 August. Opposition to this move was minor and Dreux and Orleans fell on 16 August and Orleans on 18 August. Patton aided by emergency air supplies continued eastward. Blumensen wrote this account in "The Battle of the Generals" as follows:
"In his diary on the 23 August Patton wrote in his diary, "that we must go north (rather than east)." Despite his long-held wish to head east toward the Saar, he saw the chance to put the finishing touches on the Germans, another opportunity to trap and destroy them in a kind of shorthand he continued "The XX Corps from Melun and Montereau and the XII Corps from Sens can do it faster than anyone else." The XV Corps too, by reinforcing the Mantes crossing, could join the others. By heading toward Beauvais, all three corps could sweep cross country to the sea, catch and block and ruin the escaping Germans. The Third Army in a grand wheeling movement toward Beauvais would cross the Seine, Marne and Oise rivers and cut off the Germans fleeing the allied Armies.
"This is the best strategic idea I have ever had," Patton wrote.
"I sold it to Allen."
Leven Allen, Bradley's chief of staff was impressed with Patton's recital of his concept. When Patton finished his explanation, Allen said in an understated manner,
"Seems fine to me, General."
"Tell it to Brad when he comes back." Patton said.
In his diary, Patton said,
"If Bradley approves, he has only to wire me, 'Plan A'. by 1000 (ten o'clock) tomorrow. If I do not hear anything by that time, I shall then move east as already decided on 'Plan B'. I am having the staff put both plans to concrete form. This may well be a momentous day"
The disadvantage of Patton's idea was the same as the previous encirclements and that was his men would have to move across and cut across the expected path of the other three allied armies after they crossed the Seine. On 24 August Allen explained the plan to Bradley and his response was negative and at noon Bradley sent Patton instructions to continue executing 'Plan B'."
Blumensen wrote this conclusion.
"What the Germans feared was an immediate and ruthless drive down the right bank of the Seine River, as Patton had wished to initiate. Such an advance would have completely destroyed the German armies that had fought in Normandy. Further resistance to France would have been futile. The path to Germany would have been undefended and open to the invading allies. The Germans were unable to fathom why the Allies failed to pursue this course of action. After the war, Eberbach said" I still don't understand why the Allies did not crush us at the Seine."
On 19 August, according to a RAF analysis, the Germans in the pocket on the road to the Seine totaled 270,000 men. Adding 50,000 soldiers who were located elsewhere west of the Seine gave a grand total of about 240,000 arrived at the Seine. The number, 240,000 troops, crossed, together with 28,000 vehicles and several hundred tanks.
Most of the Germans traversed the Seine by means of sixth ferry and boat crossing sites, all of which the Germans identified and numbered and closely coordinated. A good many crossed over three pontoon bridges, at Lauviers, at Elbeuf, and near Rouen. One of these structures handled 100,000 men and 16,000 vehicles. Quite a few Germans traveled across the partially destroyed railroad bridge at Rouen. Many more crossed on a multitude of small boats and rafts found by chance along the river banks.
The bulk of the crossings occurred at night. By far the greatest number of soldiers got out on the 26th and 27th of August. The Allies made no serious interference with the German movements to and across the Seine. Bad weather prevented most of the Allied airplanes from flying. The few airplanes in the air were far from the Seine River valley.
Following is the account of the Ground operations on 24 to 30th of August. This will help locate the actual locations of the troops during this period when Patton had asked to set his plan for the destruction of the German Army in the area. (See map on page 134) On 24 Aug The Ground Forces action:
In the 21st Army Group (Montgomery)
In the First Canadian Army Area
In the I Corps extends right flank to St. Georges-du-Vievres on Risle River.
In the II Corps area Canadian 2nd Infantry Division seizes Berrnay and establishes bridgehead across Risle River at Nassandres. Contact is made with U.S. XIX Corps in Elbeuf area.
In the British 2nd Army Area. In the XII Corps area the 125th British Infantry Division is concentrating near Le Neubourg in preparation for attack across the Seine at Louviers.
In the 12th Army Group (Bradley)
In the First Army Area
In the XIX Corps is close to Elbeuf and is interdicting Seine Crossing sites with artillery fire.
In the XV Corps area the 5th Armored Division reached the town of Houdelbouville.
In the V Corps area the 2nd French Armored Division gets a little closer to the city limits of Paris against strong opposition, the 102nd Cavalry Group units, screening for the 4th Infantry Division reached the Siene River south of Paris. Ordered by General Bradley to push into Paris at once, the 4th Infantry Division less one RCT, attacks toward the city from the South in conjunction with French attacks from the Southwest. One RCT of the 4th Infantry Division retains mission of securing crossing of the Siene South of Paris.
In the Third Army Area
In the XX Corps gains bridgeheads across the Seine at Melun with the 7th Armored Division and Montereau with the 5th Infantry Division.
In the XII Corps the CCA of the 4th Armored Division drives East toward Troyes while CCB, to the right, reaches St Florentin area and the 35th Infantry Division moves up to Courtenay CCR is moving forward to join the rest of the 4th Armored Division.
On 25 Aug
In the 21st Army Group (Montgomery) In British 2nd Army Area
In XXX Corps area the 43rd British Infantry Division estab- lishes bridgehead across the Seine at Vernon under cover of Artillery fire In the 12th Army Group (Bradley)
In the First Army Area
In XIX Corps area they overruns Elbeuf, its objective makes contact with British forces to North.
In the V Corps area, French 2nd Armored Division bypassing resistance in Versailles area, gets forward elements into Paris from the South West at 0700. The 4th Infantry Division enters from the South soon afterward, following Troop A, 38th Cavalry which enters at 0730. FFI forces and French Civilians assist in methodical clearing of scattered strong points within Paris, German commander Lt. Gen. Von Choltitz, surrenders formally to French Brig. Gen. Leclerc at 1515. The 22nd Infantry Divison and the 4th Infantry Divison establishes bridgehead across the Seine S of Paris. The V Corps releases 80th and 90th Infantry Divisions to Third army, which assigns they to XII and XX Corps respectively.
In VII Corps Area CCB of the 3rd Armored Division crosses the Seine below Paris at Tilly, the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions are assembling S of Paris.
In the Third Army Area the units were deployed on a line from Melun to Sens and attacking east with the XX Corps on the left and the XII Corps on the right.
In the XX Corps Area they defend the Seine bridgeheads at Melun and Montereau,the 5th Infantry Division crosses Yonne River at Missy.
In the XII Corps Area CCA of the 4th Armored Divison over comes strong opposition at Troyes.
24 Aug
In the Third Army the XX Corps gained a bridgehead across the Siene at Melun and Montereau. The XII Corps with the 4th Armored Division drives towards Troyes
The XIX TAC had low ceilings and poor visibility over target areas and this restricted combat activity to 12 missions totaling 164 sorties. The rocket firing 513th Squadron of the 406th Fighter Group launched 12 projectiles at 105-mm guns near Mantes and claimed 4 destroyed and 2 damaged. Five 88-mm guns were also attacked. Other aircraft of the 406th Fighter Group on armed recon destroyed 40 carts of an ammunition convoy and disrupted railroad traffic. The 371st Fighter Group attacked railways. The 362nd Fighter Group flys cover for the 7th Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division and destroyed tanks and motor vehicles and dropped 12 leaflet bombs. No HE bombs were carried but rockets and strafing destroyed or damaged a total of 55 railroad cars,2 locomotives, 68 motor vehicles, 3 tanks and armored vehicles, 40 ammunition cars, twelve field gun positions were attacked and two headquarters left burning. Twenty nine recon sorties were flown driving the Luftwaffe out of France 25 Aug through 31 Aug.
25 Aug
In the Third Army Patton's forces, debouched from their Seine bridgeheads and against spotty resistance raced toward the Meuse River. In the VIII Corps launches a strong attack on Brest. In the XII Corps the 4th Armored Division overcomes strong opposition in Troyes. In the XX Corps the 5th Armored Division crosses the Yonne river at Missy.
In the 563rd LW2 was moved to Thiville 3 miles south of Chateaudun. Also FDP2 was delegated to set up an advanced Tactical Control Center to function as control during leapfrog moves and on August 25th they established an advance TCC near Montfort. During the month Company D was being tactically employed by the IX Air Defense Command, Lt. Altman's platoon was returned to England for training on SCR-584 microwave radar and he would be returned to the 563rd SAW Battalion on completion of the training. The frequent moves during the month taxed our supply of vehicles and trucks were loaned from operating company to the moving company so all the moves could be made as quickly as possible.
The XIX TAC labeled this day as the day that broke the back of the German fighter force in France. In aerial combat and in strafing attacks on many airfields the p-51's and P-47's of the IX and XIX TAC destroyed a total of 127 planes (77 in the air and 50 on the ground). Eleven others were probably destroyed and 33 damaged, making a total of 171 German planes whose destruction, probably destruction or damage was claimed. Losses of the two commands totaled 27 planes. In Germany the Luftwaffe suffered serious losses. Eighth Air Force fighters, escorting heavy bombers, claimed 11 destroyed in the air and 40 on the ground. Total claims for Ninth and Eighth Air Force fighters during the day (both air and ground) thus came to 178 destroyed, 13 probably destroyed and 63 damaged or a grand total of 354 planes. XIX TAC share of the bag totaled 36 destroyed, 1 probable and 8 damaged in the air and 16 destroyed and 4 probable's on the ground for a total of 54 destroyed, 5 probable's, and 8 damaged against a loss of 8 planes and 7 pilots. P-51 pilots of the 354th Fighter Group flew sweeps north to northeast of Paris paying special attention to airfields had one of their biggest days and all of the XIX aerial combat claims were theirs and in addition they destroyed 13 single engine fighters on the ground at fields near Reims. Operating by squadrons, they were always out-numbered; late in the day, for example 12 P-51's fought 45 or more FW-190's and ME-109's north of Beauvais, claiming 13 destroyed and 3 probable's losing four. Flying 632 combat sorties, the Command claimed the following results against ground targets in addition to the harvest reaped in the air: 266 motor vehicles, 4 tanks, 44 locomotives and 164 railway cars destroyed or damaged; 5 marshaling yards attacked and 5 railway lines cut; 3 field gun positions, 4 troop concentrations, 1 ammunition dump and 8 military buildings destroyed; 5 airfields attacked and 2 hangers destroyed. In anti shipping off Brest 2 naval vessel are claimed as destroyed and 3 naval and 9 merchant vessels damaged. Four P-51's of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group flew artillery adjustment sorties for corps artillery at Brest, noting many hits on enemy gun positions and shipping. Recon sorties totaled 64. Indications were seen that the enemy might bring jet propelled aircraft soon. A probable ME-262 twin jet was sighted by pilots of the 405th Fighter Group.
The Pursuit to the West Wall Phase extended from August 26th to September 15th.
AUGUST 1944
Aug 26
In the Third Army Gasoline stocks were down to reserves and was being supplied by air. In the XII Corps the 4th Armored Division is headed from Troyes northeast toward Challons-sur-Marne. The 35th Infantry Division protected the south flank of the Third Army and were supported by XIX TAC air patrols.
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Able to Thimert, Post Baker to Droisy, Post Charley to Damville, Post Dog to Quessigny and Post Fox to Boussey. These locations were northeast of Nogent Le Rotrou about 20 miles beyond where FDP1 would move on the following day. On August 26th FDP2 moved to St. Cornielle which is 4 miles north east of Le Mans. GO2 Ground Observer Posts George, How, Jig, Kingand Love to Montfort. FDP3 moved from Le Pin to Chateau Renault with LW3 from Maumusson to Herbault and placed LW3 one mile east of Herbault which is about 7 miles East of FDP3. GO3 Ground Observer Platoon moved Post Mike to Villerbon, Post Oboe to Sierre- s, Post Queen to Blois and Post Roger to Mer. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Gambiascuil, Post Tare to Orvillers, Post Uncle and Victor to Montfort and Post William to Rambouillet.
XIX TAC encountered very few enemy aircraft while providing protective cover for army columns. After the previous days losses the enemy avoided combat with our fighters and the day's bag was two enemy aircraft destroyed and one damaged all three on the ground. Our group on armed recon, patrols and armored column cover flew 528 sorties. Four planes were lost. Results were claims including 315 motor vehicles, 22 armored vehicles, 75 horse drawn vehicles, 3 motorcycles, 8 locomotives, 106 railroad cars destroyed or damaged; 16 rail line cut, 1 bridge and 9 merchant vessels damaged and 10 barges destroyed or damaged. Attacks were also made on 30 enemy buildings, a radar station, 5 strong points, 1 oil tank, 1 factory and 3 airfields. Pilots of the 405th Fighter Group reported contrails of a probable Jet propelled aircraft at 20,000 feet altitude with estimated speed of 500 MPH.
Aug 27
In the Third Army's VIII Corps area the encirclement of Brest completed.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 7th Armored division drives toward Reims and secures a crossing of the Marne River at Chateau-Thierry which it occupies.
In the 563rd FDP1 moved from Ardevon to La Madelein Bouart which is about 8 miles north of Nogent Le Rotrou. LW1 moved to Laplate which is southeast of Nogent Le Rotrou. FDP4 was moved to Le Courdray Laube which is 15 miles east of Le Mans.
XIX TAC conducted a rail-cutting project to sever a main enemy escape route south of the Loire River Low clouds during much of the day restricted air operations to 196 Fighter Bomber sorties and 88 Recon sorties. On an armed recon mission to Besancon, the 405th Fighter Group destroyed 11 enemy aircraft by bombing and strafing an airfield. A train nearby was carrying 13 JU-88 fuselages and 11 of these were destroyed the other two were damaged. The result of the day's attacks included 34 locomotives, 148 freight cars, 158 motor vehicles and 6 tanks destroyed or damaged; 2 rail lines cut; 4 gun positions, 1 command post, 5 river craft and an airfield attacked with 7 hangers destroyed. Against enemy aircraft our claims were 3 destroyed in the air and 11 destroyed on the ground. Three of our planes were lost. Tactical Recon P-51's accounted for one of the enemy aircraft claims and one of the losses.
Aug 28
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the battering of the Breast Peninsula continued.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the troops continued to rapidly advance toward Chalons-sur-Marne.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the troops were closing in on Reims.
In the 563rd LW4 was moved to Soize which is 12 miles south of Nogent Le Routrou and about 23 miles from FDP4. Also, LW2 was moved to St. Agil which is 20 miles south of Nogent Le Rotrou and about 25 miles from FDP2. Post Peter of GO3 was moved from company headquarters to La Chapelle St Martin.
In the XIX TAC area low clouds during much of the day restricted air operations to 196 Fighter Bomber sorties and 88 Recon sorties. On an armed recon mission to Besancon, the 405th Fighter Group destroyed 11 enemy aircraft by bombing and strafing an airfield. A train nearby was carrying 13 JU-88 fuselages and 11 of these were destroyed the other two were damaged. The result of the day's attacks included 34 locomotives, 148 freight cars, 158 motor vehicles and 6 tanks destroyed or damaged, 2 rail lines cut; 4 gun positions, 1 command post, 5 river craft and an airfield attacked with 7 hangers destroyed. Against enemy aircraft our claims were 3 destroyed in the air and 11 destroyed on the ground. Three of our planes were lost. Tactical recon P-51's accounted for one of the enemy aircraft claims and one of the losses.
Aug 29
In the Third Army's XII Corp the 4th Armored Division overran Chalons-sur-Marne and Vitry-le-Francois.
In the Third Army's XX Corps was speeding northeast to Reims and the town was captured by the 5th Infantry Division.
In the XIX TAC area because of completely unflyable weather only one combat mission was undertaken and it was aborted.
Aug 30
In the Third Army's XII Corps elements of the 4th Armored Division reach the St. Dizier area.
In the Ninth Air Defense Command Company D was ordered to move from Levast to Chateaudun by it organic transportation. The mission under the 564th Signal Air Warning Battalion was assigned the tactical employment of providing air warning service in connection with the defense of the Paris area. Since the 564th SAW Bn had only British ground controlled interception equipment company D was assigned to provide the early warning service and to provide gap filling between the ground controlled interception sets. This program called for one lightweight section north of paris, one section south of Paris and two lightweight sections east of Paris. Company D headquarters was established at Morangis near Paris (Orly) airport. These radars were on a full 24 hour operating schedule and all plots were reported by radio and wire to the large filter room of the 564th SAW Bn which was also the headquarters of the 2nd Air Defense Wing. During this tour of operation the lightweight radars of Company D were responsible for giving early warning service on many hostile flights in the Paris area. This information was in turn given the GCI's via the filter room and interceptions were made by the P-61 night fighters. Robot bombs that were sent toward the Paris area were also plotted by means of the LW radars. During this period of operations all the light weight radar sites were visited by British RAF Technical Officers who were making a survey of British Radar being used by the American forces. All site commanders were complimented on the sighting of these radars and the excellent way they were operated and maintained. The Commanding officer of the 564th SAW Bn highly commended the officers and men of Company D for the effort put forth on this work.
In the 563rd FDP2 moved from St Cornielle to Patay and LW2 to St Agil. The Battalion Headquarters was moved to Monfort Le Rotrou which is 10 miles east of Le Mans. The 100th Wing headquarters also moved to this location on August 30th. About this time the TCC which was operated by the 100th Wing formed the 19th TCC (Provisional) so that the TCC could move independently of the 100th Wing. Also on August 30th, FDP2 was moved to Patay which is about 16 miles east of Chateaudun. During the month of August Lt. William Wright was appointed as Battalion Soldier Voting Officer. Capt. Joseph Goldberg was appointed as Battalion Graves Registratration Officer in addition to Dental officer. Lt. Harold Waeckerle was appointed an additional duty as Battalion Investi- gating officer as well as an additional duty of Battalion Gas Officer and Lt. Paul Rapp was relieved of this duty
In the XIX TAC area a cold front swept over Western Europe with low ceilings and rain and all missions were scrubbed except 2 weather recons flown by the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group.
Aug 31
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division establishes a bridgehead across the Meuse river at Commercy and the XX Corps the 7th Armored Division establishes a bridgehead across the Meuse at Verdun and halts on a gasoline shortage.
The XIX TAC flew 18 missions comprising 313 sorties, despite continued bad weather, dropping 60 3/4 tons of GP bombs, 39 tanks napalm and 16 leaflet bombs. Twenty rockets were discharged and considerable strafing done. There was no claims against enemy aircraft and no losses. Results included 134 motor vehicles and 8 tanks destroyed. Attacks were made on 37 gun positions, 1 head- quarters, 1 troop concentration, 2 strong points, 1 barracks and 22 railroad lines were cut.
SEPTEMBER 1944
During September FDP4 was formally designated a Forward Director Post and Lt. Paul Rapp was put in command. FDP4 consisted of the Headquarters Company Type 15 Radar Platoon commanded by Lt. Frank Van Camp, LW4 commanded by Lt. George B. Dorroh. This provi- sional unit was staffed by additional manpower to be able to function as a separate platoon with their own mess. The Head- quarters Company still serviced them administratively. Also during September two more platoons from Company D were attached to the 563rd for detached service in England, one to the RAF station at Great Malvern, Worcestershire and the other at Milfield and both for training for SCR-584 microwave radar and to be returned to the 563rd SAW Battalion on completion.
Sep 1
On September 1st Eisenhower assumed command and tactical control of all Allied ground forces.
The Third Army was practically immobilized by the acute shortage of gasoline and the enemy was building up behind the West Wall. The XX Corps the 7th Armored Division advanced to Etain. The XII Corps the 4th Armored Division expanded the Commercy bridgehead over the Meuse and the 80th Infantry Division crosses it on that date.
On September 1st FDP4 was moved to St. Denis Du Tertre about 15 miles east of Le Mans and a mile south of 563rd headquarters.
XIX TAC flew 492 sorties and destroyed 11 enemy confirmed, 6 probable and 12 damaged. Thirty-three locomotives, 130 tanks, and armored vehicles and 817 motor transport vehicles were damaged or destroyed in the day's bombings and strafing.
Sep 2
In the Third Army the XX Corps feints north from Verdun and halts just short of Sedan when fuel runs out.
The XIX TAC, in 164 sorties reported destroyed 47 railroad cars, 106 motor transports, 7 locomotives, 7 locomotives and 7 tanks and armored vehicles destroyed or damaged.
Sep 3
Eisenhower authorized a continuation of The Third Army's advance. Patton's movement was slow, for the Germans, fearing his attack the most, had concentrated in his sector in late August many of the troops arriving from other theaters. German Panzer officers planted themselves at Metz and halted the German soldiers fleeing from the Falaise gap and organized them into units. On September 3rd the airdrome at Reims was repaired sufficiently to receive cargo planes.
In the 563rd FDP2 was moved to Lavel En Brie at the edge of the Bois De Fresnoy which is 16 miles east of Fountainbleau and also moved LW2 to Les Cerimois which is 8 miles east of Sens and 25 miles southeast of FDP2. GO 4 moved all Posts of GO4 Ground Observer Platoon to Troyes.
XIX TAC operations, the island of Ile-de-Cezembre surrendered at 0930 hours to the XIX TAC. Fighters flew 38 missions with 510 sorties, but found very few targets.
Sep 4
On September 4th the 83rd Infantry Division of the Third Army had detachments along the Loire river and one of their patrols learned that German Gen. Erich Elster, harried by the air, might be considering surrender. Two men sent to his Chateauroux headquar- ters confirmed this and on September 10th the details for his capitulation were worked out in a conference at Issoudun. To impress the enemy commander with the inevitable consequences of delay, a strong formation of the 354th Fighter-Bomber Group swept over Issoudun during the conference, ready to act if the Americans displayed panel signals. Elster, impressed by this further show of air power, agreed to march to Beaugency and there surrender. His troops were allowed to retain their arms until they reached the river, but attendant airplanes threatened should they show signs either of hesitation or of fight. Gen. Weyland was wired by teletype
"Inasmuch as your command has been instrumental in accom- plishing this surrender, request that you or your representative be present with Gen. Macon to accept the surrender."
Accordingly, and appropriately, the commander of the XIX TAC was present at the Beaugency bridge ceremonies on that same day, and later received a consignment of surrendered German Lugers for his unit commanders. When the count was made, prisoners were found to total 754 officers, 18,850 men, and 2 women. XIX TAC's unique mission had been accomplished.
The Third Army front was advancing very rapidly and still another move of FDP1 was anticipated. About this time the supply of gasoline was still critical and the Third Army tightened up on its use (see Editors Note 10 on the following page).
In the 563rd Company A moved FDP1 from Madeleine to Villiers- sur-Seine which is about 6 miles southwest of Nogent-Sur-Seine a distance of about 150 miles. However the Third Army was advancing so rapidly that it was soon apparent that another move was in the offing. GO 1 Platoon was also moved to that vicinity with Posts Able at Plessis, Charley at Chalantre, and Fox at Analaine. GO4 moved Post William to Corgendy which is southeast of Fountainbleu.
XIX TAC flew 159 sorties, destroying 77 railroad cars and 19 motor transports.
Sep 5
In the Third Army Gen. Patton oders the XII Corps to cross the Moselle, secure Nancy and be prepared to advance to the Rhine river.
In the Third Army the XII Corps tries to cross the Moselle and puts one battalion of the 80th Infantry Division across at Pont a Mousson.
GO4 Ground Observer Platoon moved to an area just southwest of Fountainbleu with Posts Sugar to Avon Le Peze, Tare to Mespigny, Uncle to Echemines and Victor to Dilladis.
The XIX TAC flew 389 sorties in and 31 missions dropping napalm tanks on enemy installations and 46 military installations damaged or destroyed.1
Sep 6
In the Third Army the XII Corps the 80th Infantry Division Bridgehead attempt is overrun by the Germans
LW1 was moved to St. Martin which is 10 miles east of Nogent Sur Seine and about 14 miles east of FDP1.
The XIX TAC flew 416 sorties in 37 missions.
[Editors Note 10--- during the first part of September Company A headquarters was at Villiers-sur-Seine which was about 62 miles south east of Paris. I was investigating the gas shortage and when Capt. Slattery told me he was shut down by the Comm Zone Petrol Depot. I thought I would try my hand at expediting gas and went to the nearest depot who had lots of gas but were hording it. I told the Depot commander that if I did not get gas he would be exposed to German air attack and I had the only unit in the area that could protect him with our radars. He gave me the gas and I had a 2 1/2 ton truck which I loaded with 5 gallon cans. I went back to Company A and gave them the gas. Since the whole battalion was stopped and the fighters also curtailed I told Slattery that as long as I got the gas and there was no operations he could do I gave him permission send his man a group at a time into Paris for R and R and use the gasoline for that purpose, which they did.]
Sep 7
In the Army the XX Corps the 7th Armored Division continues to the Moselle river to Mondelange, north of Metz and starts south to Hauconcourt. The 5th Infantry Division attacks towards Metz to Briey.
XIX TAC Flew 238 sorties in 16 missions, destroying 132 motor transports and 310 horse drawn vehicles. Eleven gun installations and 11 military installations were either damaged or destroyed.
Sep 8
The 106th German Panzer Brigade counter attacked the 90th Infantry Division between Landres and Mairy but became disorganized and it was virtually destroyed. In the action the Germans lost 30 tanks, 60 half-tracks and 100 other vehicles.
In the 563rd FDP4 moved to Mar-delle-Au-Coq which is 23 miles southeast of Nemours and near Courtenay and LW4 was moved to Montbouy which is about 11 miles southeast of Montaghris and about 20 miles south of the FDP4 site.
The XIX TAC could divert few airplanes to the Third Army and they were spread thinly along a very wide front. The XIX TAC flew 470 sorties in 39 missions. These missions concentrated heavily on the enemy's military installations, with claims of 28 gun installations and 136 military installations destroyed or heavily damaged.
Sep 9
In the Third Army the XX Corps the 90th Infantry Division drives to Neufchef about 5 miles from Thionville.
XIX TAC flew 308 sorties in 25 missions, claiming kills on 27 rail, 88 motor transports, 200 locomotives, 27 gun installations and 32 military installations. Thirteen tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed and 5 enemy airdromes were attacked.
Sep 10
In the Third Army the 10th Infantry Division began a crossing of the Moselle between Noveant and Arnaville at 0200 Hours under smoke screen, the first to be used by the Third Army on a large scale, and took the enemy by surprise. The Germans began a strong counter attack which the XIX TAC helps stem. From this time on the XIX TAC was permitted to divert some of its airplanes from the primary targets at the Brest Peninsula to support the Third Army on the Moselle river crossings. This where it was vectoring fighter- bombers to the airdromes. G3 of the XX Corps action would result in freeing FDP3 from its rear area assignment, 10th the G-3 of the XX Corps secured three squadrons of fighter bombers for use against the enemy holding up the advance near Amanvilers. The P-47's hit their targets but the 500 pound bombs had very little effect on the reinforced concrete.
XIX TAC flew 377 sorties and destroyed or damaged 32 enemy tanks, 33 gun installations and 32 military installations.
Sep 11
In the Third Army the 5th Infantry Division reinforced the Arnaville bridgehead and expanded it toward Corny and Arry against severe counterattacks. The XIX TAC assisted with strikes on Arry and Corny.
In the 563rd an anticipated move of FDP1 was ordered and Company A was on the road the following morning to its new site which was located about 3 miles north of Etain.
The XIX TAC flew 411 sorties and in 45 missions during the day's operations and destroyed or damaged 32 military installations and destroyed 92 railroad cars, 46 motor transports, 44 gun installations and 35 horse drawn vehicles.
Sep 12
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 80th Infantry Division attacks across the Mosele river with bridgeheads at St. Genevieve, Loisy, Bezaumont and La Cote. The 4th Armored enlarges its bridgehead at Lorey near Nancy.
In the Third Army's XV Corps area the 79th Infantry Division traps a garrison at Neufechateau.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 5th Infantry Division bridges the Moselle river at Arnaville and the 7th Armored Division crossed.
In the 563rd FDP2 moved to near Vigneulles where they not only operated as FDP2 but ran an advanced Tactical Control Center for the 19th TCG while the TCC operated by the 316th FCS was moving. As the advanced TCC, FDP2 set up to have Company A report into their communications center and the FDP2 controllers acted as TCC controllers. FDP2 acted in this capacity until September 17th when the 316th FCS moved up. Also on September 12th Company B moved LW2 to Rembercourt about 9 miles east of Hattonville. GO2 moved Post George to Preny, Post How to Pagny-sur-Mosele, Post Jig to Gorze and Post Love to St. Genevieve.
In the report on the Lorraine campaign, Cole wrote an account of the Battle West of Metz. The XX Corps was attacking and the situation from September 8th through the 13th was shown on his map shown on his page 136. This is a typical Ground observer operation in which Company B Ground Observers was supporting the 5th Infantry Division of the XX Corps and this shows the position of Ground Observer post Jig directly supporting elements of the 5th Infantry Division which is shown on page 162.
Sep 13
Due to a critical shortage of Class I supplies, the Third Army headquarters began issuing German rations, numerous captured storehouses being emptied, and field bakeries began to use captured German flour. The pipeline to Chartes started operations with an expected gasoline usage of gallons 100,000 daily.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the enemy abandons Nancy and launches a strong counter attack over running St. Genevieve, Loisy and Bezaumont threatening the bridgehead and a counter attack of the 80th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division restores the original bridgehead perimeter.
In the First Army XV Corps the French 2nd Armored Division discovers enemy columns prepared to drive on Donpaire and Ville- sur-Illon engages them with support of the XIX TAC and defeats them and destroy 60 German Tanks.
In the Third Army XX Corps area the 90th Infantry Division has a critical shortage of artillery ammunition and are receiving heavy artillery fire from Fort Driant.
In the 563rd Company A moved to Etain and about 1800 Hours FDP1 was set up and operational. Company A moved LW1 to Chavanges which is about 20 miles southeast of St. Dizier.
XIX TAC flew 82 sorties in 9 missions with few claims for the day, destroying five gun installations and attacking 3 troop concentrations.
Sep 14
In the Third Army the XX Corps the planned attack of the 7th Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division to the south of Metz across the bridgehead at Arnaville is postponed because of deep mud making the movement of tanks impossible. The XII Corps completes its envelopment of Nancy.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters moved to Hattonville which is about 15 miles south east of Verdun and the 19th TCC moved to Vignuelles which is a mile north of Hattonville. O
The XIX TAC was limited in its operations due to adverse weather but completed 108 sorties in 6 missions with claims of 26 motor transports, 6 locomotives and 7 tanks and armored vehicles either destroyed or damaged.
Sep 15
In the Third Army the XII Corps the Germans began a counter attack on the Dieulouard bridgehead and both sides suffer heavily during the days fighting. The 80th Infantry Division destroyed 14 German tanks by artillery fire. The XX Corps expands the Arnaville bridgehead in preparation for an attack on Metz.
In the 563rd Lt. Robert S. McSpadden was promoted from 2nd Lt. to 1st Lt. on Par 3 SO 259 Headquarters Ninth Air Force dated 15 September.
The XIX TAC, concentrating on German rail activity, flew 294 sorties in 23 missions during the day's operations with claims of 22 railroad lines cut, 62 railroad cars damaged, 16 gun installa- tions and 18 military installations damaged or destroyed.
The Winter Operations Phase extended from September 16th to December 15th.
SEPTEMBER 1945
During this period the Ground Observer observations became increasingly important. The posts were able to occupy good obser- vations positions and the TCC chief controller took immediate and direct action to destroy the targets with fighter-bomber attacks.
Sep 16
The Third Army occupied a front extending from Thionville on the left boundary to Luneville on the right boundary. The direction of attack was to the northeast with the XX Corps on the left flank, the XII Corps in the center and the XV Corps on the right flank.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 80th Infantry Division, supported by the XIX TAC fighter-bombers and Corps Artillery stopped a German Counterattack at Dieulouard and mopped up the area northeast of Nancy. The 4th Armored Division attacked and occupied Lunneville. The 80th Infantry Division assisted by XIX TAC air support and artillery decisively defeated a major counter attack against the Dieulouard bridgehead. The 90th Infantry Division limited attacks on Metz was meeting stronger enemy resistance and since the gains were minute as well as costly these attacks were halted in this sector.
In the Third Army's XV Corps area the Germans made a strong counter attack on the French 2nd Armored Division who checked the attack and then withdrew to avoid a major engagement.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the limited objective attacks of the 90th Infantry Division west of Metz are proving to be costly and almost fruitless. The 7th Armored Division attacked to enlarge the bridgehead at Arnaville and the 5th Infantry Division regrouped in that bridgehead.
In the 563rd FDP4 was moved to Bouvron which is 5 miles north of Toul and LW4 also was moved to Royamune which is about 3 miles north of the FDP4 site at Bouvron.
XIX TAC flew 286 sorties in 21 missions with few claims being made. Fourteen gun installations, 7 military installations and 8 small Naval vessels were either damaged or destroyed.
Sep 17
In the Third Army the German held forts around Metz were virtually impregnable. An air ground attack against was halted as German resistance increased.
In the 563rd the 316th FCS moved up and when the TCC was oper- ational FDP2 reverted back to FDP operation. The 19th Tactical Control Group headquarters moved to Vigneulles which several miles from Hattonville. The 19th Tactical Control Group also located in the same vicinity.
XIX TAC flew 133 sorties in 17 missions with the following claims, 2 railroad lines cut, 23 railroad cars, 15 motor trans- ports, and 23 military installations damaged or destroyed.
Sep 18
In the Third Army XV Corps the 79th Infantry Division crosses the Moselle river to Moriville and Einvaux.
On September 18th GO4 which had been attached to Company A was attached back to Headquarters Company. At that time GO4 was had leapfrogged to Avon-La-Pexze which is near Nogent-Sur-Seine.
XIX TAC due to bad weather 32 sorties were made.
Sep 19
In the Third Army the Germans effectively delayed the advance by blowing up bridges, constructing road blocks with mines and felled trees and constructed trenches, bunkers and antitank positions as they fell back.
In the 563rd the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was shipped in from England and was assigned to the 563rd Battalion It was located immediately near Nousard which was about 5 miles southeast of Hattonville, which is where Battalion headquarters was located. The following day was fully operational as FDP5. FDP5 was located here following the advice from the SHAEF Signal Officer who thought that the MEW radar should be located in a high position to extend its range. The Nousard position was selected by the Battalion Exec to fulfill this requirement. Attendant with such a site the FDP controllers had to contend with permanent echoes from surrounding mountains which made it difficult to track a flight continuously. Because of the controllers complaint on future moves this desire of higher headquarters was substantially ignored and the siting was then done by the FDP5 staff following the same criterion as the other FDP's which required a flat area with a perimeter of trees to shield the permanent echoes. LW4 and GO4 reported poison gas near Conflans, France. Three officers of FDP4 and two officers of LW4 as well as the Gas NCO's identified the gas as Phosgene. There were light concentrations of gas with intensity of odor, covering an area of 10 miles in length and 1/2 mile wide. There were no casualties only effects were very slight dry throats, parched lips and smarting eyes. The incident was inspected by the Third Army Staff and the gas confirmed and determined to have been laid in World War I and dormant all these years. The gas colored the stars on the jeeps as intended.
XIX TAC flew 262 sorties in 22 missions with eight light claims.
Sep 20
In the Third Army there was a shortage of artillery ammunition but the XX Corps continued the attack on Metz.
In the 563rd GO2 posts Love located near Mousson and King located at Vitonville were reporting German artillery columns at Nomeny located in the vicinity of Pont-A-Mousson. The German artillery fired upon the Love post. On September 23rd the same columns picked up tanks started a German counter attack. The reports went to XIX TAC and Third Army and on the September 25th the XIX TAC field order stated that due to GO information of FDP2 the enemy columns were attacked and destroyed.
XIX TAC flew 165 Sorties in 12 missions claiming 13 railroad lines cut and 30 railroad cars, 12 motor transports and 11 locomotives damaged or destroyed. In addition, 5 marshaling yards were attacked with good results.
Sep 21
In the Third Army's XX Corps area a strong German counter attack delays the 7th Armored Division in crossing the Seille river south of Metz.
In the 563rd FDP3 moved to a bivouac area about 3 miles south of Luxembourg City at a site overlooking the town of Delheim. Up to this date this move was the longest single jump by a FDP having moved from Orleans to Luxembourg City a distance of about 230 miles as an airplane flies. On 0110 hour that night they were attacked by a German Cavalry unit and their machine gun fire struck the SCR- 582 microwave radar unit and the impact started a fire which reduced it to a total loss. Very soon after the strike a U.S. Armored Cavalry Colonel invested and had his men pick up the shattered van and hauled it away so the Germans would not know it was a destroyed. There was no casualties. Company C was asked to move by the Artillery command because they needed the site to position their artillery to shell a nearby town. The SCR-582 unit was a state of the art microwave unit which /had been manufactured at Massachusetts Institute of Technology labs by the two officers who employed it. Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill and Lt. Robert A. Homan. The unit was stationed at FDP3 at the time for use as an LW unit and was capable of close control of the fighter-bombers. Before that time it was based at Battalion Headquarters and was used to test out new sites for ground echoes because of its high mobility and accuracy. It must be said that the unit being an untried device prior to its application in the 563rd did have some electronic and electrical problems which were handled the unit team handled themselves.
XIX TAC flew 245 sorties in 19 missions, with heavy claims made,especially on rail transportation. Fifteen railroad lines were cut, 256 railroad cars, 14 locomotives, 47 motor transports and 20 tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed. A shipment of 12,000 gallons of gasoline arrived at St. Dizier, brought by fighter-bombers of the XIX TAC.
Sep 22
In the Third Army the Germans continued o construct additions to the Siegfried Line fortifications.
In the 563rd GO4 Platoon moved into a Fort at Champignuelles near Nancy. GO4 was the first American unit to reach either the town or the fort but encountered no resistance. Sugar post of GO4 was the net control station and was located at the fort along with Post Tare and Post Uncle. On this date Post Victor was moved to near Nancy and William up across the Moselle at Vandoeuvre five miles south of Nancy. While occupying these sites GO4 reported intense activity between foot troops and some artillery which directly opposite GO4 post Sugar on the far side of the Moselle River. A patrol was made up and sent out through GO4 post Uncle which was located about 500 yards southwest of the enemy lines to gain information on ground concentrations. However, they were unsuccessful and were driven back by enemy machine gun fire. At a later date they were able to proceed forward and gave valuable information concerning the locations of enemy ground concentrations and guns.
On September 22nd FDP3 moved to about 7 miles west to near the town of Hesperage which is about 3 miles south of Luxembourg City in Luxembourg also LW3 was moved to Esch about 6 miles south of FDP3. The Luxembourg location proved to be an excellent choice. At the time of their move Company C was supporting the left flank of the Third Army and soon they would be in the center of the drive north to stop the German counter attack that was not suspected at the time. Also LW4 was relocated to the vicinity of Boxieres-Aux- Dames which is about 3 miles north of Nancy and at the same time the Headquarters Ground Observer platoon was moved to perimeter positions surrounding LW4.
XIX TAC headquarters was moved to Etain, where the Third Army headquarters was located. From this point on the Third Army and the XIX TAC Advanced would locate side by side to facilitate coordination between General Patton and General Weyland.
The Company B ground observer platoon posts G and H were already located in the vicinity of Pont-A-Mousson which is between Metz and Nancy and Post K was moved to Mousson and Post Love moved to Bouxieres.
XIX TAC flew 273 sorties in 23 missions with many claims against both enemy transportation and military installations. Twenty-one railroad lines were cut, 135 railroad cars, 120 motor transports, 13 locomotives, 4 supply dumps, 6 gun installations and 22 tanks and armored vehicles were either damaged or destroyed.
Sep 23
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 35th Infantry Division occupies high ground 10 miles northeast of Nancy.
In the 563rd Company C Ground observer platoon was moved to Syren, Luxembourg about 6 miles south east of Luxembourg City and about 5 miles east of FDP3. GO3 moved Post Mike to Contern, Post Oboe to Derange, Post Peter to Delheim, Post Queen to Roeser and Post Roger to Sandweiler.
XIX TAC flew 96 sorties in which eighteen railroad lines were cut and 20 railroad cars, 27 motor transports, 1 locomotives, 14 gun installations and tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed.
Sep 24
At Supreme Headquarters Eisenhower had ordered Bradley to have the Third army operations curtailed because of the increasing difficulty of supplies and also to give priority to the British in the northern sector. Gen. Patton was ordered to halt offensive operations for aggressive defense and called for limited actions, as supplies permit, to improve defensive positions and as a conse- quence the 7th Armored Division had to drop their plan to cross the Sielle river. (see Editors Note 11 below).
In the Third Army's XX Corps area during the latter part of September the 3rd Armored Division and the 10th Infantry Divisions established a bridgehead over the Moselle River near Pagny-sur- Moselle which is halfway between Pont-A-Mousson and Metz. This map, shown on page 172, shows the positions of Ground Observer post Jig Company B plotted (on Cole's map on his page 161) of the history of the Lorraine Campaign by Cole showing the bridgehead which was being expanded by the 5th Infantry Division. Both How and Love posts had occupied the positions on September 12th.
In the XIX TAC two fighter groups, on very short notice and
(Editors Note 11) On the afternoon of September 22nd Gen. Eis- enhower met with his top commanders. In forthright terms he annou- nced that he "required general acceptance of the fact that the possession of an additional major deep-water port on our north flank is an indispensable prerequisite for the final drive deep into Germany". Priority, therefore, would be given to an attack on the north flank by Montgomery's 21st Army Group with the object of clearing the Schelde approaches to Antwerp and "the envelopment of the Rhur from the north by the 21st Army Group, supported by the First Army" would be regarded as the paramount Allied concern. The allocation of supplies to the 21st Army Group would not permit the Third Army to continue the attack east of the Moselle River. Gen. Eisenhower's decision stemmed from an untenable logistical situation. Gen. Bradley's 12th Army Group alone needed 20,000 tons of supplies per day in order to support a secure offensive for bridgeheads across the Rhine. The expectations for the delivery of supplies during the period from October 1st to 15th summed up to only 12,000 tons per day. To support even that much, all other troops would have to be immobilized and much of the allied air strength would have to divert from strategic to supply missions. in extremely bad weather flew close support of the 4th Armored Division during a counterattack by strong enemy armored and infantry units. They destroyed three enemy tanks and then bombed and strafed a section of wooded areas, flushing a large number of German tanks which were knocked out both the air and land forces. The weather was bad enough to keep the fighters from returning to their field near St. Dizer. They were finally directed to Etain where they landed and where they were met personally by General Patton, who thanked them for their courage and commend them on their flying. In all they flew 106 sorties in 9 missions claiming 16 railroad cars, 8 motor transports and 4 tanks and armored cars damaged or destroyed.
Sep 25
In the Third Army 107 rounds of 155-mm howitzers were fired at the concrete shelters and casements of Fort Kellerman and the only results were chipped concrete.
In the 563rd Company A moved LW1 to Beauvillers which is which is about 12 miles northeast of Etain, the location of FDP1.
XIX TAC had adverse weather conditions precluded any air activity by the XIX TAC.
Sep 26
At Supreme Headquarters all support went to Gen. Montgomery's 21st Army Group.
In the 563rd General Order 33 of the XIX TAC was received awarding the Bronze Star Medal awarded to the following Men of Headquarters Company :
Tec/5 Joseph S. Detwiler, in recognition of meritorious ser- vice in connection with military operations against the enemy.
Pfc William Albert Wittman, in recognition of meritorious ser- vice in connection with military operations against the enemy.
XIX TAC with Bad weather reduced the activity of the XIX TAC to 35 sorties with claims of 4 motor transports damaged or destroyed and 3 military installations attack. The XIX TAC began attacks against the Metz forts and continued to attack daily until December 30th. However, the fighter-bomber efforts had little effect on the reduction of the forts which were reinforced concrete and practically invulnerable to aerial bombs or artillery. Patton's approach was to bypass the forts and destroy the German support by siege. Bad weather reduced the activity of the XIX TAC to 35 sorties with claims of 4 motor transports damaged or destroyed and 3 miliary installations attacked.
SEP 27
In the Third Army the XX Corps continued artillery firing on Fort Jeanne d'Arc with no good effect.
In the 563rd Company C moved their ground observer platoon to locations a little east of Nancy Post Jig moved to Mardigny and Post Love to St Genevieve.
XIX TAC with excellent flying conditions, flew 517 sorties in 39 missions with excellent results. Among the claims were 26 railroad lines cut, 180 railroad cars, 46 motor transports, 38 locomotives, 5 supply dumps, 22 gun positions, 12 military installations and 19 tanks and armored vehicles damaged or de- stroyed. Troop concentrations and marshaling yards were attacked with good results.
Sep 28
In the Third Army the XXII Crops repulsed numerous counter- attacks while maintaining aggressive patrols.
In the 563rd Company A moved the Ground Observer platoon moved to the vicinity of Moyeuvre. GO Post A moved to Briery, Post Baker to Rombas, Post Charley to Budan, Post Dog to Garche and Post Fox to Helheim. GO3 moved Post Mike to Pelheim, Post Oboe to Conach, Post Peter to Mayen, Post Queen to Dalheim and Post Roger first to Syren then to Bons the same day.
XIX TAC carried out 575 sorties in 36 missions claiming 72 railroad lines cut 371 railroad cars, 49 motor transports, 67 locomotives 16 gun installations and 17 military installations damaged or destroyed. Eight marshaling yards and 5 airdromes were attacked.
Sep 29
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 4th Armored Division, effectively supported by air, decisively defeats German forces attempting to reach Arracourt and drives them southward where they go on the offensive.
In the 563rd LW3 was moved to near Moesdorf and then to Fishbach on the same day. GO3 moved Post Mike to Pelheim, Post Oboe to Conach, Post Peter to Maynen, Post Queen to Dalheim and Post Roger to Syren then to Bons on the same day. During Septem- ber, Lt. Viergever who was the senior officer in Headquarters communications section when Lt. Lewis F. Janek was injured was appointed Battalion Communications Staff Officer in addition to commanding the Headquarters Communication Section. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Champigneulles, Post Tare to near Nancy, Post Uncle to Agincourt and Post William to Haraucourt.
During the month of September the following appointments were made (in addition to their other duties):
Lt. Viergever was released as Battalion PX Officer
Lt. William Wright was appointed Battalion PX Officer.
Lt. Robert Schurke was appointed an Air inspector.
Lt. Jack Reynolds was appointed Administrative Inspector.
Lt. John Nolan was appointed to Battalion Post Exchange Council
Lt. Paul Rapp was relieved as Battalion Post Exchange Council member.
XIX TAC had a very good day, flying a total of 576 sorties in 46 missions. Their claims were 45 railroad lines cut, 226 railroad cars, 66 motor transports, 43 locomotives, 23 military installa- tions, 22 gun installations, 50 horse drawn vehicles, 77 miscella- neous naval vessels, 3 highway bridges and 3 tanks and armored vehicles damaged or destroyed. XIX TAC also continued their attacks on troop concentrations and marshaling yards.
Sep 30
In the Third Army the German's attacked the 35th Infantry Division to recover the Foret De Gremencey and General Patton orders the 6th Armored Division to restore the situation.
In the 563rd GO2 Post Love was moved to Brauvillers.
XIX TAC air activity was voided by bad weather conditions.
OCTOBER 1944
During October Patton had received authority to press a lim- ited, if subsidiary, offensive designed to enlarge the bridgehead across the Moselle and to hold the maximum number of enemy forces on its front, and consequently the XIX TAC saw more action. The attacks on the fortifications of Metz continued to be generally unavailing, but after the decision of 11th October to abandon the direct assault on these targets the fighter-bombers repeatedly proved their worth against enemy armored vehicles, troops, gun positions, command posts and airfields.
During October 1st through the 9th the XII Corps was attacking in the vicinity of Jeamdelaincourt which is about 12 miles south east of Pont-A-Mousson. Cole's history of the Lorraine campaign (his Map 32 on his page 283) shows the local situation. Plotted on the map and shown below are the positions occupied by Headquarters platoon observer posts Tare and William in support of elements of the 35th and 80th Infantry divisions and a combat team of the 6th Armored division. Both Tare and William posts occupied the positions on October 2nd. Also on October 1st GO4 platoon moved to sites on the eastern side of the Moselle River covering the area between Nancy and Pont-A-Mousson. The net control station was set up near Landremont and the alternate net control station near St. Genevie. Other posts were established south from Land-Remont to Nancy.
In the 563rd, starting in October, FDP5 began night control operations and working with the 155th Night Photo Squadron and the 425th Night Fighter (Black Widow) squadron. Throughout the Autumn the Night Fighter squadrons were seriously handicapped by an insufficient number of P-61 aircraft. The actual average operative strength of these squadrons was ten P-61's and some worn out A20 liaison aircraft. (see Editors Note 12 on the next page)
Oct 1
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 83rd Infantry Division reach Grevenmacheron the West bank of the Moselle northeast of Luxembourg City. A strict plan of gasoline rationing is iniated.
Oct 2
An infantry attack and heavy aerial bombardment of Fort Briant was launched by the XX Corps and XIX TAC.
In the 563rd GO3 Post Mike moved to Bons and Post Roger moved to Flaxweiler. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Champigneulles, Post Tare to St. Genevieve, Post Victor to Siechamps and Post William to Leyr.
The XIX TAC coordinated with the XX Corps in the Fort Driant attack. Having a busy day, the XIX TAC flew 426 sorties in 33 mis- sions. Claims were 29 railroad lines cut, 243 railroad cars, 58 motor transports, 32 locomotives, 42 gun installations and 13 miscellaneous naval vessels destroyed or damaged with 8 marshaling yards attacked.
Oct 3
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 5th Infantry Division met with stiff opposition when they entered Fort Driant on the west bank of the Moselle river. A total of 23 Field Artillery Battal- ions supported the attack by firing a 30 minute preparation fol- lowed by supporting fires, all directed against neighboring fortresses as well as Fort Driant. Guns were active against Fort Jeanne d'Arc, Fort Verdun Groupe, Batterie Moselle and Marival. Only limited results due to heavy concrete reinformed defenses.
XIX TAC, in 22 missions the planes and pilots claimed 39 railroad lines cut, 78 railroad cars, 35 locomotives, 15 military installations, and 4 small naval vessels damaged or destroyed. Eight marshaling yards were attacked with good results.
Oct 4
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 10th and 90th Infantry Divisions reinforce the attack on Fort Driant.
In the 563rd GO2 moved Post Jig to Malmaison and Post How to Lorry Mardigny.
The XIX TAC continued its concentration on rail transport and cutting 22 railroad lines and damaging or destoying 248 railroad cars, 25 locomotives,21 gun positions and 2 railroad bridges.
[Editors Note 12--- In retrospect the air operations studies after the war noted that the captured German officers, interrogated after the war, stated that they had greatly enjoyed the freedom of movement during the hours of darkness because of American lack of night fighters. This was reported in the Bradley report by the Air Effects Commission of the 12th Army Group. As near as I can tell there was two squadrons with the IX TAC which were the 422nd and 442nd Night Fighter Squadrons and one squadron with the XIX TAC which was the 425th Night Fighter Squadron.]
Oct 5
In the Third Army the XII Corps was preparing an attack to advance on Lettricourt and while regrouping the XIX TAC began a systematic bombing of the German strongholds, Moivron, Jeandelainc- ourt and Mount St. Jean. The Artillery also laid battered away at Moivron and Sivry. At the same time three squadrons of P-47's went to work on the German reserves and line of communications, dropping 864 fragmentation bombs on the Bois Dit la Fourasse which was the main enemy troop assembly area behind the hill mass and bombing the Seille bridge at Nomeny.
In the 563rd Company C moved into the Chateau which was nearby because of the severity of the winter. The FDP3 site had been quite near the rather indefinite front line and on October 6th a flight of fighter bombers being controlled by FDP3 were ordered to jettison their bombs on a nearby village. It was so close to them that the resulting concussion stopped the rotation of the radar antenna and jarred loose some connecting cables. They repaired the damage quickly enough to enable them to control the airplanes back to their base.
XIX TAC completed 7 missions and 110 sorties. XIX TAC cut 4 railroad lines and damaged or destroyed 13 motor transports, 54 military installations, 1 highway bridge and 28 small naval vessels. Six marshaling yards were attacked. The Air Command's program of cutting railroad lines was proving highly successful. Day by day the airplane attacks were isolating the enemy from supplies and communications in the rear and preventing an effective defense buildup.
During the Winter Operations the weather caused a severe limitation on vehicular movement because of mud and the roads in the area of operations were limited. There were a number of German occupied forts which could not be reduced by bombing or shelling. The operations of the Third Army became more like a WW I type of operation. The conditions and type of operations made the Ground Observers an important element of combat and they operated much like artillery spotters except they were fixing targets for the fighter bombers. The Ground Observers assumed more importance and they set up to get close observation of the German Units. They were more directly involved because at times the FDP controller would pass messages back and forth from the fighter bomber pilot to the Ground Observer.
After October 2nd the movements of the Ground Observer posts more frequent and more complex. In the more fluid phases such as the Exploitation and Pursuit phase, the ground observer platoons were moved forward along with the FDP's and then all posts in the platoon would move forward at the same time. When they arrived at the forewarn position they would usually be deployed in a line in front of the FDP or on the perimeter of the FDP and/or in the vicinity of the LW radar. In the Winter Phase this pattern did not fully apply. The FDP commanders had the problem of security for the FDP, Air warning in blind spots and within the ground echo of the radars, maintaining sites to spot enemy activity and requests for coverage from Battalion Hq operations and TCC operations. Ground observer posts are occupied for good vision of the enemy ground operations, good vision of aircraft and good radio communi- cations. This makes a site with a high elevation above the sur- rounding terrain desirable. Sites cannot be occupied too long because the enemy becomes aware of them and the potential damage the spotters can cause and they may single them out for artillery fire. See also Ground Observer operation on page 52 which lists other considerations of Ground Observer operations. The number of moves made by the individual posts for the period from 2 October to December 15th were: 2-31 Oct 34 sites, 1-30 Nov 37 sites, 1-15 Dec 27 sites
A listing of the ground observer positions follows on the sites occupied 22 Sep through 14 Dec.
POST SITE COORD DATE TOWN NEAREST MI NEAR
COMPANY A
GO ABLE 8 U702736 28 Sep Briery 15 NW Metz
GO ABLE 9 U735520 15 Oct Gorze 10 W Metz
GO ABLE 10 U720495 22 Oct Vandalainville 12 SW Metz
GO ABLE 11 Q016688 24 Nov Gonpreville 11 NE Metz
GO ABLE 12 Q207552 6 Dec Durchinal 4 W St. Avold
GO ABLE 13 Q330622 10 Dec Merlenbuch 2 NE St. Avold
GO BAKER 7 U803719 28 Sep Rombas 10 N Metz
GO BAKER 8 U794457 15 Oct Lorry Mardigny 8 S Metz
GO BAKER 9 U757531 21 Nov Gorza 10 W Metz
GO BAKER 10 Q265558 6 Dec St. Avold 2 E St.Avold
GO CHARLEY 8 U815772 28 Sep Budan 8 E Briery
GO CHARLEY 9 U786353 15 Oct Mousson 7 NE Nancy
GO CHARLEY 10 U980297 16 Nov Fossieux 13 NE Nancy
GO CHARLEY 11 U869828 20 Nov Illange 4 S Thionville
GO CHARLEY 12 Q042811 25 Nov Dalstein 12 SE Thionville
GO CHARLEY 13 Q344576 6 Dec Bettingen 6 E St. Avold
GO CHARLEY 14 Q386592 10 Dec Thedingen 8 E St. Avold
GO DOG 7 U803719 28 Sep Garche 2 NE Thionville
GO DOG 8 U803719 15 Oct Pierrevillers 7 E Briery
GO DOG 9 U977731 20 Nov Bettelainville 12 SE Thionville
GO DOG 10 Q165615 6 Dec Bisten 7 NW St. Avold
GO DOG 11 Q333719 12 Dec Werbeln 10 NE St. Avold
GO FOX 8 U757680 28 Sep St Privat 5 SE Briery
GO FOX 9 U735624 16 Oct Varneville 7 SE Briery
GO FOX 10 U757680 23 Oct Roncourt 5 SE Briery
GO FOX 11 U739624 25 Oct Verneville 8 SE Briery
GO FOX 12 U955618 25 Nov Retonfay 7 E Metz
GO FOX 13 Q380527 5 Dec Host 4 SE St. Avold
GO FOX 14 Q417590 10 Dec Tentrlingen 12 E St. Avold
CCOMPANY B
GO GEORGE 6 Z035914 18 Oct Chattonrapt 12 SE St. Dizer
GO GEORGE 7 U990368 18 Nov Liocourt 15 SE Metz
GO GEORGE 8 U997350 24 Nov Alaincourt 15 SE Metz
GO GEORGE 9 Q170740 6 Dec Tromborn 18 NE Metz
GO HOW 6 U793458 4 Oct Lolly Mardigny 28 SW Metz
GO HOW 7 U033460 18 Oct Thiancourt 30 N St. Dizer
GO HOW 8 Q050480 20 Nov Remilly 10 SE Metz
GO JIG 7 U790458 27 Sep Lolly-Mordigny 11 SE Metz
GO JIG 8 U745600 4 Oct Malmaison 6 W Metz
GO JIG 9 U033460 18 Oct Triaucourt 24 N St. Dizer
GO JIG 10 U207465 24 Oct Mondrecourt 25 NE St. Dizer
GO JIG 11 Q250510 25 Nov Benigen 7 S St. Avold
GO JIG 12 Q303723 12 Dec Differten 8 N St. Avold
GO KING 6 Y785353 22 Sep Musson 7 S Metz
GO KING 7 U882933 18 Oct Voillecompte 9 S St. Dizer
GO KING 8 Q131446 20 Nov Mang 18 E Metz
GO KING 9 Q216822 6 Dec Gisingen 12 N St. Avold
GO LOVE 6 U783426 22 Sep Bouxieres 8 SE Metz
GO LOVE 7 U816307 27 Sep Ste. Genevieve 14 S Metz
GO LOVE 8 U094009 30 Sep Brauvilliers 13 NE Thionville
GO LOVE 9 U731520 18 Oct Gorze 14 NE Thionville
GO LOVE 10 U963514 21 Nov Bazoncourt 8 SW Metz
GO LOVE 11 Q185851 6 Dec Kerprici 15 N St. Avold
COMPANY C
GO MIKE 5 P869109 23 Sep Contern * 5 N Thionville
GO MIKE 6 P928061 28 Sep Delheim * 5 N Thionville
GO MIKE 7 P928056 29 Sep Delheim * 5 N Thionville
GO MIKE 8 P975075 2 Oct Bons * 6 NE Thionville
GO MIKE 10 U800791 18 Oct Famek 5 SW Thionville
GO MIKE 11 U855913 21 Nov Hettange 2 N Thionville
GO MIKE 13 Q087978 8 Dec Biischdorf * 7 NE Thionville
GO OBOE 5 P919130 23 Sep Derange * 7 N Thionville
GO OBOE 6 P971131 28 Sep Conach * 8 NE Thionville
GO OBOE 7 P927067 29 Sep Delheim * 8 NE Thionville
GO OBOE 9 U914909 10 Oct Cattenom 2 NE Thionville
GO OBOE 10 U855913 14 Oct Entrange 2 NE Thionville
GO OBOE 11 Q024980 25 Nov Perl * 6 NE Thionville
GO OBOE 12 Q042980 27 Nov Perl * 6 NE Thionville
GO OBOE 13 Q065983 28 Nov Perl * 7 NE Thionville
GO PETER 5 P924066 23 Sep Delheim * 8 NE Thionville
GO PETER 6 P995142 28 Sep Beyren * 8 NE Thionville
GO PETER 7 U793893 12 Oct Angevillers 2 W Thionville
GO PETER 8 U843851 26 Oct Terville 1 W Thionville
GO PETER 9 U980800 24 Nov Kedange 4 E Thionville
GO PETER 10 Q100852 27 Nov Waldwelstroff 6 E Thionville
GO PETER 11 Q063862 3 Dec Laumesfeldcroix 6 E Thionville
GO PETER 12 Q087478 7 Dec Arriance 7 E Metz
GO QUEEN 5 P874055 23 Sep Roeser * 5 N Thionville
GO QUEEN 6 P927067 28 Sep Dellheim * 5 N Thionville
GO QUEEN 7 P989038 29 Sep Wellenstein * 5 N Thionville
GO QUEEN 8 U942961 10 Oct Fixem 3 N Thionville
GO QUEEN 9 U937962 21 Oct Fixem 7 NE Thionville
GO QUEEN 10 Q025888 24 Nov Sierck 10 E Thionville
GO QUEEN 11 L060006 7 Dec Borg * 7 NE Thionville
GO ROGER 5 P919130 23 Sep Syren * 17 N Thionville
GO ROGER 6 P925095 28 Sep Syren * 15 N Thionville
GO ROGER 7 P975075 28 Sep Bons * 15 N Thionville
GO ROGER 8 P989038 29 Sep Wallenstein * 13 NE Thionville
GO ROGER 9 P898038 29 Sep Frisange * 10 N Thionville
GO ROGER 10 P977199 2 Oct Flaxweiler * 21 N Thionville
GO ROGER 11 P974113 15 Oct Conach * 18 NW Thionville
GO ROGER 12 P933119 21 Oct Derange * 16 N Thionville
GO ROGER 13 U909919 22 Nov Cattenom 4 NE Thionville
GO ROGER 14 U908923 24 Nov Cattenom 4 NE Thionville
GO ROGER 15 Q189909 7 Dec Mondf 21 N St. Avold
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
GO SUGAR 5 U821164 22 Sep Frouard 5 NW Nancy
GO SUGAR 6 U830170 29 Sep Frouard 5 NW Nancy
GO SUGAR 7 U821164 2 Oct Champignuelles 5 NW Nancy
GO SUGAR 8 U834291 19 Nov Laudremont 11 N Nancy
GO SUGAR 9 Q123234 26 Nov Morville 17 NE Nancy
GO SUGAR 10 Q344272 7 Dec Rohrbach 20 S St. Avold
GO TARE 6 U863157 22 Sep Champignuelles 3 N Nancy
GO TARE 7 U815110 29 Sep Nancy 3 W Nancy
GO TARE 8 U817316 2 Oct St. Genevieve 10 N Nancy
GO TARE 9 U999348 15 Oct Alaincourt 15 NE Nancy
GO TARE 10 Q190138 20 Nov Moncourt 21 E Nancy
GO TARE 11 Q164364 21 Nov Baronville 26 NE Nancy
GO TARE 12 Q360444 27 Nov Diffenbach 10 SE St. Avold
GO TARE 13 Q431380 7 Dec Hunkirch 16 SE St. Avold
GO TARE 14 Q587527 14 Dec Wolfingen 21 E St. Avold
GO UNCLE 6 U863157 22 Sep Champigneulles 3 NE St. Avold
GO UNCLE 7 U916153 29 Sep Agincourt 4 NE Nancy
GO UNCLE 8 U908151 20 Oct Agincourt 4 NE Nancy
GO UNCLE 9 Q170299 19 Nov Obreck 21 NE Nancy
GO UNCLE 10 Q236312 24 Nov Liedersingen 15 S St. Avold
GO UNCLE 11 Q401360 27 Nov Munster 16 SE St. Avold
GO UNCLE 12 Q371340 2 Dec Dorsweiler 16 S St. Avold
GO UNCLE 13 Q542458 8 Dec Herbitzheim 20 E St. Avold
GO VICTOR 6 U816119 22 Sep Nancy 3 W Nancy
GO VICTOR 7 U908151 2 Oct Siechamps 4 NE Nancy
GO VICTOR 8 U980070 16 Oct Haroucourt 8 E Nancy
GO VICTOR 9 Q170138 20 Nov Bessingen 19 E Nancy
GO VICTOR 10 Q189136 21 Nov Moncourt 20 E Nancy
GO VICTOR 11 Q353162 27 Nov Lungenberg 32 E Nancy
GO VICTOR 12 Q570317 7 Dec Gung 26 SE St. Avold
GO VICTOR 13 Q141413 14 Dec Brulange 11 SW St. Avold
GO WILLIAM 5 U825074 22 Sep Vandoeuvre 1 SE Nancy
GO WILLIAM 6 U992055 29 Sep Haraucourt 8 E Nancy
GO WILLIAM 7 U916223 2 Oct Leyr 9 NE Nancy
GO WILLIAM 8 Q179249 20 Nov St. Medard 21 E Nancy
GO WILLIAM 9 Q417296 26 Nov Mittersheim 21 SE St. Avold
GO WILLIAM 10 Q463277 27 Nov Finstingen 28 SE St. Avold
GO WILLIAM 11 Q403274 27 Nov Mittersheim 18 SE St. Avold
GO WILLIAM 12 Q495273 2 Dec Finstingen 21 SE St. Avold
GO WILLIAM 13 Q696436 14 Dec Mombrann 12 E St. Avold
Oct 6
In the Third Army the XX Corps task force gained control of the northeast and the southwest corners of Fort Driant.
XIX TAC flew close support of the Third Army and claimed 21 railroad lines cut and 117 railroad cars, 6 motor transports, 9 locomotives, 24 gun installations, 3 highway bridges, 7 ammunition dumps and 20 tanks and armored vehicles destroyed or damaged.
Oct 7
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 83rd Infantry Division takes Echternach.
In the 563rd ground observer post Tare reported a German convoy near Alaibcourt which was about 1 1/2 miles southwest of their location near that town. Records show that post Tare got the quickest response on an enemy target to that date and received a Fighter-Bomber strike within 3 minutes of the report. And one has to remark that the strike came in the niche of time because the enemy convoy was in the process of enclosing them to say nothing of the havoc the enemy could have caused in behind our main line of resistance. On October 7th the 738th Signal Air Warning Company reported that T/Sgt Jay F. Lee was transferred to the 70th R.C.D. for shipment home to the States. Before he joined that organiza- tion in April of 1944 he had served in Iceland for over 2 1/2 years. On October 8th the 738th Signal Air Warning Company also were notified that Lt. Allen B. Reppert was promoted to 1st Lt.
XIX TAC flew 402 sorties, destroying or damaging 187 railroad cars, 19 gun installations, 33 military installations, 83 miscella- neous naval vessels and cutting 30 railroad lines.
Oct 8
In the Third Army's XII Corps area, after an hour of prepa- ratory fire, begins a drive to the Seille river. The 6th Armored Division makes the main effort and reaches Moivron.
In the 563rd FDP5 was moved from Nonsard to Villers-En-Haye which is about 12 miles north west of Nancy. This site was selected because of the concealment provided the radar but it had the disadvantage of having a blind spot in the lower beam of the radar in the southwest sector. This limited the usefulness in this area. FDP3 reported interference on the Ground Observer FM frequency. Two outside stations whose call signs were Jig and Baker Prime were dead on GO3 network frequency, they played music to each other. The men reported that they enjoyed the music but could not hear the ground observers reports.
XIX TAC flew 311 sorties and attacked enemy airdromes and military installations. A total of 45 German planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground, and among other claims were 40 gun installations, 39 military installations and one ammunition dump.
Oct 9
In the Third Army it was decided to break off the costly attack on Fort Driant.
In the 563rd Company C reported a source of V-1 and V-2 launches spotted 8 miles from GO3 Post Mike which is located at Fixem which is about 7 miles southeast of Luxembourg City. The V-2 rises 10,000 feet then heads west. Post Roger who is located at Flaxweiller which is 10 miles northeast of Luxembourg City reported V-1 launches on October 9th.
XIX TAC had adverse weather conditions preventing flying.
Oct 10
In the Third Army XII Corps area the 35th Infantry Division clears the enemy from Fosieux.
In the 563rd GO3 reported that Post Queen captured a German soldier. The Post were looking for a suitable bivouac area and were close to an abandoned village. They were looking into a house when one of hem spotted the German walking down the street toward them. One of the men aimed his tommy gun at the German who promptly surrendered. By interrogation of the prisoner they found that he was one of a party or seven who had an officer with them. They reported that the other six were still at large. GO3 moved Post Oboe to Cattenon and Post Queen to Fixem.
XIX TAC had Poor weather which precluded aerial operations.
Oct 11
In the Third Army Tactical reconnaissance reported that the Germans were entrenching and constructing defense positions along the high ground east of the Seille River in the vicinity of Clemery in the XII Corps area. This activity was exactly the type of warfare that had evolved during World War I and was just what General Patton had warned against. At Fort Driant the Germans began using disabled tanks as outposts and placing harassing fire on the Third Army troops.(see Editors note 13 below)
XIX TAC area weather improved somewhat, flew 124 sorties in 10 missions. XIX TAC found four targets and managed to cut 3 railroad lines and damage or destroy 33 gun installations, 6 military installations and 6 small naval vessels.
Oct 12
The German's began flooding the areas in the zone of ad- vancement immediately in front of the Third Army.
In the 563rd Company B was moved to Racourt which is 12 miles north of St. Dizier and they set up FDP1 there with a mission of covering the rear areas of XIX TAC airdromes by radar. The move of Company B was ordered by the XIX TAC to provide security for the large concentration of headquarters which included the 100th Fighter Wing, Third Army and the XIX TAC. They left Vignuelles and traveled 45 miles to set up the site which was operating five hours later. They also tied the FDP control center with the AAA control center. GO3 moved Post Peter to Angevillers.
XIX TAC flew 207 sorties in 18 missions. XIX TAC claimed 14 railroad lines cut, 36 railroad cars, 23 locomotives, 38 gun installations and 13 military installations damaged or destroyed. XIX TAC headquarters was moved to Nancy setting up in large military caserns. Third Army headquarters moved to the same locale and this was the first time that both headquarters were located in the same city. Aircraft of the 406th Group successfully attacked a number of similar targets in that area at the time of the forced withdrawal of the XX Corps. Also on October 12th the 378th Squadron of the 362nd Fighter Group destroyed four command posts southeast of Chateau-Salins.
Oct 13
In the 563rd Battery C of the 132nd AAA Battalion was tied into FDP3 communications center to receive early warning from the FDP1 filter board. They had a SCR-584 of their own and they pick up the close targets that point out to them. The battery has four 90-mm guns.
In the XIX TAC one of the more notable achievements of the XIX TAC was scored on October 20th, when it had been decided to break the Etang-de-Lindre Dam south of Dieuze in order to forestall such an action by the enemy for the purpose of obstructing a later ad- vance by the U.S. The P-47's of the 362nd Group breached the dam with several direct hits by 1,000 pound bombs. This like so much else undertaken on the Third Army front in October, however, was
(Editors Note 13) During this period the value of the Ground Observers in a World War I type of operation was becoming apparent because their mission was similar to the mission of the Artillery "Spotters" except they assisted support from the Fighter Bombers. At that time I remember the men relating how they were situated to look over the enemy ground activity and reporting on the spot move- ments of tanks, vehicles and troops. They often exchanged voice messages over their radio through the TCC Filterers and the TCC controllers direct to the Fighter Bomber Pilots. They were also able to feed back the results of the mission. The static condition caused by mud and water impairment of roads and the presence of permanent fortifications set up the World War I conditions exactly and the Germans were taking advantage of it. in preparation for offensive action that could not yet be taken.
Ninth Air Force directives of the 5th and 8th of October had greatly expanded the interdiction program and effected extensive changes in the assigned rail lines between the several commands concerned. The inner line interdiction was extended to cover 25 roads, 17 of which lay west and eight east of the Rhine River. Fighter-bombers of XIX TAC were directed to accent their effort on eight lines in front of Third Army's sector of operation in the general area of Coblenz, Hermeskeil, Kaiserslautern and Landau and ten roads. It was perhaps a token of the declining hope for an early Allied breakthrough that the previous prohibition of air attack on railroad bridges west of the Rhine from Grevenbroich in the north through Eukirchen, Ahrweiler, Mayen, Simmern, Kaiser- slautern, and Nonnweiler in the south were now declared subject for destruction. Ten days later rail and road bridges across the Rhine were added to the program. Also between October 5th and 8th the XII Corps was regrouping and the XIX TAC began a systematic bombing of the German strongholds, Moivron, Jeandelaincourt and Mount St. Jean and on October 8th three squadrons of P-47's went to work on the German reserves and line of communications, dropping 864 fragmentation bombs on the Bois Dit-la-Fourasse where the main enemy troop assembly area was and also bombing the Seille bridge at Nomeny.
Oct 14
In the Third Army the Germans continued to shift troops in both the foreword and rear area of the XX Corps.
In the 563rd. GO3 moved Post Oboe to Entrange. LW4 moved to Budivilles which is about 12 miles southeast of Nancy and LW2 moved to Lanenvill-Au-Pont near St Dizier.
XIX TAC carried out 230 sorties in 19 missions, clearly having more success than the Third Army. XIX TAC cut 25 railroad lines and destroyed or damaged 207 railroad cars, 41 motor transports, 24 locomotives, 16 military installations, 1 fuel dump and 9 tanks and armored cars. XIX TAC attacked a total of 11 marshaling yards
Oct 15
In the Third Army area at this particular time there was very little ground activity as there was a shortage of artillery ammunition and all artillery ammunition supplies above 3 inch was frozen. As of 1500 the XII Corps area the 26th Infantry Division has taken over the front line and their area AAA shot down two ME- 109's in the afternoon, one crashed at their feet and the other went over the nearby hill in flames.
In the 563rd the XIX TAC field order gave credit to what they called "the air warning network" for furnishing information on the approaching enemy aircraft. Pfc James E. Rymer was killed in action at 0015 hours. He was a member of Love Post of Company B ground observer platoon. At the time of his death the post was located near Gorze, France, overlooking the part of the Third Army front line near Fort Driant, in the vicinity of Metz. During the early morning hours of October 14th American forces were withdrawn from their positions inside and near Fort Driant in order to bye- pass the almost impenetrable fortifications and continue the attack. The Germans took advantage of the withdrawal by bringing up some artillery, probably Tiger tanks, under cover of darkness sometime before 2000 hours on October 14th. At approximately 2000 hours, this enemy artillery group fired shells into the vicinity of Love post, with the probable intention of shelling the town of Gorze. At that time all members of Love post took shelter in the cellar of the house where their post was established. The barrage lasted for a very short time and the men remained in the cellar until after 2200 hours when Standley, Qualman and Rymer of Love station returned to their beds to sleep. When the shelling started again Tech/5th Standley awakened both Tech/5th Qualman and Rymer and told them to take cover again in the cellar. Qualman had already reached the cellar and Rymer was on his hands and knees in a crawling position when a shell struck a tree just outside the house and Rymer was hit by a piece of shrapnel and as Standley was just climbing into the hole to the cellar he was knocked down by the force of the explosion. The piece of shrapnel that hit Pfc Rymer just about tore both of his legs off and entered his body in the lower intestines. he lived just a few minutes. The men at the post made every effort to get medical assistance for Rymer, hoping that there might be something that could be done to help him. Through a series of unfortunate circumstance such as telephone communications being cut and being pinned down by a later artillery barrage, it was at least an hour before Rymer's body was brought to the attention of the medics. At daybreak the men took Pfc Rymer to post George which was the net control station of the ground observer platoon and then to Battalion Headquarters where arrangements were made for the burial of the body. Although Pfc Rymer died within minutes and nothing could have been done to change that his buddies were hoping against hope that they could save him. Lt. Richard L. Viergever was appointed Battalion Communications Officer and Lt. Janek was relieved because of injuries and hospitalization. Lt. John Nolan was appointed to the Battalion Post Exchange Council and Lt. Paul Rapp was relieved of that duty. On page 189 a typical deployment of a Ground Observer platoon is shown. This is a site map of GO1 Ground Observer platoon of Company A along a line from Thionville on the north to Pont-A-Mousson on the south. This shows the line as it was on October 15th. GO3 moved Post Roger to Conach. GO1 moved Post Able to Gorz, Post Baker to Lorry Mardigny, Post Charley to Musson, Post Dog to Piervillers. GO3 moved Post Roger to Conach. GO4 moved Post Tare to Alaincourt. Company C announced the appointment of Lt. Benjamin F. Guttenberger as Company Intelligence Officer and Lt. Clair B. Watson was relieved of that duty also Lt. Charles A. Stewart was designated as Company C unit Historical Officer.
In the XIX TAC the daily situation report included a Flash that the XII Corps reported the following:
"In the 26th Infantry Division area AAA shot down two ME-109's one crashed at their feet and the went over the hill in flames and that the Air Warning Net furnished the information on the enemy aircraft approaching".
The XIX TAC was active attacking bridges and rail lines and were notably successful during October 13th and 14th. During this period fighter-bombers also struck at marshaling yards on virtually every day that they were able to fly and they also kept watch for targets along the highways. The IX and XIX TAC's, which together accounted for the major portion of the month's air sorties, claimed the destruction of 393 military transport, 316 armored vehicles and tanks, 493 locomotives and 1,755 railroad cars. But, despite these substantial claims, effective isolation of a given battle area was nowhere achieved. That this was the case was attributable to the enemy's extraordinary ability to effect rapid repairs on damaged lines, yards and bridges, the exceedingly dense network or rails which enabled the use of alternate route and the inability of the fighter-bombers, because of the weather to maintain the continuous policy action which a successful interdiction program required. That Company A Ground Observer Platoon the enemy was able to escape the full penalty without the benefit of air coverage is suggestive of the other advantages he enjoyed.
Much of the reconnaissance effort was spent in endeavors to locate weak spots in the enemy's line of fortification. To this end, the photo reconnaissance squadrons mapped the entire Siegfried and Maginot lines and defensive positions which the enemy had constructed along the Moselle, Saar, Rhine and other rivers. Fighter-bombers attacked stores and fuel dumps, gun positions, barracks and headquarters, fortified villages and river and canal shipping. The fighter-bombers also flew escort for the heavy bombers. The total sorties flown by the Ninth Air force aircraft in October was 21,120 and showed a marked decrease from September's 25,843. Encounters with enemy aircraft took place on relatively few days, despite the fact that the enemy was steadily increasing his front-line strength of fighters. The month's claims of German aircraft destroyed amounted to 172 while the Ninth's own losses were 177 which is a loss accounted for almost entirely by the enemy's concentrated antiaircraft defenses.
Oct 16
In the Third Army the 90th Infantry Division continued house to house and hand to hand fighting in Maizierfes-les-Metz.
In the 563rd GO3 Post Queen reported a Robot plane at 1315 hours going very high and very fast. GO1 moved Post Fox to Verneville. GO4 moved Post Victor to Haroucourt.
XIX TAC was grounded due to bad weather.
Oct 17
In the Third Army gasoline rations are reduced 25 percent.
In the 563rd a German rocket was reported by GO3 Post Queen at 1005 hours and another at 1415 hours.
XIX TAC was mostly grounded by bad weather. Forty sorties were flown with light claims being made.
Oct 18
In the 563rd Company B was ordered to withdraw GO2 ground observer platoon from their positions along the Moselle River and placed in the vicinity of St. Dizier to provide perimeter security for the XIX TAC airport located there. As a result of this Company A readjusted GO1 platoon to a line extending from Hanconcourt to Pont-A-Mousson which was a line of about 27 miles. GO2 moved Post George moved to Chantonrapt, Post How and Jig moved to Triaucourt, Post King to Voillecompte and Post Love to Gorze. GO3 moved Post Mike to Famek. 16 Grounded due to bad weather.
XIX TAC had Thirty-four sorties carried out but no targets were found due to adverse weather conditions.
Oct 19
In the 563rd FDP4 reported extremely bad weather in the early morning, but toward noon we began to get some activity in our sector and at 1220 Hours we picked up a flight dropping Window which affected the Type 11 Radar from 010 degrees to 0650 degrees. This was reported and the proper forms were filled out and forwarded to the TCC. At 2100 hours the TCC identified several of our tracks as hostile and we concentrated on these tracks in spite of considerable interference and jamming from 20 degrees to 360 degrees.
XIX TAC had bad weather again that hampered flying allowing only 78 sorties with very light claims. As a halt in the advances on all fronts approached, the four TAC's received instructions giving interdiction a priority over all other commitments. Most of the 315 rail cuts claimed by aircraft of XIX TAC were made on the railways in the general vicinity of Trier and Coblenz in the north, Kaiserslautern and Landau in the east, and Pirmasens, Saarbrucken, and Strasbourg in the south. Rail and road bridges were frequently attacked. However, bridge locations over the numerous water bar- riers or in the deep defiles of the Saar, Rhine, and other rivers made attacks on them difficult, since often they were hidden by mist or covered by clouds. The 33 bridges attacked during the month resulted in pilot claims of 17 destroyed.
Oct 20
In the 563rd, GO4 reported that Pfc Marcinkiewicz was killed in an automobile accident, while his traveling companion, Sgt Bertran A. Robinson, suffered a Broken back. Both were transferred to the 75th Field Hospital, Marcinkiewicz dying on the way. Both were members of the GO4 Ground Observer Platoon. Earlier in the month Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill was attached to Company D and returned on October 20th with two SCR-584 radar and after a quick overhauling they were put into operation as LW radar. As a Battalion expert on microwave radar, Lt. Wetherill was frequently detached to pick up equipment and crews and then re-attached to place them in operation. GO4 moved Post Uncle to Agincourt. FDP4 reported the weather was poor and there was little activity in our sector until about 0900 hours. We tracked all aircraft we saw until we were ordered to shut down while an artillery outfit tested a new 90-mm gun on a nearby fort. After the firing we resumed operations and sent in all information we were able to get. When Company C was moved to do airport security duty at St. Dizer their GO2 Ground Observer Platoon was withdrawn and Company A extended the line of their GO1 Ground Observer Platoon to cover the area and their disposition is shown on Site Map D on the following page.
XIX TAC flew 245 sorties in 20 missions. XIX TAC cut 24 railroad lines, destroyed or damaged 57 railroad cars, 70 motor transports, 12 locomotives and 5 military installations. XIX TAC attacked and destroyed a raft on the Seille River.
Oct 21
In the Third Army the 26th Infantry Division launched a small attack to Moncourt and gained 2,000 yards. G-2 intelligence reported that a large railway gun which had been shelling Nancy with 240-mm shells was in the German held railroad shops in Metz for repairs. A pilot of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group adjusted a 155-mm gun battalion upon the shops and 140 rounds were fired for effect. Sixty of these rounds were fired under close observation. The firing was concluded with 6 rounds of white phosphorus shells, which caused large fires. An intelligence report indicated demolition of the gun, 22 cannoneer casualties and complete wreckage of the area.
[Editors Note--- A GO2 Ground Observer Platoon Post Love was located near Gorz on 15 October and it was there that Pfc James E. Rymer was killed in action.}
In the 563rd LW4 moved to Serres which is 5 miles east of Nancy. The French towns-people secured a barn and all the men were housed inside. On that date both BACU1 and BACU2 were assigned to the 563rd Battalion and located near Manonville which is about 14 miles north west of Nancy. LW5 was located near Bouvron which is about 8 miles north of Toul. LW6 was located near Viterne which is about 6 miles southeast of Toul. LW7 was located near Vieville-en- Haye which is about 18 miles north of Toul and LW8 was located near Dainville which is about 20 miles southwest of Toul. GO3 moved Post Queen 0.5 Km further west at Fixum and Post Roger from Conach to Derange.
The XIX TAC flew 174 sorties with average damage and de- struction claimed.
Oct 22
In the 12th Army Group General Bradley announced that the forthcoming offensive would hinge on the weather conditions rather than on a specific date.
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Able to Vandalainville.
XIX TAC flew 152 sorties, cutting 16 railroad lines and damaging or destroying 89 railroad cars, 53 motor transports, 18 locomotives and 5 gun installation.
Oct 23
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Fox to Roncourt.
XIX TAC had no missions due to bad weather.
Oct 24
In the Third Army General Patton reported that gasoline reserves, in spite of rationing, were down to less than two days of combat.
In the 563rd GO2 moved Post Jig to Mondrecourt.
XIX TAC had no missions due to bad weather
Oct 25
In the 563rd the 16th AAA Group tied into FDP3 communications center and the 129th AAA moved to a new location. FDP3 also reported that the 109th Battalion AAA guns shot down a JU-88 over the Luxembourg City by means of .50 Caliber machine guns. GO1 moved Post Fox to Verneville.
XIX TAC had bad weather which limited flying to 44 sorties but XIX TAC did manage to cut 9 railroad lines and to damage or destroy 28 railroad cars and 12 gun installations.
Oct 26
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Peter to Terville.
XIX TAC flew 9 missions totaling 226 sorties. In addition to the 27 railroad lines cut, there were 15 locomotives, 9 military installations, 3 highway bridges and 2 miscellaneous naval vessels damaged or destroyed.
Oct 27
In the 563rd LW5, LW6, LW7 and LW8 were put into action for the first time. Company D reported in at the same location as LW5 near Bouvron and this was the first time they had reported in since they were assigned to the Antiaircraft Artillery in England. LW6 moved to Germiny and LW7 moved to Vieville-En-Haye. Company D Headquarters moved to Trondes which is about 5 miles north and west of Toul.
XIX TAC was grounded due to unfavorable weather.
Oct 28
On October 28th the Line of ground observer posts were in position along a line from Moulford, Luxembourg which is about 6 miles east of Luxembourg City down to Haraucourt which is about 7 miles east of Nancy. This was a line of about 95 miles for GO1, GO3 and GO4 and was adjusted to compensate for the withdrawal of GO2 which was on security duty at St. Dizier airport. On October 29th a barrage of the German artillery was concentrated on Third Army tanks and vehicles. GO1 post Baker was hit and 2 vehicles were damaged and no personnel were injured. The barrage reoccurred at 10 minute intervals for a period of 3 hours. FDP1 reported their Ground Observer Posts locations were currently Post Able at Vandalainville, Post Baker at Lorry Mardignay, Post Charley at Mousson, Post Dog at Honconcourt and Post Fox at St. Privat-e-Mont.
XIX TAC claimed the damaging or destroying of 219 railroad cars, 65 motor transports, 33 locomotives, 31 military installa- tions, and 5 highway bridges in addition to the cutting of 25 railroad lines in 241 sorties in 11 missions.
Oct 29
In the 563rd GO1 Platoon reported that an German Artillery barrage was laid on a concentration of Third Army tanks and vehicles and Post Baker was in the barrage area. None of the men were injured but two vehicles were damaged. The German barrage occurred in ten minute intervals over a period of three hours. FDP4 reported that the weather was good in their sector and they had a calibration flight in the afternoon in which we tracked and logged. The Ground Observers reported a British plane in distress at 1850 hours and we notified the TCC. All stations were alerted so as to give all possible assistance, but nothing further was heard from the aircraft. S/Sgt Riley O. Hill was transferred in from the 134th Replacement Battalion and assigned to headquarters Company.
XIX TAC fighter bomber combat planes had one of their best days yet. In 17 missions totaling 419 sorties, XIX TAC attacked enemy aircraft, marshaling yards, railroads and gun positions. Four hundred and seven tons of bombs were dropped and 100 German fighters were engaged in the air. Twenty-four of the Germans were shot out of the sky while the XIX TAC lost only 6 planes. Before the end of the missions 5 bridges, 59 locomotives, 156 railroad cars and 13 motor cars were destroyed as well as 9 marshaling yards and 22 military installations. On this date one Fighter Group was assigned to the First Army.
Oct 30
In the 563rd FDP4 reported there was very little air activity during the day but towards evening the weather cleared and a bright moon came out at 1900 hours. There were a great many aircraft up and large flights of Bombers were traced across the sector. The operators had to read through considerable jamming, but they managed to track all flights successfully including several hostile aircraft tho attempted to follow in on the tail end of the Bomber flights. We are now connected with an Anti-Aircraft Gun Battalion and they are giving us information on flights. Lt. Paul E. Rapp submitted the following operational report and contains a history of this Platoon from 20 July 1944 through 15 October 1944. This Platoon was a provisional unit formed from the GCI Radar Platoon of Headquarters Company. FDP4 was part of Headquarters Company and was the responsibility of the Headquarters Company Commander for administration, supplies and rations. Lt. Rapp was the commanding Officer of the FDP and the Heavy Radar Platoon was commanded by Lt. Frank Van Camp and the LW4 Platoon commanded by Lt. George B. Dorroh. Normally a FDP is contained in a Company which includes a Ground Observer Platoon. FDP4 did not include a GO platoon because the Headquarters Company Ground Observer Platoon GO4 was attached to Company A, B, or C depending on the tactical situation. Although FDP4 had an information center to report back to the TCC there was not sufficient equipment or personnel to form an organization such as the Radar Companies. In the latter part of September 1944 FDP4 had most of the responsibilities of an FDP including communications, Plotting and Filtering and Aircraft controllers.
Subject: Operational reports of Signal Corps Units To: Commanding Officer, Hq & Hq Co, 563rd Signal AW Bn.
1. Forwarded herewith is a detailed report of operations as requested, covering a period from our landing on the continent to 2400 hours, 25 October 1944.
2. Augmentation of this report can be made from a check of DF and VHF logs of the 312th Fighter Control Squadron.
3. This station has operated as a GCI4 until 1 September 1944, at which time it was reclassified as FDP4. Filter Personnel were attached to the unit at that time.
4. Air Corps personnel were detached from this station on 28 September 1944.
5. Following is the date and time of each radar, DF, VHF assist and each GCI mission including nature and results. (The Log of all DF and VHF assists are in possession of the 312th Fighter Control Squadron.
(FDP4 was located at Gouberville, France from July 12 thru Aug 7)
20 July (1600 hours) Monitored bombing mission which was controlled by TCC. Set worked beautifully and throughout mission we tracked our flight. Code name of flight not available.
23 July (1145 hours) Controlled mission of two flights and returned them to base. Practice mission. Red and Blue Fights
23 July (1915 hours) Again controlled red and blue flights and returned them to base. Scouting Mission
28 July (1457 hours) Picked up 44 aircraft at rendezvous points. Tracked them off our scope and at 1520 hours picked up return flight. Landed them at their base at 1620 hours
31 July (1120 hours) Monitored mission controlled by TCC. Followed mission off scope. Returned planes to base at 1250 hours.
3 Aug (1000 hours) Picked up air sea rescue party which was in trouble 10 miles north of Cherbourg. Track faded after five minutes and we were unable to pick them up again. (FDP4 was located at Las Faroulais, France from Aug 8 thru Aug 26)
13 Aug (1415 hours) Controlled flight of eight fighter bombers (Gatepost leader) to target. (town of St. Guildes de Bois). Next a new flight of eight to same town. (Exhaust Leader). Returned flights to base. Center of town demolished. Mission Successful.
14 Aug (0630 hours) Assisted in controlling bombing missions to Brest, Vannes and Ill De Cezembre. Poor Weather. Impossible to determine results of missions.
24 Aug (1400 hours) Tacked four hostile aircraft in and out of our area but because of lack of VHF we were unable to attempt an interception.
25 Aug (1150 hours) Tracked flight of four aircraft which appeared to be in distress. a P-51 crashed 1/2 mile from site. Pilot parachuted to safety ( FDP4 was located at Le Courdray Laugbe from Aug 27 thru Aug 31)
30 Aug (1145 hours) By request of TCC we contacted and tracked red leader across our scope.
(FDP4 was located at Bouveron, France from Sep 16 thru Nov 11)
21 Sep (1000 hours) Controlled Dumpling White and Dumpling Blue on interception in Metz area. An MF-110 had been reported in the area. However interceptors found all planes in area to be friendly.
21 Sep (1420) Controlled flight of fighter bombers on bombing and strafing mission near Epinal. Large enemy vehicular convoy moving slowly in area. Planes sighted target but Ripsaw asked for mission so it was taken from us and vectored on a different course.
6. The following is taken from the information center log 3 Oct (1250 hours) Ground observer net Fleetwood sent in visual of 15 hostile vehicles eight miles northeast of station proceeding northeast. Relayed to Duckpond.
3 Oct (1330 hours) Ground Observer net sent in visual of hostile convoy going northeast of station and proceeding north no visible action taken
4 Oct (1730 hours) Ground observer net reports hostile action in following location Alincourt U-977343, Forille U-9655361, Liocourt U-975353, and troop train at U-980350
4 Oct (1740 hours) LW4 reports SOS, azimuth 190 degrees and range of 23 miles.
7 Oct (1000 hours) Ground Observer net Fleetwood reported enemy activity. Two lead tanks, 15 horse drawn vehicles followed by a company of infantry loading on train at Nomeny U-8932.
7 Oct (1007) Action taken. Fleetwood reports Thunderbolt (LB-4) strafing enemy at Nomeny
7 Oct (1010 hours) Operation successful
7 Oct (1050 hours) Fleetwood reports enemy activity with troops leaving Nomeny heading toward Avricourt. Action taken.
7 Oct (1324 hours) Fleetwood reports 25 hostile vehicles. Some horse drawn in U-889377. Action taken
7 Oct (1610 hours) Sent message to TCC by T/4 Blackburn asking for planes to take action on pill boxes and enemy concentrations at Serrieres U-865280. Requested by an artillery officer through Lt. Duncan. Also called in to TCC by FM the pinpoints on above mentioned pillboxes. Action taken.
8 Oct (1802 hours) Stations tare and Sugar reported 10 to 15 hostile tanks going south 1380 yards from their stations towards St. Martin, U-947357.
10 Oct (1445 hours) Sugar reports two ME-109's overhead
10 Oct (1448 hours) Uncle Post two ME-109's going southeast
10 Oct (1453 hours) LW4 reports two hostile aircraft going southeast
13 Oct (1310 hours) Fleetwood reports at U-967378 1,000 yards northeast of Vulmont, 500 cattle, 8 horse drawn vehicles and 5 heavy trucks with trailers, trucks in with cattle and setting up guns.
13 Oct (1410 hours) Our planes now strafing area
13 Oct (1425 hours) Fleetwood reports supply trucks of enemy constantly using highway crossing northwest of Vulmont and hiding under trees along the road when our planes are overhead.
13 Oct (1440 hours) Believed to be taken care of
13 Oct (1603 hours) Fleetwood reports 12 horse drawn vehicles south of Vulmont, 1,000 yards and trucks 400 yards east of Vulmont.
13 Oct (1645 hours) Three horse drawn vehicles going north on highway out of Vulmont U-968379.
13 Oct (1700 hours) Fleetwood reports 50 hostile vehicles at U- 964385
13 Oct (1720 hours) Fleetwood reports German truck at U-969379 going northeast.
13 Oct (1725 hours) Fleetwood reports another large vehicle about same place as above.
14 Oct (0031 hours) Had t-7 north of FDP4. looked like "Zippo". Reported to TCC.
14 Oct (1945 hours) LW4 reports one hostile aircraft overhead going northwest being fired upon by Ack-Ack.
15 Oct (1330 hours) LW4 reports one ME-109 at 200 feet strafing position.
15 Oct (1331 hours) LW4 reports one ME-109 shot down 100 feet from site
7. Following is a record of the performance of the radar units.
A. Type 11 radar: This unit has given excellent results with a minimum of trouble. On 10 Oct the mechanical turning gear in the antenna trailer broke. It was replaced on 12 Oct with a new trailer including transmitter. Most noticeable troubles have been in breakdown of diode C-58 in receiver 152 and filter system in PPI circuit. On several occasions this set has operated almost constantly for a period of weeks with no trouble.
B. Type 15 radar: Results from this set were poor since it was issued to us. Before leaving England a technical expert from the RAF worked with us completely overhauling the equipment. His decision was that the convoy should be replaced. On 12 oct we were issued a new transmitter. After overhauling this new convoy we have been getting much better results. At present, 25 Oct, we are operating favorably and operation compares with that of type 11 Radar. Basic faults in type 15 radar have been found to be in antenna matching and signal circuits.
8. Following is the performance of radios by type
A. Link 1488 FM Transmitters-Receiver: These radios have been used both as standby and principal means of communication with TCC and out-posts. They have performed well with only an occasional fault. these faults appeared generally after a move. Very few deviations from R5-S5 communications at all times.
B. 18Q: These radios have been used as CW standby units. They have provided a minimum standard of standby communication. Average readability R3-S3. Battalion communications section unable to improve it. One 18Q is not operational due to lack of spare parts, list has been submitted to S-4.
C.610: One 610 radio is used as standby with ground observer #4. On the few occasions it was needed and on regulars tests it functioned well, providing R5-S5 communication
9. Performance of Signal Corps and British Radar power units.
A. Lister Diesel power plant 20KVA 230V 50 cycle: These units are the main source of power for both type 15 and type 11 radar. They have given a minimum of trouble with only one power failure since arriving in France. The cooling system has given the most difficulty.
B. PE75: This unit provides standby power for radios. It was installed for this purpose on 15 Oct and has performed perfectly since then.
16 Oct Raining with low cloud base. There was very little air activity in our area
17 Oct Weather began to clear in the early morning and in the afternoon there were quite a few aircraft up. At that time these were a good many friendly flights in our area.
18 Oct The weather closed in again and there was no activity in our sector.
19 Oct Extremely bad weather in early morning, but toward noon we began to get some activity in our sector. At 1220 hours we picked up a flight dropping window which affected type 11 from 020 degrees to 060 degrees. This was reported and the proper forms were filled out and forwarded to Fighter Control Center. At 2100 hours, Fighter Control Center identified several of our tracks as hostile's and we concentrated on these tracks in spite of consider- able interference and jamming from 020 degrees to 360 degrees.
20 Oct The weather was poor and there was little activity in our sector until about 0900 hours. We tracked all aircraft we saw until we were ordered to shut down while an Artillery outfit tested a new 90mm gun on a nearby fort. After the firing we resumed operations and sent in all information we were able to get.
21 Oct Poor weather conditions still prevailed in our sector and during the day there were very few aircraft up. What information we were able to get was sent into fighter Control Center.
22 Oct Flying was restricted to a few patrol missions due to bad weather. We tracked these missions as long as they remained in our sector until they returned to base.
23 Oct Cloudy weather restricted flying operations to a minimum again and there was very little activity in our sector.
24 Oct Bad weather again restricted flying operations 045 degrees to 220 degrees with type 15 and 11 Radar sweep 360 degrees continuous rotation.
25 Oct The weather cleared somewhat although it was still cloudy and there was little activity in the sector
26 Oct Weather clear with scattered clouds. Station was extremely active tracking many flights which were up throughout the day. By nightfall the clouds had closed in again, however, and there was little activity in our sector.
27 Oct Bad weather again and there was very little activity all day.
28 Oct Weather clear and bright. All units reporting to informa- tion center and the station was busy handling the larger amounts of information coming in.
29 Oct Weather was again good and there was considerable activity in sector. We had a calibration flight in the afternoon which we tracked and logged the ground observers reported a british plane in distress at 1850 hours and we notified the Fighter Control Center. All stations were alerted so as to give all possible assistance, but nothing further was head from that aircraft.
30 Oct There was very little activity during the day but towards evening the weather cleared and a bright moon came out at 1900 hours. There were a great many aircraft up and large flights of Bombers were tracked across the sector. The operators had to read through considerable jamming, but they managed to track all flights successfully including several hostile aircraft who attempted to follow in on the tail end of the flights. We are now connected with an Anti-Aircraft Battalion and they are giving us information on flights.
31 Oct Throughout the Day there was very little activity but the weather cleared in the afternoon and we tracked a large number of flights during the evening. All stations were busy until mid- night."
Paul E. Rapp
1st Lt. Sig C
Platoon Commander
Two SCR-584 radar brought into Company C by 1st Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill in the middle of the month were ordered out by Battalion Headquarters for operation as BACU1 and BACU2. During October FDP3 reported V-1 and V-2 bombs sited by GO posts Peter and Queen who were sited near Thionville. Also on October 30th FDP4 reported that they were tied in with an AAA Battalion and are receiving information on flights. There was considerable radar Jamming reported by FDP4 which was probably "window" from our own bomber flights crossing the sector, however FDP4 managed to read through the jamming and report several hostile flights attempting to follow in on the tail end of the bomber flights.
Reporting all the Ground Observer activity would fill a book by itself so to give a picture of activity the following report for October is presented as an example of Ground Observer activity and was reported by GO4 by Lt. Jimmie P. Duncan the GO4 platoon commander and follows:
Date PostTime Information
10/3 S132725 hostile vehicles, some horse drawn, 14200 meters N.E. of Sugar destroyed by fighters
10/3 S1430Heavy hostile convoy, 20 vehicles, 9 miles NW of Sugar post. Destroyed by fighter bombers.
10/4 S&T1328100 to 150 enemy troops on N.W. slopes of Mt. Toulon at U877282 1346 Above Strafed by fighter bombers target destroyed or dispersed
10/4 S1330Movements of enemy artillery, foot troops and vehicles around Liocourt U980356, Manoncourt U870320 and Fouville U963360 1346 above strafed by fighters for 20 minutes. Large fires started approximately 40 vehicles turned over or burning
10/4 S&T1403Passenger train in station at Nomeny with 25 cars 1415 Above train strafed and left burning
10/4 T145035 hostile horse drawn vehicles going E to Nomeny from Manoncourt 510 Above strafed and left burning
10/6 T1105Tare being shelled by enemy 88 MM artillery
10/7 S100440 to 50 hostile vehicles headed by tanks,followed by 200 foot troops, loading on train at Nomeny 1007Fighters strafed and destroyed or dispersed target 3 minutes after reporting.
10/7 S1030100 hostile foot troops in Manoncourt U870320 1130Above target strafed and dispersed
10/7 S&T110420 light and heavy vehicles going towards Abaucourt from Nomeny 130Above target strafed and dispersed
10/7 S123015 hostile vehicles on road from Nomeny to Manonco- urt 1305Above target strafed and left burning
10/7 S1540T.D. commander planning to attack Serres tonight and request that it be strafed and set afire if possible 1730 Above target strafed and left burning by fighter bombers
10/8 T 1050Vehicles and troops leaving Nomeny heading towards Avricourt
10/8 T132425 Hostile vehicles, some horse drawn going S at U889377 1350 Above target strafed and destroyed or dispersed
10/8 S180215 hostile tanks 1380 yards from post Sugar, going S towards St. Martin 1225Target bombed and dispersed
10/10 T1135Under heavy artillery fire
10/12 S11452 ME-109's going SE at 6,000 feet
10/12 U14482 ME-109's circling overhead at 5,000 feet
10/12 S13108 heavy vehicles with trailers mixed in with approximately 500 cattle at U967378, 1,000 yards NE of Vulmont. Enemy setting up guns at this location 1410Target strafed, destroyed or dispersed
10/13 S160315 horse drawn vehicles and 10 trucks, 1,000 yards E of Vulmont going E 1630Above targets strafed and destroyed by fighter bombers
10/13 S&T16355 horse drawn vehicles at U968379 going N on highway out of Vulmont
10/13 S&T170050 horse drawn vehicles going north on highway out of Vulmont. 1723Above target staffed, approximately 40 vehicles left burning or overturned
10/14 T1210Under heavy artillery fire
10/14 S1225Under heavy artillery fire
10/16 S&T15151 FW-190 circling at 4,000 feet attempting to strafe Post Sugar but was driven off by friendly antiaircraft fire
10/16 W1535 friendly fighter bombers attacked by 1 hostile aircraft
10/18 T1135Under heavy artillery fire
10/19 S&T22301 hostile aircraft overhead going west
10/20 S16303 large caliber enemy guns firing on our front lines from U940410
10/21All stations reported robot going south. Crashed 3 miles NW of Post Victor at approximately U906123
10/23 S1450Enemy battery stuck in mud at U945353, 800 yards due N of Thezy-St.-Martin
10/24 T1305Post Tare under artillery fire
10/25 S&W1135Robot going S at 2,000 feet altitude
10/25 V1640Hostile aircraft 2 miles S of Post Victor going SE
10/28 S&T2110Aircraft going NE overhead, believed hostile
10/29 S1845Picked up distress call on FM radio, British airman calling Mayday 3 times and giving his position as 6022N 0401E
10/31 U&W1005Unknown aircraft going SW, believed to be a robot The platoon is still located on Pont-A-Mousson-Nancy front, and working with Artillery and Tank Destroyer units. Up to this time the Platoon has been responsible for the destruction of over 300 vehicles, 2 trains, approximately 15 tanks, several enemy aircraft and several hundred foot troops. Many other units are now beginning to realize the value of the air support that Ground Observer units are able to provide. This will insure further success, not only of ground observer platoon GO4 but of all other units of this type in any theater of operations.
Jimmie P. Duncan
2nd Lt. Signal Corps
Platoon Commander
Company C ground observer platoon GO3 reported an unusual number of German V-1 and V-2 launches between October 16th to October 27th. The following was reported by Lt. Charles A. Stewart who was a filter officer for FDP3 control center:
16 Oct 1315 Robot reported by Queen going Roger to Queen, very high and very fast. Louder than in England
17 Oct
0015 Peter reports hostile, Mike reports hostile
1005 Rocket reported by Queen bearing Peter Roger.
1415 rocket U9977 (vicinity of Contz) Able 4 going Peter Sugar
21 Oct
0405 Ground Observers report gunfire, cannot read which station.
0408 Ground Observers report further on gunfire
1052 Enemy shell fire 1 mile north of Peter
1204 One flying bomb reported going south over Mike
1322 Ground Observer Peter enemy shell fire 1500 yards away
1847 Queen reports rocket-- no direction--bearing Peter Sugar going Peter
1855 Peter reports rocket looks like ball of fire rises to 6,000 feet, then fire goes out.
2005 Peter George 5 going Sugar Rocket Buzz overcast.
23 Oct
1040 Ground Observers reported Buzz bomb heading Peter over Roger
1437 Q VP9402 (vicinity of Mondorff) BQR-QS-400 climbing foggy V3.
1455 Q QS V3 climbing overcast, R QS V3 500 climbing overcast.
25 Oct
1747 Buzz Bomb V-1 reported by Oboe going Sugar 400 MPH Able 5
25 Oct
0516 M--going Q--1,000 feet--400--weather clear
0518 P--going Q--1,000 feet--400--weather clear
0647 M--going QS---4,000 feet--300--overcast
27 Oct
1035 Buzz Bomb going QS 550 MPH overcast (FF2) by Roger T- V3
During October on reconnaissance missions, in the protection of ground troops from /enemy air attack, and especially in attacks on the enemy's supply and communications, XIX TAC fought with its accustomed effectiveness. The weather on seven days prevented op- eration, but the command got in 4,790 supporting sorties for the month. In all the weather was poor and the flying was restricted.
NOVEMBER 1944
Preparatory to the launching of the ground offensive, fighter- bombers during the period of November 1st to 7th flew approximately 1,000 sorties, successfully attacking ordnance and supply dumps at Haeries of bombing and strafing attacks on a number of airfields, including those at Gotha, Schwabisch Hall, and Sachsenheim, resulted in claims for the destruction of 31 enemy aircraft.
Nov 1
XIX TAC flew 12 missions with 247 sorties and dropped a total of 125 bombs, destroying 3 enemy planes on the ground and losing 2 aircraft.
Nov 2
Bad weather kept the XIX TAC out of the skies.
Nov 3
On November 3rd and 4th weather limited operations to 131 escort sorties for medium bomber attacks on rail bridges at Konz- Karthaus and Morscheid and on the Kaiserslautern overpass, attacks which inflicted little damage. Weather during this seven day preparatory period was generally poor, preventing all fighter- bomber operations to a few reconnaissance missions.
In the 563rd FDP5 reported that 3 men were transferred to the Infantry to relieve shortages in replacements,
XIX TAC area Poor weather conditions again limited the flying operations. Flew 51 sorties in 4 missions escorting medium bombers through clouded skies. The bombers then dropped their bombs and left with unobserved results. Also 6 tactical reconnaissance and 4 photo missions were flown.
Nov 4
In the 563rd Company C was visited by Col. Madison, 16th AAA Group Commander and his S-2, Maj. Handley. They were very much impressed with the work of FDP3. Instead of just one Battery of AAA tied to FDP3 as before, FDP3 would have several Battalions which are part of the 16th AAA Group. Most of the information they furnish to FDP3 comes from the 48th AAA Brigade. The Brigade Commander is Brig. Gen. Timberlake. On the FDP IC board were several circles, the small ones often miles in diameter are called AAZ (Antiaircraft Artillery Zones). The center of one small circle is the city of Luxembourg, grouped about the city are several AAA Batteries. When hostile or unknown planes enter the 40 mile outer circle the AAA Plotter relays the information to his Plotting Room, then the AAA Radar picks up the flight and when it enters the AAZ circle they open fire. FDP3 has many hostile flights in this small circle but this time none have been shot down.
XIX TAC flew 80 sorties in 4 missions. One plane was lost escorting heavy bomber.
Nov 5
XIX TAC flew 15 missions of 252 sorties an dropped 83 tons of bombs. In addition to flying 24 tactical reconnaissance and 12 photo missions, XIX TAC succeeded in destroying 28 of the newest type of German planes (Messerschmitt jet propelled model) which never had the chance to leave the ground.
Nov 6
On November 6th LW6 was moved to St. Jure.
XIX TAC Due to bad weather the XIX TAC remained on the ground.
Nov 7
In the Third Army Gen. Patton ordered a new offensive to begin on 8 Nov.
XIX TAC the bad weather including a heavy rain downpour gave poor flying conditions and kept air activity of the XIX TAC to a minimum, allowing only night photography missions.
Nov 8
Preceded by a tremendous artillery barrage, the offensive of XII Corps was successfully launched on November 8th. In support of this attack, fighter-bombers flew 471 sorties, attacking command posts, gun positions, troop concentrations in woods, bridges, road and rail traffic, and airdromes in the enemy's rear as far east as Wiesbaden, Sachsenheim, and Darmstadt. Tonnage dropped included 35 tons of GP, 81 tons of fragmentation bombs, and 31 tanks of napalm. The day's claims included 9 motor transport, 3 tanks, 14 gun positions, 4 command posts, 22 locomotives, 1 bridge and rail cars. The incendiary bombs dropped on foxholes and trenches achieved good results. Enemy air opposition was feeble, but the weather, which during the course of the morning grew progressively worse and drastically reduced the number of fighter-bomber sorties planned for the afternoon.
A protracted siege of unfavorable weather in the Aachen region resulted in a decision to strike the first major blow of the new offensive on November 8th by Patton's forces against the southern and northern flanks of the Metz salient. To the south of Metz, XII Corps was to launch an attack on D-day from the vicinity of Pont-a- Mousson, bypass the most formidable forts, advanced rapidly northeastward to the Rhine, and establish a bridgehead in the Darmstadt area. Elements of XX Corps were to contain the tip of the enemy salient west of the Moselle, while its major forces were to cross that river on November 9th in the Thionville vicinity, take the city of Metz by encirclement and infiltration, and gradually reduced the forts. Subsequently the XX Corps was to advance to the Saar and Rhine rivers in the direction of Mainz and Frankfurt. To assist the advance of the two pronged attack, but especially to facilitate the by-passing of the formidable Metz- Thionville defenses, heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force, the mediums of the 9th Bombardment Division, and fighter bombers of the XIX TAC were to execute large-scale attacks on the 8th and 9th of November.
In the 563rd LW7 was moved to Distroff which is about 2 miles east of Thionville and they were assigned to Company C which was located at Luxembourg City about 28 miles north.
XIX TAC weather conditions improved and the XIX TAC flew 471 sorties in 29 missions. The fighters and bombers dropped 134 tons of bombs, including tanks of napalm dropped on fox holes and along trenches with good results. Two German planes were destroyed on the ground and six were shout out of the air.
Nov 9
In the Eighth Air Force 1,476 heavy bombers delivered a saturation attack on all fortified towns east of the bridgehead area in support of the Third Army's XX Corps attack with. To assist the XX Corps advance fighter-bombers were to carry out attacks on November 9th, flying low-altitude missions against 9 enemy headquarters and command posts and maintain armed recon- naissance within the main area of the ground attack. In order to avoid shorts Patton insisted that all bombing must be at least four miles from the nearest friendly troops.
In the XIX TAC fighter-bombers, flying 312 sorties in 21 missions in cooperation with the ground force of the two corps, bombed enemy troops, tanks, flak positions, towns and defended villages, marshaling yards and other targets. After November 9th the ground offensive continued to make good progress on both prongs of the attack, in spite of soggy ground, atrocious weather which greatly reduced air cooperation, and fierce enemy resistance. XIX TAC also flew in support of the heavy bombers in addition to their own attacks. XIX TAC dropped 61 tons of high explosives and 41 tons of napalm tanks, losing four planes during the operations. To prevent the bombers from making a mistake and bombing their own forces, antiaircraft units provided two flak lines to guide the planes. An example of a mistake would be the short bombing which took place in Normandy when many Americans were bombed by their own planes, one of the casualties being General Leslie McNair. The flak lines were each two miles long and consisted of bursts from eight guns sited in at 500 yards apart. XIX TAC fired their shells to appear at an altitude of seventeen thousand feet, which was three thousand feet blow the attack flight.
Nov 10
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 6th Armored Division with the 80th Infantry Division gains 8 miles. The 4th Armored Division and the 35th Infantry Division drive to Hamport.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the Germans mount a counter attack at 0300 hours. The attack is contained by the 90th Infantry Division helped by massed Corps Artillery.
XIX TAC area had poor weather stopped the flying except for 91 sorties.
Nov 11
In the 12th Army Group General Bradley shifted the control of the 83rd Division from The Third Army to the First Army.(see Editors Note 14 on next page).
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 80th Infantry Division attacked due north and liberated Bacourt and Prevocourt and the 4th Armored pushed the south border of the Corps to Conthil and Rodalbe, about 25 miles east of Pont-A-Mousson.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 90th Infantry Division double the size of their Moselle bridgehead. Fort Koneigsmacker, which is 6 miles northeast of Thionville, surrenders to the 385th Regiment of the 90th Infantry.
XIX TAC flew 10 missions with 162 sorties, dropping 31 tons of bombs and 32 tanks of napalm and firing 18 rockets.
Nov 12
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 6th Armored Division is advancing toward Faulquemont.
In the 563rd LW4 moved to Jurycourt. LW8 was moved to Dainville.
The XIX TAC could only fly a few night sorties attacking 2 railway trains and strafing a German convoy on a road.
Nov 13
XIX TAC had no air activity due to inclement weather.
Nov 14
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 26th Infantry Division drove south towards Dieuze, the 4th Armored Division occupied Guebling and Zarbeling and the 6th Armored seized Landrof.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 95th Infantry Division captured Ouvr St Hubert, Feves and Fort D'Illage and the 10th Armored began crossing the Moselle near Thionville.
XIX TAC had bad weather preventing air activity.
Nov 15
In the Third Army the XX Corps continues the attack on Metz
In the 563rd LW5 was moved to Erbevillers.
XIX TAC flew 2 missions of 30 sorties and dropped 35 tons of bombs, also strafing an enemy convoy and attacking marshaling yards near Metz.
Nov 16
In the Third Army's XII Corp area the 6th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division attack toward Faulquemont.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 5th Armored Division captured Peltre, Sorbey and Chesney. The 95th Infantry Division captured Vignuelles, Saulny, Lorry-les-Metz, Plesnois and Norry-le- Venour
On November 16th BACU1 moved to Liocourt. GO1 moved Post Charley from Pont A Mousson to Possieux.
XIX TAC In conjunction with attacks by the XX and XII Corps the XIX TAC fired rockets in 112 sorties, dropped almost 33 tons of bombs, one half-ton of napalm and fragmentation bombs.
(Editors Note 14) Later on Gen. Patton in his personal diary said that Gen. Bradley, in removing control of the 83rd Infantry Division was one of the major errors of the war effort in the ETO. He wrote "If Bradley had not welshed on his agreement, we would have taken Saarburg within 48 hours after we got to Konigsmacker. Once we had Konenigsmacker they could not have stopped us from taking Trier, and if we had Trier it would have been impossible for the Germans to have launched their Ardennes Offensive." Also he said "I am convinced that Bradley's refusal to allow me to use the 83rd, as he promised, was one of the underlying causes of the Battle of the Bulge." As editor I conclude that what Gen. Patton meant was that if he had one more Division that is what he would have done but the historical records said that the 90th Infantry Division did occupy Koenigsmacker.
Nov 17
In the Third Army the XX Corps the 10th Armored Division fans out to pursue the enemy toward the Sarre and is closely supported by aircraft. The 95th Infantry Division gets to Fort St. Julien, west of the Moselle.
In the 563rd LW6 was moved to Phlin.
XIX TAC had a break in the weather conditions, allowing the XIX TAC to resume large operations. In support of the Army Corps 20 missions were flown, totaling 317 sorties. Dropped on the Germans were fragmentation bombs, napalm, 78 tons of high explosive bombs and leaflet bombs, in addition to rockets fired. Also attacked enemy airdromes. Attacks were made by the 405th and 406th Fighter Groups and were concentrated almost entirely against the enemy's rail and road transportation systems, tactical recon- naissance having reported intense activity on the lines leading to Third Army's front and into the Schnee Eifel. A tremendous harvest of enemy transport was reaped, the three days' claims amounting to 842 motor transport, 60 armored vehicles, 162 locomotives, 1,096 railway cars, and 113 gun positions destroyed or damaged. Metz was formally encircled and bypassed on November 19th. The XIX TAC pilots reported large German concentrations and material movement including tanks west of the Rhine river to Trier. In retrospect it is difficult to visualize why the battle of the Bulge came as a surprise to the 12th Army Group Headquarters.
Nov 18
In the Third Army area From November 18th to the 30th the XII Corps with the 4th and 6th Armored and the 26th and 80th Infantry divisions were attacking near Dieuze which is about 25 miles east of Nancy and in the history of the Lorraine Campaign, Cole shows the situation (on his Map 41 his page 451) which is shown on the situation map on page 215 for the right wing of the XII Corps in the attack west and east of the Sarre from the 18th to 30th of November and this has the positions of FDP4 and ground observer posts William, Uncle and Tare who are in support of the 4th Armored Division and the 26th Infantry Division. Page 212 shows Cole's (his map 42 on his page 471) of the same history shows the left wing of this action of the XII Corps in the Operations west of the Sarre from November 18th to 30th. The 6th Armored Division and the 35th Infantry Division are supported by LW4 and ground observer posts Tare and Uncle. On the far right of these operations the 6th Army Group was operating. By November 18th the Third Army had encircled strategically located Metz. The city capitulated on the 22nd but the last of the outer forts did not fall until December 13th.
In the 563rd Ground Observer Platoon GO2 was attached to Company A to report into FDP1. Lt. John E. Nolan, Company B commander recommended the attachment when he reported that information passed to the TCC is also passed to the local AAA Batteries and they have their own ground observers covering the same area. GO2 moved Post George from Chatronranpt to Liocourt. XIX TAC area enemy air activity increased, with 31 aircraft attacking the advancing Third Army units. Gen. Weyland put the 405th and 406th Fighter Groups on the columns retreating before the 10th Armored Division with disastrous results to the enemy. Antiaircraft units shot down 7 of the planes and claimed 8 as probably destroyed. In opposition flew 25 missions with 347 sorties. The XIX TAC TCC was exchanging information with the XII TAC's TCC who supported the 6th Army Group.
Nov 19
On November 19th the XX Corps closed the circle around Metz and on November 20th methodically cleared up the rear guard op- position within Metz and contain the forts around the city. The XII Corps the 80th Infantry Division seized the bridge at Faul- quemont , the 6th Armored Division drove toward Hellimer and the 4th Armored Division secured Francaltroff.
In the 563rd GO4 moved Post Sugar to Landremont and Post Uncle to Oberk.
The XIX TAC was having a field day with the withdrawing German troops. They flew 409 sorties of armed reconnaissance, Corps support and Bomber escort. Although 13 aircraft and 8 pilots were lost, XIX TAC destroyed or damaged 387 motor transports, 18 tanks and armored vehicles, 57 locomotives, 429 railroad cars, 48 gun positions and 7 factories and buildings. Ten railroad lines were cut. Twelve attacks were made on marshaling yards and 12 towns were attacked.
Nov 20
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 80th Infantry Division the bridge at Faulquemont and the 4th Armored Dividions seizes Francaltroff.
In the Third Army's XX Corps moves toward Merzig which is fortified by the Germans.
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Charley to Illange and Post Dog to Beittelainville. GO2 moved Post How to Many and Post Tare to Moncourt. GO4 moved Post Victor to Bessengen and Post William to St. Medard. LW4 moved to Laneueville.
On November 20th Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland commanding general of the XIX TAC sent the following commendation to all TAC units: "TO C.O. 19th TCG
"Your efforts during the past few days of flyable weather have been magnificent. The Hun is on the run. The Army has its tail up. Gen. Patton highly appreciative of your work. the going may be tough but if this weather holds our team will crack the Siegfried Line. Congratulations and keep up the good work Signed Weyland"
XIX TAC was having a field day with the withdrawing Germans. XIX TAC flew 409 sorties of armed reconnaissance, corps support, and bomber escort. Although 13 aircraft and 8 pilots were lost, XIX TA destroyed or damaged 387 motor transports, 18 tanks and armored vehicles, 57 locomotives, 429 railroad cars, 48 gun positions and 7 factories and buildings. Ten railroad lines were cut. Twelve attacks were made on marshaling yards and the same number of towns.
Nov 21
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 26th Infantry Division captured Albesdorf, Torcheville and Insweiler. The 4th Armored Division captured Loudrefing, Rening, Rodalbe and Cutting and advanced to the Rhine-Marne canal at Mittersheim.
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Baker to Gorze. GO2 moved Post Love to Bozoncourt. GO3 and Post Mike to Hettage.
XIX TAC had four hundred and eleven planes flew almost entirely as escorts to the IX Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force.
Nov 22
In the Third Army all resistance at Metz ceased at 1435 hours.(see Editors Note 15 on following page). The line of advance was to the east and northeast and captured cities were St Jean Rohrback, Diefenbach, Petite-enquin, Greningen, Munster and Mittersheeim.
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Roger to Cattenon.
XIX TAC had all missions were canceled due to bad weather.
Nov 23
In the 563rd Company C tied the FDP3 control center into the 83rd Infantry Division and also the Ninth Air Force Advance headquarters in order to give early warning to these units of ap- proaching hostile aircraft. Company C also gave this account of their Thanksgiving Day meal:
"The menu for the day was
Turkey, all that you could eat
Cranberry sauce that was out of this world
Peas that tasted like Peas
Mashed Potatoes, fluffy and light
Gravy that would make anything appealing
The Turkey was stuffed with stuffing that would make a good meal in itself, Coffee as though Horn and Hardart made it, Apple Pie with Cheese like you mother used to make before rationing, Rasin bread was like only a GI bakery can make it. The Meal also included GI hard candy and D ration chocolate. For supper that day we had Spam.
XIX TAC was grounded by bad weather.
Nov 24
In the 563rd Company C reported that this day was like a holiday as they had fried Chicken, Coles, Giblet gravy, creamed Corn, mashed Potatoes, Coffee, Bread and Butter. GO1 moved Post Able to Gonpreville. GO2 moved Post George to Alaincourt. GO3 moved Post Peter to Kendage, Post Queen to Sierck and Post Roger to Cattenon. GO4 moved Post Uncle to Lindersinger.
With the fall of Metz to the XX Corps, after a two months' siege, handicapped by the worst flood conditions in twenty years and by weather preventing maximum air support, a new route to the German frontier was opened and the last important obstacle in front of Siegfried Line was removed.
s XIX TAC kept from flying by bad weather conditions.
Nov 25
In the Third Army XII Corps the 6th Armored Division takes Vallette, aided by an air strike.
In the Third Army XX Corps the 10th Armored Division crosses the German border to capture Bethengen.
In the 563rd FDP3 reported that at 1447 hours a V-1 landed about a mile south of the ICC. LW3 reported seeing two men bail out of a B-17 about three miles north of their site at 1442 hours. Several of their men were sent in a vehicle to find the wreck. When they arrived at the spot where the plane crashed there were so many soldiers that they were not needed. GO1 moved Post Charley to Dalstein and Post Fox to Retonley. GO2 moved Post Jig to Benigen.
XIX TAC with good flying conditions, flew 220 fighter bomber sorties in corps support with armed reconnaissance. XIX TAC accounted for the destruction and damaging of 183 railroad cars, 67 motor transports, 18 locomotives, 4 gun positions and various miscellaneous targets.
[Editors Note 15--- In the book Patton's Third Army by Charles Pro- vence gave this capsule on Metz. "In the year 451 A.D., the city was stormed and devastated by the Huns, who then occupied it for sixty years. In 1870, the city was surrendered by a French garrison during the Franco-Prussian War after the city had run out of food. The city then remained in German hands until the end of the First World War, at which time the French recaptured and held it until the Third Reich's Blitz- krieg of 1940 forced the French to surrender. The Germans then occupied it again."]
I would also add that the main fortifications were very thick reinforced concrete and the largest high explosive bombs and large caliber guns bounced off leaving little more than chip marks. About the only function that was achieved by bombing the fort was to drive the Germans into the interior labyrinth.
Nov 26
In the Third Army in the XX Corps area the 95th Infantry Div- ision penetrated the Maginot Line and in the XII Corps area the 80th Infantry Division approached St. Avold under strong enemy rear guard action.
In the 563rd GO4 moved Post Sugar to Morville and Post William to Mittersheim.
XIX TAC flew 217 sorties in corps support and escort missions, losing 2 planes during the operations. XIX TAC claimed destruc- tion or damage to 99 railroad cars, 27 locomotives and many other miscellaneous targets. In all, 14 towns were attacked and bombed.
Nov 27
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 80th Infantry Division enters St. Avold and the 4th Armored Division attacks east of the Sarre overrunning Wolfskirchen, Eywiller and Gungwiller.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 90th Infantry Division advances to the Sarre river.
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Oboe moved from Entange to Perl the first unit of Company C to locate on German soil. GO4 moved Post Tare to Diffenbach, Post Uncle to Munster, Post Victor to Lungenberg and Post William to Mittersheim then to Finstingen in the same day.
XIX TAC flew no missions due to bad weather.
Nov 28
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 26th Infantry advanced to Hinzingen and the 4th Armored Division advanced northward and capturing Durstel, Berg, Burbach, Harskirchen, Zollingen and Pisdorf. The 6th Armored Division captured Diffenbvach, Ccappel, Barst, Biding and Marienthal.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 95th Infantry Division captured Rammelfangen and Duren.
In the 563rd LW6 was moved to Grostenquin which is 7 miles south of St. Avold and this was the last site that they reported into the Battalion. BACU1 moved to Bistroff and BACU2 moved to Distroff. On November 28th Company A was cited on Ninth Air Force General Orders 254 for performance in of Mont St. Michel area on August 3rd to 8th during the breakthrough of the Third Army. This was a presidential award. (see page 105 for citation) Also on November 28th FDP4 was moved to Erstroff which is 4 miles south of St. Avold and this was the last site that FDP4 reported into the TCC. During the first part of December the personnel were transferred to the 738th Signal Air Warning Company for duty at FDP5. GO3 moved Post Oboe from near Perl about 2 Km east.
XIX TAC had bad weather canceling flying.
Nov 29
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 4th Armored Division takes Durstel.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 10th Armored Division reached the Sarre river near Merzig and the 95th Infantry Division gains the heights overlooking Saarlautern.
In the 563rd Capt. Mac Ray was appointed Battalion Claims Officer in addition to his other duties. Lt. Richard L. Viergever was relieved of this duty.
XIX TAC did not fly today
Nov 30
In the Third Army XX Corps area the 90th Infantry Division pushes on to Buren.
In the 563rd FDP3 reported that one Buzz Bomb landed one mile south of LW3. The men at LW3 heard the bomb and cut out and hit the foxholes. No damage was reported. Battalion Microwave expert, Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill was returned to the Battalion from Company D and was assigned to Company A. Lt. Wetherill had been getting newly arrived SCR-584 radar into shape for employment as BACU units. GO4 the Ground Observer Platoon of Headquarters Company was attached to Company A and will report into FDP1. 1as which had been attached to Headquarters Company were released and reassigned to Company A and would report to FDP1.
The XIX TAC made no report.
DECEMBER 1944
Dec 1
In the Third Army's XX Corps area air preparation precedes the 95th Infantry Division attempt to cross the Sarre river. Medium bombers attack Saarlautern, Ensdorf and Fraulautern. Fighter bombers interdict movement east of the river.
In the 563rd LW4 was moved to Burgheid which is about 45 miles east of Nancy. This was the last site occupied by LW4 before the personnel were transferred to the 738th Signal Air Warning Company for duty at FDP5.
XIX TAC flew 126 sorties, both in corps support and escort missions. Their best claims for the day came from motor vehicles with 41 destroyed. XIX TAC also accounted for the destruction of 32 railroad cars and 27 horse drawn vehicles.
Dec 2
In the Third Army in the XX Corps area elements of the 95th Infantry Division crossed the Sarre River in the Saarlautern area and was supported by XIX TAC fighter-bomber support.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters moved to Cit. Des Charbonnages which is 6 miles south west of St. Avold. FDP5 was moved to Marhange which is 14 miles northeast of Nancy. Page 215 shows the XII corps action from December 1st through December 20th and is Cole's (his map 46 on his page 521) of history of the Lor- raine Campaign. This has plotted on the following elements of the 563rd in support of the 26th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division and shows the locations of ground observer posts of Company A which are Able, Baker, Charley and Fox also post Uncle and Tare of Headquarters Company as well as BACU1 and LW6. GO3 Post Oboe reported enemy artillery shelling their post. GO4 moved Post Uncle to Dorsweiler and Post Peter to Laumesfeld.
XIX TAC suffered losses of 9 planes flying Corps support,but still managed to inflict damage on the Germans. XIX TAC either damaged or destroyed 3,2l9 railroad cars, 46 motor vehicles and 35 locomotives. XIX TAC also cut 35 railroad lines and attacked other military targets. In addition, XIX TAC claimed 7 enemy aircraft shot down and 2 disabled. In the clear skies 537 sorties were flown and the damage to the enemy was heaviest in the vicinity of Zweirucken.
Dec 3
In the Third Army XII Corps the 26th Infantry Division cleared Bettring, Holving and Puttenlange.
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Peter to Laumesfeld.
XIX TAC due to inclement weather eight sorties were flown. One town was attacked with unobserved results.
Dec 4
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 4th Armored Division CCB seized a bridge across the Eichel river and set up a bridgehead at Vollerdingen.
In the 563rd FDP3 reported that from 1930 to 2130 many planes were going east to west without showing IFF. AAA firing almost continuously at planes not acting according to plan, i.e., going south to north, circling, etc. All such targets were low and within the forbidden zone.
XIX TAC had five missions totaling 57 sorties flown. XIX TAC damaged or destroyed 49 railroad cars and 22 motor vehicles.
Dec 5
In the Third Army XII Corps the 4th Armored Division CCA crossed the Eichel river at Domfessel and advanced to the northeast to Bining, Schmittvile and Kulhausen.
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Fox to Host.
XIX TAC flew 168 day and 7 night sorties. XIX TAC dropped 46 tons of bombs and knocked out 30 locomotives and 108 railroad cars. One plane was lost.
Dec 6
In the Third Army the XII and XX corps of the Third Army in forcing the Germans back into the West Wall. The 35th Infantry Division assisted by the 6th Armored Division pushed into Sargum- ines and cleared the west sector.
In the 563rd LW7 was moved to Tromborn which is 12 miles north west of St. Avold this is the last site that LW7 reported into the battalion. BACU2 and BACU3 moved to Tromborn which is 18 miles northeast of Metz. GO1 moved Post Able to Durchinal, Post Baker to near St. Avold, Post Charley to Bettingen and Post Dog to Bisten. GO2 moved Post George to Tromborn, Post King to Gisingen and Post Love to Kerprich.
XIX TAC cut 26 railroad lines and damaged or destroyed 10 locomotives and 126 railroad cars by dropping 535 tons of bombs in 29 sorties.
Dec 7
In the Third Army the 5th Infantry Division cleared the towns of Wadgasswen, Hostenbach, Wehrden and Furstenhausen..
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Peter to Arriance, Post Queen to Borg and Pos Roger Mondf. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Rohrbach, Post Tare to Hunkirch and Post Victor to Gung.
In the XIX TAC poor weather prevented flying.
Dec 8
While the 35th Infantry Division was pushing east of the Sarre bridgehead on the morning of December 8th the 26th Division drove forward to crack the Maginot Line. A thirty minute preparation by corps and division artillery was followed by a bombing and strafing mission in which five squadrons of the XIX TAC took part, inflicted very severe losses on the German troops in Le Grand Bois and in the trenches around the Maginot forts.
In the 563rd LW8 was moved to Montenach. GO2 moved Post Jig to Kreuzwald and Post Love to Renlingen. GO3 moved Post Mike to Bischdorf. GO4 moved Post Uncle to Herbitzheim. Company B was notified that WO William F. Church was promoted from Warrant Officer Junior Grade to Chief Warrant Officer by command of the XIX TAC. The citation read:
"Mr Church is technical officer for the Type 15 radar being used at Forward Director Post Number 2. He attended the Radar School at Lexington, Kentucky Signal Depot for eight months. At Camp Murphy, Florida, he studied radar unit SCR-270 and the SCR-568 for four months. In England he attended School at Yatesbury for five weeks, studying the Type 15 and Type 11 radars. In Civilian life Mr. Church was an instructor at the university of Kentucky for a period of one and one-half years. His home is in St Joseph in Michigan."
XIX TAC Dropped 73 tons of bombs and 134 tanks of napalm on various military installations during 271 sorties.
Dec 9
In the Third Army G-2 survey of enemy rail movements for the period from 3 December to 9 December estimated that the Germans were definitely building up at least six and one/half divisions in the Eifel area. A report sent from Third Army to SHAEF indicated the probability of the upcoming Ardennes Offensive. That report was ignored.
In the 563rd LW5 moved from Erbeviller to N of Jury.
The continuing bad weather did not keep the XIX TAC completely out of the air. They flew 56 tactical sorties and 5 reconnaissance sorties. Limited bombings and strafing of gun positions and a marshaling yard were completed.
Dec 10
In the Third Army XX Corps area the Germans make all out effort to destroy the bridgehead at Dillingen bridgehead by counter attacking all along line.
In the 563rd WO William F. Church was promoted from WOJG to CWO on SO 153 Headquarters XIX TAC and noted the following qualifications
"He attended the Radar School at Lexington Kentucky Signal Depot for eight months. At Camp Murphy, Florida, he studied the Radar Units SCR-270 and SCR-628 for four months. In England he attended the Radar School at Yatesbury for five weeks, studying the Type 15 and Type 11 British Radars. In Civilian life Mr. Church was an instructor at the University of Kentucky for a period of one and one half years. His home is in St. Joseph, Michigan."
GO1 moved Post Able to Merlenbuch, Post Charley to Thedivgen and Post Fox to Tentzlingen.
XIX TAC flew 32 sorties. To get to and attack 4 marshaling yards and 20 locomotives, the pilots had to engage in dog fights which culminated in 5 confirmed, 1 probable and 4 damaged German aircraft.
Dec 11
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 35th Infantry Division finishes clearing Sarreguemines.
In the Third Army's XX Corp the Dillingen bridgehead puts a vehicular ferry into operation.
On December 11th, LW6 was moved to near Hambach and this was the last site that LW6 reported into the battalion.
XIX TAC had bad weather which prohibited flying.
Dec 12
In the Third Army a report was sent by the G-2 to SHAEF repeating the warning of the very great probability of the Germans buildup to the east of the First Army. More than abundant information was contained in the report to support the G-@ views concerning preparation for a major offensive in the Ardennes area. Fort Jeanne d'Arc, the last remaining strong point in the Metz area surrendered to the 26th Infantry Division of the III Corps.
In the 563rd GO4 moved Post Sugar from Rohrbach to Dehlingen, Post Tare from Tanchen to Hunkirch and Post Victor from Lungenberg to Saarinsberg. GO2 moved Post Jig from NE Kreuzwald to Differten. LW8 moved from Dainville to SE of Sierck Les Bains. On December 12th BACU4 was assigned to the battalion and was located at Peltre which is 3 miles southeast of Metz. Also on December 12th Company D reported in from a location one mile east of Metz and this was the last time they reported into the battalion
XIX TAC flew 256 sorties, dropping 88 tons of bombs. Fifteen German planes were shot down and the XIX TAC suffered a loss of 8 planes. Claims included oil storage tanks, ammunition dumps,locomotives and railroad cars.
Dec 13
In the Third Army the III Corps had command of the 26th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division and assume command of the 42nd Infantry Division on it arrival.
The XII Corps had the 35th, 80th and 87th Infantry Divisions and the 4th Armored Division.
The XX Corps had the 5th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions.
Third Army G-2 estivates were that an operation was in the planning stages that would employ the four divisions of the Germans Sixth Panzer Army as a spearhead in a counter offensive. The four reconstructed divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army remained west of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Cologne despite the growing threat of the Third Army breakthrough of the Siegfried Line. Another Panzer division was also reported in the vicinity of Cologne in reserve with forces concentrated north of the Moselle River, close to the boundary of the First and Third Armies. It was concluded that the hoarding of the Sixth Panzer Army was an effort to employ this armor in a coordinated effort, making every attempt not to engage them in a piecemeal attack. A report was sent to SHAEF warning of the continuing buildup of German forces east of the First Army's VIII Corps.
In the 563rd the 19th TCC moved to Longeville near St. Avold. FDP5 reported that 3 men were sent to Officer Candidate School for training in the Infantry to relieve replacement shortages.
XIX TAC flew 3 missions two missions were in escort of the IX Bomber Command and the third was a mission in which a train was attacked, damaging the locomotive, twenty boxcars and cutting the rail line. Commanding generals of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, the XIX and XII Tactical Air Commands conferred with General Patton and representatives of the Seventh U.S. Army in an effort to coordinate the proposed aerial bombardment of the Siegfried Line, which was in connection with an upcoming attack tentatively planned for 19 December. In all, the air attack was to include 500 to 600 medium bombers, 1200 to 1500 heavy bombers (supported by fighters), and 1200 to 1500 Royal Air Force bombers. The plan was to be repeated 3 or 4 days in succession.
Dec 14
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 87th Infantry Division reached the German border and took Rimling and Obergailbach.
In the 563rd Company A had GO1 Ground Observer platoon de- ployed in the St. Avold area and reporting back to FDP1 which was over 50 miles back. Prior to this the Third Army Front was moving eastward and GO1 was kept well up to the front. A sample of the action was reported by Post Dog on December 14th. (see Lt. Keefer's report on page 282 for details). GO4 moved Post Tare from Hunkirch to Wolflingen, Post Victor to Brulange and Post William Mombrann. GO3 reported four enemy trucks at Stadtkyll.
XIX TAC dropped 35 tons of bombs, damaging or destroying 28 motor vehicles, 6 locomotives and 55 railroad cars. In all, 131 sorties were flown.
Dec 15
In the Third Army the XII Corps encountered three local counter attacks.
In the 563rd the XIX on General Order 58 awarded the Bronze Star Medal to the following men of the 563rd Signal A.W. Battalion:
Lt. Jimmie P. Duncan in recognition of meritorious service in connection with military operations from 19 Sept 1944 to 31 Oct 1944
Lt. Charles W. Root in recognition of meritorious service in connection with military operations from 21 September 1944 to 16 October 1944.
Tech/Sgt Lawrence G. Gifford in recognition of meritorious service in connection with military operations from 6 August 1944 to 13 November 1944.
Lt. Charles W. Root was promoted from 2nd Lt. to 1st Lt. on SO 350 Headquarters Ninth Air Force. The citation for Lt. Root was as follows:
"The Ground Observer Platoon of Company B is commanded by Lt. Root. it was during the Third Army's crossing of the Moselle River that Ground observer information of enemy ground and air activity relayed by FM radio back to FDP2 and in turn relayed by land wire to the filter center was so successful. Because of the information sent back and the services rendered the ground forced, Lt. Charles Root received the above mentioned award."
Lt. Lewis F. Janek returned to the 563rd Battalion and was reappointed Battalion Communications Officer. Lt. Richard L. Viergever who was Battalion Communications Officer during Lt. Janek's absence was transferred to the 738th Signal Air Warning Company where he functioned as FDP5 communications officer. The 563rd Battalion headquarters was at Faulquemont (Cites Des Charbonnages) about 7 miles southwest of St. Avold where the Winter Operations phase ended. Company B was continuing on the assignment of providing security for the St. Dizier area where the 100th Fighter Wing had a headquarters in the town and the 405th Fighter Group occupied the Airdrome. This duty of Company B would continue until September 24th. They were released from this assignment when the 100th Fighter Wing Headquarters scheduled a move to Metz which would be on September 29th. Also FDP1, FDP3 and FDP5 were in their location at the end of the winter phase and FDP4 was also in its last location at Erstroff about 10 miles south of St. Avold. During this period there were infiltrating German soldiers and paratroopers dropped in Luxembourg in connection with the Battle of the Bulge.
XIX TAC flew 144 sorties in mushy weather, attacking an ammunition dump and two supply dumps. Observed from the aircraft were some large explosions, but other than that, the poor visibili- ty disallowed any knowledge of true damage. Also destroyed or damaged were 7 locomotives and 52 railroad cars.
The Ardennes Campaign Phase extended from December 16 to February 7th.
DECEMBER 1945
Dec 16
The Germans had waited for a period of bad weather to minimize Allied air attacks. On December 16th they attacked on a front from Malmedy to Echternach in Luxembourg with the Sixth Panzer army, lead by General Von Ruhndstedt. Although they had the highest morale and best equipment in the German army they were poorly lead and ran in to a traffic snag. The Fifth Panzer Army was better lead and with more room shattered the U.S. 28th and 106th Divi- sions. The spearhead opened in the VII and VIII Corps areas of the First Army.
In the Third Army General Patton had written in his personal diary
"....the First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII Corps static, as it is highly probable that the Germans are building up east of them....had the V and VIII Corps been more aggressive, the Germans could not have prepared this attack. One must never sit still."
Never the less Patton had the 4th Armored near Luxembourg which proved to be ready to attack north to cut off the German Counter Attack. Patton had his headquarters in Nancy and when the counter attack came moved to Luxembourg where he took over the space for the Bradley's headquarters.
In the 563rd the headquarters, FDP4 and FDP5 were located to follow the 6th Armored Division which was anticipated to penetrate the West Wall when weather conditions improved. The TCC was located near St Avold and we were in a very good position to support the expected penetration into Germany by the Third Army. The weather was against a major effort and the road network was very poor and had been damaged with water from rain and snow. It was anticipated that the attack would accelerate as the overcast would lift to permit flying and the roads would dry enough to support tanks. Although the German troops against the Third Army had high morale and were making a determined defense it was thought that every element was in a good position to crack the West Wall and enter Germany. The pilots of the XIX TAC had been reporting German Tanks concentrating at Trier so the oncoming counter attack of the Germans would not be a complete sunrise. FDP3, located near Luxembourg City provided left flank protection for the Third Army and as the time of the German Counter Attack approached was subject to German Infilterers. Following page is the situation Map of the last phase of the Lorraine Campaign.
S/Sgt Michael Glaser and T/Sgt Joseph Bates of Company C captured a German soldier in a farm house about a half a mile from Company C bivouac area. The soldier was dressed warmly and was clean shaven as though he had spent the night in a farm house. He was wearing an American field jacket under his own overcoat. The people in the farm house stopped several American vehicles and told them there was a German soldier in the house, but none of the vehicles had weapons on them until our men came along. The prisoner was taken to a PW stockade in Luxembourg City where he was questioned by S/Sgt Glaser who speaks German. The prisoner claimed he escaped from a PW camp with three others and that the others were in the woods close to the farm house. A patrol was sent out from Company C headquarters and together with elements of the 802nd Tank Destroyer Battalion the area was scoured with no luck. Several days later a man was walking past LW3 which was located at Fischback, Luxembourg which is about 8 miles north of Luxembourg City and was dressed in German pants, boots, an American Field Jacket and carrying a suitcase. He was challenged and arrested by Pfc Jennings the radar guard at that time. Various items found on his person included road maps of the area, two hand grenades, a hunting knife, and a clip of .03 ammunition. The suit case contain a civilian suit and a pair of O.D.'s. The prisoner claimed to be a Luxembourger and was taken to the Mersch Gendarmerie at the discretion of MP of Mersch. They kept the ammunition but released him after finding his identification papers in order and several local police identified him as a member in good standing of the Luxembourg Marquis. He was just moving to Fischback and had picked up some American Clothing along with the American habit of collecting souvenirs. Company B received orders to move FDP2 to a site one half mile south of Torchville, since a reconnaissance of this site had been made, and since they had a few days notice, an advance party was sent to set up camp two days before the actual move. Further reconnaissance by the FDP2 advance party proved this site unsuit- able for their purpose. The alternate site at a location one mile north of Bistroff (in Alcase) was decided upon.
XIX TAC claims for the day were 143 motor vehicles, 40 locomotives, 608 railroad cars damaged or destroyed. XIX TAC flew 237 sorties in 21 missions.
Dec 17
In the Third Army Intelligence reported that the scale of enemy rail movements remained on the same high level of activity as those covered in previous reports. Tactical reconnaissance reported that a total of 49 trains moved south and west from marshaling yards located directly in the pathway of the First and Third Armies. It was obvious that they were being in reinforce- ments for the enemy thrust in the Ardennes-Eifel area.
In the 563rd BACU1 was moved to Hombach. GO1 moved Post Baker from SE of St. Avold to Morsbach, Post Charley to Rulilinger and Post Fox to Buschbach Dog from Werblen to E of Emulterbach. GO2 Last Phase of Lorraine OffensiveArdennes Offensive German Planmoved Post How to Feldsburg. GO4 moved Post Uncle to Rederching and Post William to Revereweiler.
XIX TAC flew 356 sorties in 29 missions. XIX TAC dropped more than 93 tons of bombs on the Germans even though there were numerous dog fights with the fighter bombers claiming 17 confirmed, 3 probable and 1 damaged plane. American losses were 9 planes. Among the claims for the day were 207 railroad cars, 12 locomo- tives, 51 motor vehicles and 52 gun installations either damaged or destroyed. Nine marshaling yards and 11 towns were attacked.
Dec 18
On December 18th Eisenhower ordered Patton to suspend the Saar offensive and shift his Third Army north. It was not too sur- prising to Third Army troops as concentrations of tanks had been observed before this at Trier.
In the First Army penetrations had been made into the VIII Corps area and the 99th Infantry Division's area in the V Corps. This penetration had reached about 40 miles in depth and 30 miles in width. It ranged from St. Vith to St. Hubert with flanks anchored in the south at Echernach, Diekirch and Ettelbruck, and in the north at Monschau, Malmedy, Stavelot and Marche.
In the Third Army General Patton's plan was to advance to the northeast and "...chop them off at the neck..." This plan would allow the allies to then encircle the Germans and destroy them entirely.
The 19th TCG and the 563rd Battalion were preparing to resume the eastward thrust when Patton diverted his attack north. In the 563rd all the FDP's were still in position and looking into the Bulge. An immediate change of direction was made by the Battalion and the TCC. The TCC was moved to Villerupt near the Luxembourg border and about 5 miles south east of Longwy. FDP3 reported hostile tracks covered the inner artillery zone and lasted 50 minutes, there were about 25 hostile tracks. Some of the air- planes dived over the FDP3 information center. FDP3 reported that this was the first German air attacks to come onto their board. The German push had started the day before and Company C was on the alert for hostile aircraft. At 0507 Hours 2 hostile airplanes flew over the tree tops and opened fire. FDP3 radar and information center were missed by about 100 yards. All the time the AAA were firing their 90-mm, 40-mm and .50 caliber guns. When the battery close to the FDP3 opened up their van jumped and shook. About 15 minutes after the airplane fired close to FDP3 the LW3 unit reported that they were being strafed. LW3 reported in a few minutes after and said that there was no one hurt or any damage done. Also on December 18th FDP3 tied into the 4th Infantry Division using the old telephone line that FDP3 used to the 83rd Infantry Division. The 83rd had moved out and the 4th had moved in. FDP3 reported a man was walking past the LW3 site towards Fisback dressed in German pants and boots and a G.I. field jacket and carrying a suitcase. He was challenged and arrested by Pfc Jennings, the radar guard at the time. Various items found on his personage included road maps of the area, two hand grenades, a hunting knife, and a clip of .03 ammunition. The suit case contained a civilian suit and a pair of O.D's. The prisoner claimed to be a Luxembourger and was taken to Mersch gendarmerie at the discretion of Military Police of Mersch. They kept the ammunition but released him after finding his identification papers in order and several local police identified him as a member in good standing of the Luxembourg Marquis. He was just moving to Fishback and had picked up some American clothes along with the American habit of collecting Souvenirs.
XIX TAC reconnaissance sorties of the Ardennes region and immediately east of the enemy salient to the Rhine were flown on a substantial scale only on December 17th and 18th.
Dec 19
In Supreme headquarters General Eisenhower negated Patton's plan to chop off and encircle the Germans and he opted for a safer plan which would simply stop the German's advance then push them back into their original area of the Moselle without destroying the bulk of their forces.
In the Third Army troops were already advancing on the move north, there to form the cutting edge of a powerful thrust into the southern flank of the German advance. A provisional Corps was assigned the 10th Armored less the units in Bastogne, the 9th Armored, the 109th Infantry and the 4th Infantry.
In the 563rd GO4 moved Post Uncle from Rederching to SW of Ruhlingen.
XIX TAC had bad weather grounded the aircraft until 1400 hours. When the skies cleared XIX TAC flew 102 sorties, shot down 10 planes confirmed and 1 probable and lost 3 of their own planes. The 100th Wing headquarters was at St. Dizer. On that same day the Ninth Air force ordered ten fighter groups to be transferred from the IX TAC to the XIX TAC and at the same time SHAEF ordered the Third Army to reduce the German counterattack in the Ardennes. The 19th TCC expanded the communications to accommodate the new fighter group traffic.
Dec 20
In the Third Army Gen. Patton inspected the III Corps dis- positions, found them satisfactory and gave the order to attack on 0600 Hours on December 22nd. On December 20th the 4th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division and the 80th Infantry Division were assembling in the Arlon-Luxembourg City area. The plan was simple, the III Corps would advance on north in the direction of St. Vith with the 80th Infantry Division on the right, the 26th Infantry Division in the center and the 4th Armored Division on the left. The 4th Armored Division would push to Bastogne and make contact with the 101st Airborne Division. The VIII Corps and the XII corps were assigned to the Third Army the XII corps on the right and the VIII Corps to the left of the III Corps. (see Editors Note 16 below)
For a short time the 563rd headquarters one of the few units back near the winter line of resistance on the German border. The key unit of the Third Army which was the 4th Armored Division had been in the area of the forward elements of the 563rd Battalion which was also located near St. Avold.
The 4th Armored Division had pulled back almost immediately after the Germans stuck in the Ardennes as this had been antici- pated. Several days later they were moving north toward Bastogne to assist the entrapped 101st Airborne Division who had blunted the attack of the Germans. The troops of the Third Army including us took pride that they were to go to the rescue of the entrapped men in Bastogne and restore the order of battle from a retreat to a forward attack. The evidence of the German buildup for their Ardennes counterattack had been building up and observed in the Third Army sector for several weeks prior.
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Oboe to Ritzing.
XIX TAC had bad weather which prohibited all aerial activity.
Dec 21
In the First Army he 101st Airborne Division was completely encircled at Bastogne.
In the Third Army the III Corps captured Merzig and encircle ed Ettelbruck.
On December 21st Eisenhower ordered the 365, 367th and 368th Fighter Bomber Groups transferred from the IX TAC to the XIX TAC. In the 563rd GO4 Post Sugar was moved to Dehlingen.
Dec 22
In the First Army Brig. Gen. McAullife, the acting Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division had a demand from the Ger- man's to surrender Bastogne and it was then that he gave his famous reply of "nut's" and his garrison was holding under heavy fire and sharp attacks. The U. S. shortage of ammunition was becoming acute as the weather conditions had previously prevented aerial resupply. In the Third Army General Patton began his drive to relieve Bastogne. Warned by intercepted radio messages, the Germans were ready and the first Patton
[Editors Note 16--- This was one of the times when a famous quote of Gen. Patton filtered down channels and that quote was "The Kraut finally got his head in the meat grinder and I've got the handle." It seemed that where we were, that Patton also literally pushed Gen. Bradley out of his headquarters in Luxembourg City and took it over for the Third Army headquarters. I also think that both Gen. Bradley and Gen. Eisenhower were glad they had Patton on board to take on a hard task so quickly but I noticed that elements of the Third Army were heading north even before the Supreme Headquar- ters gave the order. Gen. Patton anticipated this as the rank and file of the 19th TCG heard it from the pilots who saw what was going on from the air.]
progress was slow. In the III Corps area the 4th Armored Division advanced to within 10 miles of Bastogne and the 80th Infantry Division cleared Heidersheid which is northwest of Ettelbruck.
In the 563rd FDP2 was ordered to move to Ste. Marie-Sur- Semois, Belgium. At that time they were sitting at Bistroff which is about 6 miles south of St. Avold. They had arrived at Bistroff on December 20th from their previous site at Rancourt. To make a long story short On December 16th they were ordered to move to Torchville in the vicinity of Nancy and their advanced party decided it was not suitable and chose the alternate site at Bistroff. When they arrived at Bistroff the new orders to proceed to Ste. Marie-Sur-Semois, Belgium were received so they were not operational at Bistroff. All of this was necessitated by the sudden emergence of the Battle of the Bulge. In any event FDP2 made two 100 mile moves each one of them with a time of movement of 5 1/2 hours. Ste. Marie is 20 miles NW of Villerupt and this move completely oriented the FDP's on the bulge in support of the Third Army which was already heavily engaged combat on the approaches Bastogne, Luxembourg. This move also put them into position to cover the left side of the Third Army when the German army counter attack was turned back and the Third Army would resume the eastward attack. GO2 moved Post Jig to E of Tromborn, Post King to Felsburg and Post Love to Dalen. FDP3 moved from Chateau Renault to E of Luxembourg. Walter Cronkite, war correspondent, reported this story from FDP3:
"Here in a tiny trailer, smaller than a modern kitchenette was unfolded the whole drama of this greatest day in the air war since 1940."
So begins the UP story datelined 9th Air Force Control Station, Western Front, byline Walter Cronkite.
"Somewhere out over the German lines this morning, an artillery observation patrol of Piper Cubs--little two pilot sport planes that used to rattle around the airports back home--skipped in and out of the clouds looking for the enemy"
The writeup continues.
"Two pilots, 1st Lt. Ellis E. Thompson of Fairfield, N.D. and 2nd Lt. Bernard B Mackell of Pittsburgh, Pa., were given equal credit for sighting the enemy that day--"
"a column of tanks, half tracks, buses, and trailers that stretched through the woods down a dale and up and beyond a hill"
One of the pilots yelled.
"There are trucks and tanks up there--millions of them. Let's have some air, quick"
Ready to give them air, and quickly was Flight Officer William Stephens of Glendale, Ariz., who took the call and information: radioed Red Leader" to inform
"I have a target for you"
and then called in other flights of Thunderbolts. The Date was 22 December; the location the German-Luxembourg City.
"Flight after flight was steered to the target and flight after flight crackled out success reports, logging through ether the greatest day in the air war.,"
Mr. Cronkite's story concludes.
"and that's the way it was as Yank fliers, under direction of RIPSAW 3, ripped into 3,000 vehicles."
That tiny trailer which Mr. Cronkite describes had 36 swastikas painted on its side indicating direct kills controlled by RIPSAW 3.
In the air, German air activity increased dramatically with 87 planes making 87 raids on this date. An attack on a supply point at Mancieulles destroyed 100,000 gallons of Allied Gasoline. Antiaircraft unit units claimed they shot down 8 of the enemy planes.
The XIX TAC had a total of 558 sorties were flown during which XIX TAC dropped 157 tons of high explosive bombs (plus large quantities of napalm) on German positions. Twenty-two confirmed and 1 probable enemy planes were shot down. A majority of the flights were made in the U.S. First Army area and over Trier, a city used by the Germans as a jumping off place for their offen- sive. Claims made were 412 motor vehicles, 26 gun installations, 56 railroad cars and various other targets. The command strength of the XIX TAC was increased from four to nine fighter bomber groups in view of the increased need for assistance against the enemy breakthrough.
Dec 23
In the First Army area the weather began to clear permitting aerial resupply of the defenders in Bastogne who were the 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions the improved weather permitted extensive air support, particularly in the Bastogne area, where supplies were dropped to the garrison.
In the Third Army more than 100 German planes bombed and strafed installations and the Antiaircraft Artillery claimed they shot down 16 and probably 6 more.
In the 563rd Lt. Charles A. Stewart FDP2 Filter Officer and Lt. David O. Schultze GO2 commander both of Company C were promoted to First Lieutenants. GO3 NCS reported that a Major General told them the situation was critical around them and there was no one on their left flank. GO1 moved Post Dog to Emulterbach.
XIX TAC was another successful day completed. XIX TAC flew 493 sorties, shooting down 23 confirmed and 4 probable enemy aircraft losing 11 of their own. XIX TAC dropped 54 tons of high explosive bombs and expended the largest amount of fragmentary bombs and napalm of any day of the month. Among their claims were 26 tanks and armored vehicles, 250 motor vehicles, and 36 gun positions. Thirty-two tactical reconnaissance missions were scheduled to cover the entire battle area.
Dec 24
In the Third Army Area German aircraft made 94 raids and the Antiaircraft Artillery claimed they shot down 17 and probably 6 more.
In the 563rd at 0000 hours FDP3 forwarded a report from the 4th Infantry Division that aircraft at 6,000 feet elevation came in from the northeast and dropped 2 bombs which were heard at the FDP3 IC then the enemy flight flew northwest over LW3 and were lost. At 0730 hours FDP3 reported that LW7 was down on emergency mainte- nance. The transmitter was on fire caused by nearby enemy artillery shelling. The radar was back on the air two hours later. GO3 NCS was requested by a local Infantry Division Command Post to cease transmitting at night because it disclosed their position to the enemy. At 0055 Hours 2 enemy airplanes bombed FDP2 radar site. A total of 4 bombs were dropped, the first one striking 100 yards southwest of the site, the others fell from 300 to 600 yards distance in the same direction. The first airplane came in from the NNE and then flew east. The second airplane came from the NNE also and about a mile or so behind the first. As the second airplane approached the radar site it turned slightly, flying southwest, and, as it did so, it dropped the bombs mentioned above. The first plane may have been shot down by AAA located about 5 miles east from our radar site. The assumption that it may have been shot down is based upon the fact that immediately after the AAA guns began to fire the sky seemed to flash for a fraction of a second and at the same time the sound of the motor, as heard by the guards, ceased. Also on LW7 was located at Hambach and were attached to Company C and reporting into FDP3 went on emergency maintenance. Their transmitter was on fire caused by nearby shelling. The radar was back on the air 2 hours later. Also that night the FDP1 Ground Observer Platoon GO2 net control station was requested by local a local Infantry command post to cease transmit- ting at night because it disclosed their positions to the enemy. The following night LW7 received strafing by 2 airplanes on their area. FDP2 moved from Rancourt to SW Ste. Marie. Company B, under command of Capt. John Nolan, was cited for rapid moves and quick setup under extremely adverse weather and road conditions. The Company was ordered to move from Rancourt (Meuse) to Torchville or as an alternate to Bistroff. After a reconnaissance the site proved to be unsuitable and the alternate site at Bistroff was chosen. The move from Rancourt to Bistroff was made in three serials on 20 December five and one half hours. Upon arrival at Bistroff, Alcase, Company B then received an order to move to Ste. Marie, Belgium and another 100 miles from Bistroff. They departed and arrived at Ste. Marie on 22 December and arrived five and one half hours. At Ste. Marie on the 24 December they were bombed by German Aircraft. During the trip the weather was extremely poor and the roads muddy. The Company had to build roads and bridges to locate in its site. The area was also infiltered by German troops dressed as Americans, causing a severe security problem. In spite of all the difficulties FDP2 was in action the same day as they moved.
The XIX TCC moved from St. Avold to Villerupt. XIX TAC flew 652 sorties, killing 19 German planes confirmed and 2 probable. Additionally, XIX TAC claimed a total of 558 motor vehicles, 117 tanks and armored vehicles and 115 railroad cars either damaged or destroyed. XIX TAC cut 15 railroad lines and attacked 12 troop concentrations. XIX TAC lost 13 planes and 11 pilots.
Dec 25 In the Third Army the 2nd Armored Division struck the 2nd Panzer division near Celles. The battle ended on December 26th when the 2nd Panzer's immobilized advance guard and beat back other German units attempting to extricate it. Late the same day, Patton's 4th Armored Division punched a narrow corridor into Bastogne and made contact with the 101st Airborne Division. As usual the 4th Armored was leading the spearhead and softening the enemy for the Infantry troops continuing the attack. Usually the 4th Armored spearhead was so effective that it was immediately practical to make a forward reconnaissance for new sites.
In the 563rd Company B the ICC personnel observed a B-26 coming from the northeast and from a trail of smoke, it was in trouble. It was flying at an altitude of 7,000 feet. A figure was seen to jump from the plane and a few minutes later a parachute opened. The plane made a gradual right turn flying north northeast and was seen to head for earth about three or four miles away. The Pilot, Lt. Charles Bukel, landed safely next to our D/F radio antenna. Lt. Bukel told us that while in formation and nearing the target they found moderately accurate flak. Immediately after opening his bomb bay doors the plane was hit with flak. It was hit the second time after dropping the bombs on the target. The second hit started a fire in his right engine and the engine immediately became dead. On the way back to the base the left engine began to spit and sputter. The pilot ordered his crew who throughout the flak had not been hit, to bale out. After all crew members had jumped he leveled the plane and jumped himself. later in the day information reached us that the Co-Pilot, Lt. Sloan, and three members of the crew had been found. The sixth member was not heard from during the stay of the pilot. Lt. Bukel and the three members of his crew enjoyed the Christmas dinner here very much. While at Dinner, Lt. Bukel informed us that this was his 65th mission and that he had hopes of being released to go home. Lt. John C. DiLeo Historical Officer of Company B reported on the Company B Christmas dinner as follows:
"Christmas day was enjoyed by all if, for no other reason, then because of the excellent meal served. In order to have everyone served and not to hurry their meal, the company was split into three groups. The first sitting was at 1430 hours, the second at 1500 hours and the third at 1530 hours. The Cook stayed up the previous night with no sleep to dress the turkeys, bake the pies, etc., and everyone commented on the fine results. As each man entered the kitchen mess tent he was given a cigar and an apple. next, the turkey (and plenty of it), dressing, mashed potatoes, gravy, cranberry sauce, apple pie, candy, raisin bread and coffee. The tables were given that "home-like" atmosphere by the supply acquiring what looked like white table cloths. The Mess sergeant reported a strange fact--no one asked for a second helping."
LW7, attached to Company C, was staffed in their area by two thunderbolts with red noses and orange tails. These planes went south after the raids.
XIX TAC flew 599 in a day of heavy activity. XIX TAC had kills on 757 motor vehicles and 74 tanks and armored vehicles.
Dec 26
In the Third Army area the 4th Armored Division made contact with the 101st Airborne Division at Assenois, to miles south of Bastogne.
During the period from December 26th through 27th the XIX TAC flew 1,102 fighter-bomber sorties. On December 26th three fighter- bomber groups (354th and 367th) flew armed reconnaissance missions in the areas of Saarbrucken, Merzig, Trier and St. Vith. The object of this was to disrupt the enemy's movement of reinforce- ments and supplies from his rearward area into the battle field, particularly to Bastogne. The 361st Fighter Group escorted medium bombers and carried out fighter sweeps. The 365th and 368th Fighter Groups were non-operational because of fog and haze at their bases. The following day three groups again supported the counter thrusts of Patton's three corps, while the other five groups were out on armed reconnaissance throughout the battle area. The enemy's concentration of large forces against Bastogne provided the fighter-bombers with abundant targets on every rail and road leading to Bastogne from the north, east, and southeast. Approxi- mately 450 tons of bombs were dropped on a wide assortment of targets, but particularly upon the enemy's communications system. The most significant claims were: 690 motor transport, 90 tanks and armored vehicles, 44 gun positions, 143 rail cars, 2 bridges, 5 highway cuts, and 33 rail cuts. On both days there was little enemy air opposition. Twenty-five enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed with a loss of seventeen fighter-bombers. Only four of the latter were caused by aerial combat with the enemy.
In the 563rd LW2 moved to Habay-La-Neuve. Company B was named in a citation commending them for the rapidity of their movement having moved over 100 miles and setting up operations as well as establishing an Advanced TCC at Vignuelles and doing this 24 hours ahead of schedule. BACU4 was assigned to Company A for operation.
XIX TAC flew 558 sorties in 59 missions. XIX TAC dropped 157 tons of bombs and escorted medium and heavy bombers. XIX TAC destroyed or damaged 412 motor vehicles, 34 armored vehicles and tanks, 26 gun positions, 61 buildings, 2 bridges, 2 supply dumps and 83 stacks of ammunition. XIX TAC also hit 8 marshaling yards and 14 rail lines. While the XIX TAC lost 15 planes, XIX TAC killed 22 German planes with 1 probable and 11 damaged.
Dec 27
In the Third Army area enemy air activity dropped off sharply and with 74 planes they made 35 raids. The Antiaircraft Artillery claimed 3 planes destroyed and probably 8 more.
In the 563rd Company A relocated GO1 Ground Observer platoon who had been in the St. Avold area in support of the eastward thrust of the Third Army and the 4th Armored Division. The abrupt change of direction necessitated by the Battle of the Bulge necessitated their new location along a line from Wachern to Furweiler which is in the area about 15 miles northeast of Thionville and more or less poised in the position of the new right flank of the Third Army when the German counter attack is stopped and movement to the east resumes. GO1 moved Post Able to Ritzing, Post Baker to Eft, Post Charley to Furweiler, Post Dog to Wachem and Post Fox to Biringen. GO3 moved Post Mike to La Rochette, Post Oboe to Waldbilig and Post Queen to Stengen. Effective December 27th the following platoons of SCR-584's were transferred effective from Company D as follows:
Lt. Robert's platoon attached to Company A
Lt. Martensen's platoon attached to Company B
Lt. Cobbs' platoon attached to Company B
Lt. Kenny's platoon attached to Company C
Lt. Altman's platoon attached to Company C
FDP3 reported one plane was shot down by .50 Cal AAA machine gun fire on the outskirts of the city of Luxembourg. GO
XIX TAC flew 544 sorties in 57 missions. Claims for the day were 434 motor vehicles, 97 tanks and armored vehicles, 336 railroad cars, 15 locomotives, 3 bridges, 42 gun installations and 11 supply dumps either destroyed or damaged.
Dec 28
In the Third Army the 26th Infantry Division captured Nothum and rapidly approached the Wiltz river.
In the 563rd LW8 was moved to Angevillers which is 6 miles northeast of Thionville. This was the last site that LW8 reported to the Battalion. The 563rd Battalion Headquarters moved to Audin Le Tiche which is a suburb of Villerupt. The TCC was set up in Villerupt. LW6 and BACU1 moved to Reuland. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Vandelainville, Post Victor to Boschbach and Post William to Kochern.
In the XIX TAC There were no fighter sorties on December 28th and on the following two days the XIX was the only TAC able to operate. The sorties were divided about equally between ground support in the Echternach, Bastogne and Arlon areas and armed reconnaissance over St. Vith and Bastogne battlefields and the south eastern perimeter of the interdiction zone, especially in the Coblenz-Mayen region. The Luftwaffe was not in evidence. Nine of the twelve aircraft lost on the two days' operation were to antiaircraft fire, one to friendly antiaircraft fire, and two to causes unknown. Bombing and strafing of the enemy's road and rail movements continued to produce very gratifying results as the fol- lowing claims indicate: 234 motor transport, 101 tanks and armored vehicles, 31 gun positions, 301 railroad cars and 69 rail cuts. Despite unfavorable weather, managed to make 196 sorties, dropping 62 tons of bombs on German forces. Special attention was given to rolling stock, with 56 locomotives and 325 railroad cars being destroyed or damaged. Rail lines were cut in 3 places and 2 large oil tanks were destroyed. There was no enemy air activity over the U.S. Third Army's area of operations.
Dec 29
In the Third Army the Antiaircraft Artillery shot down 10 out of 82 planes during a raid.
In the 563rd the fighter control and radar FDP's were ideally located to fully support the fighter bombers and functioned superbly in accommodating the increased signal traffic demand. The facilities of the FDP's stood at their location and moved toward the battle even though they were in vulnerable locations near the combat zone. GO4 moved Post Sugar from Rohrbach to Freeimenger.
The 100th Wing moved their headquarters to Metz and on that same day the 4th Armored Division was attacking north directly toward Bastogne and the 35th Infantry division was square in the way of the German attack. Cole, in his history of the Ardennes Campaign read as follows:
"At Lutrebois the American use of the combined arms in this action was so outstanding as to merit the careful analyses by the professional soldier and student. The 4th Armored Division Art- illery, for example, simultaneously engaged the First SS Panzer army in the east and the Third Panzer Grenadier army in the west. XIX TAC fighter bombers intervened precisely at the right time to blunt the main German armored thrust and set up better targets for engagement by the ground forces."
XIX TAC flew but found many fewer targets than at any time since the initial German penetration. XIX TAC did find and destroyed a V-1 rocket launching site at Dierfield and lost six planes and five pilots during the day.
Dec 30
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division advanced to Renmange.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 5th and 10th Infantry Divisions captured Riesdorf seven miles northwest of Echternach and the 379th Infantry Regiment of the 95th Infantry Division seized a bridgehead in the Sarlautern area.
In the 563rd two ME 109's passed over the FDP3 site. Guards opened fire with .50 cal machine guns but failed to bring planes down. The FDP3 controller vectored friendly fighters over FDP3 site to intercept the enemy planes.
XIX TAC flew 92 sorties, making claims on 165 motor vehi- cles,62 tanks and armored vehicles, 22 locomotives, and 468 railroad cars.
Dec 31
In the Third Army VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division captured Houmont and Chenogne.
The XIX TAC flew 296 sorties and dropped 128 tons of high explosive bombs, clamming 125 motor vehicles, 68 railroad cars, 4 bridges and 17 buildings. They also attacked 9 marshaling yards with 17 railroad lines being cut. No losses were sustained by the XIX TAC.
In the 563rd Company A Ground Observer Platoon GO1 submitted an operations report for the month of December which was reported by Lt. Lawrence A. Keefer and shows the type of action on the ground for this phase and it follows:
1 Dog 1300 Hours sighted V-2 East of station (near Haroucourt)
2 Able Reported a B-26 with engine on fire and leaving formation. Baker reported same plane hit the enemy Ack-Ack and downed northeast of station about 7 miles at 1020 hours (near Maron)
2 Baker Reported ME-109 going east at 9,000 ft.
3 Able Shelled by hostile artillery, foggy could not locate position (near Crevie)
3 Charley Reported gun fire position 2,200 yards north from post. Gun fired from 1200 hours until early the next morning (near Crevie)
4 Charley Reported four FW-190's north 3 miles orbiting at zero altitude. Chased by Thunderbolts but lost them in the clouds
5 Charley Reported thunderbolt making belly landing two miles south of post. Rushed to airplane. Pilot had already left. Stood guard until relieved by Infantry guard, airplane number 27614B. GO 1 moved from positions generally just east of Metz to positions just west of St Avold on December 8th.
8 Baker Enemy artillery entering town all day unable to locate position (near St. Avold)
10 Fox 2200 to 2215 Hours heavy barrage of enemy shells near station with no damage.
11 Fox Reported liaison airplane shot down east 3 miles from post (near Narbefontane)
12 Able Shelled but no damage to post.
12 Fox Shelled at 0614 hours to 1100 hours. Liaison plane shot down east 2 miles from post (near Tentzlingen)
12 Fox Through a break in the ground haze an enemy tank destroyer was observed close to outpost at Q407609 shelling town at Q398638 (near Oetingen). The enemy position was reported to the artillery and they knocked it out.
13 Able Civilian sniper shot 6 shots at observer throughout the Day, could not locate sniper.
13 Charley Gun position north 2 miles shelling in vicinity of post all night until early morning.
13 Fox Liaison airplane shot at by Ack-Ack southeast 3 miles from station (near Biringen)
14 Dog Reported enemy barracks full of troops at Q353738 and enemy observation tower at Q355744 (near Hostenbach and 5 miles west of Saarbrucken). At least four 88's were firing from base of tower. Action received approximately 15 minutes after from Thunderbolts who missed targets. Light artillery moved near post and shot at the barracks and tower. After a fifteen minute barrage the artil- lery left and the outpost was shelled, shells were directed from tower. Rangers, who were to be relieved by the 6th Calvary. The relief was not immediate, so enemy patrol moved in and held station down with rifle and machine gun fire. Radio gave out, only com- munications a wire line to 3rd Battalion of the 10th Infantry Regiment (5th Infantry Division) asked 10th Infantry for aid with no result. Good radio needed. When ground haze closed over post at 1500 Hours. The jeep was warmed up in the dugout position and Tech/5th Hart and Cpl Moresi made a run with jeep through rifle fire over road. After out of danger of gun fire, they were informed by Infantryman with mine sweeper that this road had been mined during the night by enemy. They had found three mines after an In- fantry jeep was blown up with four men in it. Tech/5th Edwin B. Hart and Cpl William J. Moresi returned to Ablestation. The 6th Cavalry took over the sector at 1800 Hours relieving pressure and they credited the post's presence with keeping enemy from occupying the area. Tech/5th Hart returned on December 15th with radio and supplies.
14 Dog Baker reported train at Q362672 (vicinity of Forbach). Put acting on report knocked train out less than 10 minutes later.
14 Able Shelled could not locate positions
14 Fox Shelled could not locate positions
15 Dog Reported enemy troops active in barracks area Q353738. Reported observation tower at Q355744 again and one of a string of pill-boxes at Q359741. (vicinity near Saarbrucken)
15 Baker Reported 30 enemy vehicles convoy moving on main road toward Forbach at Q450620 suspect P-47 took action, not sure. (vicinity just southeast of Forbach)
15 Baker Reported gun position near railroad at Q395663 and Ack- Ack positions at Q394664 and Q380664. Also enemy observation on high tower on hill at Q392652. Outpost shelled buildings next to it destroyed. No movement allowed here a night.
15 Fox At 0725 Hours enemy patrol trying to enter town where post was located was routed by Infantry. Homes in town were searched by Infantry and found 2 machine guns in church steeple, small arms, two radios and 14 Germans
15 Able Civilian sniper again shooting at observer from 1300 to 1630 Hours. Could not locate.
16 Baker Enemy personnel in tower on hill at Q392652. Two ME- 109's orbiting over Forbach.
16 Dog Post shelled. Artillery spotter at Q355744. (vicinity of northwest of Saarbrucken)
17 Baker Reported train going Northeast from Forbach at Q298678. Mortar fire hit observation post, another shell hit near observer as he ran for shelter.
17 Able Sniper active again, still could not locate
17 Fox Reported tank and machine gun fire at Q630639 and unidenti- fied vehicle at Q452627 (vicinity of Forbach)
17 Charley Radio set had to be left when post was shelled directly, Radio O.K. after barrage.
17 Dog P-47 knocked down at Q345775 by enemy Ack-Ack (vicinity of Saarlautern). Reported one FW-190 south of station (located east of Emulterbach just north of St. Avold)
18 Fox German patrol nearby, routed by Infantry. Enemy pill box at Q420630 and trench east of it. Machine gun and small arms fire 500 yards from O.P (vicinity of Forbach)
18 Charley Chased out of pill box outpost by artillery shelling.
18 Dog Told to leave station by Infantry. Orders changed half hour later by S-2 of 3rd Battalion of 10th Infantry Regiment (5th Infantry Division). Told to stay and watch for paratroopers, said they would provide protection in case of expected counter attack.
19 Fox Sighted two Germans coming over the ridge north of outpost, then disappeared in wooded area. A short while later they were noticed entering lower end of town. Pfc J. T. Burks flushed them out of a house in the lower end of town. They were wearing civilian clothes. Said they were deserting the German army. Destroyed antenna on house but could not find radio.
19 Dog Still supplying aircraft warning for Infantry.
20 Fox Heavy artillery and mortar fire on town of post weather too bad to locate.
20 Dog Had to leave outpost and move back five miles.
20 Baker Enemy patrol in town. Two prisoners taken from patrol by Infantry
21 Fox Three Germans at Q420628 east of OP. Later 20 Germans at Q420623. Gun position four 150-mm Q425624 (Bushbach). Enemy observation post at Q439634 in church steeple. Enemy patrol of eight men 500 yards from OP.
21 Baker Had report on enemy vehicles moving down road under smoke screen but proved false.
22 Fox Shelled by 150 mm believed railroad gun.
22 Charley Had to withdraw to the next town back. Germans counter attacked. One vehicle was sent back to next town. Vehicle was chased by artillery fire. OP was kept there until enemy neared town. Town was later retaken. OPO moved back, shell fire heavy.
22 Able Shells landing near station.
23 Fox Enemy convoy northeast of post one mile.
23 Charley Enemy artillery position Q498634 in factory courtyard 300 yards by 100 yards. Brick shelters around guns. Enemy observ- er from smoke stack in courtyard (vicinity north of Saargemund)
24 For Heavy machine gun fire one mile north
24 Charley Enemy firing on troops of newly arriving Seventh Army troops. Severe damage to troops and equipment Guns from Q495634. (vicinity north of Saargemund)
27 Fox Heavy artillery barrage. Heavy machine gun fire northeast of OP. All stations connected to other unit in vicinity for reports.
JANUARY 1945
Jan 1
On January 1, 1945 Gen. Patton issued Third Army General Order No 1 as follows:
To the Officers and men of the Third Army and
To Our Comrades of the XIX Tactical Air Command
From the bloody corridor at Avranches, to Brest, thence across France to the Saar, over the Saar into Germany , and now on to Bastogne, your record has been one of continuous victory. Not only have you invariably defeated a cunning and ruthless enemy, but also you have overcome by your indomitable fortitude every aspect of terrain and weather. Neither heat nor dust nor floods nor snow have stayed your progress. The speed and brilliancy of your achievements are unsurpassed in military history.
Recently I had the honor of receiving at the hands of the 12th Army Group Commander, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, a second Oak Leaf Cluster to the DSM. This award was bestowed on me, not for what I have done, but because of what you have achieved. From the bottom of my heart I thank you.
My New Year wish and sure conviction for you is that, under the protection of Almighty God and the inspired leadership of our President and the High Command, you will continue your victorious course to the end that tyranny and vice shall be eliminated, our dead comrades avenged, and peace restored to a war-weary world.
In closing, I can find no fitter expression for my feelings than to apply to you the immortal words spoken by General Scott at Chapultepec when he said: "Brave rifles, veterans, you have been baptized in fire and blood and have come out steel".
G.S Patton, Jr.
Lieut. General
Commanding
The 4th Armored Division seized and held a corridor into the town of Bastogne.
In the 563rd GO2 moved Post George to Neufchateau, Post How to Betrix, Post Jig to Offagne, Post King to St. Marie and Post Love to Bercheux.
XIX TAC flew 469 sorties in excellent weather. XIX TAC accounted for destroying or damaging 195 motor vehicles, 274 railroad cars and 42 tanks and armored vehicles. Photographs indicating routes available to the Germans for their expected withdrawal from Bastogne were forwarded to command headquarters by Photo Reconnaissance.
Jan 2
In the Third Army Senonchamps and Mande St. Etienne were captured by the 9th Armored Division.
XIX TAC flew 407 sorties in 42 missions. XIX TAC shot down 5 German planes (losing 7 or their own) and claimed damage or destruction of 55 armored vehicles and tanks, 180 motor vehicles, 323 railroad cars and 12 locomotives.
Jan 3
Third Army G-2 estimated that there is 93,000 German troops, the equivalent of 12 divisions and 209 tanks or assault guns on the front. In the Third Armuy's III Corps the 35th Infantry Divisions gained positions to attack the town of Berle.
On January 3rd FDP5 moved to a location near Longwy which is about 18 miles west of Luxembourg City. From this location they had excellent coverage of the Bulge area from the western side of the action. The 738th Signal Air Warning Company found splendid quarters consisting of a chateau and two houses all steam heated. FDP3 which was still located near Luxembourg City also had excellent coverage of the battle area from the southern side. The following LW platoons were relieved from attachment as follows
Lt. Roberts' platoon from attachment to Company A
Lt. Martinsen's platoon from Company B
Lt. Altman's platoon from Company B
Lt. Cobbs' platoon from Company C
Lt. Kenny's platoon from Company C
GO1 moved Post Able to Methorn, Post Dog to Herrersdorf and Post Fox to Enschwin. GO3 Moved Post Mike to La Roche, Post Oboe to Bande, Post Peter to Ortho and Post Roger to Beausaint. Ground Observer Platoon GO4 was relieved from attachment to Company A and attached to Company C.
XIX TAC had poor flying weather which prohibited any air activity.
Jan 4
In the 563rd GO4, commanded by Lt. Duncan, was attached to FDP3 as a reinforcement on January 4th and was placed along the Mossele River. Post Uncle was just below the much contested city of Echternach. Most of the posts were subjected to enemy artillery fire and Tare Post was hit. Cpl Merle F. Livingstone and Cpl Joseph G Mazur were wounded and both men received the purple heart. Cpl Mazur was wounded in the arm by a shell fragment and Cpl Livingstone was wounded in the shoulder and leg. Cpl Livingstone went back one day after treatment but Mazur's was hospitalized for a few days and was under medical supervision then returned back to duty. Movements by GO4 were Post Sugar from W of Tromborn to Junglinster, Post Tare from Wolfingen to Briebweiler, Post Uncle from SW of Ruhlingen to SE of Herborn, Post Victor from Buschbach to Canach and Post William from Kochern to E of Flaxweiler. BACU3 moved to Jury. GO2 moved Post George to Neufcheateau, Post How to Bettrix, Post Jig to Offange, Post King to St. Marie and Post Love to Bercheux. GO3 moved Post Mike to Rambourch, Post Oboe from to Vichten, Post Peter to Schwidbelborough, Post Queen to Wolwelange and Post Roger to Ospern. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Oberdorff, Post Tare to Briebweilerand Post Victor to Conach. FDP5 moved from Marhange to Longwy and this site proved to be ideal for MEW operations, having little permanent echoes in any direction. BACU3 was moved from E of Tromborn to Jury.
XIX TAC grounded by adverse weather conditions.
Jan 5
XIX TAC flew 191 sorties, directed primarily at marshaling yards and enemy airfields. XIX TAC did manage to hit 127 railroad cars during operations.
Jan 6
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 87th Infantry Division cleared Tillet which is about 8 miles west of Bastogne.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the towns of Goesdorf and Dahl were captured.
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Oboe to Victen, Post Peter to Schwidelborough Post Queen to Bigonville. GO4 moved Post Victor to Bons. Lt. George E. Mowrer was appointed Battalion Fire Marshal.
XIX TAC air operations socked in 7 No flying due to poor weather.
Jan 7
The XIX TAC could fly neither their fighters or bombers due to bad weather.
Jan 8
XIX TAC area overcast and cloudy skies prohibited air activity.
Jan 9
By January 9th the Third Army was attacking on a broad front with the XII Corps on the right, the III Corps in the center and the VIII Corps on the left and the Germans were being pushed back.
In the 563rd LW6 (close support unit) reported into the FDP3 network equipped with an SCR-584 the controllers vector the fighter bombers over to the close support unit site. These flights are picked up by the SCR-584 and vectored to their targets. The SCR- 584 controller can do pin point bombing through haze and other weather conditions that normally impede accurate bombing. The close support is sited by Engineers and is as accurate as any radar can possibly be. This was a good application of the unit but later on the XIX TAC would put the these units under control of the Air liaison Officer of the Corps and be designated BACU units who sometimes had to use D/F units to locate their incoming fighter bomber.
XIX TAC area weather was bad managed to send out 24 sorties in escort of bomber missions.
Jan 10
In the 563rd Company C announced the formation of 4 FDP information center teams to handle the reporting, communications and filtering in the FDP. The crew chief's of these teams were S/Sgt Fred Dillman, Sgt Peter Degennaro, Tech/5th Alexander Jef- ferson and Tech/5th Martin . They also reported tracks on the filter board that were identified by the Fighter Control Center as hostile. Close supervision of these tracks showed that their speed was only 40 miles per hour. GO2 Ground Observer Platoon of Company B was attached to Company A for tactical employment they were relocated by FDP1 along a line from near St. Avold west to Villers- Stoncourt and they were place as follows.
Post Fox to Weiler
Post George to Zimmingen
Post How to Kammern
Post Jig to NE of Kreuzwald
Post King to Mertenbach about 4 miles NE of St. Avold
Post Love to Villers-Stoncourt about 12 Miles SE Metz
GO1 moved Post Fox to Fortweiler. GO2 moved Post George to Zimmingen, Post How to Fowewiler, Post Jig to Kreuzwald, Post King to Mertenbach and Post Love to Villers-Stoncourt. GO3 moved Post Peter to Grevels.
XIX TAC area had good weather allowed flying. During operations totaling 325 sorties, 182 tons of general purpose bombs were dropped on German troops. In the day's operations, either damaged or destroyed were 246 motor vehicles, 14 tanks and armored vehicles, 145 railroad cars and 4 bridges.
Jan 11
In the 563rd an identification of the slow moving targets spotted by Post Fox on 10 January were checked out with attached AAA and it showed that these were their weather balloons. FDP1 moved to Neufchef. GO1 moved Post Fox to Schonbruck. GO3 moved Post Mike to Greves.
XIX TAC had air activity
Jan 12
In the 563rd FDP1 moved Ground observer Fox from E of Rigbangen to Weiler. FDP1 moved to near Neufchef which is 7 miles southwest of Thionville. This move was made by the Leap-frog method insuring a continuous operation of the FDP. This site was the first time since arriving on the continent that Company A was bivouacked in buildings. This put them on the eastern edge of the Bulge and at an ideal pivot location where they were oriented to attack east on the right side of the Third Army when the attack would resume eastward. GO3 moved Post Peter to Heidersheid and Post Roger to Hostert.
XIX TAC area bad weather precluded air action.
Jan 13
In the Third Army area a fighter pilot was on a artillery reconnaissance mission with the VIII Corps and on completion was asked to verify a report of enemy armor moving south into Houffal- ize and he reported a mixed column of 60 vehicles moving into town. The VIII Corps artillery adjusted their guns according to the information received from the pilot and started a 3 battalion time- on-target concentration on the Germans. The pilot also vectored in a squadron of fighter bombers to bomb and strafe the enemy columns. He also circled the area, locating 2 enemy antiaircraft batteries on which he adjusted two 155-mm battalions. Destruction of the enemy column was thorough.
In the 563rd BACU2 moved to Arsdorf.
XIX TAC in a total 551 sorties flown, cutting 25 railroad lines and claiming 137 motor vehicles, 168 railroad cars and 40 factories.
Jan 14
In the Third Army XX Corps the 94th Infantry Division captured the town of Berg.
In the 563rd GO Queen reported that they were being fired upon by enemy artillery. The last hit 100 yards away. The shelling ceased after a short time without any damage or casualties. GO3 moved Post Oboe to Schandeld and Peter Cruchten. GO4 moved Post William to Flaxweiler.
XIX TAC total claims of 7 enemy aircraft, 410 motor vehicles, 52 armored vehicles and tanks, 74 railroad cars and 10 locomotives were made after flying 633 sorties.
Jan 15
In the 563rd the Battalion was subjected to a general inspection by the Inspector Generals Department of XIX TAC and all companies and the Battalion were given a superior rating. On Maj. Kenneth B. Grigsby was assigned to the 563rd and appointed Battalion Surgeon. GO3 moved Post Roger to Surre. T/Sgt Robert J. Simon and Pfc Fred W. Bonness wee released from Company C and the 563rd and sent to England of the first leg of their journey home. They had served in Iceland before being assigned to the 563rd and had been with Company C since they joined. Having spent three years overseas they were eligible to be sent home. The tragedy was that later on the 563rd was notified that they were both killed in the crash of the airplane they were on enroute to England and on their way home.
During January the XIX TAC was operating with eight fighter- bomber groups and flew 5,937 sorties. This represented 714 sor- ties less than the number flown during December, despite the fact that the command's fighter-bomber strength had been greatly augmented by transfers from other air organizations. As everywhere else on the western front, poor weather accounted for this decline. Only five of the first twelve days of the month were operational. Fortunately, superb flying weather from 13th through 16th of January and passably fair weather on the 22nd through 26th of January provided most welcome respite from the all too frequent conditions of "intermittent snow showers, low ceilings and ten- tenths cloud." A total of 3,616 sorties was flown on these nine days, representing slightly over 61 percent of the total effort for January. Operating mainly in the Bastogne area and on the southern flank of the German withdrawal, fighter-bombers carried out sustained operations against enemy road and rail transport, gun positions, and concentrations of troops and supplies. Very successful attacks were also staged upon numerous enemy-held places in Luxembourg and upon German towns and villages north and south of the Moselle. In addition to these armed reconnaissance operations, the fighter-bombers in the inner zone of interdiction, and also attacked several airfields east of the Rhine. Finally, in conjunction with the medium bomber bridge interdiction program, they attacked a number of road bridges south of the Moselle and along the Our River.
Jan 16
XIX TAC flew 504 sorties. German planes flew out to meet them. Out of the contact 14 German planes were shot down and 5 American planes lost.
Jan 17
In the Third Army a very heavy harassing and interdiction artillery program was conducted on this date and on all escape routes available to the Germans leaving the Ardennes area. This program was fired by all available artillery of the III, VIII and XII Corps.
XIX TAC listed only limited claims because of poor visibility.
Jan 18
XIX TAC area had bad weather keeping aircraft on the ground.
Jan 19
In the 563rd Lt. Harold E. Waeckerle was placed on temporary duty with the XIX TAC in the Signal Section.
XIX TAC flew 149 sorties. Only light claims were made due to poor visibility.
Jan 20
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Roger to Harlange. GO4 moved Post Victor to Syren. Lt. William A. Wright was appointed Battalion Gas Officer and Lt. Paul E. Rapp was relieved of that assignment. Maj. Maurice E. Byrne was appointed Battalion Security Officer in addition to his other duties. Lt. Robert A. Homan was assigned from Company D to Headquarters Company and appointed Battalion S-3 in addition to his other duties.
XIX TAC flew 10 sorties.
Jan 21
In the Third Army's III Corps area the towns of Wiltz, Noertrange, Niederwitz, Bruhl and Brachtenbach were captured.
In the Third Army's XII corps the 4th Armored Division captured Fouhren.
On January 21st the FDP3 controller on duty was Lt. Salfen and he received a call from Toyshop for help to the closest airfield in the city of Luxembourg. The plane was a P38 and it passed over the site going NNE at 1217 hours and landed at the airfield AP7 at 1220. Lt. Salfen later told the filter officer on duty that General Quesada was in the plane and wanted help. The general later sent his thanks to the controller.
XIX TAC had poor weather conditions which kept aircraft grounded.
Jan 22
In the Third Army VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division entered Bois de Rouvroy and crosses the German Border.
In the 563rd LW1 was moved to Tromborn which is 12 miles northwest of St. Avold. On January 22nd Company C was visited by war correspondents Marjorie Avery of the Detroit Free Press and Catherine Coyne of the Boston Herald. The ladies of the press interviewed the men of Company C headquarters which was located several miles south of Luxembourg City. No doubt they also reported on the Third Army Headquarters who were located in Luxembourg City and occupying the previous quarters used by Gen. Bradley's 12th Army Group just prior to the Battle of the Bulge. In the XIX TAC this was the command's most successful day (see XIX TAC Intelligence Report on the following page) its aircraft found the roads near Viaden and Dashburg choked with every sort of enemy vehicle -- motor, armored, and horse drawn. This congestion had been brought about by the medium bomber's operations earlier that morning inflicting heavy damage on the Dasburg road bridge. Attacking the bumper-to-bumper columns with rockets, high explo- sives and incendiaries, and repeatedly strafing them from one end to the other, the fighter-bombers inflicted frightful losses upon the enemy. The pilots claimed 1,177 motor vehicles destroyed and damage to another 536. The havoc inflicted upon the enemy was achieved at a loss of only eight fighter aircraft, although not one of the attacking planes escaped varying degrees of damage from the enemy's motorized antiaircraft units which tried in vain to ward off the devastating aerial blows. The days success elicited messages of recognition from Generals Arnold, Spaatz and Vandenbe- rg.
Jan 23
In the Third Army area the Germans launched a strong tank- infantry counter attack against the XX Corps to regain the town of Berg held by 94th Infantry Division.
Gen. Weyland sent this message to his troops on January 23,1945:
Following Messages from Spaatz to Vandenberg to Weyland quoted Spaatz "Operations of the Ninth Air Force Today were most outstand- ing. Their effect on our enemy must have been terrific. My heartiest congratulations to all concerned, particularly to those pilots who made five sorties during the day". General Vandenberg added " for performance which reflects great credit of your command and this Air Force, I add my sincere congratulations.
For information on who done it look on your own operations reports. Germans claim great strategic withdrawal with only one army NYR. Yesterday was beautiful example of tactical cooperation between Recon and Fighter control, ground control and fighter. I am plenty proud of you all.
From Weyland to all units."
XIX TAC continued the air attacks destroying or damaging 164 motor vehicles and 29 gun positions.
Preceding is the XIX TAC A-3 Intelligence Report Morning Summary for operations from Sunrise 22 January to sunset 23 January, 1945
Jan 24
In the Third Army III Corps the 6th Armored Division takes Holler and Breidfeld
In the Third Army XII Corps the 80th Infantry Division captures Kautenbach, Alscheid and Enscherange.
In the Third Army XX Corps the 94th Infantry Division were now up against the dragon teeth of the Siegfried Line and the advance detachment cleared the mine fields.
XIX TAC flew 213 sorties, destroying or damaging 137 motor vehicles and 29 gun installations.
Jan 25
In the Third Army XII Corps 80th Infantry Division crossed the Clerf river and cleared Lellingen and Pintsch
In the Third Army XX Corps the 90th Infantry Division captured Fischbach and the 6th Armored Division captured Weiswampach.
XIX TAC flew 198 sorties, shot down 2 German planes and destroyed or damaged 240 motor vehicles.
Jan 26
On January 26,1945 General Patton issued this commendation to General Weyland on the Ardennes campaign as follows: "My dear General Weyland:
Please accept for yourself and pass on to the officers and men of your command the sincere appreciation and admiration of myself, and the officers and men of the Third Army, for your magnificent cooperation in the reduction of the Ardennes salient.
As usual, we feel that the great successes achieved are the result of the unselfish cooperation and comradeship existing between the Air and Ground troops.
We look forward to bigger and better victories in the immediate future.
Most Sincerely
G.S. Patton Jr
Lieut. General"
XIX TAC got a total of 219 motor vehicles, 145 railroad cars and 13 armored vehicles were destroyed or damaged in 189 sorties flown.
Jan 27
In the Third Army XII Corps the 5th Infantry Division captured Consthum and Hozthum and the 80th Infantry Division captured Bockholz.
XIX TAC grounded by bad weather.
Jan 28
All of the ground gained by the German Army in the Battle of the Bulge was officially regained on this date.
On January 28 the 19th Tactical Control Center move to Luxembourg City, Luxembourg.
XIX TAC had seventy sorties flow as escort for IX Bomber Command. No armed reconnaissance missions were flown.
Jan 29
In the Third Army the VIII Corps crossed the Our river with the 87th Infantry Division on the left the 4th Infantry Division in the center and the 90th Infantry Division on the right. Hemmers, Elcherath, Lommersweiler and Setz were captured.
In the 563rd BACU2 moved Llange.
XIX TAC flew 512 sorties aimed predominantly at transporta- tion, bombing and strafing 745 motor vehicles and 268 railroad cars.
Jan 30
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 87th Infantry Division attacks east, capturing Schlierbach and Rodgen and clearing Adler, Shonberg and Atzerath.
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Mike from Grevis to Eschdorf and Post Queen from Bigonville to Wiltz.
XIX TAC had 2 flight missions sent up, XIX TAC had to be recalled due to bad weather. The bad weather continued and all operations were called off for the day.
Jan 31
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 90th Infantry Division captured Heckhalenfeld, Winterselt and Eigelscheid and the 87th Infantry Division captured Heum and Laudesfeld.
In the 563rd Company C January report stated the their Ground observer posts were ranged along the southern flank of the Bulge. The post's move with the front and are placed in such a manner that no aircraft, either friendly or hostile, can get through without being detected. Post Roger of GO3 is close to the city of Bastogne and gave us valuable information of our fighter bombers working over that area. Toward the end of the month most of the armed reconnaissance flights went toward the German border. and our sector quieted down. Our controllers still control missions just a few miles north of us. They also reported " most of the men living out of doors decided to fix up their tents for an expected cold spell. They did a good job on their tents and Tech/5th Kenneth L. Olson and his men decided to build a house instead of winterizing their tents. After about a week of hard work the house was finally completed--pinups and all. Dimensions of house ar as follows: 19 feet to the peak on the ends, sides 8 feet height and 24 feet long. The house is large enough to use as a chapel on Sunday. It has three windows and a glass door in front. It is an excellent job and an example of American Sol- dier's workmanship." Lt. William A Wright was relieved as Battalion Soldier Voting Officer. At the end of January Company C submitted a report of the radar missions as follows;
"The total number of missions controlled for the month was 170 of which 43 achieved good results. The total number of tanks vehicles, trains, troops, railroads, bridges, and marshaling yards hit is hard to determine because a good many of the targets are in enemy territory. The pilots can sometimes tell how good of a job they did on their targets or the flights following can see the results. Below is a list of missions controlled and the results achieved:
1 Jan
Serum Leader. Target--tanks at L4040. Did very well on tanks and strafed several trucks.
Flapper Leader. Target--area L3845. Hit 10 tanks.
Cherry Leader. Armed Reconnaissance--Saarbrucken area. Saw P-47's with red noses and red tails, also some with white noses and read tails in the vicinity of Q7050. Investigated but could not make certain they were hostile.
Elwood Leader. Armed Reconnaissance--Trier area, hit trains.
2 Jan
Flapper Leader. Hit marshaling yards and trains in area L6514. 10 vehicles and 2 tanks hit in area L1239 and L1045.
Tropic Leader. Hit trains and rail yard's at P8161. Then found convoy where we got plenty of flak. Ten trucks and tanks hit and strafed.
Serum Leader. Worked Trier to Daum Area. Hit a moving train and convoy of trucks.
5 Jan
Tropic Leader. Reconnaissance mission. Bombed 2 trains south of Bitburg.
Foxhunt Leader. Not assigned, but called us. We took him to target at P5774 where he found enemy vehicles for strafing. No flak.
10 Jan
Flapper Leader on mission W51-3. Bombed railroad cars and did armed reconnaissance in the area.
Serum Leader. Bombed flak positions, railroad cars
Schooner leader. On mission to hit bridge at P916840. Bombed and hit target.
Browning Leader. Target at P8385. Hit and strafed enemy convoy and tanks.
13 Jan
Klondike Leader. Worked bridges near L1020, did Bitburg.
Basher Leader. target at P9065. Tanks and motor transport.
Fairdawn Leader. Armed Reconnaissance, bombed lots of motor transport.
Rosco Leader. Rosco over to Clearview for target at P6400. Clear tanks at P6355. Shot rockets many hits.
Fairdawn Leader. Found 2 towns, motor transport and tanks in woods.
15 Jan
Rosco Leader on mission W51-8. Worked vicinity P6590, hit trucks and tanks
Klondike Leader. Found marshaling yards and bombed same.
22 Jan
Rosco Leader over target area in vicinity of P8757. Hit troops and vehicles.
23 Jan
Serum Leader. Hit lots of motor transport in area of P8275.
Flapper Leader. Vectored flapper to P9872. He found many motor transports and hit same.
24 Jan
Plastic Leader. Saw railroad well camouflaged, also tanks in woods. Hit concentration at L1202.
Elwood Leader. Bombed flak positions and also strafed vehicles and bombed three bridges in vicinity of L1353.
25 Jan
Browning Leader. Received target tank target at P7656. Could not locate that target so bombed P8250, hit about 15 vehicles.
26 Jan
Schooner Leader. Bombed and strafed vehicles going east in vicinity of P8364. Hit convoy along Our River.
Serum Leader. Took him to bridge at L4348. Hit bridge and some motor transport.
29 Jan
Schooner Leader. Dropped bombs and hit 2 motor vehicles with troops at P8264 and L3954.
Schooner Leader. Bombed CP at P9062.
Jampip Leader. Prum and St. Vith area. Sighted over 400 motor transport vehicles.
Fairdawn Leader. Over target at L5662. Hit bridge three times."
XIX TAC had bad weather which prevailed for the day preventing engaging the enemy in any activity.
FEBRUARY 1945
During most of February, the Third Army was slowly pushing forward through the mud and slush of melting snows in the rugged Eifel terrain and along the north bank of the Moselle, the primary program of XIX TAC's fighter-bombers was rail and road interdic- tion. There were the usual missions of armed reconnaissance against defended localities and marshaling yards, rail-cutting, bomber escort, alert patrol and as the month wore on, attacks against airdromes, fuel and ammunition dumps, and motor transport depots. Notable success was achieved against road and railway bridges in the area along the Moselle, especially at Bullay, Eller, and Nonnweiler. Many successful sorties were also flown in direct cooperation with the ground forces, particularly in connection with the establishment of bridgeheads over the numerous rivers were heavy enemy fire and swift currents made crossing operations difficult. The steadily mounting destruction of enemy transport and equipment was highlighted by attacks on February 23rd, when an aggregate of 527 sorties was flown, and 269 tanks and armored vehicles, 1,308 railroad cars and 724 motor vehicles were claimed destroyed or damaged.
When toward the close of February, the Third Army plunged through the Sigfried Line and then in March commenced lightning- like drives across the Moselle into the enemy's rear, the fighter- bombers were presented with a happy hunting ground. The dis- organization and confusion wrought among the enemy by the three converging attacks from the north, west, and south brought about a precipitate attempt at evacuation. The resultant congestion of all types of vehicles on roads leading eastward was tremendous. Fortunately, with the exception of the period from the March 4th through the March 8th when a total of only 59 combat sorties was flown, the weather permitted large scale operations daily. Alert tactical reconnaissance kept a vigil of all roads, spotting large concentrations of retreating enemy transport and then leading the fighter-bombers to the kill. Records of sorties flown and claims of destruction of transport were established one day, only to be surpassed within a few days.
Feb 1
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 90th Infantry Division captured Grublangenfeld and Heckhuscheid.
In the 563rd Pfc Francis A. Reinboldt was transferred in from the 128th Replacement Bn and assigned to Headquarters Company.
XIX TAC had Thirty-two sorties were flown, all of them being in escort for medium bombers.
Feb 2
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 87th and 90th Infantry Divisions captured Bleailf, Radscheid, Krewinkel, Betrtherath, Weckerath and Losheim.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the Corps Artillery attacked a group of enemy tanks just east of Kreuzweiler with a time on target concentration of by seven Battalions of Artillery.
In the 563rd Company C reported that a number of the privates in the company were promoted to PFC. They also reported that the communications to the Tactical Control Center now includes a wire line. This means of communication is the best one for reporting and more valuable information is passed over land line than can possibly get over RFM or CW radio. The following day Company C reported that the tie with local AAA was changed from Maestro to Madonna, this was the start of the AAA outfits moving away from the city of Luxembourg.
XIX TAC flew 414 sorties, aimed mostly at railroad facilities. XIX TAC cut 29 rail lines and damaged or destroyed 585 railroad cars and 32 locomotives.
Feb 3
In the Third Army the XX Corps Artillery laid on 155-mm howitzer fire to harass and interdict the enemy's rear echelons.
In the 563rd Tech/5 Harold E. Gerrietts was transferred from Headquarters Company to Company B. Flight Officer Bigsby of the RAF stayed three days at FDP3 and made changes on both the type 15 and type 11 radars and Lt. Charles A. Stewart said he improved the coverage and the system of height finding. On February 4th FDP3 reported an unusual track on the filter table at 1645 hours. The Third Army front had 6 aircraft tracks then suddenly increased to 16 tracks. A later check showed that these planes were dropping surrender and other leaflets on the German front lines. The operators first thought that the planes were dropping window but it did not jam the radar. The Tactical Control Center cleared it up. Battalion Headquarters received XIX TAC General Orders 9 awarded the Bronze Star Medal to Lt. Lawrence A Keefer in recognition of meritorious service in connection with military operations against the enemy from 12 Sept 1944 to 21 January 1945.
XIX TAC had 3 Air operations were limited by the weather, made 3 uneventful escort missions.
Feb 4
In the 563rd Lt. Eugene A. Tikalsky, Lt. Edward R. Krause and Lt. Herbert A. Taper were assigned to Headquarters Company from XIX TAC. Pfc Ralph W. Cline was transferred in from the 14th Replace- ment Depot and assigned to Headquarters Company. Tech/5 Claude L. Robinson was transferred in from the 134th Replacement Bn and assigned to Company C. S/Sgt Hugh J. McGarrible was transferred in from the 134th Replacement Bn and assigned to company D. Lt. John J. Reynolds, Jr was appointed Battalion Savings Officer in addition to his other duties. WOJG Reginald L. Stark was appointed investigating officer in cases involving violations set forth in the Geneva Convention. FDP2 moved to Asselborn, Luxembourg which is about 55 miles north of Luxembourg City near the Belgian border. This site was the closest to the front line that FDP2 had operated up to that time. The weather had turned worse at the beginning of the week. The snow which had no chance to melt because of the below freezing temperature was melted by a warm rain and added to the swollen, overflowing streams. The roads did not drain because of ruts and seemingly bottomless mud-holes. With all these adverse conditions the move was made in good time. The new site proved to be a problem from the first day with transportation being hampered by the mud. A corduroy road was the only answer to the problem. Without this road it would have been impossible to obtain supplies and other essentials. On the other hand the site proved to be excellent for tactical purposes. It was proven from daily operations that a much greater distance of control of aircraft is possible than at other previous sites. FDP2 moved from St. Marie to N of Asselborn. GO3 moved Post Oboe from Schandel to Boursche- id.
XIX TAC had bad weather which prohibited any operations, with the exception of 2 planes which performed weather reconnaissance.
Feb 5
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 90th Infantry Division cleared Habscheid and the 4th Infantry Division captured Brands- cheid and Schlausenbach.
The 19 TCG Tactical Control Center moved to the city of Luxembourg and took over the FDP3 tie in with the AAA group. Lt. Stewart, the FDP3 Filter Officer, said
"the tie in was profitable to both FDP3 and the AAA and on occasion when the aircraft were too close to FDP3 site for us to see them, the radar in the AAA group would furnish information on the tracks, also FDP3 used AAA information to check the calibration of FDP3 radar sets and the accuracy of the type 11 height finding".
In doing so the TCC took over the telephone tie previously set up.
XIX TAC had no flying because of bad weather.
Feb 6
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division Attacked the West Wall and advanced two miles southeast and entered Berg.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area both the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions cross the Sauer river.
XIX TAC flew 214 sorties. XIX TAC either damaged or destroyed 272 motor vehicles, 13 armored vehicles and tanks,s 245 railroad cars and 30 buildings.
Feb 7
In the Third Army the VIII Corps was meeting strong resistance to deepen penetrations of the West Wall. In the III Corps area assault elements of the 6th Armored Division and the 17th Airborne Division crossed the Our River and the German border and although the enemy gave strong resistance after they recovered from the surprise the 6th Armored Division constructed bridges and moved additional forces across during the day. By February 7th the line of resistance of the Third Army was restored along the Our River by the Third Army and the German Counter attack was over. In the XII Corps area attacks were made across the Our and Sauer rivers between Vianden and Echternach with the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions and although the artillery support was strong the swift current of the river and heavy artillery fire from the West Wall limited the number of crossings and prevented bridging. In the XX Corps area attacks were made by the 94th Infantry Division on German pockets in Tettengen and the 26th Infantry Division began a series of local actions in the Saarlautern-Roden bridgehead sector.
In the 563rd LW2 moved to Lutz. For this movement Company C was cited by Battalion Headquarters to Commend them for "an extremely rapid move under very adverse conditions". GO3 moved Post Roger to Roders.
XIX TAC had sorties were flown due to poor weather.
According to the War Department "History of the United States Army in World War II Series, European Theater Operations" and contained in "The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge" edited by Hugh M. Cole, the Battle of the bulge extended from 16 December 1944 through 7 February 1945. Following is a list of positions during this time frame in Belgium and Luxembourg. The coordinate system is the combat map grids of this period. It is known that the government of Belgium awarded a Fourragere for action from the 16 Dec to 25 Jan in Belgium however the award must be by specific decree of the Belgium Government. Solicitation of foreign awards is prohibited and a foreign award must have been approved by the Department of the Army within one year. Both the French and Luxem- bourg Governments have been known to award a Croix-de-Guerre to units. The Department of the Army states that none of these awards are automatic.
Following is a list of 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion sites in Luxembourg and Belgium that were occupied during the Battle of the Bulge.
Belgian Sites
Unit Near Town Date Grid Coordinate Co B Hq Ste. Marie 24 Dec-03 Feb P426208 FDP2 Plt Ste. Marie 24 Dec-03 Feb P426208 Co B Hq Asselborm 04 Feb-07 Mar P733691 FDP2 Plt Asselborn 04 Feb-07 Mar P733691 BACU2 Plt Lullange 29 Jan-01 Mar P879715 LW2 Plt Harbay-La-Neuve 28 Dec-6 Feb P480320 LW2 Plt Lutz 07 Feb-09 Mar P787744 GO2 Plt post G Neufchateau 01 Jan-03 Jan P351408 GO2 Plt post G Neufchateau 04 Jan-09 Jan P438409 GO2 Plt post H Bertrix 01 Jan-03 Jan P224430 GO2 Plt post H Bertrix 04 Jan-09 Jan P218425 GO2 Plt post J Offange 01 Jan-03 Jan P163462 GO2 Plt post J Offange 04 Jan-09 Jan P183484 GO3 Plt post M LaRoche 03 Jan-04 Jan P488761 GO3 Plt post O Bande 03 Jan-04 Jan P351741 GO3 Plt Post P Ortho 03 Jan P465720 GO3 Plt Post Q Wolwelange 04 Jan P548384 GO3 Plt Post R Beausaint 03 Jan P427779 Luxembourg Sites Unit Near Town Date Grid Coordinate 563rd SAW Bn Audin-Le-Tische 28 Dec-09 Feb U720985 Co C Hq Hesperance 22 Sep-07 Mar P835100 FDP3 Plt Hesperance 22 Sep-07 Mar P035100 LW3 Plt Fischbach 29 Sep-12 Mar P870297 BACU1 Plt Reuland 28 Dec P919269 LW6 Plt Reuland 28 Dec P918270 GO3 Plt Post O Waldbilig 27 Dec-02 Jan P940357 GO3 Plt Post O Vichten 04 Jan-13 Jan P759359 GO3 Plt Post O Schandeld 14 Jan-25 Feb P735340 GO3 Plt Post P Ortho 03 Jan P465720 GO3 Plt Post P Schwidelborough 04 Jan-09 Jan P645380 GO3 Plt Post P Grevels 10 Jan-11 Jan P690417 GO3 Plt Post P Heidersheid 12 Jan-13 Jan P738445 GO3 Plt Post P Grevels 14 Jan-27 Feb P690417 GO3 Plt Post Q Stegen 27 Dec-03 Jan P975379 GO3 Plt Post Q Wolwelange 04 Jan-05 Jan P584384 GO3 Plt Post Q Bigonville 06 Jan-29 Jan P601406 GO3 Plt Post Q Wiltz 30 Jan-12 Feb P708530 GO3 Plt Post Q Weicherdangfe 13 Feb-26 Feb P948614 GO3 Plt Post R Beausaint 03 Jan P427779 GO3 Plt Post R Ospern 04 Jan-11 Jan P683331 GO3 Plt Post R Hostert 12 Jan-15 Jan P658362 GO3 Plt Post R Surre 16 Jan-19 Jan P682263 GO3 Plt Post R Harlange 20 Jan-06 Feb P607496 GO3 Plt Post R Roders 07 Feb-12 Feb P880548 GO3 Plt Post R Heinersheid 13 Feb-26 Feb P820673 GO4 Plt Post T Briebweiler 04 Jan-03 Mar P945326 GO4 Plt Post U Herborn 04 Jan-06 Mar L059283 GO4 Plt Post V Conach 04 Jan-05 Jan P981135 GO4 Plt Post V Bons 06 Jan-19 Jan P972095 GO4 Plt Post V Syren 20 Jan-24 Feb P922095 GO4 Plt Post W Flaxweiler 14 Jan-23 Feb L010191
The Rhineland Campaign Phase extended from February 8th to March 19th.
FEBRUARY 1945.
During most of February the Third Army was slowly pushing forward through the mud and slush of melting snows in the rugged Eifel terrain and along the north bank of the Moselle, the primary program of the XIX TAC's fighter-bombers was rail and road interdiction. There were the usual missions of armed reconnais- sance against defended localities and marshaling yards, rail- cutting, bomber escort, alert patrol and as the month wore on, attacks against airdromes, fuel and ammunition dumps and motor transport depots. Notable success was achieved against road and rail bridges in the area along the Moselle, especially at Bullay, Eller and Nonnweiler. Many successful sorties were also flown in direct cooperation with the ground forces, particularly in con- nection with the establishment by VIII and XII Corps of bridgeheads over the numerous rivers where heavy enemy fire and swift currents made crossing operations difficult.
During this phase the Third Army was attacking east with the VIII Corps on the left, the XII Corps in the center and the XX Corps at the right. The VII Corps had the 11th Armored Division, the XII corps the 4th Armored Division and the XX Corps the 10th and 12th Armored Divisions.
Feb 8
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 4th Infantry Division captured 4th Infantry Division captured Condenbret and Hermespand sad.
In the Third Army's XII Corps expands the bridgehead near Dillingen.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 94th Infantry Division captures Sinz.
XIX TAC reported 30 locomotives, 452 railroad cars, 43 tank and armored vehicles, 173 motor vehicles and 153 buildings either damaged or destroyed in 314 sorties. XIX TAC lost a total of 3 planes.
Feb 9
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 87th Infantry Division captures Neuendorf, the 4th Infantry Division captures Gondenbrett.
In the 563rd FDP3 reported that GO3 Post Uncle had been spotted and fired upon by German Artillery. There were no cas- ualties.
XIX TAC flew 192 sorties, dropped 91 tons of bombs and attack 15 military installations and 8 marshaling yards. XIX TAC also cut 14 rail lines and destroyed or damaged 161 railroad cars.
Feb 10
In the Third Army area road conditions are extremely poor and handicap the flow of supplies and equipment to the front lines. In the VIII Corps area the 4th Infantry Division attacks Prum from the west.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters moved from Audun Le Tiche to Villerupt. They occupied the buildings vacated by members of the 19th TCG.
XIX TAC flew 136 sorties despite bad weather. The fighter bombers destroyed or damaged 37 motor vehicles, 131 railroad cars, 4 bridges and 17 buildings. XIX TAC attacked a total of 13 towns.
Feb 11
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division attacked and captured Harspelt and Sevenig. The 4th Infantry Division encircled Prum and the 22nd Infantry Division entered the western section of Prum.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 76th Infantry Division enlarged its bridgehead over the Sauer river.
In the 563rd Company C submitted the following report;
" For the past few days it had been raining hard and the wind was blowing hard, it finally blew hard enough to do a little damage to our installation, a strong wind blew the transmission lines off the type 15 antenna putting the radar off the air for a short time until it could be repaired. The same gust of wind also blew over one of the guard shacks and the guards had to stand guard all night in the rain until the next day when the company care center repaired the shack."
Also Company C was received a commendation from Col. J. H. Madison, Commanding Officer of the 16th AAA Group which read as follows:
"I wish to commend you for your splendid cooperation with the 16th AAA Group from 23 October 1944 to 5 February 1945 in Lux- embourg City in furnishing early warning to the three AAA Gun Battalions attached to the Group.
Early warning furnished by FDP3 enabled SCR-584's of the Gun Battalions to lock on targets at maximum range and to open fire the instant enemy aircraft entered the defended area. Information given by you was especially helpful during the heavy enemy aerial activity which accompanied the German counter-offensive, and was undoubtedly instrumental in aiding the Group to accomplish its mission.
Air warning which the Group had while operating with your assistance was the best it has had since it became operational on the Continent on D-day.
J. H. Madison
Colonel, C.A.C.
Commanding
Company C was officially cited by the Battalion Commander for Excellence in preparation of the monthly Historical Report. Lt. Charles A. Stewart, who was the Company C Historical Officer in addition to his other duties was largely responsible for the superior performance of the Company in administrative matters such as this.
XIX TAC flew 171 sorties and damaged or destroyed 210 railroad cars, 21 buildings and 11 locomotives.
Feb 12
In the Third Army in the VIII Corps area the 4th Armored Division captured Prum, Germany and thus penetrating the West Wall in their area.
In the 563rd Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaum was relieved from Company C and placed on temporary duty with Battalion Headquarters. Lt. Robert P. Feldman and his LW platoon of 32 men were transferred from Company D to Company A. Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill and detachment of 4 men were transferred from Company D to Headquarters Company. Lt. Charles F. Cobbs and his LW platoon of 32 men were transferred from Company D to Company B. Pfc Albert F Shucavage and Pfc Herbert S. May, both of Company D were transferred to Company B. GO1 moved Post Charley from Furweiler to Gheltlingen.
XIX TAC had no missions flown.
Feb 13
In the Third Army about thirty tons of ammunition were dropped by parachute in the vicinity of Belialf as an experiment. Its purpose was to determine the possibilities of supporting the VIII Corps by air drop if all rear supply routes became entirely impassable due to bad road conditions and the lack of rail transportation.
In the 563rd Lt. Emry T. Altman and his LW platoon of 32 men were transferred from Company D to Company C. Ground Observer platoon GO2 were attached to Company for operations. Lt. Donald P Burns and detachment of 9 men were transferred from Company D to Company B. Lt. Martin Dworshak and detachment of 10 men were transferred from Company D to Company C. The following Officers and 32 men of Company D were transferred to Company A.
Lt. James D. Kenny
Lt. Curtis E. Owen
Lt. Oliver H. Smith
Cpl Donald W. Warley and Tech/5 Henry J. Mebonek were transferred from Company D to Company C. Both men are Medical Corps. GO3 moved Post Mike to Wahlhausen, Post Queen to Weicherdangfe and Post Roger to Heinersheid.
XIX TAC flew no missions because of bad weather.
Feb 14
In the Third Army bad road conditions forced supplies to be air dropped to VIII Corps units. Among the supplies dropped were 60,000 K rations, 15,000 gallons of diesel fuel, 1,000 rifle grenades, 1,000 trip flares nd 4,500 rounds of high explosive 80-mm mortar ammunition.
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Charley to Peringen.
XIX TAD was grounded for the third day in a row.
Feb 15
In the Third Army in the VIII Corps area the 87th Infantry Division prepares to cross the Moselle River. In the XII Corps area The 4th Armored Division attacks toward the Nehe River.
In the 563rd BACU2 was assigned to Company B. Also on February 15th Lt. Fredrick H. Fahner of Company B was promoted to First Lieutenant by order of XIX TAC. Also on February 15th Lt. David A. Pritchard, who is the Technical Officer of FDP2 was commended by the British radar officer from SHAEF for his expertise in the modification of the Type 15 radar interbay feeder system and in locating a rather difficult fault on the top aerial receiver system. The modification of the main feeder layout from the transmitter vehicle to the antenna cabin was passed on to the other Companies so they could improve their performance. GO3 moved Post Mike from Eschdorf to W of Wahlhausen, Post Queen from Wiltz to E of Weicherdange and Post Roger from Rodgers to Heinescheid.
XIX TAC dropped 108 tons of bombs during 190 sorties. XIX TAC attacked 21 towns and 9 marshaling yards.
Feb 16
In the Third Army in the VIII Corps area the 87th Infantry Division begins the assault to cross the Moselle River and advances to the outskirts of Koblenz. In the XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division secures a bridgehead on the Nahe river. In the XX Corps area the 10th Armored Division and breaks out and attacked toward Prims.
On February 16th GO3 post Victor reported one B-26 crashed 1/4 mile NE of the post. Men from Victor post went out to investigate and found that the situation was well in hand as many of our troops had already reached the scene. Hallan Leader from the 345th Fighter Group under control of FDP3 shot down 2 ME 109's at L4040 at 1530 hours. At 1548 hours Hallen Squadron under FDP3 control shot down 2 more MZ 109's making a total of four in 18 minutes. Next, Lt. James D. Tate, commanding LW3 of C Company reported on an unfortunate crash of an American P-47. It was observed approaching the LW site at about 2,000 feet altitude, leaving a smoke trail. The airplane was losing altitude fast and made an 180 degree turn beyond LW3 site and crashed 1/8 mile away. Pfc Stewart and Tech /5th Millard reached the crash site within 3 minutes of the crash, and could only open the cowling 1/2 inch when it jammed and thermite went off inside burning the cockpit. No further action was possible. The wreckage burned until about 1830 Hours. LW3 men maintained guard on the remains until 1600 Hours. On February 17th the body was removed by the Ninth Air Force Medical Officer. The body was badly burned but identified by the pilots dog tags. The pilot was apparently killed instantly by impact when the airplane stuck an embankment tearing motor from fuselage and a tree sheared off the right wing. The aircraft guns had not been fired and there was no indication of flak damage. Also on February 17th Company C reported that the winter camouflage was finally removed from the radars and I/C site and replaced with the normal green nets. On February 18th Lt. William A Wright was appointed Commanding Officer of the Headquarters Company.
XIX TAC had thirty-four sorties were flown but it was reported that the bombing of a bridge killed at least 150 Germans.
Feb 17
In the Third Army in the VIII Corps area the 87th Infantry Division attacked east through Koblenz. In the XII Corps area the 90th Infantry Division cleared the seized Boppard and cleared the along the west bank of the Rhine from Boppard to St Goar. In the XX Corps area the 10th Armored Division crossed the Nahe river near Turkismuhle.
In the 563rd Cpl John McCarble was transferred in from the 134th Replacement Bn and assigned to Company B.
XIX TAC area bad weather kept aircraft on the ground.
Feb 18
In the Third Army in the VIII Corps area the 87th Infantry Division cleared Koblenz. In the XII Corp area the 4th Armored captures Bad Kreusnach east of the Nahe. In the XX Corps area the 12th Armored Division is driving toward Worms and the 10th Armored Division reaches St. Wendel.
In the 563rd Lt. William A Wright was appointed Commanding Officer of Headquarters Company and relieved of assignment as Battalion Gas Officer. Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaum was appointed battalion Gas Officer in addition to his other duties. Pfc Michael W. Lettiere, Medical Corps, was transferred from Company C to Company A.
XIX TAC had Fourteen sorties were flown accumulating only negligible results.
Feb 19
In the Third Army in the VIII Corps area the 74th Infantry Division is responsible to defend the west bank of the Rhine from Boppard to Bingen. In the XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division is making rapid progress against weakening resistance. In the XX Corps area the 12th Armored Division attacks rapidly toward the Rhine. The 10th Armored Division is clearing St. Wendel.
In the 563rd Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaum was appointed Post Exchange Officer in addition to his other duties and Lt. William A. Wright was relieved. Tech/5th William Roberts was transferred from Headquarters Company to Company B.
XIX TAC in spite of bad weather flew 279 sorties. The weather conditions did keep them from having anything except marginal results. XIX TAC destroyed 6 German planes and damaged 10 others. On the ground XIX TAC damaged or destroyed 185 railroad cars and 95 vehicles.
Feb 20
In the Third Army in the XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division advances to Worms and blocks the entrances to the city. The 11th Armored makes a rapid advance to the Rhine and clears the bypassed resistance. In the XX Corps area 12th Armored Division reaches Gruenstat and the 10th Armored Division drives to Neukirk- en.
In the 563rd T/4 Arnold J. Wienken was transferred in from the 4318 Hospital and assigned to Company B. The following men were transferred to Headquarters Company
Sgt Joseph E. La ne from Company A
Tech/5th George G. Nelms from Company C
Tech/5th Alex Brost from Company D
Pfc Herbert J. Maroon was transferred from Company B to Company A.
XIX TAC flew 174 sorties ended with 2 enemy command posts attacked and 257 vehicles destroyed or damaged.
Feb 21
In the Third Army XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division clears the west bank of the Rhine from Worms to Oppenheim. The 11th Armored Division reaches the Rhine river at 0800 hours. In the XX Corps area the 12th Armored Division reaches the outskirts of Lukdwigshafen.
XIX TAC flew 504 sorties in support missions. XIX TAC damaged or destroyed 318 vehicles, 28 armored vehicles and tanks, 575 railroad cars and 14 gun position.
Feb 22
In the Third Army XII Corps area the 5th Infantry Division assaults the Rhine at Oppenheim and begins crossing at 2200 hours. In the XX Corps area the 12th Armored Division attacks to secure a bridgehead at Speyer.
XIX TAC lost 2 of their own planes and shot down 3 German planes while flying 358 sorties. XIX TAC accounted for damage or destruction of 18 marshaling yards and the cutting of 78 railroad lines. Escort missions were flown for 25 formations of medium bombers making a widespread attack aimed primarily at rail activity.
Feb 23
In the Third Army in the XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division prepares to cross the Rhine, in the XX Corps area the 12th Armored Division attempts to establish a bridgehead at Germersheim where resistance is overcome with the aid of air support.
In the 563rd Lt. George E. Mowrer was appointed Graves Regis- tration and Personal Effects Officer. Lt. James R. Corning was transferred in from the Ninth Air Force and assigned to Company B. Capt Arthur G. Root, Jr, Lt. Jack F. Roberts, Lt. Gordon P. Wilson and team of 10 men were transferred from Company D to Headquarters Company.
XIX TAC lost six planes in 572 sorties. XIX TAC had fine weather and plentiful targets. XIX TAC destroyed or damaged 724 vehicles, 269 armored vehicles and tanks, 1,308 railroad cars, 19 gun positions, 135 buildings and 36 locomotives.
Feb 24
In the Third Army the VIII Crops completes preparation for the assault crossing of the Rhine. In the XII Corps area the Rhine bridgehead is strengthened and enlarged.
In the 563rd BACU3 moved to Obernaumen, Germany which is 13 miles northeast of Thionville. GO4 moved Post William Temmels.
XIX TAC made claims of 253 vehicles, 47 armored vehicles and tanks, 597 railway cars, 2 supply dumps and 8 marshaling yards destroyed or damaged. The work required 327 sorties in 47 missions.
Feb 25
In the Third Army VIII Corps area the 6th Armored Division begins a drive towards the Main at Frankfurt and crosses the Rhine at Oppenheim.
In the 563rd GO4 moved Post Sugar to Junglinster, Post Victor to Kirf.
XIX TAC flew 434 sorties. Their count for the day was 250 vehicles, 97 tanks and armored cars, 21 locomotives,m 692 railroad cars, 67 buildings and 26 marshaling yards damaged or destroyed. A total of 23 rail lines were cut. Out of the day's activities lost one plane.
Feb 26
On February 26th Company B tied in FDP2 with wire lines to the VIII Corps also the 113th AAA Group was tied into FDP2 to obtain information early warning information on hostile flights. GO1 moved Post Baker to Orschulz and Post Fox to Whingen.
XIX TAC area poor weather hampered air activity. Flew five missions, two of which were weather reconnaissance. The other three were armed reconnaissance missions east of the Rhine River. Two locomotives were destroyed and 6 were damaged. XIX TAC also hit 40 railroad cars.
Feb 27
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Mike to Sevenich, Post Oboe to Nashingen, Post Queen to Ameldingen and Post Roger to Houf
XIX TAC reported poor flying conditions limited flights to 112 sorties. With low, overcast skies, the planes were kept from strafing the Germans. A total of 36 bombs were dropped with only partially observed results, although it was known that 4 marshaling yards were damaged and 6 locomotives were destroyed. The XIX TAC flew 239 sorties that were mostly on escorts for medium bombers. Several German planes were encountered in the operations with losses or 4 confirmed, 2 probably destroyed and 3 damaged. There were no air losses for the XIX TAC.
Feb 28
In the Third Army the VIII Corps attacks across the Pruem river near Luneach. The XX Corps is attacking north toward Trier.
In the 563rd the February operations report of Company C reported that FDP3 had controlled 208 missions for the month involving 1,650 aircraft. Company A reported that over 200 missions were handled by FDP1. GO3 moved Post Peter to Bettingen.
Overcast conditions kept the numbers of sorties down. The XIX TAC flew 239 sorties which were mostly escorts for medium bombers. Several German fighters were encountered in the operations with a losses of 4 confirmed, 2 probably destroyed and 3 damaged. There were no losses in the XIX TAC.
The month end historical reports for February follow.
An example of the activities of a Ground Observer Platoon is given in 1st Lt. Wesley J. Howard's report on the February oper- ations in Company A. In addition to the GO1 net work into FDP1 Information Center (IC) the GO1 posts had the following reporting lines laid to other ground forces units. Air warning and Air information was exchanged for Ground information and the arrange- ment was warmly accepted by the Army units. The communications established for the period were:
Post Ground Unit
Able 3rd Cavalry Group
Baker 94th Infantry Division
Charley 43rd Cavalry Group
Dog 26th Infantry Division
Fox 26th Infantry Division
GO1 was on north south line about 18 miles east of Thionville and their log is was follows:
1 Feb
Enemy shelled Able station from 0030 to 0500 Hours. No immediate damage to station
2 Feb
Fox - reported enemy pillbox, Q353458 (near Deifenbach) and observation tower near it.
Baker - all day and every evening surrounding area was heavily shelled- counter attack expected but it did not come
7 Feb
Fox-one Liaison plane crashed east one mile from the Station. Men were sent to investigate. An investigating Officer of the 26th Infantry Division was already taking care of it.
11 Feb
Charley and Fox reported searchlights south of Station proved to be friendly.
13 Feb
Dog a branch-off of Dog Station was sent up to the immediate front lines, called Dog-Dog Station.
Dog-Dog - At 1500 hours received a request from the 26th Infantry Division to request from the Air Force to lay a smoke Screen by airplane across Saar River two miles north of Sisingen, Germany, so that boats could cross river and evacuate 12 Infantry men that were pined in a swamp by enemy fire. Many of the men had been wounded and had already spent a day and night in the swamp. The answer from higher headquarters was negative.
Baker - Could not leave station as the only exit road was under intensive artillery fire.
14 Feb
Fox - At 1020 Hours a balloon with gondola attached was reported northeast, 3 miles from station.
15 Feb
Able - at 0600 Hours reported a V-1 launch 5 miles west of Post.
Fox - At 1030 hours Balloon seen again north, 5 miles. Last seen going east at 20,000 ft.
16 Feb
Fox - At 1630 Hours Four Thunderbolts with U.S. markings strafed and bombed a convoy of trucks belonging to the 26th Infantry Division. The convoy displayed panel of the day. Two 2 1/2 ton trucks loaded with ammunition burned and one man was wounded in the leg. Thunderbolts going east, incident occurred on Highway N-54 one mile west of Station
17 Feb
Fox - At 2115 to 2130 hours intersection in front of Station was shelled. No damage to Fox Post.
21 Feb
Fox - At 1445 to 1540 Hours enemy shelled intersection with 88 shells 300 yards from Station knocking out a 3/4 ton truck and a 1/4 ton truck belonging to 26th Infantry Division.
22 Feb
Fox - At 1530 Hours Reported balloon northeast at 7,0000 feet, 4 miles from station. Friendly anti-aircraft fired at balloon.
23 Feb
Able - At 1905 Hours reported heavy ack-ack batteries circling Merzig.
24 Feb
Fox - At 2300 Hours road intersection 300 yards from Post shelled by enemy. 25
Feb
Dog - Aircraft Warning Group of 455th AAA Hq. Battalion joined this Station and is now cooperating in every way. Baker - Moved to Saar River south of Saarburg, near Freuden burg. Believe this station first through the "Tiger Teeth and into the Sigfried Line.
28 Feb
Fox - At 1530 Hours enemy patrol seen nearby we escaped into the woods.
In the February report from Company A, Lt. Wesley J. Howard also reported on some of the more outstanding missions for the month of February handled by FDP1 and these are some of the more than 200 missions handled by FDP1 during February. The report follows:
Date Call Sign Mission Group Results
2/2 Browning J-29-5 405 Destroyed majority of 40 to 50 motor vehicles in Trier Area.
2/6 Browning J-29-4 405 Armed Recce in middle of Love Sqdrn staffed trains. Hit marshaling yard and barracks.
2/9 Firebrick TYK-1 362 Contacted Beigehart and dropped food supplies to friendly troops in vicinity of Eschternach
2/14 Klondike Red XGD-1 362 Brandy assigned to look for concen- trations in Bitburg area. Found town of Badem (1937 Love) loaded with motor vehicles. Bombed same.
2/14 Klondike XGD-1 362 Assigned target at P9650 by outbreak. Got many trucks and big gun positions.
2/21 Discharge LPF 371 Attacked train at L5108 and camou- flaged marshaling yards in same vicinity.
2/23 Kismet EIB-1 371 On armed Recce for Hartfelt bombed and blew up train in L1907
The FDP3 report of controlled missions for February was submitted by Lt. Stewart as follows:
2 Feb Fairdawn Leader, 406th Fighter Group, on armed reconnais- sance hit 3 moving trains and vehicles at L8380.
6 Feb Roscoe Leader, 406th Fighter Group, on armed reconnaissance in M square hit enemy airfield at M3052 and destroyed 10 single engine planes. Firebrick Leader, 363rd Fighter Group hit marshaling yards at Trier and on a later mission hit tanks and trains on siding at L4171.
9 Feb Churchspire Leader, 354th Fighter Group, bombed and strafed trains east of Trier. Hit trucks in Bitburg area and tugboats and barges in Rhine River at F7705. Hallen Leader, 354th Fighter Group strafed and bombed convoy at L0625. Bombed towns Rittersdorf L114, Nattenheim L1359. Rover Leader, 354th Fighter Group, cut 2 railroads in Koblenz area, also hit convoy in vicinity of Bitburg. Blue Flight of Rever Leader hit train at L5468.
11 Feb Klondike Leader, 362nd Fighter Group hit trains at L0830. Argue Leader, 362nd Fighter Group bombed and strafed in vicinity of Wittlich, L3954. Firebrick Leader, 362nd Fighter Group, hit trains with about 25 freight cars and about completely destroyed them at L7040.
13 Feb Rever Squadron 354th Fighter Group, bombed and strafed 200 yellow box cars at L3548.
14 Feb Dekko Squadron, 367th Fighter Group got a few hits on railroad bridge at M0835. Flapper Squadron 368th Fighter Squad- ron,hit railroad bridge at F0945. Serum Leader 366th Fighter Group, hit railroad installations and cars at L3725.
16 Feb Hallem Leader, 354th Fighter Group, got 2 MZ 109's at L4434 and 2 more Me 109's at L7050.
20 Feb Serum Leader, 368th Fighter Group, dropped bombs on special buildings at CP. Missed building and went back to strafe. Saw tanks and trucks strafed. Some results are 1 tank aflame and 30 vehicles destroyed in vicinity of Bitburg.
23 Feb All fighter groups had a field day on German vehicles and tanks; so many vehicles were destroyed that it cannot be estimated how many were hit and destroyed
24 Feb Tropic Black, 368th Fighter Group, hit 75 cars and engines at L1943.
MARCH 1945
Mar 1
In the Third Army the XX Corps the 10th Armored Division entered Trier in the afternoon and clears it and the Moselle bridge is taken intact that night.
In the 563rd Lt. John J. Reynolds was named Safety Officer in addition to his other duties. Lt. Donald P. Burns was transferred from Company B to Company A.
XIX TAC had a total of 485 sorties were flown and XIX TAC dropped 188 tons of bombs, shot down 7 German planes, and lost 3 planes of their own. Low cloud cover caused limited visibility, but XIX TAC still were able to claim destruction or damage to 111 motor vehicles, 29 tanks and armored cars, 12 locomotives, 40 railroad cars and 63 factories.
Mar 2
In the Third Army XX Corps the 10th Armored Division captured Trier.
In the 563rd BACU2 moved to Sevenich. GO3 moved Post Peter to Schankweiler. The TCC identified a target reported by FDP3 as a jet propelled aircraft was flying over the FDP3 radar site near Luxembourg City at 35,000 feet elevation. The FDP3 control center was asked to observe it but it was so high it could not be seen. LW3 reported an unknown medium bomber one mile south and going northwest, it was in distress with one motor gone and losing altitude fast. This plane finally leveled off at 3,000 feet elevation and continued on its course. The LW's also functioned as another ground observer post.
XIX TAC flew 577 sorties through murky weather. XIX TAC had good results on targets of all types. Among their claims were 204 motor vehicles, 29 locomotives, 8 barges, 115 factory buildings, 9 fuel tanks and 1 supply depot damaged or destroyed. XIX TAC also cut 29 rail lines and 4 highway cuts and shot down 5 German planes. The XIX TA lost 3 planes.
Mar 3
In the Third Army the XII Corps 5th Infantry Division established a small bridgehead at east of Kyll.
In the 563rd Company B reported that 15 men were transferred to the Infantry to cover the current shortage of replacements.
A teletype report from XIX TAC showed a comparison ratio showed that the 368th Fighter Group which flew 6 missions or 24 sorties which were controlled by FDP2 had a high average of destroyed and damaged enemy equipment for that day. Out of 106 motor transports knocked out by the XIX TAC, the 368th Fighter Group destroyed or damaged 70 of the 24 horse drawn vehicles damaged or destroyed by XIX TAC, 12 were destroyed or damaged by the 368th. Of the 20 field guns damaged by XIX TAC all were accounted for by the 368th Fighter Group, then again on March 4th in spite of the cloudy weather and comparatively poor visibility the 368th Fighter Group had outstanding missions and also in cooperation with the VIII Corps damaged 70 motor transports, 3 armored vehicles, 12 horse drawn vehicles, 20 field guns and 10 horses.
XIX TAC had an overcast sky which prevented some of the 540 sorties from being completely successful. The majority of the sorties were flown in corps support. Among claims for the day were 224 motor vehicles, 38 tanks and armored vehicles, 245 railroad cars, 2 bridges,16 gun positions, 95 factory buildings, 22 towns, 11 marshaling yards and 1 troop concentration.
Mar 4
In the Third Army the XII Corps 5th Infantry Division expands the Kyll river bridgeheads.
In the 563rd GO3 moved Post Peter to Rettingen. GO4 moved Post Tare to Rupt and Post Victor to Irsch.
During the period of March 4th to March 8th a total of only 59 combat sorties were flown by the XIX TAC as they were limited by the weather conditions which were poor which reduced flying effectiveness. The XIX flew 6 sorties. Two for weather recon- naissance and 4 for corps support. The only claims for the day wee one rail out and one locomotive, 12 factory building and 5 railroad cars damaged or destroyed. Maj. Opdenmeyer, S-3 of 19th TCG called the FDP's with verbal orders modifying the reporting of radio jamming. The only time teletype reports are to be turned in is when flights which are controlling are completely lost due to the jamming.
Mar 5
In the Third Army the 4th Armored Division attacks northeast over the 5th Infantry Division bridgehead on the Kyrll river.
In the 563rd BACU1 moved to Trautsburg, Germany which is about 18 miles northeast of Trier. Pfc Stephen M. Dobrovitz was transferred in from the 134th Replacement Bn and assigned to GO4 Platoon, GO4 is currently attached to Company C. GO3 moved Post Mike to Bitburg, Post Peter to Gilzen, Post Queen to Oberweiler, Post Roger to Seffern. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Niederponvin.
The XIX TAC had no flights because of bad weather.
Mar 6
In the Third Army the 4th Armored Division drive toward the Rhine gains momentum.
In the 563rd an advance party of an officer and 10 men from Company C moved into Germany to prepare a radar site and bivouac area for FDP3. The new location was just outside the city of Bitburg, Germany. The advanced party cleaned out the rubble. The bivouac area was on a German rifle range. There were six fairly large buildings so most of the personnel could be indoors. A few tents were put up and the men living in them made floors out of the scrap lumber that was in the area. This area was used for about two weeks and the men had a field day as they found about a half a million rounds of German Rifle ammunition. FDP3 was in full operation by 2150 hours on March 7th. Ground Observer Post Tare was moved from NW of Breibweiler to SE of Rodt. Ground Observer Post Victor was moved from Kirf to E of Irsch.
XIX TAC had bad weather kept aircraft grounded.
Mar 7
In the Third Army area the XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division reached the high ground overlooking the Rhine just south of Andernach by leapfrogging tank-infantry teams with excellent ef- fect.
In the 563rd Lt. Godfrey A. Welham was relieved from attach- ment to the 738th Signal Air Warning Company back to Hq 563rd for duty of filter officer with the TCC. BACU4 moved to Rustroff. The remainder of Company C joined their advanced party of 6 Mar at Bitburg. GO3 moved Post Oboe to Dahlenfeld, Post Queen to Altsheid and Post Roger to Huscheid. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Trier, Post Uncle to Besslich, Post Victor to Ayl and Post William to Kommlingen. Tech/5 Harold E. Gerrietts was transferred from Company B to Company A.
XIX TAC had aircraft grounded again due to poor weather.
Mar 8
In the Third Army VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division takes the road center at Mayen where engineers put a bridge.
In the 563rd Company A FDP1, Type 11 radar moved from the vicinity of Neufchef to Halstrsoff. As soon as the Type 11 became operational and communications established with the TCC from the advanced location the Type 15 Radar was moved forward. This site had been tested by one of the LW radar on March 6th and found satisfactory. FDP2 was moved to about a mile south of Prum, Germany. FDP3 reported a German FW-190 dove over the station at 500 feet altitude going north. The plane came over from tree top level and the station guards expected to be strafed but the plane zig-zagged over the station and disappeared to the north. GO4 moved Post Victor to Ayl.
XIX TAC had three weather reconnaissance sorties were flown and were all uneventful. Bad weather precluded any attack sorties.
Mar 9
In the Third Army the VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division reaches the Rhine river at Andernach. In the XII Corps the 4th Armored Division is directed to secure the Moselle bridge at Treis.
In the 563rd the Bronze Star Medal was awarded to Cpl William J. Moresi, Jr. and Tech/5th Edwin B. Hart were awarded the Bronze Star Medal March 1945 in Section I paragraph 18. Tech/4th Raymond C. Long was also awarded the Order of the Purple Heart for injuries sustained in combat. BACU2 was moved to Wildersheim. LW3 was moved to Seiwerath.
XIX TAC operating in very adverse weather cooperated fully with the advancing ground units. XIX TA attacked special military targets where visibility permitted, flying a total of 309 sorties. XIX TAC destroyed or damaged 104 railroad cars, 37 factory buildings, 4 oil storage tanks, 42 motor vehicles and 11 locomo- tives. XIX TAC suffered no losses.
Mar 10
In the Third Army the 4th Armored Division continues to mop up the west bank of the Rhine from Andernach to Koblenz
In the 563rd Pfc Victor J. Pohler a teletype operator attached to Company B stepped on a box mine while looking for some extra cable and reel for the operation of the teletype. He was seriously wounded, suffering extensive lacerations and fractures of the left leg and foot. Although shocked by the explosion, he had the presence of mind to apply a tourniquet and stop the bleeding he was evacuated to the 110 Evacuation Hospital. LW2 moved from E of Lutz to N of Seiwerath. BACU4 was moved to Orshol.
XIX TAC flew 337 sorties, dropping 60 tons of bombs on Germans. XIX TAC also provided column cover for the 4th Armored Division during its rapid advance. Some special targets were attacked and a large number of psychological warfare leaflets was dropped for the Germans to read during their leisure time. Damaged or destroyed during the operations were 129 motor vehicles, 8 locomotives, and 23 gun installations.
Mar 11
In the Third Army area direction of attack of the Third Army shifted from east to southeast in order to approach the Rhine River along an area from Koblenz to Mannheim.
In the 563rd BACU4 was attached to Company A and was just setting at the site of GO1 post Baker which was near Frenden, Lux- embourg and during the night an enemy breakthrough was reported directly to the front of BACU4. The men manning Ground Observer Post Baker took up the defensive positions and made preparations for the demolition of the SCR-584 should it be in danger of being captured. They also investigated the break through report and found it to be false and normal operations were resumed.
XIX TAC had a low ceiling but managed to fly 205 sorties in escort of medium bombers. Ten communications centers were attacked.
Mar 12
In the Third Army the VIII, XII and XX Corps are moving to assault the Moselle river.
In the 563rd BACU4 was moved to Rustroff. FDP5 was moved to Immerath. Tech/4th Raymond C. Long of Company A was injured by an exploding mine while clearing out an area for their motor pool, however the wound was not too serious and he was treated by the Battalion Surgeon and released to duty later in the month. He was awarded the Purple Heart Medal for his injuries. Tech/5th Gus G. Costas was transferred from Company C to Headquarters Company.
XIX TAC had bad weather which limited flights to 142 sorties. The majority of the flights were in escort for the 9th Bomber Command.
Mar 13
In the Third Army the XX Corps attacks southeast from the Saarburg bridgehead at 0300 hours and after a heavy artillery preparation but the West Wall defenses make progress slow.
In the 563rd Company B and FDP2 moved from Ellwerath, Germany to Kehrig, Germany. In a procedure developed by Company B and now put in to use the first time Company B LW2 platoon located at Ellwerath, Germany took over as communications center (and report- ing back to the TCC) for FDP2 while the FDP2 radar was moved bering moved to Linler, Germany. This maneuver was also necessary to provide a relay station should the new FDP2 station have difficulty establishing communications with FDP2. During this period Company B GO2 Platoon was attached to Company A. LW3 moved Eckfeld.
XIX TAC dropped 88 tons of bombs in 432 sorties. XIX TAC claimed 140 motor vehicles, 21 armored cars and tanks, 380 railroad cars, 92 factory buildings and 9 locomotives damaged or destroyed. A total of 18 Germans were shot down but there were no XIX TAC losses.
Mar 14
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 80th Infantry Division was mopping up near Weiskirchen and when the weather cleared in the afternoon, airplanes of the XIX TAC got into the fray in strength, but because it was hard to pinpoint advance positions in the thick fir forests, the strikes had to be confined to targets well in front of the infantry.
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Able to Orscholtz. Sgt Clement J. Vickers was accepted and departed for Infantry Officer Candidate Staining School. GO1 moved Post Able to Orschultz.
XIX TAC had 482 sorties dropped 80 tons of bombs. Destroyed or damaged were 244 motor vehicles, 19 tanks and armored vehicles, 315 railroad cars, 3 supply dumps, 17 locomotives, and 135 factory buildings. The XIX TAC lost one plane to the 10 German planes that were shot down.
Mar 15
In the Third Army area the tail end of the Eifel Campaign, remnants of the nine German divisions, cut off west of Cochem, withdrew south of the Moselle and by March 12th managed to estab- lish a hasty formed defense line in the Hunsruck Mountains, trying to protect the north flank of General Balck's dwindling Army Group G. But Patton had developed a major threat to the enemy forces manning the West Wall, a danger the Germans could not ignore. Their fears were fully justified. By driving to the Rhine, the Third Army had exposed the enemy's right flank and created the op- portunity to resume a devastating war of movement for the first time since last August in France. Crossing the Moselle south of Koblenz, Gen. Gaffey's 4th Armored Division ripped across the enemy's rear, followed closely by infantry units of Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy's XII Corps. Shortly afterward, the armor of Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker's XX Corps plunged through the West Wall and attacked toward the Rhine, linking with units of XII Corps to trap the remnants of 10 enemy divisions in the Hunsruck Mountain region.
Panic seized the Germans. They attempted to set up a defense line west of Mainz and Mannheim, but failed to hold the Third Army's charging armor. The 4th Armored penetrated far into the Palantine, cutting off all but one of the enemy's Rhine River es- cape crossings. The 10th and 12th Armored drove the enemy eastward toward the Rhine. His withdrawal quickly becoming a rout, the enemy dashed for Speyer, the only crossing of the Rhine left him.
Chopped to pieces by Patton's armor rushing on them from three directions, attacked relentlessly by the fighter bombers of Gen. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command, and pursued closely by infantry, the Germans lost the bulk of two armies. Other Third Army units gained control of Koblenz on March 18th. The Palatinate Campaign ended three days later with the Germans having been pushed across the Rhine everywhere in the Thire Army's sector.
In the Third Army's VIII Corps area the troops were on the left flank crossed the Moselle River and thrust southeast toward Boppard with the 87th Infantry Division. The 87th Infantry Division was preparing to cross the Moselle River and assault Koblenz.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division is committed to a bridgehead of the 90th Infantry Division to cross the Nahe River at Bad Kreuznach. This Corps was in the center and crossed the Moselle River at Hatzenport and drove rapidly toward the Rhine River with the 4th Armored Division. the troops were attacking with the 4th Armored Division which quickly picked up momentum and driving toward Hochstatten. Roadblocks ate the entrance of each town, usually defended by no more than a cluster of riflemen and machine gunners, were about all that stood in the way. White sheets fluttered from upper story windows, a now familiar sign that German civilians had divined the approaching end.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the troops were the right flank and were driving towards Birkenfeld with the 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division. The 26th Infantry Division pushed to positions near Saarholzbach.
In the 563rd Lt. Neal Rabogliatti and Lt. John C. DeLio were promoted to 1st Lt. by Order No 74, headquarters Ninth Air Force. Under observation by FDP2 on March 15th at 1150 Hours, Lt. Kenneth E. Placek, leader of a flight of P-47's was shot down by enemy 88's while dive bombing the town of Bingen from an altitude of 2,000 feet. The flak tore through his wings and hydraulic system. Noticing smoke pouring from his plane and that some of his instru- ments were inoperative, he belly landed 100 yards from FDP2 site at 1200 hours. Lt. Placek belonged to the 378th Squadron of the 362nd Group. It was his 71st mission and his base was at Etain, France. The airplane's radio was not damaged, so Lt. Placek assured the remainder of his flight that he was not injured. He had lunch with the Company B officers and about 1430 hours was driven back to his base in the Company commanders jeep. BACU4 moved to Tiercelet. LW1 moved to from to Kerrig, Germany which is about 3 miles west of Saarburg and GO1 moved Post Able to Orshultz and Post Dog to Irsch. BACU4 moved to Tiercelet which is 18 miles northeast of Etain. GO2 moved Post George and How to near Felsburg, Post King to Rammelfang and Post Love Gerlfang. GO4 moved Post Tare to Mohn and Post Uncle to Lorsch. Lt. Neal Rabogliatti and Lt. John C. DiLeo were promoted to the grade of 1st Lt. per SO74 Headquarters Ninth Air Force.
In the XIX TAC the fighters were enjoying a bright sunlight day, fighter-bombers worked in close co-ordination with the armor and before night fell had flown 643 sorties to claim a new record for five groups in one day. The planes dropping 133 tons of bombs on the Germans. A total of 16 towns and 7 marshaling yards were attacked, 393 railroad cars, 219 motor vehicles, 38 tanks and armored vehicles, 15 locomotives were damaged or destroyed and more than 100 German troops killed. Five German planes in the air and 3 on the ground were destroyed and the XIX lost 1 plane in the entire operation.
Mar 16
In the Third Army VIII Corps area the 87th Infantry begins the assault across the Moselle River. In the XII Corps area the 90th Infantry Division cross the Moselle at Hatzenport and the 4th Armored Division crosses the Nahre at Oberhausen. In the XX Corps area the 10th Armored Division attacks through the 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions and crossed the Seffers River and cleared Rimlingen.
In the 563rd the advance echelon of the 738th Signal Air Warning Company left for a new site for FDP5 on a hill above the country village of Immerath. This site was 8 miles from the north bank of the Moselle and approximately half way from Trier to Koblenz. By that time the Third Army was establishing bridgeheads on the south bank of the river as it drove on toward Mainz and Worms. This new site had been selected tentatively by Captain Easton by the USSTAF RFD system. (see Editors Note 17 on the following page). This site proved satisfactory. GO4 moved Post Uncle from Besslich to Kirsch.
The XIX TAC fighter bombers were out in force. The VIII Corps released 11th Armored to XII Corps. The 4th Armored Division speeds southeast to the Nahe River near Bad Kreuznach and secures beachhead. The 89th Infantry Divisions, upstream from Cochem sent two regiments to cross the Mosselle and by the end of the day established a bridgehead and were ready for the 11th Armored crossing. The XIX TAC destroyed 20 German planes in the air and 20 on the ground while losing 5 of our own. XIX TAC flew 625 sorties and dropped 136 tons of bombs, destroying or damaging 550 motor vehicles, 81 tanks and armored vehicles, 398 railroad cars and 35 locomotives.
Mar 17
In the Third Army's VIII Corps area the 87th Infantry Division attacked through Koblenz and assembled in the Nieder
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division enlarged the Nahe River bridgehead and assaults Bad Kreuznac. The 11th Armored Division begins the drive toward the Rhine at Worms at noon.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 80th Infantry Division established a bridgehead at Prims
In the 563rd GO1 moved Post Charley to Gerlangen. GO2 moved Post Mike to Schutz, Post Oboe to Bittenfeld, Post Peter to Binsfeld, Post Queen Neroth and Post Roger to Zilsdorf.
XIX TAC flew 190 sorties, claiming 640 motor vehicles, 30 armored vehicles and tanks, 153 horse drawn vehicles. XIX TAC also shot down 2 German planes and damaged 2 more.
Mar 18
The Third Army was attacking and advancing rapidly with the 4th Armored Division in the spearhead.
In the Third Army's VIII Corps area the 78th Infantry Division is driving north along the east bank of the Rhine.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 4th Armored previously ordered for a drive to Mainz is redirected to Worms and captures part of Bad Kreuznach, East of the Hahr river and attacks toward Wollstein. The 11th Armored Division speeds made spectacular gains and raced 20 miles to the Nahe River at Kirn although the bridges are wrecked.
In the 563rd FDP1 was alerted to move eastward and Lt. Wilfred Smith the FDP1 chief filter officer and Lt. Larry Keefer the Ground Observer Platoon Commander were sent on a reconnaissance for a new site. They were driven by Pfc Edward Hall and following is an account of this recon as reported by Lt. Larry Keefer himself.
The XIX TAC had the incredible number of 714 sorties were flown and responsible for destroying and or damaging 1,033 motor vehicles, 106 armored vehicles and tanks, 49 locomotives, 488 railroad cars and 416 horse drawn vehicle.
The following letter was received in March 1995 which was exactly 50 years after Maj. Keefer's (then Lt.) expedition to Bad Krueznach. When Keefer's reconnaissance was started Company A was at Halstroff, France which is about 14 miles east of Thionville,
[Editors Note 17--- The USSTAF system used three dimensional maps which were painstakingly sculptured by the English map service and a small instrument with a small flash light bulb could be located on the map surface and in a darkened room this light source would light up all the areas which would probably have permanent echoes to a radar located at the point of the light source. The Battalion were furnished a set of these maps in England and transported them to France where they were occasionally used. Soon the burden of using a 2 1/2 ton truck to haul them was too much and on one move they were left behind. These maps were gone before the 738th Signal Air Warning Company arrived. We had found that initially a map preliminary map survey followed by the testing with the Headquarters SCR-582 Radar would give superior results. The FDP's were instructed to use their surveyor's transit to pick a site with perimeter screening and to take one of their LW units if necessary to confirm the suitability of the site.]
was about ten miles east of Bad Krueznach at Wolfsheim which was occupied within days after this expedition. FDP1 only occupied the site at Wolfsheim seven days when it moved again across the Rhine to Munster, Germany. Company A crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim. Keefer's letter follows:
"Until the Reunion of 1993, I was unaware that the events and records of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion were pre served and retrievable. I knew that a historical record was kept by the Companies and the Battalion, but I imagined them stored somewhere in a dusty foot locker--lost forever. I never dreamed copies of them were in such places as the National Archives, the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Center, as well the Department of Defense.
I certainly never expected to see anything recorded about the reconnaissance to Bad Kreuznach, Germany. A brief dissertation from Company A's historical record appears on page 156 of the SPOTLIGHT (Ver 1 The History of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Bat talion in Combat in World War II) which you compiled and published. Since that entry is brief and lacks a volume of information I am submitting my version of it for publishing in the Transactions of the 563rd Signal Air Warning History. I wrote the original copy several years ago for my Grandchildren. I wanted them to know that their Grandfather was not "A HOTEL SOLDIER"!
Even though it has been 50 years ago, I still remember some events in finite detail. As you read it, you can see why I would.
Lawrence A. Keefer"
"On the 18 March 1945, I was informed by my Company Commander, Capt. Thomas J. Slattery via our radio link, that I was to go on reconnaissance the next day with Lt. Willfred Smith. Lt. Smith was to survey a site location for Company A's Radar near Bad Krueznach, which is about 60 miles east of Trier. The area South of Trier along the Saar River and northeast along the Moselle River for 20 miles, was controlled by the German forces on the East side. The only route that was in American hands, was to go north to Trier, North toward Luxembourg, then cut northeast along the Moselle 20-30 miles toward Koblenz, then south across the Moselle river to Bad Krueznach. When the Third Army troops stopped the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge, and pushed them back through the Siegfried Line, this was the ground they gained. Outside Bad Krueznach, the German forces managed to stall that drive, and hold back any further advances. Even so the advances of the First and the Third Armies had driven the enemy through the Siegfried Line to the Rhine River from St. Goar, to Koblenz, to Remagen where the First Army captured the railroad bridge and crossed the Rhine River. Naturally Gen. Patton was not happy about the crossing. He wanted his troops to be first and lead the way to Berlin.
The first step in preparation for the trip was to make sure I had a good driver. My choice was Pfc. Edward F. Hall. He was an excellent driver and a natural born "Infantry man". He instinct- ively did the right thing at the right time, whether he was driving or reacting to an enemy action. He didn't look the part--he was tall, lanky, quiet and wore glasses. I didn't have an assigned driver. I usually used someone who hadn't just gotten off night duty at the Net Control radio. The Platoon Sergeant would then fill-in for the operator while he was driving. After a few trips and some close encounter, most of the operators preferred not to by my driver. Hall was already, and volunteering. Hall and my "unofficial" mechanic, Frank Birdsall checked out the Jeep and filled the gas tank and spare can. We needed "C" rations, stove and utensils, water, maps, water and spare maps in the Jeep. In the morning, we packed the Jeep and when Lt. Smith arrived, we took off to Trier to check sleeping bags, extra ammunition and clothing for the three of us for about five days--all stacked in one Jeep. This was "old hat" for a G.O. Officer. I even had an emergency box with K rations, The second most important part of preparing for a trip like this, the latest intelligence on the planned route. At the Infantry Headquarters in Trier (the 94th Infantry Division, I think), they said,
"You don't want to go the route you planned. All you have to do is cross that new bridge across the Moselle over there (pointing across the road) and follow the 11th Armored Division straight on. They left yesterday and are halfway there already, with little resistance."
Lt. Smith and I talked it over and he balked and said
"Is it safe?"
I responded,
"It's as safe as anything up there. Besides, why take five days for the trip when you can complete it in three?"
He agree and Hall was all for it. We were off at full speed after crossing the Pontoon bridge across the Moselle.
[Editors Note 18--- Note that on the operations map on page 286 that during Keefer's Recon the Corridor to Bad Krueznach was assigned to the XII Corps attacking southeast with thee 90th Infantry Division on the left flank next, the 4th Armored division attacking Bad Kreuznach with objective of Oppenheim and Worms, next, the 5th Infantry Division supporting the 4th Armored, next the 11th Armored Division with objective of the Rhine River north of Mannheim. Keefer's party was following the 11th Armored. In the course of their search for the new site they entered 11 towns that had not been captured, and directed to the rear many German soldiers who had their fill of fighting.]
Smitty had never seen what he would see on this trip. I don'tthink he had ever been to the "Front" let alone followed a "Tank Drive", with nothing ahead of you but a bunch of tanks on attack with support and supply groups following them in convoys, and the Infantry leap-frogging troops to mop-up enemy stragglers and/or resistance. One of the first things he saw was the remains of a German convoy that our fighter-bombers had completely destroyed. Most of the rubble was still on the road--mostly horse drawn wagons.
It took most of the day to pass and get ahead of the many and various convoys of units moving up. it was interesting to note the excess baggage they take along. We even got ahead of the Infantry- 's leap-frogging, and saw many German soldiers, sans weapons, walking to the rear, trying to surrender to any vehicle that came along. It is one thing to "flush out" the enemy from his entrench- ment and have him surrender, but to see them throw away their weapon and look for someone to surrender to is pathetic. Why is Hitler continuing this War?
The groups were not all small either. One was at least half a Company (over a hundred Germans). In front of the group was an American 1st Sergeant leading them to the rear. A few were even hobbling long on make shift crutches. The Infantry had some big tractor-trailers to haul them away, but they just hadn't gotten up this far.
There were no route markers, no M.P's to direct the changes in route. if a bridge had been destroyed and you couldn't ford the stream at that point, you had to search for the place that the tanks did ford or cross it. Sometimes you had to backtrack for miles with no markers of M.P.'s to tell you which way. We'd go back to another cross road and follow it until we had come to where they crossed, but sometimes we'd come up to an Armored car only to find out that they were covering the "flank and the cros- sing was the other way. Sometimes there was no vehicle there and it soon became obvious that you were in unconquered territory and the crossing was off the road, miles the other way. Fortunately, Operations Map 11 to 21 March 1945 the American soldier (like many of it's civilian population) are trash-makers. Look for the ciga- rette butt, empty pack or cellophane, or gum wrapper,"K" ration box or whatever and you know that "we" have been there.
The German soldier didn't have our luxuries, and they saved theirs cigarette butts until they had enough "makings" for another cigarette. Occasionally we'd see supply truck convoys loaded with gasoline and rations "barreling though". You had to get out of their way or they'd run you down. Even they made some wrong turns. There should have been some markers saying MSR (Main Supply Route) so that the trucks couldn't make mistakes. Of course, in a day or so the bridges will be replaced and all will be fine, but right now a few people or supplies could be at the wrong place at the wrong time.
With darkness approaching, we found another group of fellow travelers to spend the night with--for defense. We took turns standing guard--as if, we could do anything if attacked. Late in the evening we could hear cannon or mortar fire and flashes of light in the distance. The noise went on form most of the night. I pitied the poor people that were getting the shelling as well as the noise. We were about 10 miles from.
The next morning we took off rather early, and saw no one for the longest time. We passed a village that had a few American vehicles and men in them. We later found that it was an Army Ordinance detachment.
About mile from that village, we drove up a slight grade on the side of a hill. On she right side of the road the hill dropped off sharply, on the left there was about a 20 foot cut into the hill. The road narrowed to a skinny two lanes with log "pilings" on both sides of the road--a perfect place for a "Road Block". Sure enough, long logs were stacked along the "Cut" side of the road for just that! I observed all this as the Jeep approached it at about 25 MPH. That wasn't all we saw! We saw some people approaching the pilings on the "Cut" side. I expected to see civilians delegated to remove pilings, as I've seen many times before, after an area was taken---but, hold on--- "they",were German Soldiers, about 6 of them! We continued on, a little slower.
If anything was said at this point, I don't recall it, but my immediate assessment of that situation was that, they, like the many German Soldiers we'd passed, wanted to, or would surrender easily. In any event, if ignored at this spot, they might get the idea to set up the Road Block--or maybe that already was their idea--or orders!
As we approached them, they "ducked" behind the pilings--a decision had to be made--now! If they were to be stopped, we had to do it. it was early in the day and we hadn't seen other veh- icles on the road. We were it and I couldn't let a road block happen! I had no time to think it out and certainly no time to consult Smitty or Hall. It was my vehicle and my call!
I yelled, "Stop", and Hall did, about 20 feet beyond the piling, in the middle of the road.
"We've got to stop this!" I said, scrambling out of the Jeep,
Smitty followed. I don't recall if he had his gun. Hall was already out, with his carbine in his hand (not pointing). I had only my .45 Caliber pistol, still in my shoulder holster. The guns were not drawn or pointed as a threat, as I honestly thought they would surrender with this "brash" approach.
I called out, "KOMMEN AUS"! in my best Pennsylvania Dutch (Low German), meaning "Come out"!. There was hesitation. I called again, "KOMMEN AUS"!--more hesitation. I called the third time-- and then said to Smitty and Hall, "TAKE COVER"! Ed hall had already picked his spot after the first hesitation. He hit the ditch on the drivers side and Smitty crouched down outside the passenger side of the Jeep. I still expected them to surrender and slowly backed toward the embankment on the far side of the road, about 8 feet away.
As I approached the edge of the road, (still facing the pilings),__ALL HELL BROKE LOOSE! I don't know if all six were shooting, but it sounded like it--and all at me! The one gun that I was sure was shooting at me was a SCHMEISSER machine pistol. We called it a "BURP" gun, because of its sound as it spewed out bullets.
Bullets whizzed by me from my left to my right and back again. I was still backing as I went down behind the bank of the road. I not only saw the bullets "flicking" at the edge of the road, but got some of the dirt in my face.
With all that shooting, I didn't have a scratch!
I wasn't the least bit scared as I stood up there in the open facing the Germans, and not even while they were firing at me, but now, safe from it all--I was scared stiff! I don't know how long I laid there, __THANKING GOD!--and re-thanking GOD! Only the had of GOD could have kept that machine pistol, from putting several holes into me at each passing. It is just impossible!
Finally, I was able to calm myself, and convince myself that I was alive, not wounded, and not even scratched. I became aware of my surroundings. There was no noise, no shooting, no voices, and worst of all, no vehicles coming to aid us. there were no bushes or weeds along the edge of the road, just shorts grass.
I didn't feel that I could raise my head high enough to see anything without drawing fire, even though they knew I was dead! I'm not sure my group didn't think the same. I wasn't too sure of it myself!
Not being able to see, I tried to evaluate the situation. With no noise, the Germans were wither waiting behind the pilings or making an escape toward the village we passed coming here and Hall was in a bad spot, his cover was very shallow in that ditch. So he couldn't do anything. If Smitty moved a muscle, he would get a hale of bullets. So, it was up to me! I had to get to the pilings on my side of the road, so I could see. I had to stay low enough on the bank so I couldn't be seen. Getting there was very slow, as the bank was really a steep hill. A slip and I could slide down hill quite a way! The hill had been grazed, but it had to be goats, as it was to steep for cows. Why doesn't a vehicle come, this is the MSR. Any vehicle would have to stop as our Jeep is blocking the roads. This would solve everything.
I finally made it to the piling opposite the one where the Germans were. I could not see anyone behind them. I could see Smitty crouched behind the Jeep. At least he was safe and not a prisoner--that was one of my fears. I shot a shot or two into the pilings with my .45 to make sure no one was there, and to alert Smitty and Hall. Somehow the German soldiers got up that 10 foot cut and got away. I started shooting into the bushes above the pilings and beyond, and called to Hall to shoot into them from his side. he did and in a few seconds, three of the German soldiers came out into the open with their hands up.
I yelled to them, "KOMMEN HIER" (Come here). Which they did, sliding down the bank. They had discarded their weapons when they came out of the bushes, but I had Hall frisk them anyway.--a lesson learned(one of my men got wounded by a hidden pistol 7 months ago). Smitty had brought a Thompson Sub-Machine gun along on the trip, so I had him spray the bushes again to be sure there weren't more in there. We didn't flush out the others, so I tried my Pennsylvania Dutch again. "WO DER LEUTNANT? (Where is the Lieutenant?
They pointed to three figures in a distant field. I took Hall's spare M1 rifle he had in the Jeep and set the sights for maximum distance and fired several shots, but they were too far away. No Germans were killed, even thought the historical record of this event said there was. I had the three prisoners set on the hood of the Jeep, and we took them back to the village where we last saw Americans. They didn't want any more prisoners, they already had ten and not enough food to feed them. We gave them some of our "C" rations and they took the prisoners. We stopped long enough at he pilings to survey what was really these. Besides the long logs to set in she pilings to block the road, there were three TELLER (ANTI-tank) mines and two PANZERFAUSTS--like our BAZOOKA, but with a larger War Head.
We had indeed stopped a catastrophe and except for the WILL OF GOD, I could have been a catastrophe as well! Given the chaotic conditions of the Germans due to the tank and air attacks of the day before, I felt a "brash" approach would bring a quick surren- der, and it would have, had it not been for another "stubborn Lieutenant. There were other solutions to stopping the enemy from establishing the Road Block, but w didn't have the luxury of time to consider them.
I have reviewed those options many times in the past 50 years and I still believe that the approach I took, under the stated circumstances, was the best choice. The "Key Play" that could have "won" in any approach, would have been the arrival of a vehicle(s) and more manpower. After all, this was the route of the "Tank Drive" and the Main Supply Route. We proved this by following this route and catching up with the rear echelon of the tanks later in the day. Had the Road Block been established and that was obvious- ly the enemy's objective, and the Lieutenant's determination, they could have stopped traffic for hours or the whole day. A wall of logs to stop vehicles, teller mines to blow up any vehicle trying to crash through, if the Panzerfousts didn't stop the first, and a squad of Germans behind the wall to stop anyone from trying to remove the logs.
Gen. Patton could have lost his opportunity to establish the bridgehead across the Rhine on 22 March because of delayed supplies.
We already had enough action for one day but it was still morning and we had a Reconnaissance to do., We took off "flying" trying to make up for the time we had lost. As we progressed on our journey, it became quite obvious that the "Tank Drive" was meeting very little resistance. We passed some very extensive "hand" dug trenches that zig-zagged for miles through fields on both sides of the road, and no sign of any action taking place there. No destruction anywhere, except that which our Air Force had done weeks or months before.
This is the area in the State of Palatinate that is between she Siegfried Line and the Rhine River. That is why we were not too surprised when we were informed that the tanks were not going to Bad Krueznach but were heading for Worms to try to capture a bridge across the Rhine. When were they going to BAD KRUEZNACH? "Much later if at all. With resistance collapsing, the troops at Bad Krueznach could now come to us". was the reply from an Officer in the 11th Armored rear HQ.
I suggested to Smitty to forget trying to go to the "site at Bad Krueznach, because with the new territory gains, headquarters will probably want a site further on--even across the Rhine.
"No", he said, "that site looks like an ideal site and would be good coverage all the way to Berlin."
"I have to check it out" he added.
"It means going through about 10-20 miles of unconquered ground" I said.
He reminded me that earlier that earlier I sad "If we don't have to cross the Rhine, we could drive all the way to Berlin before anyone knew it.". After coming all this distance, I wanted to go too. I just thought I would give Smitty an out. After the horrendous experience we had this morning, I was sure he would desire to give it up. The Armored officer we talked to could not confirm that the troops at Bad Krueznach knew about the advances of his Unit, nor was he able to confirm the status of the enemy resistance in that area. I had my misgivings about trying this, but I didn't voice them. I had assumed the obvious before and nearly got killed--this time I consulted the others, maybe it will be different.
We took off four our new destination. Me with my map in my lap, Hall with the throttle to the floor, and Smitty hanging on for dear life in the back seat.
About 5 miles down the road, I got the answer to my question, about the status of the enemy-=-they evidently knew about "the advance" and they were"bugging-out"! We passed an Inn with two German trucks parked out front each hooked to long barreled 88's (cannons). In the doorway of the Inn, two German soldiers with beer mugs in their hand. I didn't see their expression, but I saw them scramble. Assuming the German Infantry wasn't too far behind, I checked the map for an alternate route to take. I directed Hall to the new route, and told him to put the gas pedal to the floor and keep it there, no matter what!
We went through many towns (11 according the records) with chickens flying, animals scrambling, and women and children hustling to get out of their way. I am sure that in among the German "cuss words", there was one familiar word "AMERICKANISH"! I kept changing our route, but not the speed. I wanted to be sure that we wouldn't run into an ambush--in case there was communications to someone up ahead.
We finally got back to the main road and to the hill just outside of Bad Krueznach. It was obvious, that here was where the big cannons, we passed, were dug in. We took a "rest stop here, making sure we were not under observation to "our troops" in the town below. Not having met up with any troops from there, we had to assume they didn't know that the Germans had left.
I dept my mouth shut but our biggest problem now was getting killed by our own troops__by "Friendly Fire"--it happens and it could, right now!
Making sure we were not observed, we moved, so we could see the road leading down the hill. It looked like a tornado had cut a path up the hill. There wasn't a live bush or tree standing, and three protruding objects that once were American Sherman tanks. They were severely damaged or burned out, scattered here and there up the hill. The asphalt road was pock-marked with shell holes. It was late in the afternoon as we climbed into the jeep to go down the hill.
My instructions to Hall wee no faster than 5-10 MPH! "We want to give them plenty of time to decide if we are "friend or foe!" Even though their field glasses will tell them we are Americans, we are coming from the hill that the enemy occupied a few hours ago. Actually, I didn't think they would fire at us. The real reason I wanted hall to drive slow, was so I could look for mines--ours or theirs--, especially around the shell-induced pot-holes, where we had to get off the asphalt. I am sure Hall sensed my concern, we had a few close calls with mines before.
As we approached, we saw some last minute "scrambling" of Infantry men into trenches in front of sand--bagged, dug-in tanks. When we got abreast with them they motioned us on, then fell in behind. After we turned down the first street, they stopped us, disarmed us, and escorted us to their headquarters where our Jeep was taken from us--we were prisoners!
It is hard to believe that the 11th Armored Division's advances that had gone on for over three days with the initial intent of linking up their fellow Third Army Infantry Division at BAD KREUZNACH and they knew nothing about it until a "non-script, suspect American" group told them about it. Would you believe it:
This armored unit had been in the Battle of the Bulge and had personally run into German soldiers in G.I. uniforms and driving captured G.I. vehicles on a mission of destruction and/or decep- tion.
We had the right pass word; were assigned to the Third Army sector; we had all G.I. equipment; never-the less we got interrogated. We were asked such questions as: What is the cost of a V-Mail stamp; who won the World Series; what is the World Series and on and on. The fact that we were attached to the Air Force seemed to negate anything we had to say! They never heard of a Signal Corps radar unit working with the Air Force--and ground troops. This is a "Tank War" and the Air Force helps out when the weather is nice!
After their reconnaissance vehicles checked out the "hill" and contacted elements of the 11th Armored, we were released, but we didn't get our guns or our Jeep.
We were their "guests". We were invited to dinner, and assigned a tent for the night. When we asked why we were not allowed to leave and finish our mission, they answered, that they were having trouble getting through to our battalion to verify who we were, and the nature of our mission.
My assessment was, that they assumed we were some "Hotel Soldiers" out joy riding, hoping to see dome action before the war was over. They just could not buy who we were--it was too "futuristic-a-concept"! Anyone associated with the Air Force would not be in a combat zone, let alone in an advanced combat zone.
We ate dinner with them and breakfast, as they dictated. About 10:00 AM the next morning, we were summoned to their head- quarters and told that it took a while to get through to our battalion, and they were glad to hear from us. They gave us our guns and our Jeep and bid a safe trip back,--but no apology for detaining us.
We did not go to the Radar site we initially set out to survey as I recall. Whether Smitty was taken there by our "host", I also do not recall. I know I never went there, unless it was the hill that the German 88 canons were on. We went back the way we came. The pilings and all the makings for a Road Block were still there, undisturbed! All the streams now had bridges and the traffic heading toward the Rhine was heavy.
Back near Trier, we passed several tractor-trailers heading east. They were loaded with heavy duty pontoon boats, not the inflatable ones that the Engineers use, but all metal ones. The trucks were marked U.S. Navy, and the driver and passengers were sailors. This no doubt would be Gen. Patton's heavy duty bridge across the Rhine. His tankers did not capture the bridge at Worms, but Patton's troops did establish an 8 mile bridgehead across the Rhine before the Germans could get organized to stop them. This was the "End of the End" (of the war).
It had been almost 9 months since my Platoon landed on Nor- mandy's Omaha Beach and we had been on or near the "front" ever since. As a rule, my platoon was spread out over a 20 to 30 mile front. As their Platoon Leader, I had to reconnoiter five Out-post sites before every move. The "Intelligence" (information) about the "Front Line" came "through channels" from the Air Force.
I found that most of the time it was not detailed or current enough, and found myself in some very compromising situations. I learned early to contact what ever unit that was in the area, whether it be the Infantry, Artillery or Armored, for the "real" intelligence. When that wasn't convenient or possible, I learned to pay attention to my senses--eyes and ears--they told me a lot! Never-the-less, almost daily "my life was on the line". I had experienced some horrifying situations and Pfc Edward Hall was my driver quite a bit of that time.
BUT--looking back--I must say, 20 March 1945 was the most terrifying day of all! I can not imagine how Lt. Wilfred Smith remembers that day--with only three days on a Combative front, that one day was a chapter by itself."
Mar 19
In the VIII Corps area captured the sector west of the Rhine River from Boppard to Bingen.
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 11th Armored division with close air support from the XIX TAC fighter-bombers broke through the last enemy defense positions located above the Nahe River near Martinstein and pursued the demoralized enemy east toward the Rhine River. The objective of the 11th Armored is changed to the Rhine south of Worms. The 4th Armored Division made rapid progress against weakening resistance to Kaiserslauten.
In the Third Army's In the XX Corps area the 10th Armored Division attacking with three combat commands abreast occupied positions near Kaiserslautern. The 12th Armored Division is driving east toward Mannheim. The 10th Armored Division drives eastward and clears St. Wendel area.
In the 563rd FDP3 moved to Volkenroth.
The XIX TAC flew 605 sorties without a single loss. XIX TAC claimed 816 motor vehicles, 46 locomotives, 46 tanks and armored vehicles and 367 railroad cars damaged or destroyed. XIX TAC shot down 6 German planes.
The Rhine Crossing Phase extended from March 20th to March 28th.
MARCH 1945
Mar 20
In the Third Army the XII Corps 4th Armored Division gets forward elements to the Rhine River at Worms and blocks the road to Worms. In the XX Corps area the 12th Armored Division reached the Rhine north of Mannheim in the evening. Not only were the German withdrawal routes through the Pfaelzer Forest about to be compro- mised but a swift strike down the Rhine plain from Neustadt and Ludwigshafen against the last German escape sites for crossing the Rhine appeared in offing.
In the 563rd the Battalion received XIX TAC on General Orders 19 awarded the Bronze Star Medal to Lt. Col. William McBride for meritorious service in connection with military operations from 1 Sept 1955 to 7 March 1945. BACU2 moved to Bassenheim.
In desperation the Luftwaffe during March 20th sent approxi- mately 300 airplanes of various types, including Jet-propelled Messerschmitt ME-262's to attack the Third Army columns, but to little avail. The casualties on the American side were minor. Antiaircraft units, getting a rare opportunity to do the job for which they were trained, shot down 25 German planes. Pilots of the XIX TAC claimed another 8. XIX TAC dropped 145 tons of bombs flew 655 sorties in close support of the U.S. Third Army's swiftly moving columns. Their claims for the day included 859 motor vehicles, 283 horse drawn vehicles and 17 German planes.
Mar 21
In the Third Army the XII Corps the 4th Armored Division drive north along the west bank of the Rhine River clearing region between Worms and Oppenheim. The 11th Armored Division completes its second drive to the Rhine by 0800 and occupies Worms.
In the 563rd BACU1 moved to Heisenhousen.
The XIX TAC hurriedly initiated a program of rail interdiction extending from Limburg southward to Mannheim. The XIX TAC another glorious day of attack against the retreating German rail and road columns. XIX TAC claimed 287 motor vehicles, 45 armored vehicles and tanks, 49 locomotives, 232 railroad cars and 10 planes. The Rhine River Crossing at St Goar and Wiesbaden Vicinity of Oppenheim XII TAC lost 2 planes.
[Editors Note 19--- The map on page 298 is the vicinity of Oppenheim the site of Rhine River Crossing for the Bn Hq. No records were kept but Bn Hq bivouacked several days near Dexheim to wait priori- ty for their turn to cross. The exact location of the Oppenheim bridge was also not reported. Page 301 is the Situation map for the southern crossing executed by Third Army.]
Mar 22
In the Third Army Area the XII Corps 5th Infantry Division breaks into Mainz and starts crossing the Rhine at Oppenheim at 2200 hours. In the XX Corps the 11th Armored Division secures a bridgehead at Speyer.
In the 563rd Company A moved FDP1 to Wolfsheim. An advance party of Company C consisting of 3 officers with 30 men with the Type 11 Radar. The party made a bivouac near Kastellaun southwest of Koblenz and was located in an old German labor camp. In this spot the party made a mess hall out of one of the existing buildings. The area had a huge coke pile and all sorts of lumber. Floors were put in every tent. The company Motor Sergeant found a small fire engine and put it to use washing vehicles. Many small items were found. The radar location selected was close to the bivouac area but the road leading to the site was across soft ground and over a small creek. This required building a small bridge, known as Capt. Glassow Bridge, after Company C commanding officer. The bridge and road was constructed out of existing material and tools. The men of the party worked from dawn to dusk to get the area into shape. On March 24th the rest of the company moved up and FDP3 was in full operations at 1930 Hours.
XIX TAC flew both support and reconnaissance missions to assist the U.S. Third Army's Corps. XIX TAC claimed 55 rail cuts and 876 railroad cars, 210 motor vehicles, 68 locomotives, and 18 gun installations damaged and destroyed.
Mar 23
In the Third Army Gen. Patton issued this commendation:
"To Officers and men of the Third Army
and
To our comrades of the XIX Tactical Air Command
In the period from January 29 to March 22, 1945, you have wrested 6,484 square miles of territory from the enemy. You have taken 3,072 cities, towns and villages, including among the former Trier, Koblenz, Bingen, Worms, Mainz, Kaiserslautern, and Ludwig- shafen.
You have captured 140,112 enemy soldiers and have killed or wounded an additional 99,000, thereby eliminating practically all of the German 7th and 1st Armies. History records no greater achievement in so limited a time.
This great campaign was only made possible by your disciplined valor, unswerving devotion to duty, doubled with the unparalleled audacity and speed of your advance on the ground; while from the air, the peerless fighter-bombers kept up a relentless round the clock attack upon the disorganized enemy.
The world rings with your praises; better still, Gen. Marshall, Gen. Eisenhower and Gen. Bradley have all personally commended you. The highest honor I have ever attained is that of having my name coupled with yours in these great events.
Please accept my heartfelt admiration and thanks for what you have done, and remember that your assault crossing over the Rhine at 2200 hours last night assures you of even greater glory to come.
G.S. Patton Jr.
Lieut. General
Commanding"
. In the Third Army XII Corps the 5th Infantry Division establishes a firm bridgehead and crosses the Rhine. In the XX Corps the 12th Armored Division thrusts to Weingarten where stiff resistance is overcome with the aid of air support.
In the 563rd the following Officers were appointed to the Battalion Post Exchange Council in addition to their other duties
Capt. Mac Ray
Lt. William A. Wright
Lt. Clarence A. Wetherill
Lt. Robert A Homan
Ground Observer Platoon GO4 was released from attachment to Company C and attached to Company A. The reconnaissance made by Company A on March 18th to March 20th was approved and permission to move to the new site picked by Lt. Smith and Lt. Keefer was granted and on March 23rd the type 11 radar was moved with the type 15 radar remaining behind to cover the rear area. The new site was in the vicinity of Bad Kreuznach FDP1 moved from Halstroff to Wolfsheim and FDP3 moved from S of Bitburg to N of Volkenroth. BACU1 moved from Trautsburg to Heisenhousen. Go1 moved Post Dog from SE Irsch to SE Lorzweiler. GO3 moved Post Queen from SE of Neroth to Utzenheim and Post Roger from Zilsdorf to Halsenbach. GO4 moved Post Sugar from Trier to N of Kaberg.
XIX TAC flew a massive number of sorties, totaling 775. XIX TAC failed to find any highway transportation. Six of the fighter bombers were lost to the Germans but Germans got the worst of it, by far. Destroyed or damaged the XIX TAC were 41 planes, 1,100 railroad cars, 70 locomotives, 162 motor vehicles, 21 tanks and armored vehicles and all types of military installations.
Mar 24
In the Third Army's XII Corps area XII Corps the 4th Armored Division crosses the Rhine and attacks towards the Main River.
The Third Army's offensive east of the Rhine recalled to mind its dashing drive of the preceding summer. Except for occasional brief halts to overcome local resistance or to effect side-slipping moves in accordance with directives from headquarters, the drive became a sweeping end run across the enemy's southern flank. Darmstadt had been captured on March 25th by the 90th Infantry Division from the west and the 4th Armored Division form the East. On March 26th the VIII Corps expanded and strengthened the Rhine bridgehead and the 4th Armored Division held a shallow bridgehead on the Main river.
In the 563rd the following men were transferred in to the battalion from the XIX TAC and they were further assigned to Headquarters Company
Tech/5th Eugene O. Norvell
Tech/5th Steven Tomko
Pfc Robert A. Hawthorne
Pfc Claude W. Newman
Pfc Michael J. Barbato
Tech/5th Archie A. Price was transferred in from the 134th Rein- forcement Bn and assigned to Company B. Pfc Charles R. Harless was transferred in from the XIX TAC and assigned to Headquarters Company.
XIX TAC during the day 374 motor vehicles, 27 tanks and armored vehicles, 329 railroad cars and 32 locomotives were claimed a after XIX TAC strafed the Germans and dropped a total of 62 tons of bombs on them.
Mar 25
In the Third Army the VIII corps the 87th Division begins the attack across the Rhine at Boppard and on their left encounter a strong counterattack. In the XII Corps the 6th Armored Division crossing the Rhine river at Oppenheim and drives towards the Main river at Raunheim. The 4th Armored Division clears Darmstadt.
In the 563rd Tech/5th Martin J. Langen was transferred in from the XIX TAC and assigned to headquarters Company. GO1 moved Post Dog to Lorzweiler. GO3 moved Post Oboe to Laudort, Post Peter to Dichtelbach, Post Queen to Utzenheim and Post Roger to Helsenbach.
Mar 26
In the Third Army's VIII Corps a treadway bridge is completed at Boppard under extremely adverse circumstances. In the XII Corps area 6th Armored Divison reaches the Main River near Offenbach.
XIX TAC flew a massive 700 sorties in both reconnaissance and support missions. Damaged or destroyed 527 motor vehicles, 36 armored vehicles and tanks, 61 locomotives, 27 gun positions, 1,067 railroad cars, 2 bridges, and German troop losses were 150. The XIX TAC lost 2 planes.
Mar 27
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the Rhine bridgehead is enlarged and the 78th Infantry Division drives east to Hohenstein.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 80th Infantry Division crosses the Rhine at Oppenheim and assembles in the Bischofsheim area to assault the Main River.
In the 563rd BACU3 moved to Welgesheim. GO1 moved Post Able to Drais, Post Baker to Bodenheim, Post Charley to Gauslgesheim and Post Fox to Bingen. Post Fox reported that the enemy threw 88-mm artillery and small arms fire but there was no casualties or damage. The GO1 ground observer line was very close to the enemy territory. GO3 moved Post Mike to Laubach, Post Oboe to Persheid and Post Peters to Erbach. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Kaberg, Post Tare to Fich, Post Uncle to Saffig, Post Victor to Nortershousen and Post William to Obersfell. LW3 was moved to Leniningen. Company C at their location near Volkenroth, Germany reported that about 1500 Hours their mess hall caught on fire because of some spilled gasoline igniting. The kitchen part of the mess hall was a mass of flames for a few moments but the prompt action of mess personnel the flames were controlled. The men made use of fire fighting equipment that were found in the area.
XIX TAC flew 408 sorties in support of advancing ground troops. Their kills for the day included 1,027 motor vehicles, 25 armored vehicles and tanks, 290 railroad cars, 19 locomotives and 5 planes.
Mar 28
In the Third Army the XII corps had advanced to Lauterbach. Three crossings were made over the Main River, and by April 1st, with 4th, 6th and 11th Armored Divisions in the lead, thrusts were rapidly developing to the northeast and southeast.
In the 563rd Company B reported that 12 men were transferred to the Infantry to cover the shortage of combat replacements, with the 15 transferred on 3 March this is a total of 27 men lost to Company B. XIX TAC General Orders 22 was received awarding Capt. Thomas J. Slattery, Commanding officer of Company A, the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious service in connection with the military operations from August 1st 1944 through March 1st 1945. Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company moved from Villerupt to near Spabrucken. Company A reported that their Type 11 radar was being moved while Type 15 radar was covering, taking care of the rear area and controlling night fighters while the FDP5 was moving. FDP1 also reported that they had moved LW1 to about 18 miles northeast of Frankfurt and after they moved in they discov- ered that their area was completely surrounded by enemy troops. After several hours of severe tension passed an Infantry unit moved in to engage and mop up the Germans. This site was not reported as an occupied site in the unit history and LW1 ended up at Windeken several days later.
The XIX TAC flew 307 sorties and furnished cover for the advancing columns of the U.S. Third Army and claimed 649 motor vehicles, 21 tanks and armored vehicles, 16 locomotives and 53 horse drawn vehicles.
The Reduction of the Rhur phase extended from March 29th to April 4th
MARCH 1945
Mar 29
In the Third Army the Corps were attacking to the northeast with the XX corps on the left, the VIII Corps in the center and the XII Corps on the right.
In the 563rd LW2 was moved by Company B to a little south of Bassenbeim, Germany which is about 7 miles west of Koblenz. Tech/5th Lavern A. Kelley was transferred from the 128th Replace- ment Bn and assigned to Headquarters Company. LW1 moved east towards Windecken, Germany which is in the vicinity of Frankfurt and found that in that location they were completely surrounded by German troops. They sat tight for several hours when a unit of Infantry moved in to engage and mop up the Germans and on March 31st they moved to the operating site south of Windecken, Germany. The XIX TAC transferred Lt. Lloyd G. Martinsen and his platoon of 32 men had been on duty with the 564th Signal Air Warning Battalion and they were further assigned to Headquarters. After a recon- naissance that was made on March 29th the 738th Signal Air Warning Company located a site for FDP5 at St. Johann, Germany which is half way between Bad Kreusznach and Mainz. This was near a previous location of FDP1 and telephone lines to the TCC were already established. The move was started on March 29th and completed on April 1st and FDP5 was non-operational for 51 hours. During the month of March quite a few men from the 563rd Signal Battalion and 738th Signal Company were transferred to Infantry Re- placement Depots to cover a theater wide shortage of Infantry men. GO1 moved Post Able from of Drais to Jugesheim, Post Baker moved from Bodenheim to Seligenstadt, Post Dog from SE of Lorzweiler to Stockstadt and Post Fox from S of Bingen to Sachsenhousen.
XIX TAC Bad weather prevented flying.
Mar 30
In the Third Army VIII Corps area the 89th Infantry Division was mopping up bypassed pockets
In the Third Army XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division was turned northeast pursues the enemy toward Hersfeld.
In the Third Army XX Corps area the 6th Armored broke through and exploited their breakthrough north of Frankfurt and attacked north- east towards Giessen.
In the 563rd Company B moved FDP2 to near Limbukrg, Germany and crossed the Rhine River at Oppenheim. BACU moved to Minkelf- eld. GO2 moved Post George to Neustadt, Post How to Rossdorf, Post Jig to Obenberg, Post King to Heirng and Post Love to Gros-Ostheim. GO3 moved Post Queen to Barstadt. Company C reported the control activity for FDP3 with a total of 411 missions for the month of March involving 2570 aircraft and from October through March a total of 1045 missions with an approximately 8780 aircraft. The number of enemy aircraft shot down by XIX TAC fighters which were under the control of FDP3 was 29. FDP5 reported that 6 men were transferred to the ground Infantry to fill current shortages of replacements.
XIX TAC had poor flying weather and kept flights to 1617 sorties
Mar 31
In the XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division was attacking toward Eisnach with CCA on the right and CCB on the left.
In the 563rd the 738th Signal Company crossed the Rhine at Op- penheim and set up FDP5 at Welgesheim. The site at Welgesheim was in an area previously occupied by FDP1 which still had some tele- phone wire line into the TCC and FDP5 reports this site as near St. Johann, Germany half way between Bad Kreuznach and Mainz. GO2 moved Post George from Neustadt to Heiring and Post King from Heiring to Neustadt. GO3 moved Post Queen to Barstadt. FDP1 reported that in the morning hours all stations reported many German ME-262's (jet planes) and Post Fox reported one JU-88 circling over their station. Post Charley was bombed but there were no damage done to men or vehicles. On March 31st Company A submitted their history report which was signed by Lt. Lawrence Keefer and ended with the report that the BACU's now attached to FDP1 were standing by on 31 March and BACU4 was on a bombing range and BACU is at the FDP1 site. He also added this classic descrip- tion of these units.
"A Battle Area Control Unit can best be described as a line based bomb-sight. The particular piece of radar used by these units is the SCR-584 and is the only American radar in use by the FDP. Extreme accuracy in azimuth and range is possible with these sets. If one were to look through a 10 foot long one inch pipe one would grasp some idea of the accuracy obtainable. This, however, makes finding an aircraft difficult, but this can be offset by the deputy controllers at the FDP calling tracks to the BACU and by good use of the D/F (direction finding) at the BACU. Once the aircraft is in view the set is put on automatic control. Using targets given by the Corps area the controller of the BACU vectors the fighter bomber into a bomb run and controls the release of the bomb, thus acting as a Bombardier. Observed results so far have been very gratifying. These units were designed primarily for overcast and night bombing." (See Editors Note 20 on page 310)
On March 31st Company C submitted their history report for the month which contained a report on the controlled missions for the month. This report written by Lt. Charles A. Stewart is repeated here as a sample of the control activity at a FDP. A complete report from all FDP's for all the months of combat would fill a very large book alone so this report is entered to represent all the others. (see Editors Note 21 below). Lt. Stewart's report is s follows:
1 March
Planes from the 368th Fighter Group were controlled by our FDP and due to bad weather our controllers had to resort to blind bombing in the Bitburg area. no results were observed but the flights were up all day. Lighthouse, Airborne controllers conducted a blind bombing mission by land line. Lighthouse dropped his bombs on zero count from controller. Target was supply depot at Lebach Q4092--no results seen.
2 March
Serum Black of the 368th Fighter group his M/T north of Seffern and bombed at St. Thomas--no result. Serum Blue of 368th fighter group hit many tanks and motor transports at L3142. Flapper yellow of 368th Fighter Group hit motor transport at L3542. Flapper yellow of 368th Fighter Group hit motor transport at L3573. Lighthouse (Anvil 367th Fighter Group) hit ammo dump at L4053. Serum Amber 368th Fighter Groups hit marshaling yard at Q4576. Serum Red hit motor transport in Wittlich.
3 March
Tropic yellow, 368th Fighter Group worked area east of Sarreburg. hit motor transport and trains, no results. Serum White, 368th Fighter Group hit area East of Bitburg, Motor transport and tanks. Tropic Blue Bombed and strafed trains in area of L2804,
10 March
Klondike Leader, 362nd Fighter Group, hit motor transport vicinity of L6274 Tropic Red, 368th Fighter Group, bombed and strafed trains in area of L2804. Tropic Red, 368th Fighter Group, hit gun positions and trains in vicinity of L2000. Serum Amber, 368th Fighter Group, bombed and strafed buildings and motor transport in vicinity of L5347. Dumpling Pink, 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group, was also on this mission and was very happy with results they photographed. Serum Red, 368th Fighter Group, tried to make an interception with a Yellow nosed P-47 starting over Metz, no results. Serum Green, 368th Fighter Group, hit motor transport and tanks east of Bitburg. Tropic Red, 368th Fighter Group, hit rail tracks east of Bitburg. Tropic Red hit Rail tracks, motor transport and trains at L254.
[Editors Note 21--- All the Company's did a marvelous job but it is also necessary to state that Company C always responded extra generously to all the requests of the Battalion Headquarters and higher headquarters which were many. Their staff work was always superior. Other general reports were needed and I should add that the Company C Operational Analysis reports prepared by 1st Lt. Robert A. Slaven were also superior.]
13 March
Argue Leader, 362nd Fighter Group, shot down a FW-190 at 1400 in L6520. Firebrick Red hit many trucks in Limburg area.
14 March
Argue Red, 362nd Fighter Group, hit trucks and tanks in vicinity of M0562. Firebrick Red hit motor transport and town in L7964. Firebrick Red leader was shot down over enemy territory approx- imate position L8075. Firebrick Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, hit tanks and troops vicinity L7060. Firebrick Green, 362nd Fighter Group, hit several tanks vicinity of L8774. Argue Green, 362nd Fighter Group, hit motor transport, tanks and bombed town in vic- inity of L7963. Firebrick Red, 362nd Fighter Group, hit supplies in L7963. Firebrick Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, hit gun emplacement in vicinity of L7167. Argue Red, 362nd Fighter Group, hit convoy of motor vehicles in vicinity of L8070. Firebrick Green 362nd Fighter Group, hit supplies in vicinity of L8567.
15 March
Argue Yellow, 362nd Fighter Group, bombed supply dump in vicinity of M2752. Klondike Green, 362nd Fighter Group, Hit trains in vicinity of L8075. Klondike Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, hit box cars with supplies in M4070. This flight was attacked by 20 German FW-190's but did not loose any airplanes. Argue Leader, 362nd Fighter Group, hit motor vehicles at L9153.
[Editors Note 20--- The XIX TAC signal section and myself had a conflict on the employment of BACU. The higher headquarters envi- sioned that the BACU would be put under the command and control of the Corps Air Liaison Officer and operate quite detached from the Battalion and the TCC. I opposed this because I felt the BACU units should have the advantage of siting assistance, connections with the longer range radar coverage. One principal operating problem is that the SCR-584 with its limited aperture has diffi culty picking up its incoming flight and should be backed up by radar with area coverage particularly and directly with an FDP. Area coverage assistance from the TCC is adequate but "second hand", having to be received, plotted and rebroadcasted. The accuracy of these radar was the best available but the state of the art at the time was still not as ideal as the non-radar staff officers thought it to be. I remember making an analysis of the problem on a probability basis and as I remember to get a 90 percent probability of a hit they would have to send out ten Fighters instead of a single one. My report came to the attention of the Operational Analysis civilians attached to the XIX TAC and they called me in to discuss this. The scientists agreed that my analysis was correct but they had no influence on the outcome because the BACU's were employed soon after just exactly like the XIX TAC Signal office wanted it. By the way, at first, one of the principal of uses of the Hq SCR-582 microwave which was operated by Lt. Clarence T. Wetherill and Lt. Robert A. Homan was locating sites in the forward area.]
16 March
Firebrick Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, hit 15 horse drawn vehicles in L9560. Argue Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, hit 7 vehicles in that area. He hit 15 armored cars. Argue Green, 362nd Fighter Group, hit target in marshaling yards at M1554. Klondike Red, 362nd Fighter Group, hit target in M3110. Dropped bombs on barges in Rhine but none of them went off. Firebrick Red, 362nd Fighter Group, hit trains and 30 cars at M2555. Klondike Yellow, 362nd Fighter Group hit bombed a town and hit barges on the Rhine Many refugees on foot observed waving white flags. Klondike Blue, 362nd Fighter group hit train and thirty cars at M2555. Argue Yellow, 362nd Fighter Group, hit many vehicles in M0737. Argue Green, 362nd Fighter Group, hit a town at L5437. Left target and was attacked by 10 German ME-109's and lost one airplane.
17 March
Firebrick Leader, 362nd Fighter Group, shot down one enemy aircraft vicinity of G2825 with no loss. Argue Red, 362nd Fighter Group, got 15 vehicles vicinity of L5514. Firebrick Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, destroyed 20 trucks in the vicinity of L5514. Firebrick Green, 362nd Fighter Group, hit two horse drawn vehicles and five trucks at L5810.
18 March
Casket leader, 367th Fighter Group, shot up 30 motor transport at L5810. Bekko Leader, 367th Fighter Group, hit train at M0939s. Churchspire Leader, 354th Fighter Group, got at least two bandits with no losses. Hallem Leader, 354th Fighter Group, hit trains and cars vicinity of M0939.
19 March
Hallem Red, 354th Fighter Group, hit 6 trains in L9585. Firebrick, 362nd Fighter Group, hit marshaling yards and a 4 barges on the Rhine. Argue Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, shot up 3 balloons over Worms.
20 March
Firebrick Leader, 362nd Fighter Group, hit artillery positions at M2817.
21 March
Klondike Red, 362nd Fighter Group, hit marshaling yards south of Manneheim, also hit trains and box cars at M7740. Argue Leader, 362nd Fighter Group, hit a big factory and tanks in M8225.
22 March
Firebrick Blue, 362nd Fighter Group, hit vehicles in M7938.
24 March
Casket Leader, 367th Fighter group, hit trains and gun positions at M5055.
25 March
Knobhold Leader, 367th Fighter Group, started air field in M9357. Dekko Red Leader, 367th Fighter Group bombed and strafed train at grid location M8570.
26 March
Knobhold Red, 367th Fighter Group, hit gun emplacements and convoy at M7289. Casket Blue, 367th Fighter group, hit convoy on road south of Handu. Dekko Blue, 367th Fighter Group, working in M3292 hit many motor vehicles.
27 March
Churchspire Leader, 354th Fighter Group, hit motor transports in area of M0575. Weather very bad.
28 March
Dekko Blue, 367th Fighter Group, hit many horse drawn vehicles north of Frankfurt.
30 March
Dekko Blue, 367th Fighter Group, hit motor vehicles in area M0020
During the month of march we controlled 411 missions totaling about 2,570 aircraft. The number of missions during from October through March totals 1,045 and approximately 8,780 aircraft. The number of enemy aircraft shot down by our controlled flights totaled 29. The following is the results received from our controlled flights for the month of March 1945.
Tanks Motor Transport Gun Positions
Date Location Date Location Date Location
2 Mar N of Seffern 2 Mar L3142 3 Mar L2900
2 Mar E of Sarreburg 2 Mar L3575 14 Mar L7167
2 Mar E of Wittlich 3 Mar L5042 19 Mar M2817
3 Mar E of Sarreburg 3 Mar L5225 24 Mar M5055
3 Mar SE of Sarreburg 14 Mar M0562
13 Mar L6274 14 Mar L7964 Supply Dumps
15 Mar L9513 15 Mar L7963 Date Location
16 Mar L5437 1 Mar Q4092
18 Mar L5810 Trains 14 Mar L7963
24 Mar L3668 Date Location 14 Mar L8567
26 Mar M3292 3 Mar E of Sarrebu 5 Mar M2752
27 Mar M0575 3 Mar L2804
30 Mar H0020 3 Mar L2900 Barges
3 Mar SE Sarreburg Date Location
Horse Drawn Vehicles 15 Mar L8075 16 Mar M3110
Date Location 16 Mar M2555 16 Mar Rhine R.
16 Mar L9560 16 Mar M0939
17 Mar L5810 18 Mar L9585 Balloons
28 Mar N Frankfurt 21 Mar M7746 Date Location
24 Mar M5055 19 Mar Worms Area
Buildings
Date Location Airplanes
3 Mar L5347 Ammunition Dumps on Ground
21 Mar M8225 Date Location Date Location
2 Mar L4053 19 Mar Worms Area
Marshaling Yds
Date Location Enemy Aircraft Box Cars
2 Mar Q4572 In Air Date Location
16 Mar M1554 Date Location 15 Mar M4070
18 Mar On Rhine 13 Mar L6520 16 Mar M2555
21 Mar S Mannheim 17 Mar G2825
22 Mar M7938
XIX TAC flew 580 sorties and claimed as damaged or destroyed 685 motor vehicles, 47 tanks and armored vehicles, 722 railroad cars and 94 locomotives.
APRIL 1945
Apr 1
In the Third Army's XII Corps has outdistanced the XV and XX Corps is continues northeast with both flanks vulnerable. The 4th and 11th Armored Divisions are spearheading. The 4th Armored Division establishes a pontoon bridge at Werra this night. The 11th Armored Division was ordered east and begins an assault of Fulda.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 6th Armored Division advanced to within 3 miles of Fulda.
In the 563rd FDP5 moved Welgesheim. LW1 moved to Windeccken. GO3 moved Post Mike to Wibigen, Post Oboe to Persburg, Post Peter to Kiedricht and Post Roger to Dozheim. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Hemmanau, Post Tare to Vallender, Post Uncle to Helischeide, Post Victor to Miehlen and Post William to Munzenberg.
XIX TAC flew 388 sorties, dropping 68 tons of bombs. XIX TAC claimed 398 motor vehicles, 109 armored vehicles and tanks, 32 locomotives, 236 railroad cars and 77 German planes damaged or destroyed.
Apr 2
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division secured a bridgehead at Creuzburg and a pontoon bridge at Sprichra. Although the ground opposition is light the German Air Force was active against both the bridge sites.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the troops crossed the Fulda at Malsfeld and with CCA and CCB abreast drives toward the Werra River and secure a bridgehead at Reichensachen.
In the 563rd GO4 moved Post Sugar to Espa, Post Tare to Nauborn, Post Uncle to Duterbin, Post Victor to Gromongen and Post William to Wolfored.
XIX TAC poor weather limited flights to 73 sorties but excellent results were obtained even with that small number. Claims for the day were 102 motor vehicles, 55 railroad cars, 9 buildings, and 26 German planes damaged or destroyed.
APR 3
In the Third Army's XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division captured a position overlooking Gotha.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 6th Armored Division crosses the Werra river and thrusts towards Muhlhausen lead by CCB and followed by CCA.
In the 563rd FDP3 and moved to a Grabenlinden located 6.5 Km SW of Giessen. This was a leap frog move. The weather was very bad and the number of flights controlled was very small. The men were quartered in tents. BACU1 moved to Wolfored. LW3 moved to Wolfored, Germany. LW2 moved to Windecken. Pfc Ernest G. Lavalee was transferred in by the XIX TAC and assigned to headquarters Company.
/ XIX TAC flew 219 sorties and claimed 185 motor vehicles, 32 locomotives, 104 railroad cars and 23 planes damaged or destroyed.
Apr 4
In the 12th Army Group The German Army Group B was entirely surrounded and pinched by the Ninth, Fifteenth and First U. S. Armies. The Ninth Army was transferred in to the 12th Army Group. With this transfer Gen Bradley had under his command four Field Armies, which were the First, Third, Ninth and Fifteenth. The command now consisted of 12 Corps and 48 Divisions. The strength of the units was 1,300.000 troops. This was the largest exclusive- ly American Field Command in U.S. history. With the addition of the Ninth Armyy to the 12th Army Group, Bradley's command included the entire Ruhr Pocket effort. Two Corps of the Ninth Army supported by the IX TAC and XXIX TAC fighter bombers.
In the Third Army XII Corps area the 90th Infantry Division seized Merkers where Nazi art treasures, gold and uniforms were discovered in a salt mine by the 358th Infantry Regiment. The 11th Armored Division captured Stuhl and liberated many slave workers from arms factories.
Using this powerful force, Bradley was reducing the Ruhr,and was planning to penetrate further into Germany in the general direction of Leipzig and Dresden in a new Allied main effort aimed at splitting Germany in two by linking up tith the Russians.
The main role in the new drive fell to Hodges First Army in the center to make a thrust directly east to Liepzig and followed by a crossing of the Elbe River east of there.
On the left the Third Army was to drive eastward towards Chemnitz and be prepared to turn to the southeast.
In the Third Army XX Corps area the 6th Armored Division encircled Muhlhausen. The defeated German garrison at Kassel surrendered to the 80th Infantry Division
In the 563rd, FDP3 was reporting to the TCC by CW radio and contact was established at 1200H. GO2 moved Post How to Henneng.
XIX TAC flew 455 sorties, claiming 215 motor vehicles, 53 locomotives, 162 railroad cars, 7 gun positions, 9 buildings, and a whopping 48 Luftwaffe planes damaged or destroyed
The Advance to the Elbe Phase extended from April 5th to
April 18
APRIL 1945
Apr 5
In Third Army the VIII, XII and XX Corps are consolidating In the 563rd Company A moved from Munster to Fulda. The Type 11 radar was moved to Fulda. The Type 15 Radar of FDP1 was still back at Halstroff, France which was over 200 miles west. The site at Halstroff was being used chiefly by the controllers for homing while more forward airfields were being readied for the Fighter Groups. Company B moved to Homburg. Company C moved to Renda. XIX Tactical Air Command General Orders 24 was received which awarded the Bronze Star to Maj. Maurice E. Byrne for meritorious service in connection with military operations from 15 July 1944 to 1 March 1945. The citation read as follows:
"As Battalion Executive and Technical Officer, Maj. Byrne dis- played high professional skill and deep devotion to duty in bril- liantly employing and coordinating the highly technical and comp- licated radar equipment of his organization so as to obtain a maximum of results with a minimum of confusion. In the months of August and September 1944, during the rapid advance across France of the Third Army, in spite of the necessity of "leapfrogging" equipment hundreds of miles, in a large part due to the exceptional efforts of Maj. Byrne, the battalion was able to overcome all difficulties and function in a superior fashion. The ingenuity, resourcefulness and exceptional technical and operational knowledge of all phases of radar displayed by Maj. Byrne reflects to his credit and that of the Army Air Forces. Entered the military service from Lewiston, Idaho."
Also on April 5th Company A moved the FDP1 Type 11 Radar from Munster to Fulda. The type 15 radar was still back at Halstrosff, France over 200 miles west, where it was being used chiefly by the controllers for homing while more forward airfields were being readied for the Fighter Groups. The type 15 radar was finally released from its rear assignment and joined the site at Fulda on April 11th. While at Fulda the type 21 radar was made operational by Lt. William McAdam and his crew. Upon arrival at Fulda ground observer platoons 1 and 2 and LW1 platoon were called in. The ground observers were given duty of furnishing security guards for the company. Having fulfilled its mission the LW1 crew was absorbed to other company duties. The last operational site of LW1 was at Henneg, Germany. FDP1 remained in operation at Fulda until April 21st. FDP2 was moved from SE of Limburg to NE of Homburg. FDP3 was moved from Grabenlinden to SE of Renda.
XIX TAC flew 369 sorties, claiming 371 motor vehicles, 25 tanks and armored vehicles, 536 railroad cars, 12 gun positions, and a massive total of 132 German planes damaged or destroyed.
Apr 6
In the Third Army the VIII, XII and XX Corps were consoli- dating.
In the 563rd BACU4 was moved from Tiercelet to Kemel.
In the XIX TAC poor weather canceled air activity.
Apr 7
In the Third Army the VIII, XII and XX Corps were mopping up.
In the 563rd LW2 was moved from Dornigheim to Bengheim. GO4 moved Post Sugar from Espa to Spangenberg, Post Tare from Helsa to Mauborn, Post Uncle from Dutenbin to Rinkenkuhl, Post Victor from W of Grumingen to Seiferts and Post William from S of Munzenbverg to Reichenbach.
The XIX TAC was having a big day and flew 395 sorties. The claims were 247 motor vehicles, 69 armored vehicles and tanks, 39 locomotives, 340 railroad cars and 95 German Planes were destroyed or damaged.
Apr 8
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions continue clearing Thuringer Wald.
In the 563rd GO4 moved Post Victor from Seiferts to Friedri- chberg. The following account of movement of Company C was reported as occurring on Apr 8 but there is no reference to the site location in the historical records except it was recorded in the historical report of Company C for the month of April by Lt. Charles Stewart and his narrative was as follows:
"FDP3 the TCC authorized a shutdown and move to Altonfeld, Germany just southwest of Kassel. This move was a "Leapfrog- Leapfrog" move. The type 11 radar was still at Giessen and normally the type 15 moves up to the site after the type 11 is operational and communications have been established with TCC. But on this move the type 15 instead of moving into the Giessen site moved ahead of the Type 11 and set up at Altonfeld, Germany. This move was completed on April 10th and both radars were operational by 1000 Hours. The filter officer received a report from LW3 that their PPI tube was so saturated with permanent echoes that they could not see any targets. After a short wait to see if the situation would clear up. The filter officer gave permission to move to within a few miles of the same area. While at the Altonfeld site considerable enemy aircraft activity was observed both by FDP3 local guards and the GO3 Ground Observer Posts. The enemy planes were strafing and flying very low."
Then in the summary of this site at the end of his report he also reported the following
"At Altonfeld, Germany Company C had one of the finest bivouac areas since we left Luxembourg. The small town was known over most of Europe as the breeding place of thoroughbred horses. There were a lot of vacant buildings in the town so we took them over for our bivouac area. One building housed most of the men and all of the officers and it was the Hotel Pension St. Georg. Capt. Glassow, being the highest ranking officer in the town, was town commandant and curfew and other regulations were established by him and through the town Mayor. All these regulations were followed by the civilians in the town. Besides being a very nice place to sleep and eat we also had hot and cold running water and all the comforts of home. Just down the street from the Hotel there was a school building that we used to show movies. There was still about 300 horses in the stables and they were being cared for by some Poles that the Germans had shipped in as slaves. Our men were able to ride the horses in the morning and enjoyed themselves very much. One of the most famous horses of Europe was still there. It was named "Bubbles" and had won an international race of some sort at Prague. The Motel St. Georg, up until that time that our troops captured that part of Germany had been a sort of Resort Hotel for high ranking German Officers and thei.r women."
. XIX TAC dropped 79 tons of bombs on the enemy and damaged or destroyed 432 motor vehicles, 41 tanks and armored vehicles, 49 locomotives and 359 railroad cars. Also destroyed 26 German planes and damaged another 26 while losing 1 plane.
Apr 9
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions are attacking abreast to a Corps restraining line.
In the 563rd the Battalion Headquarters crossed the Rhine at the Oppenheim bridge-head and located at Swarzeborn, Germany. In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company moved from NW of Spabrucken to Swarzenborn. Company A moved all GO1 Ground Observer Posts to Fulda. GO2 Platoon moved all Posts to Henning.
XIX TAC flew 549 sorties. Claims for the day included 280 motor vehicles, 34 armored vehicles and tanks, 63 locomotives, 300 railroad cars and 31 German planes destroyed or damaged.
Apr 10
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions drive abreast to the east toward the Saale river.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division with close artillery and air support drives quickly to Coburg.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 76th and 80th Infantry attack abreast towards Erfurt.
On April 10th in the Third Army area the XX Corps continued to advance with the 76th Infantry Division on the left and the 80th Infantry Division on the right preparatory to commit armor to spearhead the drive to the Elbe. In the XII Corps area the 11th Armored Division with close artillery and air support drove quickly to the vicinity of Coberg.
In the 563rd FDP5 crossed the Rhine river at Oppenheim, Germany and set up operations near Geissen.
XIX TAC dropped 95 tons of bombs while flying 535 sorties. XIX TAC claimed as damaged or destroyed 455 motor vehicles, 59 locomotives, 105 railroad cars, 114 buildings and 54 German planes.
Apr 11
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division captures Coburg.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 6th Armored Division and the 4th Armored Division abreast attack toward the Salle river at Kleinheringen. During the day's advance, Buchenwald concentration camp near Weimar and German Allied prisoner camp in Bad Sulza area were overrun.
In the 563rd Company A had their Type 15 radar unit at Halstroff, France 200 miles away in a rear area position for homing the Fighter Bombers pending their move to forward airdromes and it was released this date and moved forward to join the FDP1 at their current location at Fulda. FDP1 reported that the Type 21 radar was made operational by Lt. Will McAdam, the Commanding Officer of FDP1 and Company A Chief Radar Officer. BACU2 moved to Renda. LW1 moved to Henneng. LW3 moved Strut. GO3 moved Post Mike to Berka, Post Oboe to Nazza, Post Peter to S of Mulhausen, Post Queen to Mechter and Post Roger to Wurha.
XIX TAC flew 550 sorties and made claims of 539 motor vehicles, 599 railroad cars, 83 locomotives, 53 buildings and 49 German planes either damaged or destroyed.
Apr 12
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions drive east toward the Salle river near Rothenstein.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division establishes a bridgehead across the Hasslach river at Kronach
In the Third Army's XX Corps attacks east from the Saale river to the Weisse-Elster river. At Rossendorf an infantry bridgehead was used before it was lost to a time bomb. The 4th Armored Division crossed the Saale river in rubber boats and by ferry while nearby bridges were being repaired.
In the 563rd BACU2 moved to Homburg.
XIX TAC in large scale attacks claimed 588 motor vehicles, 428 railroad cars, 23 locomotives and 16 armored vehicles and tanks damaged or destroyed. Also claimed were 24 German planes destroyed in the air and 32 damaged on the ground.
Apr 13
In the Third Army XX Corps, in a 70 mile drive the 4th Armored Division crossed the Mulde bridgeheads crossed the Weisse-Elster river and established bridgeheads over the Zwick-Mulde river.
In the 563rd the following Officers were appointed to the Information and Education Staff of the Battalion:
Instructor Supervisor Lt. John J. Reynolds
Education Advisement Lt. George E. Mowrer
Education Supply Lt. Joseph H. Eichbaulm
Vocationsl Supervisor Lt. Robert O. Schurke
Orientation Officer Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr
Lt. Joseph H Eichbaum was appointed Battalion Soldier Voting Officer.
XIX TAC lost 3 planes in 242 sorties. XIX TAC made claims of 24 German planes, 140 motor vehicles, 7 armored vehicles, 240 railroad cars and 16 locomotives damaged or destroyed.
Apr 14
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 6th Armored Division breaks through the enemy defenses and drives east to the Zwick Mulde river.
On April 14th the 100th Wing moved their headquarters to Konigstein which is about 4 miles west of Frankfurt. The XIX TAC headquarters was located at Erlangen about 7 miles north of Nurn- berg.
XIX TAC flew 279 sorties. XIX TAC claimed 18 German planes, 190 motor vehicles, 20 locomotives and 75 railroad line cuts (after dropping 20 tons of bombs and strafing) damaged or destroyed.
Apr 15
In the Third Army's VIII Corps the 89th Infantry Division drives to the Weida river at Gera and begins crossing at night.
In the Third Army's XX Corps area the 6th Armored Division crosses the Mulde river.
In the 563rd the following men were transferred in by the XIX TAC and assigned to Headquarters Company
S/Sgt Samuel B. Campbell
S/Sgt Jack Merrick
Sgt James M. Williams
Cpl Arcadio G. Fernandez
Cpl Gordon M. McCabe
Pfc Edward J. Carey
Pfc Robert T. Jackson
Pfc James R. Pearson
LW3 reported finding a smashed C-47 airplane about a mile SW of their site with the bodies of 5 men and 1 woman in it. They were able to identify tow of the bodies. Information was gathered that the plane had crashed a few days before they found it. They promptly notified a graves registration unit and had the bodies removed. The number of the plane was 330728. In Company C monthly Historical Report for April Lt. Charles A. Stewart reported the following incidents surrounding the Blankenheim site:
"Our next move was to Blankenhain, southeast of Weimer, Ger- many. This site was upon a former German Airfield. The airfield was very small and had been used by the Germans to train men show to use gliders. Several gliders were still intact when we got there. Along the edges of a woods close to the radar site there were a number of German Twin Engine Fighters that had been de- stroyed by our own Fighters. most of these airplanes were com- pletely destroyed and a few were still whole but with holes in them. The airplanes were equipped with radar and had probably been used by the Germans as Night Fighters. The airplanes were JU-88's and HE-111's and there was about 40 of them. We could see by the bullet holes in the airplanes, and along the ground how our fighters came in and shot them up. We believe that one of our controlled flights destroyed these planes because they were in our sector.
In a little town close to our site there was a barn full of german telephone equipment that looked like it might be used in an information center.
During our stay at this site we made several trips to the Concentration Camp at Buchenwald. After seeing this our men became very bitter to the Germans and wished they could run across some SS troopers."
XIX TAC flew 364 sorties, registering claims of 562 motor vehicles, 101 locomotives and 432 railroad cars damaged or de- stroyed. Three planes were lost during the day's operations, but XIX TAC destroyed 5 German planes in the air and 50 on the ground and also damaged 1 plane in the air and 39 on the ground. The Luftwaffe was being forced to abandon many of its airfields because of the Americans and British advancing on the Western Font and the Russians advancing on the Eastern Front. The abandoned fields and pilotless airplanes were excellent targets. During the period of April 1 to April 15 the XIX TAC destroyed a record number of German planes, claiming 111 destroyed, 6 probable and 49 damaged in aerial action. XIX TAC also claimed 321 destroyed, 5 probable and 306 damaged by bombing as ground targets. During the period the XIX TAC lost 23 planes.
Apr 16
In the Third Army the VIII Corps drives southeast and with the 89th Infantry Division and reaches Greiz.
In the 563rd LW2 moved to Klettbach. Company C received orders from the TCC to close station and move FDP3 to a site slightly southeast of Weimar. Also on April 16th Company B departed from Trochtelborn and arrived and set up at Bad Steben, Germany. Enroute to the new site and near Gotha 21 German soldiers surrendered to Capt. Shattuck who had fired a shot into the woods when he saw movements in the underbrush. The 21 Germans came out quietly with their hands up over their heads. Lt. DiLeo in his monthly history report for April also noted that Company B has captured over 100 German prisoners. Ground Observer Platoon GO2 was released from Company A and returned to Company B where their new duty would be FDP security Platoon. Also on April 16th Company C captured 21 Germans and this brought their total captures to over 100. GO1 Platoon was attached to Company C for tactical operation. Normally the Night Fighters are controlled by FDP5 but during April this responsibility was passed over to FDP2 two times when FDP5 was on the move. GO4 moved Post Sugar to Apolda, Post Tare from to SE of Blankenhain, Post Uncle to Neumark, Post Victor from Berka and Post William to SW of Apolda.
XIX TAC a total of 23 planes were damaged in the air and another 84 on the ground by the XIX TA. XIX TAC also accounted for the destruction or damaging of 347 motor vehicles, 319 railroad cars and 111 locomotives.
Apr 17
In the Third Army's VIII Corps 89th Infantry Division establishes a bridgehead across the Zwick Mulde river near Zwickau and takes Reichenbach after aerial softening of the city,
In the 563rd FDP2 moved from Bienstadt to W of Lichtenberg. LW3 moved from Strut to Lehsten. At Company C the move of FDP3 Type 15 radar and LW3 was reporting in to the TCC by 1700 hours and this location was the closest to Berlin that they had been located and LW3 carried the flight at a range of 120 miles rite over Berlin, FDP1 labeled it as track number 13. GO3 moved Post Mike to Munchen-Bernstadt, Post oboe to Weida, Post Peter to Eisenberg, Post Queen to Tripris and Post Roger to Neiderstadt.
XIX TAC flew 500 sorties, and destroyed 51 enemy planes and damaged another 58. Among other claims were 544 motor vehicles, 176 locomotives and 186 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.
Apr 18
In the Third Army the VIII, XII and XX corps are regrouping for a final drive into Austria and Czechoslovakia.
In the 563rd GO1 was to report into GO3 network and into FDP3. This made a total of 10 Ground Observer posts stretching approximately 40 miles along the Third Army Line of Resistance. Communications to GO1 was bad so GO3 had to relay all of their information to the FDP3. GO1 moved Post Able first to Fulda then to Naumberg, Post Bake to Fulda and Post Charley to Fulda then to Eisenberg. FP3 ran a land line telephone circuit to the TCC and it was operational at 2245 Hours the same day. This was possible because the TCC at that time were so close to the FDP3 Weimer site. On April 16th Ground Observer Platoon GO2 was relieved from attachment to Company B and attached to Company A for duty. Also Ground Observer platoon GO1 was relieved from attachment to Company A and attached to Company C for duty. Ground Observer Platoon GO4 was relieved from attachment to Company B and attached to the 738th Signal Air Warning Company. LW3 moved from to Pfuhlborn.
XIX TAC flew 393 sorties and claimed 333 motor vehicles, 67 locomotives and 383 railroad cars damaged or destroyed. Their toll of German planes was 14.
The Final Operations Phase extended from April 19th to May 7th.
APRIL 1945
Apr 19
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division attacks southeast and clears Grafenwohr.
In the Third Army the XX Corps orders a drive into Austria with the 65th and 71st Infantry Divisions in the assault
XIX TAC claimed 45 planes destroyed and 10 damaged on the ground and another 7 shot down in aerial combat. The XIX TAC lost 1 plane. XIX TAC accounted for the damage and or destruction of 353 motor vehicles, 39 locomotives and 125 railroad cars.
Apr 20
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored captures a huge store of arms and ammunition in the Grafenwohr area.
On April 20th Gen. Weyland issued this message to all his troops:
"The following orders of the day issued by the Supreme Commander is to be delivered to every member of all Headquarters and Units under your command:
April 20,1945
To every member of the AEF:
The final destruction of the German Forces west of the Rhine the 21st Army Group thrust powerfully across that river with the US Ninth Army under command. Simultaneously, rapid drives across the Rhine and from the Remagen Bridgehead by 12th and 6th Army Groups provided the southern arm of a great double envelopment which completely encircled the entire German Army group B and two corps of Army Group H, whose mobility was rendered almost zero by our magnificent and tireless Air Forces. Thereafter,in the pocket thus created the 12th Army Group eliminated 21 Enemy Divisions, includ- ing 3 Parachute Divisions. Over 317,000 prisoners of war were captured including 24 Generals and one Admiral. Many tanks and more than 740 guns were destroyed or taken. Booty is immense and still being counted. The enemy total losses in killed and wounded will never be accurately known.
The rapidity and determination with which this brilliant action was executed tore asunder the divisions of Field Marshal Model, and enabled all Army Groups without pause to continue their drive Eastward into the heart of Germany. This victory of allied arms is a fitting prelude to the final battles to crush the ragged remnants of Hitler's Armies of the West, now tottering on the threshold of Defeat.
Dwight D. Eisenhower"
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division was attacking Graphenwohr and captured a huge cache of enemy material and munitions.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the troops were attacking southeast toward the Danube in the Regensburg area with the 71st Infantry Division and the 65th Infantry Division abreast.
In the 563rd BACU2 moved to Lichtenburg. LW2 moved to Hof. FDP1 moved from north of Fulda to Kurnach. FDP1 type 21 radar was moved forward to Kurnach in the Wurzburg area and on same day the type 15 radar jumped from Fulda past this site to Groingen. GO2 moved Post George and Post How from Henning to Posseck, Post Jig from Henning to S of Delnitz, Post King from Henneng to S of E of Hof and Post Love from Henneng to S of Rodger.
XIX TAC had a total of 575 sorties were flown. XIX TAC claimed 42 planes destroyed and 22 damaged in addition to 294 motor vehicles, 58 locomotives and 617 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.
Apr 21
In the Third Army the VIII Corps on the right crosses the Czechoslovakian border to Rossbach. The XII Corps Artillery is pounding Weiden.
In the 563rd Maj. Walter N. Levin was assigned to the 563rd Signal Battalion and attached to Headquarters Company and further appointed Battalion Surgeon. Pfc Chester C. Oblander was trans- ferred in by the 16th Reinforcement Depot and assigned to Head- quarters Company. BACU3 moved to Fulda. FDP5 moved to Pommer.
XIX TAC had good weather and bombed airfields, destroying 46 planes and damaging another 129, all on the ground. XIX TAC also claimed 174 motor vehicles and 182 railroad cars.
Apr 22
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division estab- lished a bridgehead across the Naab river at Schwarzenfeld. In the Third Army's XX Corps the 3rd Cavalry Group reinforced and operating as a combat team captured a railroad bridge across the Naab River intact and overran a German concentration camp at Hohenfels.
In the 563rd at 1500 hours Company C obtained permission from the filter officer at the TCC to prepare for a move to Auerbach.
XIX TAC poor flying conditions limited the flying operations. XIX TAC did fly 79 sorties, managing to damage or destroy 113 motor vehicles, 40 locomotives and 91 railroad cars.
Apr 23
In the Third Army's XII Corps the troops over ran Flossenberg where a large concentration camp and an aircraft factory were secured. The roads in the 11th Armored Division route were clogged with thousands of prisoners and slave laborers being set free. The 11th Armored Division was directed to continue southeast to effect a junction with the Soviet forces near the German-Austrian border.
In the 563rd FDP1 moved the Type 15 to Groingen. FDP3 was in the process of moving to E of Auerbach.
XIX TAC flew 158 sorties. XIX TAC claimed 26 German planes, 247 motor vehicles, 36 locomotives and 7 armored vehicles damaged or destroyed.
Apr 24
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division cleared Regan with the help of XIX TAC fighter bombers and Corps Artillery and the 90th Infantry Division cleared Vohenstrauss and seized the bridge at Burgtreswich.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 14th Armored Division attaches and reaches Altmuhl river at Gungolding where bridging begins under heavy fire from the Germans.
In the 563rd FDP3 started operations at 1200 hours and reported to the TCC by CW radio. The move from Blankenhain to Auerbach by FDP3 was one of their longest moves made in Germany covering 154 miles. GO3 Ground Observer Platoon was brought in by FDP3 for local security. This precaution was taken because the 316 FCS D/F station Charley who were acting as the TCC D/F station was attacked by 17 German's and two D/F men were killed eight wounded and their power unit completely destroyed. In the Company C Monthly Historical Report, Lt. Charles A. Stewart amplified on this site in his summary as follows:
"Near Aurbach there was an old German Labor camp and was being used as an OCS by the Germans. Our men ran across a number of 22 caliber rifles and about 500,000 rounds of ammunition. Also at this site was one of the finest Rifle Ranges most of us have ever seen. In their spare time the men fired their .22's and that kept them from wandering around through the nearby towns. We had a problem keeping civilians out of our area at this spot. There were many Russians, Poles, Italians and other peoples at this camp that the Germans took from other countries they occupied. These people made daily trips to our end of the camp and the civilians from the towns also went scrounging daily. At this site our men captured 9 German soldiers that were armed with 8 rifles, 3 pistols and a light machine gun. Our Air Corps unit also captured a few prisoners including one 1st Lt. in civilian clothes and brought the total number of prisoners taken at this site to 24."
XIX TAC flew 306 sorties with claims of 373 motor vehicles, 31 locomotives and 510 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.
Apr 25
In the Third Armys's XII Corps on the left flank the 97th Infantry Division assaults Cheb, Czechoslovakia. The 11th Armored Division advances to Kreuzberg.
In the Third Army's XX Corps their Infantry Divisions advance to the Danube river.
In the 563rd Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company was moved to Igensdorf, Germany which is 12 miles northeast of Nurnberg and about 9 miles east of Erlangen where the XIX TAC was located. (see Editors Note 22 below).
XIX TAC destroyed 56 German planes and damaged another 66 on the ground in 389 sorties they also accounted for 516 motor vehicles, 83 locomotives and 281 railroad cars damaged or de- stroyed.
Apr 26
In the Third Army's III Corps the 14th Armored Division and the 86th Infantry Division cross the Altmuhl river near Gungolding and capture Ingolstadt.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division drives southeast to patrol the Austrian border.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 65th, 66th, 71st, 14th and 5th Infantry Divisions cross the Danube southwest of Regensburg
XIX TAC had poor weather but it did not keep the XIX TAC out of the sky. XIX TAC flew 465 sorties and claimed 444 motor vehicles, 70 locomotives, 425 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.
Apr 27
In the Third Army's III Corps the 86th Infantry Division crosses the Danube at Ingolstad on a newly constructed foot bridge and thrusts toward the Isar River.
(Editors Note 22) The battalion occupied a small country hotel in Igensdorf which was one of the few buildings in the town. Beside the hotel was a building which had been a beer hall before the war. It turned out that the fleeing Nazi's left a railway car full of processed leather, the kind that was used in uniforms such as the leather officers coats and boots. The men of the 563rd Battalion unloaded it and stored it in the beer haul and were able to trade leather for the labor of German shoe-makers and tailors and have articles made for themselves. Unfortunately the word got around to nearby units that the stock-pile existed and soon delegations from neighboring units were making daily procurement. I don't think the leather stockpile lasted very long even though there was many ton's of it. Any way some of our enterprising men had cowboy boots, pilots jackets and SS Panzer type overcoats, etc. made from it and I am sure that the men of other units did the same.
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored reaches the Czechoslovakian border.
In the Third Army's XX Corps expands the Danube river bridgehead and captures Regensburg.
XIX TAC, in a total of 103 sorties, destroyed 11 German planes and damaged 12 more. The low claims for the day resulted from poor visibility and the lack of targets.
Apr 28
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division is driving toward Passau
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 13th Armored Division is advancing along the Danube toward Isar river at Platting.
In the 563rd FDP2 was moved from W of Lichtenberg to Paulus- hofen. BACU1 moved from Milda to NE of Landshut.
XIX TAC had bad weather and canceled flying.
Apr 29
In the Third Army's III Corps the 14th Armored advances to the Isar river to force a crossing at Moosburg. In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored is attacking SW towards Passau.
In the Third Army's XX Corps 13th Armored Divisions advance to the Isar river and secure bridgeheads at Platting.
XIX TAC in total of 233 sorties claimed 452 motor vehicles,
Apr 30
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division drives southeast on the Corps right flank with CCA on the left and CCB on the right to Wegschid.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 13th Armored Division is crossing the Isar river at Platting.
In the 563rd and In his April Historical report, Lt. Charles A. Stewart reported the following in his summary to accompany the activities that were reported for the month:
"Before a move takes place a party goes to the area of the next proposed site to pick the best spot for the radar and to get the best results. The party also picks out a bivouac and a check is made to see if the area will be safe enough to move into and while making such a trip Capt. Glassow, Company Commander of Com- pany C and Capt. Salfen the FDP3 Chief Air Controller who is at- tached from the 312th FCS, captured 5 Germans at the Giessen site. Two hugh trailers were picked up by the Company C Motor Pool Sergeant in the vicinity of Giessen. These proved invaluable in moving across Germany. One was used to haul most of the Company supplies and things that are not used constantly and left on trail- ers, saving the trouble of unloading trucks and finding storage space for the items that were on the trailers.
XIX TAC finished up the month with 175 sorties claimed 107 motor vehicles, 67 locomotives,588 railroad cars, and 4 planes 277 railroad cars, 28 armored vehicles and tanks, 60 locomotives and 9 planes on the ground damaged or destroyed.
May 1945
May 1
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division drives from the Austrian border to the Klein Meuhl river and seize bridges.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 13th Armored Division finishes crossing the Isar river at Plantting and drives toward the Inn river to search for crossing sites.
In the 563rd Company A moved from Kurnach, Germany to Kalsing, Germany and immediately went into operation thus becoming the forward echelon of the company. The other half of the FDP was still operating out of Grinegen, Germany. This method of operation was called "Split Operation" and now appeared to be normal procedure. Company A was the first to employ this movement and because it was accomplished so successfully the Battalion adopted it as another type of movement by which the FDP's could advance. The other types of movements are; "Movement Intact" and "Leapfrog". The "Split" is by far the most difficult because two complete FDP's must be maintained by the same number of personnel that ordinarily work one FDP. In this case of Company A this procedure has been going on for several months with all it's attendant hardships. FDP1 also moved LW1 to and all GO1 Ground Observer Posts to Groingen. BACU1 moved to Furth. BACU2 moved to Bayreuth. FDP2 moved LW2 and all GO2 Ground Observer Posts Bayreuth. FDP3 moved LW3 and all GO3 Ground Observer Posts to Ansbach. GO4 moved all Posts to Pommer.
XIX TAC restricted from flying by bad weather XIX TAC flew 113 sorties, claiming 13 motor vehicles, 10 locomotives, 93 railroad cars and 14 horse drawn vehicles damaged or destroyed.
May 2
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division drives south to ford the Muehl river at Neufelden.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 13th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division driving southeast toward the Inn river and reach the north bank.
In the 563rd Company B moved to Petersglain. Company C moved to a location adjoining the Airdrome Air Base at Ansbach, Germany. The 364th Fighter Group was operating from this Airdrome. This move was slow because of detours, however FDP3 was operational at 1550 that day, Ground Observers were immediately set up for perimeter security for Company C area. FDP3 moved LW3 to Thielenh- ofen. XIX TAC General Order 33 arrived at Battalion Headquarters awarding the Bronze Star Medal to Lt. David R. Schultze for meritorious service in connection with military operations from 20 September 1944 to 1 April 1945 with the following citation:
"Lt. Schultze has displayed outstanding skill and deep devotion to duty as commander of a Ground Observer Platoon, whose mission has been that of reporting from forward positions hostile aircraft and enemy ground targets of sufficient military value to warrant destruction by fighter bombers. Lt. Schultze has at all times demonstrated aggressiveness, courage, leadership and disregard of his own personal safety and has been highly instrumental in the valuable information furnished by his platoon on enemy ground and aerial targets from advance positions with Infantry and Artillery observation posts."
The 738th Signal Air Warning Company monthly historical report, for the records, FDP5 reported that from September through May FDP5 handled about 2,000 missions. So far no record is available to show the consolidated number of missions handled by FDP1, FDP2, FDP3 and FDP4.
XIX TAC weather situation kept the XIX TAC from flying a great deal. Sixteen sorties were flown with no claims made for the day.
May 3
In the Third Army's XII Corps the 11th Armored Division drives toward Linz.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 65th and 66th Infantry Divisions and the 13th Armored Division are diverted from southeast to east in order to establish contact with the Russians as soon as possible.
In the 563rd LW2 moved to Petersglaim. Company A rear FDP unit was located at Gronengen and moved to join the forward unit at Kalsing and stay overnight. This was a 160 mile trip.
XIX TAC Unfavorable weather again prevented a large number of sorties. Flying 149 sorties XIX TAC claimed 56 motor vehicles, 4 locomotives, 47 railroad cars, 1 bridge, 6 buildings damaged or destroyed.
May 4
In the Third Army's XII Corps The 11th Armored Division was attacking Linz, Austria and was attempting to contact the Soviet forces. Although the AAA fire kept the XIX TAC from Linz the fi- ghter bombers struck northwest of Linz and artillery was brought foreword to assault Linz.
In the Third Army'x XIX Corps the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions are preparing an attack to clear out the passes into Czechoslovakia through which the 4th Armored Division will attack toward Prague.
In the Third Army's XX Corps the 71st Infantry Division is on the left, the 14th Infantry Division is in the center and the 5th Infantry Division is on the right are speeding to the Traun River and taking Wells and Lambach with bridges at both cities.
In the 563rd Company A moved FDP1 on their last operational move and traveled 160 miles to join the forward unit at Kalsing. They had spent the night there. Early in the morning they were on the road again to travel another 50 miles to Vohenstrauss, Germany about 8 miles from the Czechoslovakia border and consequently on the border between the U.S. and the Russian troops. Operation were resumed early the same day. On May 8th FDP1 rear ceased operating and moved from Kalsing to Vohenstrauss, Germany. FDP1 also moved LW1 and GO1 Ground Observer Platoon To Vohenstauss.
XIX TAC flew 150 sorties, claiming 426 motor vehicles 10 tanks and armored vehicles, 25 locomotives, 231 railroad cars, 11 gun positions, 16 buildings, 42 horse drawn vehicles and 1 roundhouse damaged or destroyed.
May 5
In the 563rd BACU2 moved to Bischofshausen. BACU3 moved to Vohenstrauss.
XIX TAC Bad weather canceled air activity.
May 6
In the 563rd Company B moved with FDP2 and all GO2 Ground Observer Posts to Salzbach. LW2 to Petersglaim.
XIX TAC Weather conditions made air activity impossible.
May 7
On May 7th the German high Command surrendered all land, sea and air forces unconditionally to Allied Forces. The surrender act was signed at Reims at 0140 Hours to become effective at 0001 Hours on May 9th. Upon receipt of this news in the field all offensive operations were halted and organization of defensive positions were initiated.
On May 7th this message was sent by Gen. Weyland to his units:
"The following is a paraphrase message from SHAEF
1. Unconditional surrender of all German land, sea, and air forces in Europe to allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command has been signed by a representative of the German high Command at 01:41 Central European time, 7 May under which all forces will cease active operations at 0:00 hours 9 May.
2. No release will be made to the press pending an announcement by the heads of the three governments. All informed down to and in- cluding Divisions, Tactical Air Commands and Groups, Base Sections, and equivalent.
3. Due to difficulties of communications there may be some delay in similar orders reaching enemy troops full defensive precautions will be taken. Effective immediately all offensive operations by Allied Expeditionary Forces will cease and troops will remain in present positions. Moves involved in occupational duties will continue. Weyland"
On May 6th in the XII Corps area the 4th Armored Division advanced northeast into Czechoslovakia unopposed to Pisek. On the right flank of the XII Corps the 11th Armored patrolled deep inside of Soviet territory without making contact with the Red Army.
In the 563rd there was a meeting held at Ninth Air Force head- quarters to discuss Tables of Organization and Equipment needs for Signal Air Warning Units and the following were ordered to attend.
From the 563rd Maj. Maurice E. Byrne
Capt. Mac (NMI) Ray
From the 312th Maj. Noble L. Hull
Capt. William Y. Brown
May 8
XIX TAC flew 9 defensive patrol missions over the U.S. Third Army front.
From May 8th through the end of the month the FDP's were op- erating from 0500 Hours to 2200 Hours daily. During that period preparations were being made for Information and Education programs by each Company. Team sports were organized with every man participating. The companies lacked textbooks for the education programs but courses were improvised.
May 13
On May 13,1945 General Weyland made this commendation:
1. A report of the tri annual administrative inspections of all units of the XIX Tactical Air Command, as of 30 April 1945, rates the 563rd Signal AW Battalion the highest of all units in the command with an overall rating of superior.
2. I wish to commend the Commanding Officer, Battalion Inspectors, and all the officers and enlisted men of the battalion Headquarters and subordinate units whose hard work and attention to duty have made this superior attainment possible.
O. P. Weyland
Major General
May 15
On May 15, 1945 Maj. Byrne and Capt. Ray were put on temporary duty with the headquarters of the Ninth Air Force Headquarters to attend a discussion of organization and equipment for Tactical Con- trol centers for future units.
May 18
BACU1 was set up at Neuwnburg.
May 19
On May 19th Capt. Thomas J. Slattery, the Commanding Officer of Company A was presented the Bronze Star Medal. The presentation was made by Col. Harry A. French, commander of the 19th Tactical Control Group (Prov), with Lt. Col. William L McBride commander of the 563rd Signal Battalion in attendance. The medal had been awarded on previous orders (see award on March 28th).
May 20
On May 20th BACU2 was assigned a mission with the 362nd Fi- ghter Group near Straubing, Germany. This was in connection with a program for training of pilots and the applications of new tac- tics with BACU units. BACU2 was set up at Irlbach. BACU3 was set up at Frankfurt.
June 1945
Jun 6
Upon recommendation of their Company Commander the Good Con- duct Medal was awarded on June 5th to 52 men of Company C.
Jun 6
On June 6th to 2 men of Company B; on June 8th to 31 men of Company in Headquarters Company and 10 men of Company A and on June 10th to 32 men of Company B.
Jun 12
On June 12th XIX TAC, on General Orders 49 awarded the Bronze Star Medal to S/Sgt Virgil L. for meritorious service in connec- tion with military operations against the enemy from 17 July 1944 to 1 may 1945.
Jun 13
On June 13th Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr., assumed command of Company C. Capt. Glassow was transferred to Headquarters Company and appointed Battalion S-3.
Jun 14
On June 14th the Good Conduct Medal was awarded to 10 more men of Company A and 22 more men of Company B and on June 18th to 10 more men of Company A.
Jun 20
On June 20th Col. French sent this letter to the 19th Tactical Control Group:
To All Officers and Men of this Group:
I desire to tell you that I am proud to have been your com- mander. Truly you have justified that pride by your outstanding achievements as a Tactical Control Group.
As I relinquish command I am aware of the hugh debt of gratitude which I owe to you. I can never repay that debt but I shall always remember that group of officers and men who gave their all toward the successful completion of our mission. Yes, your accomplishments have established a high, perhaps unattainable, standard for any Group which may try to emulate your proficiency. You did much with little means of doing it.
Although it was with pride and gladness that I served with you, it is now with a sense of sadness that I leave you. I would prefer to remain with you until you are back into the United States, but mine is not the choice. Then as I go,l may I in all humility say, "Thanks for everything you have done for mae and may our friendship not cease with this parting."
Harry A. French
Colonel, Air Corps
Jun 22
On June 22nd the Bronze Star Medal was awarded by the XIX TAC on General Order 55 to the following men:
Capt. Arthur T. Engell for meritorious service in connection with military operations from 15 July 1944 to 1 May 1945.
M/Sgt William A. Hunziker for meritorious service in connec- tion with military operations from 1 June 1944 to 1 May 1945.
Tech/Sgt Chester R. Kasczynski for meritorious service in connection with military operations from 1 June 1944 to 1 May 1945.
Jun 23
On June 23rd Company B with FDP2 and LW2 moved to its final bivouac at Pommer, Germany near where the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was also bivouacked and about 4 miles from Battalion Headquarters.
Jun 24
On June 24th 10 more men of Company were awarded the Good Conduct Medal. Maj. Maurice E. Byrne was transferred to the 100th Wing Headquarters as Wing Radar Officer in the Wing Signal Staff Section.
On June 24th the 738th Signal Air Warning Company was dis- banded and company B took over the MEW equipment formerly operated by the 738th Signal Aircraft Warning Company who functioned as FDP5.
Jun 25
On June 25th Capt. Thomas J. Slattery was transferred from Company A to Battalion Headquarters and appointed Battalion Ex- ecutive Officer. Lt. Richard T. Goncher was appointed Commanding Officer of Company A until June 26th when Capt. John Nolan was transferred from Company B to Company A and appointed commanding officer of Company A. Also Capt. John A. Easton was transferred to Company B and named Company Commander.
Jun 26
On June 26th the Bronze Star Medal was awarded to the fol- lowing men on XIX TAC General Order 57:
M/Sgt Charles E. Pollina for meritorious service in connection with military operations from 15 July 1944 to 1
May 1945
Sgt Raymond F. for meritorious service in connection with military operations from 1 August 1944 to 1 May 1945
July 1945
Jul 3
On July 3rd XIX TAC issued General Order 59 which awarded a Meritorious Service Unit Plaque to the 563rd Signal Battalion with the following citation:
The 563rd Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion, for outstanding performance and devotion to duty during the period 13 January 1945 to 28 March 1945. This organization, because of it's superior knowledge and performance of tactical operations, superb training, technical skill, spirit of cooperation, aggressiveness and resourcefulness accomplished outstanding achievement relative to Aircraft Warning Service to the XIX Tactical Air Command through- out the continental campaign. The superb efficiency and relentless efforts of all members of this command contributed materially in making possible the brilliant and successful onslaughts by aircraft of the command against the enemy during the normandy, northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes and Central Europe campaigns. The accomplishment of this mission was extremely diffcult and hazardous during the latter stages of the campaigns because of the rapid advance which necessitated constant leapfrogging of equipment and personnel. That Battalion was able at all times to furnish early aircraft warning to fighters and the fighter bombers as well as invaluable information on enemy ground targets reflects highly upon the 563rd Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion and is worth of the highest traditions of the Military service
By command of General Saunders
Jul 12
On July 12th General Order 129 awarded the Bronze Star Medal to the following men in recognition of meritorious service in con- nection with military operations against the enemy as follows:
1st Lt. Will McAdam for action from 15 August 1944 to 1 May 1945
1st Lt. Allen B. Reppert for action from 1 November 1944 to 1 May 1945
M/Sgt George Kustudich for action from 1 November 1944 to 1 May 1945
S/Sgt Donald E. Anderson for action from 1 December 1944 to 1 May 1945.
S/Sgt John M. Boguslawski for action from 1 November 1944 to 1 May 1945
S/Sgt Marion P. Hobgood for action from 15 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
Sgt Joe B. Ross for action from 15 September 1944 to 1 May 1945.
On July 14th Lt. Richard T. Goncher took command of Company B upon the departure of Capt. John Nolan who was transferred to the 19 TCG as communications officer. Later Lt. Hubert W. Scott, Lt. Willfred T. Smith, Lt. Wesley J. Howard, Lt. Will McAdam and WO. Carl H. Gantzhorn were also transferred from Company A to the 19th TCG.
Jul 15
On July 15th XIX TAC General Order 131 awarded the Bronze Star Medal to Officers and Men of the 563rd Battalion in recognition of meritorious service in connection with military operations against the enemy as follows:
Capt. Mac (NMI) Ray for action from 10 July 1944 to 8 May 1945
1st Lt. Joseph J. Faro for action from 1 Jun 1944 to 1 May 1945
1st Lt. Robert S. McSpadden for action from 1 June 1944 to 1 May 1945
1st Lt. David A. Pritchard for action from 1 June 1944 to 1 May 1945
1st Lt. John J. Reynolds for action from 15th July 1944 to 1 May 1945
1st Lt. Robert O. Schurke for action from 15 July 1944 to 8 May 1945
1st Lt Robert K. Slaven for action from 1 August 1944 to 1 may 1945
1st Lt Clarence A. Wetherill for action from 15 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
WO. Vernon O. Mills for action from 1 November 1944 to 1 May 1945
Tech/Sgt Joseph G. Bates for action from 1 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
S/Sgt Frederick B. Dillman for action from 1 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
S/Sgt Herman Messinger for action from 1 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
Tech/3rd James S. P. Bowler for action from 1 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
Sgt Robert J. Norton for action from 1 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
Tech/5th John R Patillipo, Jr. for action from 1 July 1944 to 1 May 1945
Unfortunately the citations accompanying all the above dec- orations were not included in the unit history. These citations all now reside in the 201 files of the individuals concerned and also in the files of the Headquarters 563rd Signal SAW Battalion .
During the month many of the men were on leave and on pass. The activities available were many, such as seven day leaves to the U.K. and the French Riviera; three day passes to Brussels and Paris and attending I and E schools in Paris. In this way some of the men got to see Italy, Czechoslovakia and Belgium. In addition to this each company had their own I and E program and were teach- ing such subjects as Photography, Radio repair, Mathematics, Blue print reading, French language and others. Some of the companies also had courses in English, Journalism, History, Art 'appreciation and Motors. The men conducting these classes did a good job with very limited means in many cases there was no textbooks or training material. Going on at the same time were athletics and inter unit competition in softball and volleyball. Company C reported that they had 8 softball teams and 6 volleyball teams.
The FDP's were also involved in orientating the Pilots on the functioning of the radar and control system. All the BACU units were on duty with Fighter Groups on guidance control of the close support units.
Capt. Arthur Root was named Battalion Executive Officer, Lt. Guttenberger was named Battalion S-1 and Lt. David Schultze was named Battalion motor officer. Lt. Robert K. Slaven was named Commanding Officer of Company C after Capt. Arthur G. Root was transferred to Battalion Headquarters. Later in the month Lt. Guttenberger became ill and was sent to an evacuation hospital and Lt. James D. Tate took over as battalion S-1.
Jul 23
On July 23rd XIX TAC General Order 134 was issued disbanding the 563rd Battalion, effective on 2359 hours on the 20th of July. Personnel of the 563rd Signal Battalion were transferred to and absorbed by the 566th Signal A. W. Battalion. The equipment was to be absorbed into the Air Force stocks.
On July 23rd the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion was disbanded
Aug 6
On August 6th an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
Aug 9
On August 9th an atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.
Aug 10
On August 10th the Japanese government offered to surrender
Aug 14
On August 14th accepted the surrender terms.
Aug 18 On August 18th the French Croix De Guerre was awarded to Maj. Byrne for exceptional services or war, rendered with bravery, in the liberation of France, The citation was of the Order of the Division, with Silver Star. The decoration was ordered On Decision 1045 by Gen. Charles DeGaulle, president of the provisional French Government.
Aug 30
On August 30th the occupation of Japan began which was delayed since August 28th because of a typhoon.
What happened in the battalion after May 7, 1945 is sketchy to me because shortly thereafter I was transferred to the Headquarters 100th Fighter wing. Gen. Sanders had been designated by Supreme Headquarters to command the Wing landing the tactical air forces on the proposed assault land on the Japanese mainland. I was put on planning and preparation of troop and equipment requisitions as Wing Radar Officer. We worked on the plans until we heard about the A-bomb. That ended everything. We were at Camp Chesterfield at Rheims at the time and awaiting orders. When the end came we were given leave and shipped down to Cannes for "R & R". Several weeks later we were on our way home. Also about this time the 19th Tactical Control Group was organized from men in the 563rd Signal and 312th Tactical Control Squadron. Both the 100 Wing and the 19th TCG personnel at that time were unaware that the other was to be part of the assault team.
A number of officers and men of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion were transferred to the 19th Tactical Control Group and here is a narrative of that unit.
"The Headquarters group of the 19th Tactical Control Group was activated under a bulk allotment. This unit consisted of 25 Officers and 57 Men and it was activated on 9 July 1945 at Erlan- gen, Germany by the XIX Tactical Air Command, the next higher headquarters with the unit itself located at Igensdorf, Germany. The unit was commanded by Lt. Col. William L. McBride, 0171839, who was scheduled to become executive officer when Col. Harry A. French, 022906, joined the unit as Commanding Officer. Col. French was then assigned to XIX Tactical Air Command and had already proceeded this unit to another destination in the Pacific. The majority of the Officers and men came from the former organization of Lt. Col. McBride, which was the 563rd Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion. It is interesting to note that while it was generally known that this unit was destined for the Pacific, a good number of the personnel volunteered their services to be with their command- ing officer with whom they hadserved all of their overseas time. On the 16th of July 1945, the group moved via truck convoy complete in ten days to Camp Detroit, Rheims, France. It was in Camp Detroit that the unit was again processed, equipment drafted and packed, and the unit made ready for further overseas duty. After a stay of something like a week or 10 days, the unit was ordered to Calas staging Area, located at Versailles, France to await the port call.
The equipment was loaded in gondola cars on the French Railway and all personnel except those necessary as drivers and assistant drivers of the vehicles proceeded to Calas. On August 14,1945 port call was received and the unit embarked abroad the USS General Breckenbridge for the maiden voyage to the Pacific, a trip to take about 45 days. On August 15,1949 the ship sailed into the blue Mediterranean. On the third day out, radio orders were received to divert the ship to pier 88, New York City, due to the surrender of Japan. The ship arrived and the unit debarked on the 24th of August 1945. Personnel immediately proceeded via rail to Camp Kilmer, New Brunswick, New Jersey, where they were again shipped to the Reception Station nearest the individuals home for a 45 day R&R period. Orders were issued for the unit to reassemble at LeMoore Army Air Force Base, and later were changed for assembly at Fresno Fairgrounds, Fresno, California which was a sub-base of Camp Pinedale. Practically all the personnel were discharged at their respective Separation Centers at the termination of their 45 day R&R and temporary duty at their homes. Only 3 officers and 2 men reported to the Fresno Fairgrounds. Those reporting were sent to their separation Centers pending discharge from the service. Lt. Col. McBride left on 6 December 1945. Capt. Robert O Schurke, 01644757, and Capt. Mac (NMI) Ray both left the unit on 10 December 1945. (See Editors Note 23 below).
An explanation of why there are some gaps and some uncer- tainties in this history. After the war the War Department put a hold on all official records such as Morning Reports so that they could not be accessed. This was to preserve the right of privacy of the people mentioned in reports. Very few of us were in contact after the war. I got one letter from Col. McBride. He was discharged as a Col. and was in command of a Reserve Unit training unit in his area, which was near Boston, Mass.
The 100th Wing headquarters officers including Maj. Byrne came back to the U.S. from Marseilles, France via the "Marine Raven" one of the new U.S. troop transports so as to arrive at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey on September 4,1945. The Raven was a small ship and carried the 100th Fighter Wing Officers and the Nurse Corps of a nearby Field Hospital. Maj. Byrne was released and back to home town, (Boise, Idaho) and his old job as Power Engineer for the Idaho Power Company. I continued in the Reserve program and had a mobilization designation of G-4 and ChiefTechnical Officer at the Fort Huachuca (AZ) Signal Proving Ground. Before giving some biog- raphy on some of our higher command it should be said that the troops that supported Patton's Third Army turned out to be the cream of the forces available. In their subsequent performance, at all levels, the units functioned in his flamboyant stykle with boldness and skill. In retrospect it is edsy to see that he had men that turned out to be exactly what he wanted. The men proved that they were the right men at the right time.
[Editors Note 23--- I surmised that Lt. Col. McBride kept Capt. Schurke and Capt. Ray in order to finish up the administration and property turn in of the unit as I presume that Capt. Schurke was the adjutant and Capt. Ray the Supply Officer. Long after the war I got feed back of a few but not any way all of the 563rd men transferring to the 19th Tactical Control Group and Sgt Robert Norton told me that he was one of those. Also there was mention that Capt. Slattery was the Group Communications Staff officer and Capt. Nolan was the Assistant Communications officer were trans- ferred to the 19th TCG on July 14th. Firstly Lt. Scott, Lt. Smith, Lt. Howard, Lt. McAdam and WO Gantzhorn also joined the 19th TCG on July 16th. The unit history stated that almost all the 563rd "A" `team were transferred to the 19th TCG. Also many men were transferred to the newly organized 431st Fighter Control Squadron.
("Opie" to Gen. Patton). Studied at Texas A and M College, B. S. 1923, LL.D 1945, Air Corps Tactical School 1938 and Command and General Staff School 1939 sent to ETO in 1943 and commander of XIX Tactical Air Command in 1944. He was appointed Commanding General of the 9th Air force in May 23, 1945. He went on to become Assistant Commandant of the Command and General Staff School from September 1946 to May 1946; Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans of Headquarters Army Air Force, Washington D.C. 1946-1947; Deputy Commander of the National War College 1947-1950; Vice commander of Far East Air Forces from 1951 to 1954; named Lieutenant General 1951; named full General in 1952; Commanding General Far East Air Forces 1951-1954 and was Commanding Officer of Tactical Air Forces 1954-1959. He retired in 1959, note that he ended up at the very top of his profession. After retirement he was consultant to Litton Industries and McDonald Aircraft companies. His decorations were Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Korean Air Service medal with 10 stars, Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Legion of Merit, Air Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Six battle stars (U.S.). Officer Legion of Honor, Grand Cordon of the order of Cloud and Banner (Republic of China). Order of Aeronautical Merit (Brazil). Croix De Guerre with Palms (France). Order of the Rising Sun (Japan). Commander Legion of Honor (Philippines). Honorable Knight Commander, Order of the British Empire (Great Britain). Commander with Crown Order of Adolphe of Nassau, Crois de Guerre (Luxembourg). Order of Military Merit Taeguk (Korea). Knight Commander order of White Elephant, Knight Grand Cross order of Crown ( Thailand).
("Tex" to senior officers). He studied at Rice Institute 1922-1926 and graduated from the Air Corps Advanced Flying School in 1928, Tactical School in 1940 and National War College in 1947. He was commissioned a 2nd Lt. of Air Corps in 1929. He was named Commanding General of the 9th Air Force on March 27 1946. Assigned to the ETO in 1943 became commander of the 100th Fighter Wing in 1944. En route to the Pacific Theater when Japan surrendered. He went on to be deputy Commanding General of the 14th Air Force in 1947; Vice Commander of the Tactical Air Forces 1950 through 1952; named Major General in 1952; Deputy Chief of Staff operations Tactical Air Force 1951-54; Commander of Northern Air Forces at Norway 1954-1957; Vice Commander of Continental Air Command 1957-1959; retired 1959. His Decorations were Legion of Merit with Oak Cluster, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal, Bronze Star medal (U.S.). Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre (France). Commander with Crown, Order of Adolph of Nassau (Luxembourg).
Col. William L. McBride was born in Woburn, Mass. on 23 April 1891. He graduated from the Fitchburg, Mass. High School. He was employed by the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company since 1910 in various capacities. He was in the Plant Department of that company and upon entering the Federal Service in WW II was Wire Chief of a large area in Central Massachusetts. His military experience is varied and lengthy. When his national Guard outfit was called into Federal service in World War I he was First/Sgt of Company B of the 6th infantry of the Massachusetts National Guard. He served in various units of the 26th Division during the war and was discharged on april 29, 1919. He was appointed a Captain in the Infantry in 1920 and commanded various units of the 181st Infantry of the 28th Infantry Division. In 1940 he was appointed a Major and soon after entered the Federal Service for the second time. On February 1941, he finished Battalion C.O. and Staff Officers Course at Fort Benning and was assigned as commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 181st Infantry 26th Infantry Division. In May 1941 he was appointed a Lt. Col. and assumed command of the 1st Battalion of the 181st Infantry in the 26th Infantry Division. Because of his extensive telephone experience he was transferred to the Aircraft Warning Service at Drew Field. His experience as command officer of organizations on Drew Field made him the logical officer to command his present organization. He had been the Executive Officer of the 504th Signal A.W. Regiment, commanded the 551st Signal A.W. Battalion, was S-3 of the AWUTC for 4 months, Commanded "C" stage AWUTC and was commanding officer of the 4th Training Battalion. On October 11,1943 he organized the 563rd Signal A.W. Battalion for shipment to the ETO. After the war he returned to Fitchburg Mass where he continued with the New England Telephone. He remained in the Officers Reserve and was commanded a Reserve Signal training unit until he retired.
"Travels to Italy, Czechoslovakia, Austria, the Bavarian Alps and Southern Germany, On June 12, 1945: Left this morning from camp going to Nurnburg, reported to be the most German of the cities visiting the huge stadium which was of magnificent architec- ture. The city itself had been bombed till vast areas were a massive wreckage. Then through some pine forest (indecently, Germany seems to have a well preserved wood supply) hitting the super highway (Der Autobaun) and toward Munich. This was another example of excellent construction and especially the overhead bridges which were beautiful though it brought to my mind the small boys and men that were prisoners at Buchenwald who were forced to build such highways. Then we crossed the Danube River, It being blue green in color and fairly swift. We turned to our right and going through what seemed prosperous country went to the Dachau Prison Camp. Here at the camp were many German war prisoners, many in their silk like camouflaged coats and pants, instead of the victims of the Nazis. We went to the execution and torture houses of this camp. Here, we saw many dog kennels and were told that the dogs had been there where starved so that they would eat parts of the victims. Then, into the place where the prisoners of the Nazis were gassed. Before they were gassed, they were told that they were going to take a shower. The gas chamber looked like a shower room with a small window or so letting the executors look to the inside of the room. The gas came out where the water would be in a shower. Then we saw the ovens where they burned the corpses--300 of them a day supposedly kept going 24 hours a day--there was still some corpses that had not been burned as yet, laying around with blood on the wall. The whole place had a queer stink.
When we came to Munchen or Munich as we call it. Here there were modern or ancient buildings--both showing magnificent architecture. The old on especially showed the result of much patient work, having art work over the outside. The modern ones were had gracious curves and pillars. After looking over some of the frauleins, we retire in a former Nazi building for the night. In the morning we left Munich, and after getting a few more views we came into Austria and the Austrian Alps stood before us. The largest mountains I had ever seen in my life and the most beautiful with snow on their tops and with white streams of water running out of the buildings we started south through a land of well kept fields and buildings. We kept going into more hilly country and up grade and down almost perpendicular. They were covered with pine with exception of the gray rock cliffs showing. The clouds were around the tops of them. The towns in these mountains were made up of Swiss type houses and Chateau with art murals painted on them or showing fin e log work. We came to the town of Oberammergau, the place of the passion Plays. There was a cross on the cone peak that could be seen for miles. There were caves in which the Germans put airplane parts together. All through this time we were traveling through the mountains. You could look down and far below see a beautiful lake almost clear blue sometimes with a small island or so and if the lake were large enough, there would be a village of the same Swiss type with boats and other resort pleasures showing. The people had a distinctive dress something like the Swiss. The men generally wore a green had with a bright red feather in it, a coat that had much art work, on it, such as oak leaves in bright green embroidery on them, a pair of leather shorts, with high wool stockings and buckled oxfords. Some were smoking their Bavarian pipes, a hugh affair of carving and painting on them and resembling a pipe because they were smoking them. The women wore bright skirts with a white blouse plus a vest of black or matching color. The people dried their hay on sticks with prongs on them. There were many small hay busses on the small fields.
[Editors Note 24 The above account was written by Wayne Osborn of the R and R trip starting June 12,1945. The diary did not include the names of his travel companions but it can be presumed that it could have been the men of Post Victor or members of Headquarters Company which was their home base. Wayne Osborn 17168397 was Discharged on 23 November 1945 at Ft. Chaffee Arkansas and died in 1988. His home town was Emporia, Kansas.]
In 1987 Lt. Col. Emory Sweigard initiated the first reunion of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion and was held at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The reunion was repeated in 1989 with Emory Sweigard as Chairman 1989. As time went on more men of the other Signal Air Warning Battalions came to the reunion. It was then decided to make this reunion a combined reunion of Signal Air Warning Battalions. The 1991 reunion was organized by Robert Norton of the 563rd and was held at Greenbelt, Maryland. The 1993 reunion was organized by James Lynn of the 573rd and held at St. Louis, Missouri. The 1995 reunion was organized by Wendell Walton of the 563rd and was held in Kansas City, Missouri. These reunions have been listed by VETS which is sponsored by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and they are also listed periodically by the American Legion Magazine. There are two group pictures following. On page 366 is the 1987 and on page 373 the 1995 Reunion. Pages 366 to 372 is the copy of the Reunion Program for the following Reunions
The members of other Signal Air Warning Battalions were also included as all the men were familiar with the other units because they all trained at Drew Field, near Tampa, Florida. Some of the men had at one time been in several units. The Signal Air Warning Battalion's now included are:
555th Signal Air Warning Bn. with the IX TAC
563rd Signal Air Warning Bn. with the XIX TAC
564th Signal Air Warning Bn. with the IX ADC
566th Signal Air Warning Bn. with the XXIX TAC
573rd Signal Air Warning Bn. with the XII TAC
In 1987 Emory Sweigard published an elegant book "A Memory Book of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion". It included photos taken at the 1987 reunion, of the men attending and their wives. There is also extensive collection of snapshots in combat containing the pictures of about 130 of the men of the Battalion.
The reunions were as follows:
Year Chairman Location
1987 Emory Sweigard 563rd Harrisburg,PA
1989 Emory Sweigard 563rd Harrisburg, PA
1991 Robert Norton 563rd Greenbelt, MD
1993 James Lynn 573rd St. Louis, MO
1995 Wendell Walton 563rd Kansas City, MO
After the 1993 reunion a feature of the preparation for the 1995 Reunion was the debut of the "Sawbuck Gazette" a news letter of the Signal Air Warning Battalions with Wendell Walton as the editor. This publication initiated by Volume 1 on 1 March 1994 continues with Wendell Walton as the Editor to this writing and hopefully for the future.
Also at this writing (30 July 1997) the Fifth Biannual Reunion is scheduled for Pittsburgh, PA. James Q. Opperman of the 555th Signal Air Warning Battalion is the Chairman. The date is 28th to 30th of August, 1997 at the Shereton Union Station Hotel in Pittsburgh, PA. The "Sawbuck Gazette" at this date is volume 12, dated 7 July 1997.
AAA Anti Aircraft Artillery
AC Air Corps (obsolete)
ADC Air Defense Command
ALO Air Liaison Officer
AW Aircraft Warning
ASC Air Service Command
BACU Battle Area Control Unit
Bn Battalion
CO Commanding Officer
Com Communications
CP Command Post
CSU Close support Radar Unit SCR-575
CW Continuous Wave Radio used Morse Code
CWO Chief Warrant Officer
D/F Direction Finding Station
DSM Distinguished Service Medal
ETO European Theater of Operation
FCS Fighter Control Squadron
FM Frequency Modulation
FDP Foreword Director Post
FUSA First U. S. Army
GCI Ground Controlled Interception
GLO Ground Liaison Officer
GP General Purpose
IAZ Inner Artillery Zone
IFF Information Friend or Foe
Inf Infantry
LW Light Warning
MEW Micro Early Warning
Ops Operations
PPI Plan Position Indicator
PW Prisoner of War
QM Quartermaster
SC Signal Corps
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SS Special German Troops
TAC Tactical Air Command
TACAF Tactical Air Command of the Air Force
TCC Tactical Control Center
TCG Tactical Control Group
TD Tank Destroyer
TUSA Third U. S. Army
V-1 German Robot Bomb Pilotless Pulse Jet Aircraft
V-2 German Rocket Propelled Bomb
WD War Department
WO Warrant Officer
WOJG Warrant Officer Junior Grade
The officers and men of the 563rd were accorded battle par- ticipation stars for the following campaigns to be mounted on the European Theater of Operations:
Normandy Campaign terminating 24 July 1944 Northern France Campaign terminating 24 July 1944 Rhineland Campaign dated 28 April Ardennes Campaign dated 27 June Central Europe Campaign dated 27 June
Having been present for duty during the period established for these campaigns entitled 563rd Signal Battalion men to wear five (5) Bronze service stars on the EAME Ribbon (European Theater of Operations).
Some of the men were assigned to units in Florida who supervised sites in the Carribean and were therefore entitled to the American Theater of Operations Ribbon.
It was in England on July 5, 1944. By that time the 563rd had landed in the past several days and were operational near Omaha beach. The Third Army divisions and corps were pouring into the Cherbourg peninsula. They gave us transcriptions of Patton's fa- mous address to his troops on teletype tape so we could distribute what he said to us. In any army unit of any size there was always professional writers and journalists to preserve historical occasions in writings. Here is a classical capture of a famous occasion when Patton addressed his troops prior to their landing in France. The Corps Chaplain gave the invocation. The men were standing with bowed heads asking divine guidance for the Great Third Army that they help speed victory to enslaved Europe; Maj. General Gilbert R. Cook then introduced Lieutenant General Simpson whose army was still preparing for their part in the War.
"We are here," said General Simpson, "to listen to the words of a great man. A man who will lead you into whatever you might face with heroism, ability and foresight, a man who has proved himself admit shot and shell; my greatest hope is that someday soon, I will have my own great Army fighting with him, side by side".
General Patton arose and strode swiftly to the microphone; then men snapped to their feet and stood silently. Patton surveyed them grimly. "Be seated", he said the words were not a request but a command. The General's voice rose high and clear.
"Men this stuff you hear about Americans wanting to stay out of this war and not wanting to fight is a lot of Bullshit; Amer- icans love to fight traditionally. All real Americans love the sting of battle. When you were kids you all admired the champion marble player, the fastest runner, the big league ball players, the toughest boxers. The Americans love a winner, and can not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. American's play to win all the time. I wouldn't give a hoot for a man who lost and laughed. That's why Americans have never lost, and will never lose a war; for the very thought of losing is hateful and unamerican."
He paused and looked over the silent crowd, "You are not all going to die, only two percent of you here, in a major battle would die" Death must not be feared. Every man is frightened at first in battle. If he says he isn't he is a Goddamn liar. Some men are cowards, yes but they will fight just the same, or get the hell scared out of them watching men who fight, who are just as scared as they. The real hero is the man who fights even though he is scared. Some get over their fright in a few minutes in battle, some take hours, for some it takes days. The real man never lets the fear of death overpower his honor, his duty to his country, and his innate manhood. All through your career of army life you have bitched about what you call this 'chickenshit drill'; that is all for one reason--instant obedience to orders and it creates instant alertness; I don't give a damn for a man who is not always on his toes. To continue breathing, he must be alert at all times. If not, sometime, a German son-of-a-bitch will sneak up behind him and beat him to death with a sack full of shit."
The men roared. Patton's grim expression did not change. "There are 400 neatly marked graves somewhere in Sicily" he cried, "all because one men went to sleep on his job." He paused and the men grew silent. "but they are all German graves", he said softly, "because we caught the bastard asleep before they did."
The General clenched the microphone tightly, his jaw out- thrust, "An army is a team. Lives, sleeps, eats and fights as a team! This individual hero stuff is a lot of crap. The bilious bastards who wrote that kind of stuff for the Saturday Evening Post don't know anymore about real battle than they do about fucking." The men slapped their legs and rolled with glee--this was the old boy as they imagined him to be--and in rare form too! "We have the finest food, the finest equipment, best spirit and men in the world", Patton bellowed, he lowered his head and suddenly he slapped his head, facing the men belligerently, "why, by God", he thundered, "I actually pity those sons-of-bitches, we are going up against, by God I do". The men clapped and howled delightedly. There would be many a barracks tale about the old man's choice phrases, this would become part of Third Army's history.
"My men don't surrender" Patton continued. "I don't want to hear of a soldier under my command getting captured unless he is hit. Even if you are hit, you can still fight back. This is not bullshit either. The kind of man I want is like a Lieutenant in Libya, who with a Luger against his chest jerked his helmet off, swept the gun aside with the other hand, and busted hell out of the Boche with his helmet. Then he jumped on the Boche and went out and killed another German. By this time the man had a bullet through his chest--that is a man for you".
He halted, and the crowd waited. "All the real heros are not story book combat fighters, either." He went on, "Every man in the army plays a vital part, every little job is essential to the whole scheme. What if every driver suddenly decided that he didn't like the whine of shells and turned yellow, and jumped headlong into the ditch? What if every man said-- they won's miss just one man in thousands--what if every man said that?" "Where in hell would we be now? No, thank god, Americans don's say that. Every man, every department, every unit is important in the vast scheme of things. The ordnance men are needed to supply the guns, the QM to bring up the food and the clothes for us. For where we are going, there isn't a hell of a lot to steal. Every man in the mess hall, even the one who heats the water to keep us from getting diarrhea has a job to do. Even the Chaplain is important, for if we get killed, and he doesn't bury us, we would all go to Hell. Each man must think not only for himself, but think of his buddy fighting beside him. We don't want yellow cowards in this army they should be killed off like flies. If not, they will go back to the states after the war and breed more like them. The brave men will breed more brave men. One of the bravest men I saw in the African campaign, was one of the fellows I saw on top of a telegraph pole in the midst of furious fire while we were plowing towards Tunis. I stopped and asked him what in hell he was doing up there at a time like that. He answered "fixing the wire, sir!", "isn't it a little unhealthy right now?" I asked him "yes sir, but this Goddamn wire has got to be fixed". There was a real man, a soldier devoting his all to his duty--no matter how great the odds, no matter how seemingly insignificant his duty may have been at this time. You should have seen those trucks on the road to Gabus. The drivers were magnificent. All the day they drove along those sons of bitching roads, never stopping never diverting from their course with shells bursting all around them. We got through on good American guts. Many of the men drove over forty consecutive hours!" The General paused, staring challengingly out over the silent sea of men, you could hear a pin drop anywhere on the vast hillside. The only sound was the breeze stirring the leaves and the animated chirping of the birds in the branches.
"Don't forget", Patton barked, "you don't know I'm here at all. No words of the fact is to be mentioned in any letter. The world is not supposed to know what the Hell they did to me. I'm supposed to be commanding this army--I'm not supposed to be in England; let the first bastards to find out be the Goddamn Ger- mans--Someday I want them to raise up on their hind legs and howl "Jesus Christ! It's the Goddamn Third Army and that son of a bitch Patton again. "We want to get the hell over there" Patton yelled, "We want to get over there and clean the Goddamn things up! Then we'll have to take a little jaunt against the purple pissing Japa- nese, and clean their nuts out before the Marines get all the credit!".
The crowd laughed and Patton continued quietly "Sure we all want to go home, we want this thing over with, but can't win a war lying down. The quickest way to get it over is to go get the bastard. The quicker they are whipped the quicker we go home, the shortest way home is through Berlin".
"There is one thing you all will be able to say when you go home. You may all thank god for it. Thank God that at least thirty years from now when you are sitting around the fireside with your brat on your knee, and he asks you what you did in the Great War II-You won't have to say that you shovelled shit in Louisiana."
Capt. La Pietra was with his group moving towards Nurnberg after the Rhine crossing. They passed through Buchenwald about a week after the U.S. troops spear-headed into the area. We were told that in civilian life Capt. La Pietra was a professional journalist. Here is his classic description as one of the first of the U.S. troops to witness the horror of the Nazi persecution. Here again the story was put on teletype tape and was available to all troops.
"The moon hangs low over Buchenwald tonight; the sky is starry; the air is warm. There is a ring around the moon-- a very deep orange-colored ring which could easily pass for red: and to those of us who visited the "Koncentration Lager Buchenwald" this afternoon it is definitely red--as red as the blood which flowed from the human veins of its miserable internees. And God knows enough blood has gushed down its large concrete trough--to be blotted up by the dry earth within the electrically charred barbed confines of this diabolical camp.
Yes today is a day that will remain indelible in my memory; I've seen many, many unforgettable things since New York's skyline dropped behind the western horizon fifteen months ago and always finding something which superseded some other thing in impressive- ness or ghastliness. But what I saw this sunshiny afternoon at Camp Buchenwald will never be equaled, even if I travel to the very depths of hell itself!
Somewhat vaguely, I recall the barbarous acts, cruelties and atrocities related in the volumes of ancient and modern history. How far removed they seemed! Deeds of centuries age; deeds of un civilization; small unpleasantries which inevitably accompany the transformation of a world Could such a thing take place today? Impossible! Except maybe on some undiscovered, cannibal infested island. Even then, death would be more or less a speedy procedure, a head hacked off suddenly, or a quick plunge into boiling oil.
Until today, thus ran my trend of thought. Undoubtedly, yours too! But we are wrong--just as wrong as salt is sweet!
I'm sure you have all heard of Buchenwald by now. No doubt the radio commentators devoted at least a minute to it; newspapers carried a half column; and perhaps the magazines showed a few pictures. Yes, it's the same old story--and John Q. Public, war-weary and overall its crimes has slipped away into the for- gotten past.
I saw Buchenwald a week after it was liberated--way before England's members of Parliament and our congressmen did. It was still "in the raw" then, and in the little time I have, I'm going to take you on the same eerie tour of horror a la 1945. Weimar, Germany, is a fair sized city 103 miles Southwest of Berlin. A good highway leads out of Weimar to the Concentration Camp and our jeep made the four or five miles in a few minutes. A hugh factory, completely bombed, flitted by and the wire enclosure of Buchenwald loomed ahead. With me were three Sergeants and a Corporal, members of my outfit. Crowds of visitors, most of them American soldiers, streamed in and out of the main gate which was guarded by a solitary M.P. As we stepped inside and surveyed the square mile of camp area, wondering which way to turn first, one of the stripe-in- formed internees approached us and asked in amazingly good English whether we wanted a guide. Of course, we welcomed his offer and our miserable tour commenced.
But first a word or two about our guide. His name, Reinhold Schienhelm, native of Lorraine; French descent; apparent age, 50; true age, 38; K.L. number 42558; reason for interment, espionage and pro ally sentiments (actually, he is an excellent telegrapher and refused to work for the Nazis); civilian occupation, seaman; traveled widely, spent much time in the U.W.; date of internment, September 1942.
He spoke freely and was willing to tell what he knew. All my questions were answered readily; when he mentioned things which were incredible, I cross examined him to see whether he would contradict himself, but he always had a logical explanation or "on the spot" proof. Never was he offended; he seemed to expect us to doubt him, no less than four times during the afternoon he pleaded, almost tearfully: you must believe all this; it was much worse than what you see now".
As we tramped from place to place, the frightful story of K.L. Buchenwald unfolded. I will relate everything I saw and learned, using generalities in some cases and details in others.
Most of the inmates were political prisoners such as Poles, Czechs, Russians, French, Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Italians, Belgians and a very few Germans. It is impossible to estimate how many have been "handled" by the camp during its four years of operation, but the total dead was over eighty three thousand. Of these, fifty one thousand were killed "officially", using such methods of execution as hanging, beating, shooting, and electrocu- tion. The remaining thirty two thousand died a "natural" death of starvation or poisoning. All bodies were disposed of by cremation. A quota of prisoners to be eliminated was established for each day--the number depending on the influx of new ones. Needless to say, the six oven crematorium never had much time to cool. Many of the inmates were children, hanging from 3 years upwards. At this writing there were over 1200 such children in the camp.
The daily food ration was the same for all--one loaf of bread to six men, served at 4 A.M; and one liter of soup for each served at 6 P.M. Deviation from this menu occurred now and then an indication to more seasoned internees that international repres- entatives in their routine inspection of camps were expected that day.
The camp was manned by SS Officers and troops; they in turn were assisted by habitual criminals who did the menial work. The SS personnel lived with their families in fine buildings adjacent to the camp grounds, enjoying all the modern conveniences and com- forts of present day life.
The first torture weapon that met our eyes on this unpleasant tour was called "the beating block". Punishment for any mis- demeanor, regardless of it insignificance, took place here. The victim was laced to this pillory in a prostrate position, face down, and beaten with a leather strap or a wooden club--the latter being used on days when the killing quota was high. A few feet away stood another block with a pole attachment. This was termed "hanging on the tree". After their beating ordeal, victims were suspended here by their hands--and the excruciating pain increased as they recovered from unconsciousness, only to lapse back into it. The crematorium, a one story brick building, featured six ovens, all of which contained charred remains of human bodies. In one of the ovens a complete skeleton rested, and in another there was a half melted skull plus a few chalk like ribs with bits of unburned flesh still clinging on. High above the ovens hung a plaque on which was painted: "allow not disgusting worms to eat my body, give me the clean bright flame". Each furnace operated at full capacity. Eighteen bodies per cremation, 450 per day. Victims of the various murder methods were taken to the crematorium in small carts, dumped down the cellar chute, loaded onto a lifts, raised to the furnace room, and stacked into the ovens. Some of them, even though unconscious, were undoubtedly alive. More fortunate ones recovered consciousness as they slid into the cellar. These were lifted up into one of the 36 nooses which hung conveniently along the white wall and allowed to die before the bright flame did its work.
On those days when the quota was high the crematorium had to serve as a murder house also. Prisoners were marched to the cellar under some pretense, singly, each descended the steps, opened the door, and, as he entered, an SS guard clubbed him. An attendant then lifted the limp body and slipped the head into one of the nooses on the wall. When the 36th body was suspended, the lowest hanging one was lowered and piled onto the elevator. This continued until all the victims were done away with. And while all this murdering took place, a large machine in one corner of the cellar ground out noises loud enough to drown the muffled cries that accompanied the clubbing.
The camp itself was divided into two sections--the "big camp" and the "little camp". All internees had to spend a three month test period in the "little camp" where conditions were absolutely deplorable. Those who survived the ordeal and showed a willingness to abide by the camp policies were "promoted" to the "big camp". Here, conditions were slightly better.
The wooden barracks in which the internees lived were crudely constructed--about 75 feet long. In the "big camp" the prisoners had wooden beds of the upper and lower bunk type. About 100 men were assigned to a building. But in the "little camp" where there were no beds--just shelves--four layers of shelves about three feet apart vertically and six feet deep, with the end nearest the wall slightly inclined so as to act as a pillow. These shelves lined both sides of the barracks and would "accommodate" 1500 men. We walked through one of these barracks and there were still about 10 dozen occupants in it. If ever anyone wanted to see living death, here it was--grey skin pulled tightly around scissor-edged bones, dull eyes peeping through two dark sockets, broomstick legs and arms too weak to support the sixty or seventy pounds of torso. Here was grotesqueness in the superlative. Some of these skeletons hobbled up and down the aisle, using the shelved bunks for support; others rested on their wooden mattresses, apparently dead or very close to it. Outside the door, three of them lay dead, recently evacuated by some of the stronger inmates. Their half-naked bodies were partly clad with the striped clothing familiar to all internees. After on, the cart, which made a systematic tour of the entire camp, would come along and take these bodies to the crematorium area where they would be stacked on the ever-increasing pile (we saw the heap of bodies later and took pictures of it).
On my way out of the barracks, one of the miserable creatures raised his thin arm to his lips in a gesture for a cigarette. I gave him what was left of my open pack, plus a few chocolate bars. Two or three others saw this and came crawling over toward us. A near riot started. In pity and utter disgust I left--The angry shouts and ravenous cries from within the building gradually subdued but even now they are still ringing in my ears. I don't know who finally ended up with all the chocolate, but Reinhold, our guide, said that the victor wouldn't live much longer after he ate it, for the shock would be to much for the man's stomach.
The Laboratory was next on our list. In appearance it resembled the other barracks, but the interior was rather cozy. Most of the rooms were now occupied by internees who had recently moved in because of the better living conditions it afforded. The Laboratory was manned by maniacal SS doctors--men who probably had great medical minds and definitely and insane brain. They devoted their energy to medical research, using the cream of the prisoner crop as Guinea Pigs. All new internees were given a physical examination. The healthiest specimens were quartered in special barracks, known as block 36. Here, living conditions and food were excellent, and for three weeks the inhabitants ate three good meals a day and lived a life of leisure. Then one by one, they were called to the laboratory and sacrificed to "science". All types of disease germs were injected into these healthy men and results were observed daily until death overtook them. The bodies were then dissected and all affected parts were preserved in large jars, carefully labeled. An entire room lined with shelves featured a display of every organ of the human body and various skeletons. The most ghastly sight we saw was a jar in which floated, almost life-like, a half head. And by turning the rectangular glass container, the exterior profile with its agony stained face and its half open eye stared back as if to say, "tell the world--so that it won't happen again", while the other side of the cloven head, exposing to the world the bone and matter of its construction, bore silent witness to the meaning of those words. I don't know who this unfortunate creature was, but I do know that he is a martyr in the eyes of all who have seen him. Silently, I said a short prayer for him--and for those who still expect him to come back. May they never learn of the plight which befell him.
Our guide was hardened to all this. His only comment was "in America you use mice and rabbits; here they use human beings".
The commandant, a beast well versed in methods of torture and murder had for his wife a creature even more brutal than he, himself. One of her favorite hobbies was collecting tattoos. Therefore, when the inclination moved her, she attended the phys- ical examinations of newly arrived prisoners, inspected them for exceptional tattoos, noted the prison numbers of those possessing ones she desired, and turned in her list to the SS in charge. Thus chosen, these particular men received a murder priority, and in a few day's the tattoos plus a good size piece of skin were going through a tanning process. Later, these same tattoos formed a pretty lamp shade in the Commandant's comfortable home. If the tattoo supply became too great, choice specimens were preserved in Jars and put on display in the laboratory until such time as they were needed.
We passed by some low buildings a bit removed from the large barns. They were the storerooms for grain and potatoes. Two large barns housed some pigs--part of many which could not be taken when the SS fled. Our guide told us about how a small pig was missing one day and, since an internee was suspected, the entire camp had to go without food for five days as punishment.
At the Eastern end of the camp were two large stables without horses. One was nicely constructed, high with a beautifully pan- eled interior resembling somewhat a gymnasium. Along one end a balcony extended outward, overlooking the straw covered floor below. This was the "sports arena"; emaciated prisoners "played" with SS troops, the latter armed with clubs. Wives of the SS troops were the spectators, yelling their approval each time a club descended on a shriveled, helpless form.
The other stable was a low building of stone construction, containing numerous stalls and three or four rooms. The rooms were thick walled and soundproof--another murder house! On one occasion over 400 Russian soldiers, prisoners of war, were exterminated the same day they arrived. Here is how it was done. All were marched to an area outside one end of the building. They were told that this was a physical examination. One by one, they entered, stripped, and were conducted by an SS trooper (dressed in the white clothes of a doctor) to the soundproof room at the other end. Another SS (also in white) met the victim, escorted him inside, closed the door tightly, walked him over to a height measuring device, and positioned him with his back to the blanket covered wall. Behind the blanket stood still another SS, with a pistol in position, and, on a short signal, a bullet went racing through the prisoner's skull imbedding itself in the padded wall at the other end of the room. As the body slumped forward, the "doctor" caught it and dragged it out of the room, into the arms of the other white figure, and ;he carried it outside the stable dropping it on the large concrete pavement, slanted toward the center, so that the blood would drain and run toward a trough which emptied int dry earth. As more bodies piled up, the blood ran faster and faster. When the pile could accommodate no more, the drained bodies were loaded on carts and taken to the crematorium. The carts made many trips on this particular day! And so ended our short visit to Buchenwald. As we crossed the large parade ground, six or seven inmates were building a wooden pyramid shaped monument. It was near completion. On it were three large letters "K.L.B". Underneath the letters was the figure "51,000", commemorating those murdered officially.
At the main gate, we thanked our guide--gave him some cigarettes and chocolate. He assured us that we should be on the receiving end of the thanks--that we will never know how happy and grateful all the internees were when the Americans came. I invited him to America and asked what he thought of our country. He answered "Ah;, you should ask that In the states you have all the countries of the world! It is wonderful!"
Soldiers were still pouring in and out of the gate. I paused and took one last look at this inhuman place. here was the gate, through which all prisoners entered, and there was the long smoke stack of the crematorium, through which 83,000 had left. I couldn't suppress the shudder which ran through me: an unexplain- able feeling tugged at my stomach; quickly I did an about face--we headed straight for our jeep. Buchenwald, Hell's only counterpart, shall live forever in my memory. How the German people ever permitted its existence along with other camps such as Lublin, Erla, Nordhausen, Dachau--is far beyond my comprehension. Most German's claim they knew nothing of the atrocities--but they did--it couldn't be otherwise! The question uppermost in my mind is "What is the world going to do about it?".
A slight mist is settling over Buchenwald now; the stars are shining through it; the air is a bit cooler--but the moon still hangs low; and there's still a red ring around the moon.
Yesterday afternoon I visited a German concentration Camp and with the aid of an English speaking internee, I was able to see at first hand one of the most abominable, disgraceful sights I have ever seen. I assure you I will never forget it or the people responsible for its existence. This camp is several miles from the outskirts of a fairly large city and is spread over a huge area surrounded by fir trees set in a beautiful forest. It housed approximately forty thousand men and boys and was primarily a work and experimental camp. Few ever left and to quote the words of our guide "There was only one way to leave- and that was by the smokestack".
The camp was roughly divided into four sections- namely the big camp, the little camp, the factory and the sumptuous quarters of two thousand SS men that acted as combination guards and ruthless torturers. Let me take each one separately and briefly describe them but before I start I want you to know that some of the things that follow will not be nice and perhaps shouldn't be discussed over the afternoon tea but I want you to promise me that a great number of people do read it. I want you to see that everyone at home, in the neighborhood and, if possible, see if the readers of the Harvey Tribune can't read and appreciate some of barbaric treatments that our enemies have been and are still practicing over here. What follows is not propaganda and is not written to wring animosity from those that should read it but it is rather to give as true a picture of death, disaster and brutality that the German race has imposed on the world. If anyone has any pity or compunction for them afterwards and still feels that their prisoners of war should be pampered, and that the rules General Eisenhower haws set down and we are imposing over here are too strict, or that they have worked hard enough at their jobs there at homes to compensate for this, I would deem it a privilege to speak with them.
Before doing so, let me point out the purpose for this the camp existed. These slaves or prisoners were there to work in the factory on in the stone pit until they were too weak and sick and then they were to die. The Germans, the so-called super-race, felt they were better than these Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Rumanians, Frenchmen, Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians, Englishmen and yes, By God!-there were Americans there too, and so the camp existed to get rid of these "inferiors"-but only after extracting all the work they could from them.
As a man entered the camp he was strapped across a table-like arrangement and beaten across the back, posterior and thighs with a round leather strap. Later if they committed a small misdemeanor they were still strong enough not to merit killing, they were subjected to many similar beatings or hung up on hooks with their feet about twelve inches from the ground and suspended from their wrists behind them and then over their heads to a scaffold. The healthy or new men were quartered in what was called the "big camp" where they lived in thin, low-ceiling barracks. In quarters that should have housed little more than fifty men, we found four hundred fifty diseased, misplaced souls. Throughout the [entire camp these men of all ages as well as boys ten to fifteen years were fed the same rations. One loaf of bread for six men consisted the breakfast at five in the morning and one bowl of thin foul smelling soup per person at six in the evening. The men were compelled to run at all times regardless of age of infirmities and if they refused they were beaten and shot. If they became exhausted and unable to keep up the terrific pace, they received the same treatment. Many dropped in their track and many others purposely ran into the highly electrically charged fence that surrounded the entire camp. Some of the men worked in the factory which used to-but thanks to the effectiveness of our bombers no longer does exist at one side of the camp. This factory was engaged in manufacturing munitions and explosives. many times when the leaders would perfect a new weapon of this kind they would take some of the healthier men, stand them in an area, and fire close to them so they could observe the cutting and killing effects. Men were returned to camp mangled, destroyed and almost dead. l In civilized countries for the purposes of experimentation animals, such as rabbits, etc. are used for these purposes but not in Germany! They used men and laughed about it. Those that were not employed at the factory or for experimental purposes worked in the stone pit. I saw this pit and know why so many were slain there. Like all open pit mining methods the material had to be blown and cut out and then transported from the pit to the awaiting ore cars on the surrounding sides. So it was with the rocks but not as we know it. These men who were interned were forced to descend into the pit, pick up a huge boulder, hoist it to their shoulder and return back up the same steep incline running the whole while. One finds it hard to think such as these and other barbaric practices such as this exist in such a day as ours. It is reminiscent of the old Egyptian ;and Roman methods but even those were more civilized than these. Is it any wonder then that these men lost their minds, became diseased, and infected with their living conditions, and soon became nothing more than living (God, that isn't the word!) skeletons. As the men became steadily more starved, diseased and emaciated they were moved from the "big camp" to the "little camp" and at this juncture I lack words to describe the deplorable conditions I saw.
I saw men who were absolute skeletons, who were so weak they couldn't get out of bed, who called out in ;the most pitiful, unreal voices I ever heard. They lived in smaller barracks than the ones I mentioned above, yet each barracks quartered from between 1500 to 1800 of these skeletons. They were, and are, too weak to move from urinating and excretory purposes and have to live just as they are. The stench naturally is unmentionable. I saw big husky fellows that have seen death in all of its forms become too nauseated to remain. These internees are dead now and while the American officials are doing everything humanly possible they can't save the majority of them. Their screams, condition, and waste bodies will always be before my eyes. God the men responsi- ble for this atrocity must pay but death is too good for them. How can a man repay his debt to society for ruining and destroying so many mortal soul?
The first day our troops entered three of these gaunt, inhuman creatures died simply because they had something to ear. Those that remain now are being fed slowly and in sever cases intrave- nously. At the door of one of there "barracks" that I entered I was startled at seeing two of these corpses. Upon questioning I learned that they had just passed away and some of the stronger of the men left had gotten them that far. The agony on their faces alone will always prohibit me from excusing a German from anything he does. In their weak voices that really amounted to screeches they asked us for candy and cigarettes. It was hard to refuse but our guide explained they would kill each other in an effort to get even a small morsel. He knew of cases where men with gold teeth and been put in one of these places only to be found dead a short time later. They are no longer men but half-crazed animals who show the marks of torture and abuse over a long period of time.
I saw the crematory and a more hideously, scientific thing I hope to never see again. Truck loads of dead and half dead men were unloaded at ground level near a trap door. They were passed below into the basement where an SS man waited with a heavy ball bat club. If any were by some way still alive, he killed them by a variety of methods too hideous to mention. From here the bodies were dragged to an elevator which took its grisly burden to the next floor where the crematories were. In this room there were eight huge ovens, each of which still had the partially charred remains of what was once a man in them. On busy days (of which they must have had plenty since the estimate is that since the beginning of the camp in 1939, or 1940 approximately 83,000 have been put to death of which 51,000 are definitely known. They burned as many as three and four bodies in one oven at a time. So, then if the man's loved ones asked for his ashes they received not his but that of someone else. As I left the crematory I stepped into a yard on the left and found a stack of dead that were awaiting cremation, when the American troops arrived. These are daily being taken care of by normal burial procedures but there are so many it is almost an impossibility. Before they burned the bodies they took all the gold from the teeth and mutilated the remains according their insane desires. Never Have I witnessed anything more brutal or scientifically planned for mass death.
I saw a pile of bones in another part of the yard surrounding the crematory that were as neatly stacked as if they were of great value. I also saw the gallows which they used in hanging countless numbers and in so doing learned that all hanging's were conducted before the entire assembled group of people. According to our guide none of the people who witnessed these hangings felt too badly because they all figure that the individual was fortunate to\in being able to die so simply. What wild thoughts must have raced through these doomed men's minds!
Our guide was unfortunately for himself, but fortunately for us, well versed and familiar with all the perversions and insane devices that one found at the camp. You would have to see the camp to believe that such barbarity, uncivilized things such as that exist. He pointed a hugh stable that originally had been used for horses but had been put to different use concocted from the warped brains of these fanatics. The SS men and their women ()yes, women came to there functions) used to make an evening's entertainment such as we would go to the theater out of going to this arena and watching fellow SS men torture, beat and thrash slaves or internees in the floor below. Something basically and emotionally is wrong with men and woman of such low caliber and ideals and it is a direct assault against our standards of mentality, righteousness and decency. Why and how do such blood thirsty people exist.
In conclusion let me describe briefly the scenes that I saw that were absolutely the most maddening of it all. We went through the doctor's clinic and experimental laboratories. here we found parts of the human body in various shapes stored in alcohol. Every part of the body had its place even so far as cutting a man's head precisely down the center and then mounting it in show-case style. What fiendish, diabolical things these insane doctors must have done to some of their specimens, I'm sure only the Lord will ever know. They were known to walk through the ranks of the men and if they saw an odd-sized head on a man or something else that appealed to their bloody temperament they would immediately put the man to death and begin their unbalanced experiments. In a large glass enclosed show case they had an exhibit of various tatoos which they had removed from men"s bodies and preserved. The commandant's wife was often seen going through the ranks when they were all lined up stopping before various men and demanding that they remove their clothes to the waist. If she saw a tatoo that appealed to her, she took the man's prison number and the next day he was put to death; his tatoo given to her for her collection. I've heard of strange hobbies, but none quite so inhuman as that- and a woman collector at that. They resembled hides of animals after they had been treated and preserved. I personally didn't see what was reputed to her most prized collection but several of my friends did. She saw one tatoo on the chest of a man one time that so intrigued her that she not only demanded it for her collection but insisted that it be made into a lamp shade and it was in her home when the American troops entered.
There is the German man and woman fanatic: there is our enemy. Over here we often hear people back home say we are fortunate to be fighting in this theater where the people are at least civilized as compared to the Japanese for instance. If that is civilization, if that is advancement beyond the lowest stages of barbarity, if that is the product of the twentieth century, and if that is the road the human race is beginning to follow, them I'm sure we don't have the same conception of civilization. Why, we in America and countless other countries have trained our pets and animals to be more civilized than those abnormalities can ever overcome.
In closing I might point out this camp not only interned men but children and boys as well. The youngest fellow know to enter was three and a half years old and they ranged up from there to all ages. I saw and with the aid of an interpreter talked with many of the 1200 that are yet in the camp and I'm happy to say they are being well taken care of. Most of them have had little or no formal schooling and judging from their emaciated little bodies small chance to live in the world. They received the same food rations that I mentioned men receiving above. They are now eating wonderfully well, thanks to the Americans and the rich surrounding countryside. Provision have already been set up and formal education of a type is being taught to them in their own native tongue. Most of them are alone in the world with both parents either dead or missing. It's a big burden for a lad of ten or twelve, or fifteen to shoulder with no education or training. Tears almost came to my eyes when I entered one room and found a group of Hungarian lads in he midst of eating supper. They were so happy and grateful that their eyes fairly shown. They all offered and pleaded for us to share their meal with them but no one needed only to look at their emaciated, starved little bodies to say above the lump in his throat, "no, thanks. It is for you".
Editors note 26--- This was submitted by Col. Harold Salfen (then Capt.) of the 312th FCS who was Air Controller for FDP3 in combat. The account was in a letter Clyde Krebs (then Sgt 312 FCS) wrote to his parents during combat. Krebs last address was 100 East Chestnut #16-C Chicago, IL 60611. Col. Salfen's address was 3841 Whitehall Dr Dallas, TX 75229-2757 at this time.]
Signals the Story of Communications in the XIX Tactical Air Command up to V-E Day
Capt. Eugene M. Greenberg
War as I Knew It
General George S. Patton
World War II in the Air
James F. Sunderman
Patton Ordeal and Triumph
Ladislas Fergo
August 1944
Robert A. Miller
Patton's Third Army
Charles M. Province
History of the United States Army in World War II Series European Theater Operations
The Ardennes; Battle of the Bulge
Hugh M. Cole
The Sigfried Line Campaign
Charles B. McDonald
Cross Channel Attack
Gordon A. Harrison
Lorraine Campign
Hugh M. Cole
Breakout and Pursuit
Martin Blumensen
Final Operations
Charles B. McDonald
Chronology 1941-1945
Mary H. Williams
Riviera to the Rhine
Air Force Combat Units of World War II
Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate
The West Point Atlas of American Wars
Vincent J. Esposito
Who's Who in America
The Panzer Battles
Maj. Gen. F. W. Von Mellenthin
Army Air Force History of World War II
Battle of the Generals Martin Blumensen 1993
Morrow and Company
The Patton Papers 1940-45 Martin Blumensen
The Invasion of Japan John Ray Skatwes 1994
University of South Carolina Press
Pamphlet No 672-1
Unit Citation and Campaign Participation Credit Register
HQ War Dept Washington 25 DC 6 July 1961
Seek and Destroy
The Story of the XIX TAC
Author Unknown (Pamphlet)
12000 Missions
The Story of the XIX TAC for the month of August
Author unknown (Pamphlet)
Radar Magazine
Number 1 July 1944
Published by Office of Scientific Research and Development
Radiation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mediterranean Mission
Published by the 561st SAW Bn at Marina di Pisa, Italy 1945
VETS (Reunions) Veterans of Foreign Wars P.O. Box 901 Columbia, MO 65205-0901 United States Air Force Air Force Historical Research Center (AFHRA) 600 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6424 (334)-953-2439
This installation also has the Air University Library. There is a Computer Data Base (IRIS) and card index covering holdings prior to 1980. They will furnish microfilm on unit histories for $22 Per roll.
Air Force Museum Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5001
Department of the Army
Center of Military History
Washington, DC 20005-3402
Publishes books both in paper back and hard back in a series "U.S. Army in World War II" which may be purchased
US Army Military Institute
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5008
Center for Air Force History
Building 5681, Bolling Air Force Base
Washington D.C. 2033
U.S. Total Army Personnel Command
Attn TAPC-PDA (Awards)
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, VA 22332
Ninth Air Force Association, Inc
16 Oak Street
Valley Stream, NY 11581
Ninth Air Force Association Archives
Akron, OH 44325-7832
(330)-972-78322
University Libraries
Collection Management Department
Stanley W. Akers Director
National Archives and Records Administration (NARR)
Washington, DC 20408
(208)-344-2726.
They have stacks of paper which they will copy for 25 cents per page which in most cases are contained in microfilm at the AFHRA but which are of more readable than the AFHRA microfilm.
Suitland Reference Branch (NNRR)
Textual Reference Division
Washington, DC 20409
Defense Mapping Agency
8613 Lee Highway Fairfax, VA 22031-2137
They only have current maps and those with the WW II grid on them would be under the supervision of the Library of Congress.
Library of Congress Geography and Map Division
Washington, DC 20540
(202)-707-6277
They have originals of all the maps used in combat and have a duplication service which will furnish Xeox (black & white) copies
National Personnel Records Center
9700 Page Blvd, St. Louis, MO 63132
(314)-263-3901
Some records were destroyed in a fire
It must be said that the role played by the weather became increasingly important in the course of the campaign as a factor limiting air-ground co-operation. The fighter-bombers, from the Moselle eastward, were never capable of the continuous and spectacular support which had stamped the pursuit operations in August. The decline in the number of sorties flown by the XIX TAC, indicated in the following table, clearly shows the impact of unfavorable weather and also the strength of Weyland's command was reduced somewhat in the late fall.
August 12,292 sorties
September 7,791 sorties
October 4,790 sorties
November 3,509 sorties
December (1-22) 2,563 sort
The following reports of the Chief of Staff for Operations (A-3) list the damage summaries from August through December 1944.
Summary 1-10 Sep 194 Attacked Destroyed Damaged
Railroads
Railroad lines cut 33
Locomotives 58 35
Railroad cars 267 142
Marshaling Yards 1
Freight cars 35
Tank cars 5 3
Guns on railroad cars 5
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Cars 143 46
Motor vehicles 1139 97
Fuel Vehicles 30
Horse Drawn Vehicles 315 30
Horse Drawn Artillery 23
Motorcycles 1
[Editors Note 28--- The A-3 damage summaries for 1944 were saved in the XIX TAC Unit History. The whereabouts of the reports for 1945 (if any) are not know at the date of this publication. The report of damages from "Patton's Third Army" by Charles M. Province for from September on are incorporated in the main history. For completeness, Province's listings of damage for August are included in this Appendix and are placed after the A-3 Summaries.]
Gun positions
Field Guns Positions 205
Flak Positions 22
Anti-Tank Guns 2
Machine Gu n Ne sts 13
Airfields or ALG's 6
Highways
Road Junctions cut 2
Bridges 2 2
Shipping
Barges 1 1
Boat 500 Ton 1
Naval Vessels 3
River Piers 1
Military Installations Attacked
Fuel Dumps 2
Motor Transport Parks 2
Barracks 1
Troop Concentrations 21
Strong Pointw 43
Buildings 110 156 18
Ammunition Dumps 1
Radar Stations 1
Forts 1
Trenches 2
Communications Centers 1
Supply Dumps 1
Headquarters 4
Summary 11-20 September 1944
Railroads
Lines Cut 42
Locomotiv es 65 42
Railroad Cars 175 403
Marshaling Yards 11
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 31 50
Motor vehicles 256 74
Fuel Vehicles 1
Horse Drawn Vehicles 39 5
Gun Positions
Field Guns 107
Flak Positions 19
Coastal 1
Pill Boxes 2
Airfields or ALG's 3
Highways
Roads Cut 10
Bridges 1 1
Military Installations
Headquarters 4
Fortresses 7
Buildings 3 27
Oil Storage Tanks 4
Radio Tower 1
Villages 3
Troop Concentrations 4
Strong Points 30
Barracks 11
Ammunition Dumps 3
Dumps 1
Fuel Dump 1
Radar Stations 1
Shipping
Motor Boats 1
Barges 7
Merchant Vessels 1
Summary 21-30 Sept 1944
Railroads
Lines Cut 148
Locomotives 117 21
Railroad Cars 554 325
Tunnels 8
Railroad Bridges 1 1
Roundhouses 1
Railroad Repair Shop 1
Depots 1
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 9 17
Motor Vehicles 85 37
Horse Drawn Vehicles 10
Gun Positions
Observation Posts 1
Field Gun 72 51
Flak Positions 17 4
88-mm Guns 3
AA Positions 21
Military Installations
Factories and Misc Buildings 8 1
Building 1
Warehouses 6
Barracks 1
Marshaling Yards 30
Enemy Troop Concentrations 13
Enemy Command Posts 2
Ordnance Depot 1
Dumps 3 1
Fortresses 2
Villages 10
Power Stations 2
Control House for Dam 1
Hiways
Roads Cut 4
Bridges 8
Airfields and ALG's 8
Shipping
River Locks 7 1
Barges 53 82
Summary 1-10 Oct 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 13- 0- 2
On the Ground 19- 0- 26
Railroads
Lines Cut 148
Locomotive 117 21
Railroad Cars 554 325
Tunnels 8
Railroad Bridges 1 1
Roundhouses 1
Railroad Repair Shops 1
Depots 1
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 9 17
Motor vehicles 85 37
Horse Drawn Vehicles 10
Gun Positions
Observation Posts 1
Field Gun Positions 72 51
Flak Positions 4 17
88-mm Guns 3
AA Positions 21
Military Installations
Factories and Misc Bui ldings 8 1
Switch Houses 1
Buildings 1
Warehouses 1
Barracks 1
Marshaling Yards 30
Enemy Troop Concentrations 13
Ordnance Depot 1
Dumps 2
Villages 10
Fortresses 2
Power Stations 2
Control House for small Dam 1
Highways
Roads Cut 4
Bridges 8
Airfields sand ALG's 8
Shipping
River Locks 9 1
Barges 53 82
Summary 10-20 Oct 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 5- 0- 7
On the Ground 1- 0- 0
Railroads
Lines Cut 102
Locomotives 98 17
Railroad Cars 471 267
Railroad Stations 1
Tunnels 9
Roundhouse 1
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 2 7
Motor Vehicles 113 13
Horse Drawn Vehicles 23
Steam Shovels 1
Gun Positions
Field Gun 14 78
Airfields and ALG's 1
Highways
Bridges 4 10
Military Installations
Marshaling Yards 32
Enemy Command Posts 2
Oil Dumps 1
Fortressess 1
Villages 14
Enemy Troop Concentrations 8
Barracks 25
Factories and Misc Buildings 24 26
Power House 1
Shipping
River Locks 2
Barges 27 5
Dams 1
Summary 21-31 Oct 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 28- 3- 9
On the Grou d 2- 0- 0
Railroads
Lines Cut 1
Roundhouses 2 3
Railroad Trestles 1
Locomotives 99 16
Railroad Cars 486 348
Railroad Tunnels 4
Railroad overpasses 3
Railroad Repair Shops 1
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 2
Motor Vehicles 92 20
Gun Positions
Field Gun Positions 31 32
Highways
Road Calverts 1
Motor Vehicles 92 20
Military Installations
Marshaling Yards 25
Dumps 2
Villages 7
Warehouses 26
Factories and misc Buildings 40 7
Power Houses 1
Shipping
Barges 1 10
Dams 1
Summary 1-10 Nov 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 8- 0- 0
On the Ground 35- 1- 8
Railroads
Lines Cut 41
Locomotives 48 10
Railroad Cars 102 130
Railroad Trestles 1
Railroad Bridges 1
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Behicles 1 15
Motor Vehicles 67 20
Horse Drawn Vehicles 41 6
Horse Drawn Artillery 2
Gun Positions
Field Gun Positions 39 20
Highways
Bridges 1
Military Installations
Marshaling Yards 8
Enemy Command Posts 4
Dumps 4
Ammunition Dump Loading Ram 1
Villages 15
Factories and Misc Buildings 31 12
Enemy Troop Concentrations 5
Power houses 1
High Tension Lines Cut 4
Shipping
Barges 2 3
Dams 1
Control Tower 1
River Tugs 3
Summary 11-20 Nov 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 9- 3- 3
On the Ground 15- 0- 0
Railroads
Railroad Lines Cut 43
Railroad Stations 1
Loading Ramps 1
Locomotives 184 27
Railroad Cars 745 598
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 59 40
Tractors 1
Horse Drawn Vehicles 60 9
Ox Drawn Vehicle 1
Horse Drawn Artillery 35
Mootorcycles 1
Steam Shovels 1
Highways
Highways cut 1
Bridges 3
Crossroads 1
Military Installations attacked
Field Guns 59 83
Marshaling Yards 17
Villages 3
Factories and Misc Buildings 69 13
Warehouses 1
Enemy Troop Concentrations 7
Lumber Yards 1
Fortresses 1
Shipping
Barges 10
Summary 21-30 Nov 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 5- 1- 3
Railroads
Railroad Lines cut 18
Locomotives 42 9
Railroad Cars 129 241
Vehicles
Motor Vehicles 59 22
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 5
Highways 1
Military Installations
Factories and Misc Buildings 12 8
Gun Positions 10 15
Marshaling Yards 9
Enemy Troop Concentrations 2
Villages 25
Supply Dumps 1
Balloons on Ground 1
Shipping
Barges 1
Summary 1-10 Dec 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 5- 0- 3
On the Ground 5- 0- 2
Railroads
Railroad Lines Cut 78
Locomotives 91 21
Railroad Cars 301 426
Roundhouses 1
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 6 12
Motor Vehicles 98
Horse Drawn Vehicles 30 6
Trailers 1
Highways
Highway Bridges 2
Military Installations
Gun Posisions 17 37
Marshaling Yards 32
Towns 38
Factories and Misc Buildings 36 12
Power Lines Cukt 2
Enemy Troop Concentrations 5
Fortresses 11
Supply Dumps 1
Oil Dumps 2
Barracks 1
Shipping
Vessels and Barge 4 20
River Locks 2
Summary 10-20 Dec 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 40- 5- 4
Railroads
Railroad Lines Cut 43
Locomotives 67 19
Railroad Cars 552 829
Railroad Shops 2
Locomotive Tenders 1
Railroad Stations 1
Railroad Bridges 1
Roundhouses 1
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 23 5
Motor Vehicles 189
Horse Drawn Vehicles 53 3
Enemy Tank Concentrations 1
Highways
Highways Cut 3
Foot Bridges 1
Pontoon Bridges 1
Road Junction 1
Military Installations
Mortar and Artillery Positions 2
Field Gun Pisitions 44 70
Marshaling Yards 44
Command Posts 2
Towns 34
Natural Gas Tanks 1
Factories and Misc Buildings 49 56
Enemy Troop Concentrations 9
Fortresses 1
Ammunition Dumps 1
Supply Dumps 4
Gasoline Dumps 1
Oil Depots 7
Barracks 1
Shipping
Vessels and Barge 1
Barge Concentration 1
Summary 21-31 Dec 1944
Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 94- 9- 39
On the Ground 1- 0- 0
Railroads
Railroad Lines Cut 156
Locomotives 137 14
Railroad Cars 585 798
Railroad Tunnels 5
Roundhouses 2
Vehicles
Tanks and Armored vehicles 312 172
Motor Vehicles 2302 622
Horse Drawn Vehicles 36 52
Radio Trucks 3
Mobile Guns 1
Motorcycles 1
Highways
Highways cut 27
Platoon Bridges 1
Bridges 7 7
Military Installations
Gun Positions 148 142
Marshaling yards 75 1
Towns 167
Factories and Misc Buildings 215 71
Troop concentrations 41
Barracks 1 2
Dumps 7 16
Oil Dumps 1
Ammunition stacks 95
V-1 Site 1
Enemy Command Posts 1
Warehouses 2 1
Shipping
Barges 24
Damage August only reports from "Patton's Third Army" by Charles M. Province are listed below.
Daily reports of the XIX Tactical Air Command air activity.
AUGUST
1 Headquarters becomes operational
2 Preparing for battle
3 Covered armored and infantry columns is spite of bad weather.
5 Kept the enemy away from the advancing columns while attacking motor vehicles, gun positions and an enemy headquarters and performing fighter sweeps in the St. Malo area.
7 The XIX TAC raised its strength to a total of nine full goups of fighter bombers. The Luftwaffe, growing more agressive met the fighters of the XIX TAC and lost a total of 33 aaircraft. The XIX TAC was responsible for the destruction of twelve tanks and 5 staff cars. They continued to cover all columns moving to the west, south and east while also attacking troops in Brittany
8 Reached a new peak of activity by flying a total of 717 sorties, during which 29 locomotives, 137 freight cars, 205 vehi- cles and 17 tanks were destroyed. Armed reconnaissance sorties were flown to gain aerial superiority, knocking out German Air- dromes north and east of Paris.
9 Flew 72 missions and 780 sorties, destroying 7 out of 12 ME-109's. A rocket carrying squadron was placed into operation.
12 Patrolled the Loire River area and prepared the way to the French capital of Paris.
13 Gave heavy support over Falaise-Argentan, destroying 710 enemy motor transports. A force of 37 P-47 pilots, attacking a concentration of between 800 to 1,000 vehicles, claimed 400 to 500 enemy transports destroyed.
14 Approximately 400 German troops surrendered by waving white flags from their positions. Fighter control was given the so the nearest ground troops could pick up the prisoneers.
22 Bagged another 20 German planes.
26 Encountered very few enemy aircraft while providing protective cover for army columns
27 Conducted a rail-cutting project to sever a main enemy escape route south of the Loire River
The 19th Tactical Control Group (TCG) was a provisional Group which was formed to coordinate the Air Corps and Signal units operating the XIX Tactical Control Center. Before this time the Commanding officer of this effort was a staff officer of the 100th Fighter Wing. As things developed other units were put under the 19th TCG. Col. Harry A. French was appointed the Commanding Officer and the following units assigned to the 19th TCG were:
Col. Don Mayhue commanding formed the Group about August 30th. Col. Harry French Commanding took over in December 1944 was previously the Executive Officer of the 100th Fighter.
Maj. Nash was Senior controller
Maj. John F Kraft became Chief Controller in September 1944
Maj. Norton was AAA Liaison Officer.
The following units were assigned to the 19th TCG
312th Fighter Control Squadron
316th Fighter Control Squadron
563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion
738th Signal Air Warning Company (assigned to the 566th Signal Air Warning Battalion Hq Co
979th Military Police Company Detachment A
3rd Radio Squadron Detachment C
564th Signal Air Warning Battalion Detachment A
Lt. Col. Albert E. Opdenweyer, the Signal Officer of the 19th TCG reported the following staff officers of the 19th TCG and they were as follows, with their rank and address in 1943 (see Editors Note 29 below)
Commanding Officer Col. Harry A. French
(succeeded Col. Don Mayhue)
Executive Officer Lt. Col. Mason H. Miller
Signal Officer Maj. Albert E. Opdenweyer
Chief Controller Maj. John Nash
(succeeded Maj. Kraft)
S1 Staff Officer Lt. Francis E. McMullion
S3 Staff Officer Capt. Rodney E. Remick
S4 Staff Officer Capt. Robert H. Northduft
Adjutant Capt Allen D. Broadnax
(Editors Note 29) Lt. Col. Albert E. Opdenweyer now resides at 4402 SE Knapp Portland, OR 97206-9940 and his telephone number is (503)-771-5279. He was Executive officer of the 566th Signal Air Warning Battalion and Signal Officer for the 19th TCG.
I received a letter from Lt. Col. Albert E. Opdenweyer (then Maj.) on 26 May 1995 and he gave the following brief outline of his WW II service
"Having just recently learned of the existence of the Sawbuck Gazette I have been most interested in reading bits and pieces of what happened to the 566th SAWB after I received orders to head home on 6 August 1945. I had spent 13 months in England with the Electronics Training Group before joining the 566th in Florida so I had lots of points.
Seeing you listed in the Gazette reminded me of the time that we ran into the bunch of Germans up on top of that hill. I am still thankful that they were not interested in defending them- selves, and also that the infantry unit at the bottom of the hill was willing to take them off our hands. Some time later I saw a picture in Stars and Stripes which reported the capture of a German General. For all I could see he looked like the leader of our little group."
The reconnaissance party Opdenweyer refers to was in Germany probably in the spring of 1945. The party was seeking possible communications sites to support the next move of the Tactical Control Center. This was a joint reconnaissance of the 19th TCG, the 312th FCS and the 563rd SAWB and the 312th furnished me with a driver and jeep. We had spotted hill on the map and went to the top to get a good look. When we got to the top a German soldier was spotted near the barn on the crest of the hill. One of the officers in the party fired at the barn with his pistol and the German soldier put up his hands. We approached the barn and I went over to the door and invited the German soldiers leave the barn and in the meantime I picked up the pistols of the several German Officers as they left the barn. I later gave one of the pistols to my driver as a souvenir. I also remember that one of the German Officers was a German Major and medical officer and he had one casualty who had a leg wound. I do not recall how many German soldiers there was perhaps a platoon. At this point I suggested to the other officers of our party that we turn the prisoners loose because I was only too familiar with the problem of getting rid of prisoner
(Editors Note 30) Capt. William Y. Brown resides at 4673 Hixon Circle Sacramento, CA 95841 Phone (916)-489-3586 and he recalled the details. He also reported an incident during the time frame of this reconnaissance. He had been on duty and working continuously for several days without any sleep and when the communications were finally in service he was so fatigued that in the early morning he laid down on plotting table of the TCC to take a nap. He was awakened the next morning and the TCC plotters, filterer's and controllers were plotting flights all around him as he laid asleep on the plotting table.
The other officers disagreed and we decided to march the prisoners down the hill and turn them over to some infantry unit nearby. We got turned down at one infantry unit post at the foot of the hill but on the second try (I believe it was an infantry regiment headquarters) the POW processors decided that they had not interrogated any prisoners in the past several days and they agreed to receive them. The rest of the trip was uneventful and now I do not recall whether any of the 19th TCG components used this site or not. All the above pertains to the 19th TCG before V-E day.
The editor recently telephoned Capt. William Y. Brown who was the communications officer in the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and also was one of the members of the above reconnaissance party. So far the names of the others in the 19th TCG have not been found. The 19th TCG Unit history was of no help in this respect and about the only document was the XIX TAC Standing Operating Procedure and the unit history after V/E day.
The 19th Tactical Command Center (TCC) staff assigned to the 19th TCG Group (Prov) and the manpower for the Control Center was furnished mainly by the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and included the following:
Capt. William Brown, TCC Communications Officer, 312 FCS
Lt. Robert McSpadden, Chief Filter Officer, 563 SAW Bn
Following is the account of the TCC as reported by Capt. Eugene Greenburg of the XIX TAC Signal office in his history book published in Germany in 1945
From the TCC, to the pilots in the air, go warnings and instructions, either directly or by relay from the scope control- lers at the FDP's. The Senior TCC controller must see to it that the information at the TCC is made available to all parties concerned, that warnings and important data are passed to the ships on the mission, to the gun batteries, to combat Operations at XIX TAC, and to the many other people who must get the facts for immediate action.
"Hot Targets" called in by TAC Reconnaissance pilots and fighter-bombers must be passed to Combat Operations at TAC. If Operations orders certain squadrons to be diverted, the Senior Controller will see that this is done, either by the scope controllers, or by the deputy controller at TCC. On escort missions, bombers and fighters must be "talked" to their rendezvous point, and important data passed to both formations. Squadrons must be vectored to the area of Army units calling in for protec- tion from hostile air attacks or for air "artillery" against an obstacle in their way. Fighters must be immediately scrambled and put in position to intercept enemy air raids. Planes in distress, lost or hit by anti-aircraft fire, must be brought into the nearest base. Fighters must be sent to the aid of others, who may have attacked by superior enemy formations. Andy "Y" warnings must be given to our ships, to show the presence of "bandits" in the area.
All these things occur, not occasionally or periodically, but continuously throughout a single day's operations. And often, they all occur simultaneously on several channels. At
At night, there arises the serious problem of the Inner Artillery Zones. The controller must make every possible effort to prevent the loss of friendly aircraft due to our own anti-aircraft Artillery fire. At the same time, the vigil of the anti-aircraft units against enemy air raids must not be relaxed. The controller is often in a tight spot, due to failure to receive full informa- tion on a friendly aircraft movements at night, the failure of planes to follow original flight plans, or their failure to use standard safety measures, such as IFF (information friend or foe signal equipment) and other recognition features. To have the Anti-aircraft Artillery officer give a "Hold Fire" order to gun batteries requires firm decision, especially when German night raiders may be in the same area where our own night-fighters of the Royal Air Force may be operating. The night controller also can obtain the use of search-lights operated by the Anti-aircraft Artillery people, when emergency homing of night flying aircraft is needed."
The 312th Fighter Control Squadron was initially assigned to the Fourth Air Force and was activated on June 6th of 1943 at March Field, California. On October 10th of 1943 the unit reported to Santa Rosa, California Air Force Base. The unit was transferred to Hamilton Field on 18th November 1943. They were shipped to Boston and departed from there on 5th December 1943. They were disbanded on 8th October 1948.
The 316th Fighter Control Squadron was activated at March Field, California on 20th May 1943 and assigned to the Fourth Air Force. On the 10th of October 1943 they were assigned to the Los Angeles Fighter Wing. They departed from March Field on 15th December 1943 for Boston and shipped to the E on 31st December 1943 and arrived in the UK on 7th January 1944. On 28th October 1944 they reported to France. They were assigned to the IX Air Defense Command on 6th August 1944. On 5th November 1944 they were reassigned to the XIX Tactical Air Command. They reported in France on 14th Oct 1944.
The 19 Tactical Control Group was an activated element of the XIX Tactical Air Command as per General Order 35 dated 1st October 1944. They were discontinued effective 5th July 1945 in accordance with Ninth Air Force letter dated 4th July 1945.
Following is the Standard Operating Procedure of the 19th TCG from their unit history. Apparently this is the one thing that the Group wished to leave to posterity because it is about all that is now included in the history. The record is dated 8 March 1945 from the 19th Tactical Control Group and it is recorded as follows.
I Purpose:
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to prescribe the organization and operation of the Tactical Control Center (TCC).
II Operations
1. The primary mission of the TCC is to provide flight control for aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command.
2. The secondary mission of the TCC is to provide information on enemy air activity in XIX Tactical Air Command area to interested organizations.
3. Personnel and equipment necessary for the operation of the TCC will be drawn from the units of the 19th Tactical Control Group (Prov);
III Positions
1. Positions for the following will be provided
a. Senior Controller
b. Duty Senior Controller
c. Opns "B"
d. Deputy Controllers
e. Deputy Controller-TAC/R
f. "Y" Service Officer
g. Filter Officer
h. Movement Liaison Officer
i. AAA Liaison Officer
j. Ground Liaison Officer
k. Communications Officer
l. Floor Supervisor
m. Monitors
n. One D/F team consisting of the string-man for each D/F station and teller and one recorder.
o. Broadcast Teller
p. Status Clerk
q. Raid Orderly
r. Raid Clerk
s. Adjacent TAC Plotters
t. Advanced Liaison Clerks
u. Filter Plotters
v. Filterer
IV Duties
1 SENIOR CONTROLLER: The Senior Controller is a direct representative of the Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command, and is charged with responsibility for the control of aircraft and Air-Ground coordination in such areas as may be assigned. He is responsible for the operational efficiency of the TCC and subordi- nate stations. he will prescribe hours and rules for operations, supervise training of control personnel, issue standing orders, etc.
2 DUTY SENIOR CONTROLLER: The Duty Senior Controller is the direct representative of the Senior Controller. He is in charge of all operations. He will assign control of aircraft on missions to deputy controllers in the TCC and to controllers at the Forward Direction Posts. He will supervise the operation of Night Fighter Aircraft. In cooperations with the AAA liaison Officer he will control the IAZ when friendly aircraft formations are in the area. He is responsible for the receipt of operational orders from Combat Operations, XIX TAC, and for the passing of pertinent information to Combat Opns. He will see that organizations are alerted in the area when enemy Aircraft approach. He will direct the sweep of Radar Units with the occasion demands. He will determine the best possible fields for the emerging homing of aircraft in distress.
3 OPERATIONS "B": Opn "B" will assist the controller in the performance of Air duties. He will designate the VHF channels to be guarded by the monitors,. He will make sure that Ninth Air Force Common, the XIX TAC Common Channels and the Tactical Reconnaissance Reporting Channel are guarded from dawn to dusk and at other times if Aircraft are operating. He also must see that all Status Boards are kept up to date; maintain liaison with FDP Controllers; maintain an operations log, controllers manual and carry-over orders book, and advise Combat Opns of all aircraft accidents.
4 DEPUTY CONTROLLERS: Deputy Controllers will perform functions as directed by the Duty Senior Controller. Their usual duties will be to monitor operational missions, warn controlled flights when enemy aircraft are in their vicinity, guide flights to their target or rendezvous when required, provide pilots with such information as they may seek, aid pilots returning from missions, etc. Deputy controllers must at all times keep posted on the weather, condition of airfields, capabilities of aircraft, Group and Squadron Call Signs, danger zones, etc.
5 DEPUTY CONTROLLER TAC/R: Will monitor the special TAC/R reporting frequency. Will make written notations of all messages reported by TAC/R aircraft and will pass such information over direct3ect wire when available to XIX TAC Reconnaissance Operations Officer and to Duty Chief Controller. Will pass on any information or instructions to TAC/R aircraft in the air. Will receive flight plans of TAC/R Aircraft, airborne times, and call signs and pass these on to Movement Liaison Officer.
6 "Y" SERVICE OFFICER: The "Y" Service officer will provide the Duty Senior Controller with all available information of the operations of the enemy, particularly of hostile aircraft.
7 FILTER OFFICER: The Filter Officer is responsible for the operations of the equipment and personnel of the Filter and Operations Board except for identification. All aircraft warning personnel, Filter Plotters, Filterer, Broadcast Teller and Raid Clerk, during the period of operation, are under the direct supervision of the Filter Officer. he is in operational control at all times of all radar stations. He will pass Ground Observer Reports of hostile aircraft to Wing Combat Operations for immediate alerting of airfields in the area.
8 MOVEMENT LIAISON OFFICER: The Movement Liaison Officer will make prompt and accurate identification of all tracks displayed on the operations table. He will receive and pass all operational and non-operational movements to those concerned. He will assist with the clearance of non-operational flights when necessary. He will maintain Liaison with adjacent TAC's. He will assist the Duty Senior Controller in Liaison with AAA. He will keep a daily log, and make proper disposal of all classified materials which are received for the section making all necessary amendments to same. He will report and record all information observed which might be useful intelligence information.
9 AAA LIAISON OFFICER; The AAA Liaison Officer will maintain two way communications with Battalion Gun Operations rooms 24 hours a day. He will pass operational orders from the Controller to the Gun Ops rooms and will receive information for the Controller from the gun operations rooms. He will broadcast hostile and unidenti- fied track on the Army Air Warning Net. He will keep complete logs of all operational orders received from the Controller. He is in charge of the AAA enlisted personnel on duty in the TCC, including the broadcast teller and the two FM net Controllers. He will see that a C/W net, for standby purpose, is operational four hours before sunset until one half hour before sunrise, and that meteorological messages are broadcast four times daily.
10 ROUND LIAISON OFFICER: The Ground Liaison Officer, on duty at the TCC from Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, will be responsible for keeping the Controllers at the TCC and those at the FDP's consistently informed of the ground situation.
11 COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER: The Communications Officer will supervise all communications at the TCC, and investigate immedi- ately all communications failures. Failure in communications occurring outside the TCC proper will be reported at once to the Filter Officer. The communications Officer will have all changes in status indicated on the Communications Status Board.
12 FLOOR SUPERVISOR: The Floor supervisor will be in direct supervision of all enlisted personnel other than AW personnel. He will synchronize clocks, be responsible for policing, arrange for sanitation of telephones, provide drinking water, etc.
13 MONITORS; Monitors will make a record of all speech channels designated by the Controller, and report immediately to the Controller all emergency calls heard. Conversation containing information pertaining to enemy aircraft, Ground Installations, Troop Movements, etc., will be relayed to the Controller immedi- ately.
14 D/F TEAM: The D/F fixing team will obtain fixed using bearings provided by the fixer stations. This information will be made immediately available to the Deputy Controller on duty at the Intercept Board, placed on the D/F status Board and recorded by the recorder.
15 BROADCAST TELLER:
a. Will tell only incoming unknown and hostile aircraft and tracks showing SOS.
b. Combined Air Warning Code will be used at all times.
c. Time check will be made every 15 minutes.
d. Other tracks will be told upon instructions of the Filter Officer.
e. A record will be maintained of all tracks told.
16 STATUS CLERK; Status Clerks will keep Status Boards up to date.
17 RAID ORDERLY: Raid Orderly will prepare target stands for Plotters.
18 RAID CLERK: Raid Clerk will make a record of all targets appearing on the operations table, listing time and position of the original plot, identification, strength, altitude and time of track's removed.
19 ADJACENT TAC PLOTTERS: Adjacent TAC Plotters will plot targets received from adjacent TAC TCC's.
20 MOVEMENT LIAISON CLERKS: ML clerks will assist the MLO.
21 FILTER PLOTTERS: Filter Plotters will display information received from the reporting station on the operations table.
22 FILTERER:
a. Filterer is responsible to the Filter Officer for the correct analysis and display of all filtered information that appear on the Filter Operations Board.
b. He will aid the Filter Officer in enforcing all standing orders.
c. He will analysis the number of aircraft as reported by the various stations keeping in mind the performances of these stations as it affects their analysis.
d. He has complete supervision of Filter and Operations Board Personnel at all times during operations..
e. He will report to area filtering when directed to do so by his Filter Officer. The Center and direction of area will be displayed only by arrow.
f. He will observe the prescribed priority in filtering.
V DETAILED INSTRUCT section will prepare detailed instructionf for its personnel to supplement this SOP.
The AAA Liaison Section with the XIX TAC is the 147th Air Operations Detachment, 38th AAA Brigade, U.S. Third Army. Its operational activities are as follows.
a. One AAA officer is on duty at the TCC 24 hours a day. There are three officers working in 8 hour shifts.
b. The broadcast teller broadcasts all hostile and unidenti- fied flights on the Army air warning net which is monitored by all Third Army AAA and AAA defense at airfields in the Third Army area. Quartermaster and Engineer units using lights to work with at night are required to monitor this net. The net is at the disposal of the Third Army Provost Marshall for any emergency that may arise. Meteorological messages, computed jointly by Air Corps and AAA are combined and broadcast over the net to AAA units. Three tellers work in 8 hour shifts operating 24 hours a day.
c. FM Net controllers operate two nets from the TCC 24 hours a day. The nets are the means of two way operational control between the Senior Controller and all IAZ's. In addition commu- nication is established between each Corps AAA Group and Army AAA Group which sends in AAA information Service data from units ranging down to the Division AAA on the front lines six controllers work on this net in eight hour shifts.
d. An alternate in the FM is a CW net which goes into operation three hours before sunset and ends one half hour before sunrise. Three CW operators operate this shift.
e. The SCR-399 radio is used for the Army Air Warning Net. Six radio operators work in eight hour shifts 24 hours a day and log all messages going out over the air. The SCR-399 transmitters are remote by telephone lines to the TCC for the broadcast teller;'s use.
f. A complete log is kept by the AAA Officer on all opera- tional control orders and a summary report on the following subjects is submitted to the Commanding General, 38th AAA Brigade daily:
1. Communication status
2. Hostile aircraft activity
3. Friendly aircraft activity
4. Unidentified flights
5. Operation control orders
6. AAA information service from AAA units
7. Comments
g. All coded messages are forwarded to Army Headquarters monthly for security checks. The 209 converter is used for routing messages and slidex for fast AAA Information Service communication.
h. The Detachment is self-sustaining, operates it's own mess,quarters and transportation and maintaining all equipment.
A. GENERAL
1. The prime mission of this section is the prompt and accurate identification of all tacks which are displayed on the Operations Room Table. Tracks are identified as "Friendly", "Hostile" or "Unidentified". The most effective method of identifying hostile aircraft is to know at all time, the position, altitude, strength and turning of all friendly aircraft. If these facts are known, any other tracks observed must be hostile. The number of "Unidentified" tracks is a direct indication of the efficiency of any participating movement section. There should be no unidentified tracks. It can readily be seen that this system is only as good as its communications, plus the movement information received.
B. ORGANIZATION
1. Personnel:
a. Movement liaison officers 4
b. Recorders EM 4
c. Cryptographers 4
d. Radio Operators 4
(exact numbers may change according to situation and men available, radio operators furnished by 4th Tactical Air Communications Squadron)
2. Equipment
a. one SCR-399
3. Communications
a. Available land lines to IX and XII TAC's
b. Available land lines to Continental Flying Command
c. Radio channel to Continental Flying Control
d. Proposed teletype to Continental Flying Control
e. Teletype to flying control, XIX TAC
f. Available land line to Detachment "C", 3rd Radio Squadron
g. Available radio by day and telephone by night to IX Air Defense Command
h. Normal operational switchboard facilities
i. Normal operational teletype facilities.
C. AIDS TO IDENTIFICATION
1. Ground Observer Posts which report visual identification and positions of aircraft through their respective Forward Direction Posts.
2. Use of IFF by friendly aircraft. Any aircraft that indicates IFF is considered friendly and identified as such.
3. Visuals reported by AAA gun personnel
4. Conduct of aircraft--that is speed, altitude, direction and actions.
D.SPECIAL ORDERS FOR PERSONNEL
1. Movement Liaison Officer
a. The MLO on duty will, to the best of his ability and accurately identify all tracks that are displayed on the Operations Table, using facilities and methods outlined above.
b. Clear all non-operational aircraft when Flying Control is not available
c. Receive and pass on to those concerned all opera- tional and non-operational movements.
d. Maintain liaison with the adjacent TAC's, Detachment "C", 3rd Radio Squadron through the "Y" officer, duty Senior Controller, Opns B and the AAA Liaison Officer.
e. The AAALO will be given the flight plans of all aircraft passing through or which may pas through the Inner Artillery Zones as far in advance as possible. Information as to why any particular "hold fire" order was given will be made available to the AAALO.
f. Receive and properly dispose of all classified material received during his tour of duty.
g. Maintain the log, entering any pertinent information or unusual occurrences during his tour of duty. Report and record any information observed which may be of intelligence value.
h. The senior MLO will be responsible for the efficient operational nd training of the section.
2. Recorder
a. The recorder will assist the MLO in receiving, consolidating, passing and display of all movements.
b. The Senior Recorder will be responsible for the neatness, accuracy and maintenance of the file, codes and equipment of the section. He also will name all amendments in publications and keep the Navigational Warning Map up to date.
3. Cryptographer
a. Encode and decode promptly and accurately all messages given him by authorized persons
b. Pass and receive all movement messages to and from the radio operator
c. Keep a record of all messages received and passed for a period of not less than two weeks.
4. Radio Operator
a. maintain continuous communication with Continental Flying Control and report any failure immediately to the Duty MLO
b. Receive and pass on all ra Continental Flying Control and the TCC
c. Keep a record of any irregularity which may have a bearing on our failure to maintain continuous communication
d. Carry out orders given him by his Commanding Officer and as laid down in SOP for radio operators.
E. HOURS OF OPERATION
Movement section personnel will be on duty 24 hours daily, according to a schedule laid down by the Senior MLO. No personnel will quit his post until properly relieved.
1. a. The Ground Liaison Officer, on duty at the TCC from Headquarters Third US Army will be responsible for keeping the controllers at the TCC and those at the FDP's constantly informed of the Ground situation to include.
1. Locations of advance elements of front line troops
2. Current bomb line as established by ground troops
3. The tactical boundaries of the Army and the Corps
4. Location of Command Posts of Divisions and Corps comprising the Army (usually the location of the ALO
5. Changes in air-ground recognition procedure as special provisions for certain operations.
6. Locations and specifications of Inner Artillery Zones established by Army
7. Any other General Intelligence information relative to the ground situation that will better Air-Ground coordination
b. This information will be furnished insofar as possible for the sectors of adjacent armies as well, in order to coordinate the ground picture with the activities of other TAC's
c. In addition the GLO will be responsible that information relative to the ground situation received by the TCC from R?T contact with airplanes is passed to the G-3 Air Section working with combined operations at XIX TAC. In order to save time such information usually is passed by the Duty Senior Controller over his direct wire to combined operations, with the GLO being notified later. The operating procedure for the TCC was included in the unit history. Following is extension of the TCC procedure as issued by the 19th Tactical Control Group
1. The Filter Officer is responsible for the operation of the equipment and personnel of the Filter and Operation Board, except for identification.
2. All aircraft warning personnel, filter plotters, Filterer, Broadcast teller and Raid Clerk, during the period of operation are under the direct supervision of the Filter Officer.
3. The Filter Officer is in operational control at all times of all radar stations not actually on GCI mission. Any change of radar operations for missions will be authorized by the Duty Senior Controller and Filter Officer will be notified at once.
4. Maintenance periods for radar stations
a. The Filter Officer will authorize radar stations to go off the air for maintenance at the period arranged, provided conditions permit it.
b. He may authorize a departure from the scheduled maintenance time if necessary, and he may recall any station from maintenance to look for hostile or unknown targets or for aircraft showing broad IFF. He will, whenever possible allow each station to go off the air for maintenance one hour in every 24.
c. Stations when on maintenance, should attempt to be at 15 minutes recall and communications lines will be continuously manned during such periods.
d. Maintenance periods will be postponed in the event that adjacent stations are not operating.
5. Documents
a. The Filter Officer will be fully conversant with the TCC organization and with the instructions for Filter Officers.
b. He will read and initial all instructions in the Filter Officers Instruction Book
c. He will keep the Filter Officers Log and enter matters of interest occurring during his tour of duty, as well as signing in and out at the beginning and end of his shift.
d. He is responsible for all classified documents and equipment other than that of the operational analysis section during his tour of duty.
6. Transmission of Information
a. The filter Officer is responsible that all telephone and other means of communication and are maintained in good working condi- tion.
b. He will report any communication failure to the Communications Officer of the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and make an entry thereof in his log.
7. The Filter Officer will check frequently to see that the tellers know the priority sequence and that they are abiding by it.
8. He will see that during inactive periods a time check is made every 15 minutes on all plotting and telling lines.
9. He will notify the MLO of any target which is showing faulty IFF.
10. He will pass on to the Controller information in regard to faulty IFF
11. He will give all reasonable facilities to the operational analysis representative and will cooperate with him by recording all revellent information with regard to test flights.
12. He will cooperate with and give as much assistance as is reasonably possible to the MLO.
13. In the event of fire or attack the Filter Officer will maintain uninterrupted operations. Should the position become untenable he will inform the Duty Senior Controller.
14. He will control use of IFF equipment at radar stations when necessary.
15. He will see that the radar status boards shows at all times the correct status of all radar stations.
16. He will warn radar stations of the presence of hostile aircraft as the aircraft nears the station.
17. He will warn radar stations of gale warning received from the Meteorological Section.
18. For passing Ground Observer reports of hostile aircraft, the Filter Officer will have two circuits to Wing combat operation. Upon receiving the report from an FDP he will immediately pass the information to the Wing so airfields may be alarmed. Any addition- al information will be passed upon receipt.
1. ORGANIZATION: The "Y" section of 19th TCG consists of two officers and two enlisted men.
2. COMMUNICATIONS: The "Y" section maintains telephone communica- tion with 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile,(C), Detachment "C" (herein- after referred to as Det "C" by means of a direct land line and supplementary line through the TCC switchboard. The direct line in the TCC is maintained in parallel with the TCC MLO.
3.HOURS OF OPERATION: The "Y" post will be manned continuously from the time any aircraft of 19th TAC become airborne until all have landed, or have been released for the day. After the "Y" post has officially closed for the day, the MLO will receive all reports from Det "C" on the parallel direct line.
4. EQUIPMENT: The operator on duty will have on hand at all times
1. Log Book 2. Gazetteers 3. Hand map of Germany 4. Copy of the day's operations orders 5. Message code 6. Grease pencils and ruler.
5. QUALIFICATIONS: As the primary purpose of "Y" Service is to provide our aircraft with information of enemy aircraft, "Y" operators must possess an understanding of the basic organization of the GAF, a knowledge of the geography of Germany, particularly the area of operations of the XIX TAC so as to provide the controllers quick and accurate information of the location of towns and areas, and to be able to interpret and evaluate reports from Det "C". In addition operators must be able to read maps and map coordinates and know the phonetic alphabet.
6. DUTIES: A loge book will be kept in which all messages and reports will be entered together with a notation in the margin of the time of receipt thereof. This log will be opened and closed daily and will constitute a record of each day's operations. All information received from Det "C" will be transmitted directly to the Duty Senior Controller, and where the information so warrants to the MLO and AAA Liaison Office. On receipt of operations Orders all XIX TAC missions will be plotted on the hand map of Germany. At the close of each day"s operations a report will be made by telephone to the XIX TAC "Y" Officer, which report will include the total number of "Y" messages received during the day and those items of information which were actually used by the controller. All items of unusual interest will be relayed to the XIX TAC "Y" Officer immediately upon receipt.
7. TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGES: All messages from Det "C" being of immediate tactical importance, will be transmitted in the clear. Messages to Det "C" from the "Y" Post which involves operation of our aircraft, such as releases, airborne and landing times, changes in zero hours, etc., will only be transmitted by a code which has been adopted by joint collaboration with Det "C" and which will be changed at regular intervals.
8. GENERAL: Det "C" will furnish, when so requested German raid reporting for the use and benefit of the MLO. Information which is of interest to adjacent TAC's will be given to the MLO who will relay such information immediately. All hostile and unidentified tracks, other than "Y" reports, will be passed to Det "C" for possible identification. All equipments when not in use will be locked in a strong-box.
I. ORGANIZATION
1. The Communications Officer at the TCC will be responsible for all communications facilities at the Control Center and will act as liaison Officer between the senior Controller and the responsible units on changes or additions to the communications system. He will be prepared to advise the Controller on these matters and will maintain such records and make such reports as are required by the TAC.
2. Responsibilities of each unit in the TCG will be designated by the commanding Officer thereof.
II. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.
1. Air-Ground radio.
a. the TCC will have available one VHF channel for each of the four common channels used by the Command and one VHF channel for each Group in the Command. Spare VHF equipment should be on hand for use during leap-frog moves and for use when additional Groups are assigned for control.
b. The MEW station will have a minimum of six VHF channels
c. Each Forward Director Post will have a minimum of two VHF channels and will be provided four channels if equipment is available
d. Each BACU will have two SCR-522 radio nets for air-ground communication, enabling them to operate every one of eight pre- determined channels
2. Point to Point Radio-Reporting Channels.
a. Each Ground Observer cluster, consisting of four or five stations will report by means of SCR-610 to a net control station
b. Each Ground Observer NCS will have VHF/FM radio and HF radio to the FDP with which it is associated. The alternate NCS will also maintain a FM radio set on this channel.
c. Each light warning or similar type radar station will have FM radio and HF radio to the associated FDP
d. Each FDP will have at least one FM radio channel as well as HFS radio for reporting to the TCC. In addition, a FM radio net for plotting and filter liaison will be provided among the FDP's net to the TCC.
e. All reporting channels will be operated 24 hours.
3. Point to Point radio- Liaison Channels
a. A FM radio net will be provided for liaison between FDP Controllers, BACU Controller and TCC. This will not be monitored by all stations during daylight flying hours.
b. A FM radio net will be established, when possible, for liaison between the TCC and the Flying Control installations at Group airfields within the Command, for the purpose of passing information relative to Flying Control. This new will be monitored by all stations during daylight flying hours.
c. A FM radio net will be established in cooperation with Army Ground Forces among the AAA Gun Control Rooms of the IAZ's in the Army Area and the TCC. This net will be under the control of the AAA Duty Officer at the TCC and will be used to pass AAA intelligence from the AAA units to the TCC and to give hostile and friendly early warning to the IAZ. This net may be used by the Controller to issue a "Hold Fire" order when friendly aircraft pass through a restricted zone. An AAA early warning broadcast on HF will also be provided.
d. The TCC will maintain an SCR-399 radio in the Le Bourget Continental Flying Control Net for the purpose of receiving movement information on RAF and Eighth Air Force activities, and movement of aircraft from other than the TAC's.
4. DF Fixer Service
a. A Direction finding system will be maintained for the TCC and will be operated at least during daylight flying hours. The fixer layout will consist of a minimum of four stations sited to give their most efficient coverage over the TAC area.
b. Each of those stations will maintain a FM radio in each of two nets for reporting to the TCC.
c. Facilities for utilizing the DF fixers associated with the FDP and BACU installations as a second fixer layout will be provided at the TCC. Each of these dual purpose fixers will maintain a FM radio in one of the two DF reporting nets mentioned above, and will be prepared to report bearings to either the TCC or the FDP controller or both. Normally, the primary fixer layout will operate on the designated TAC fixer channel. The secondary layout will set up on any designated channel at the order of the Chief Controller.
5. Telephone and Teletype Communications
a. Wire communication in all cases will depend upon (1) the availability of material (2) the practicability of installation and (3) operational necessity. The scale of wire communication listed below is that which, it is expected, can be maintained under normal conditions. However in the Tactical Control System, wire communi- cations must be regarded as a luxury supplement to radio, and the system must be planned so that full operation is possible without dependency on long land lines.
(1) A minimum of two switchboard trucks, one redline speech circuit and one telephone circuit will be installed between the TAC and The TCC.
(2) A minimum of one redline circuit will be installed between each Fighter Wing Combat Operations Room nd the TCC.
(3) A minimum of one speech circuit will be installed between Detachment "C", 3rd Radio Squadron and the TCC.
(4) Whenever possible, two speech and one teletype circuit will be installed between each FDP and the TCC and between MEW and the TCC.
(5) Whenever possible, one speech circuit will be installed between the FDP and its associated GO NCS, LW and BACU and between each DF station and the TCC.
(6) Whenever possible one speech circuit will be installed between the TCC and the Central Centers of the TAC operating in adjoining sectors.
(7) Wire communication to other installations in the system and administrative lines to unit headquarters will be installed under the provisions listed above.
After VE day the activities of the 19th TCG were fairly well set out in the unit history of their assignment to the task force for the invasion of Japan. For this expedition the 19th TCG, the 100th Fighter Wing and the XIX TAC were specifically requested by General MacArthur and the 19th TCG and several Signal BACU units were on the high seas and the 100th Fighter Wing were getting ready to embark to Japan when the A Bombs were dropped and ended the War. There was no question what would have taken place if the war had not ended at that time as Maj. Gen. Otto Weyland (XIX TAC commander) and Brig. Gen. Homer Sanders (100th Fighter Wing commander) were flying to the Philippines in a bomber and were over Omaha when the war ended. Just before that Weyland was promoted to CG of the 9th Air Force and Sanders had been promoted to be CG of the XIX TAC. Both stepped down and returned to their former unit in order to participate in the final invasion. Some of the men have said that some of the troops being redeployed were already in the Philippines when the war ended.
This was also a provisional unit organized for the task of the invasion of Japan and was to function under the XIX Tactical Air Command. The new unit had a new TO&E tailored for the operation. Personnel for the new unit were drawn mainly from volunteers from the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion.
At the October 1995 Reunion at Kansas City, Bob Norton explained that he took great pains to keep the original as it was when used by Lt. Col. McBride and it not only shows the roster but some changes made at the time and that a few of the entries were not necessarily final and perhaps changes that were planned. The names on the roster were as follows. (The roster is shown in Appendix XVIII)
The 19th Tactical Control Group (prov) issued Standard Oper- ations Procedures on 9 March 1945 which contained the procedures for the FDP units. The procedures were as written up in the 19th Tactical Control Group Unit history as 19th Tactical Control Group Memorandum 100-42 and were as follows.
I PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1. To prescribe the organization, mission and employment of Forward Director Posts of this Group.
II ORGANIZATION
1. A Forward Director Post will consist of the following
a. Four TGI (Ground Control Interception) controllers; technical and administrative personnel, as required by Signal Corps Tables of organization for FDP; one Direction finding crew and one or two VHF Radio-Telephone crews, as required by Tactical Control Center Operations.
b. Equipment will include two SCR573-4 (one as minimum requirement); one D/F SCR575, which will be at the disposal of the FDP Controller; Teletype facilities, including TG-7B; and Control Plotting equipment as directed by Signal Corps Section.
2. Personnel and Equipment may vary according to the req- uirements set forth by the Tactical Control Center and FDP Chief Controllers and will be furnished by the Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion of Fighter Control Squadron.
III CAPABILITIES
1. An FDP, under direction of the Tactical Control Center, is designed and organized to be of utmost assistance to all Allied Aircraft in problems of ground to Air Control. It will be exp- ressly responsible for Aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command, either in offensive or defensive combat operations. Chief types of missions are as follows:
a. Close Support: Of any action requiring the use of Fighter or Fighter-Bomber aircraft under ground air control. Direction to and from the Combat Area or Target shall be the responsibility of the FDP on its assigned missions.
b. Armed Reconnaissance: For destruction of the enemy or the protection of friendly troops. The FDP will direct to any target of opportunity, any target assigned by TCC, or to any aircraft for the purpose of identification or destruction. The aircraft leader will be briefed in most cases, thus requiring only stand-by aid from the FDP Controller.
c. Bomber Escort: Under Field Order direction of TCC an FDP will rendezvous fighter with their bomber formation at any location within range. The entire mission will be monitored by VHF in order to give E/A warnings, aid in navigation if necessary, and facili- tate homing for any aircraft on such mission.
d. Fighter Sweeps: Which attack E/A and Targets deep in enemy territory will be controlled with every available facility to eliminate range handicaps. Squadron leaders will be advised when actual control is no longer possible, and when warnings can no longer be given by VHF.
e. Enemy Aircraft Interceptions: Will be accomplished during all missions when identification is confirmed by the pilot. A controller will not direct a pilot to attack any other aircraft unless full identification has been accomplished. Night fighters missions will be assigned by TCC and will include, Patrol, Intruder, Gangster and harassing flights. A Controller may direct his controlled flight to any suspected flight, depending on the requirement of the mission, but he may not divert the flight from its responsibilities or its objective.
f. Pin-point Target Bombings: Will be in accordance with 19th Tactical Control Group (Prov) SOP for Battle Area Control Units. The FDP will be prepared to resume or coordinate such missions throughout the time of flight.
g. Reconnaissance Flights: For weather information, enemy activity,s photography, calibration, or any other military subject will be carried out at the request of TCC. Information will ge gathered only at the request of TCC. Required help will be the only duty of an FDP during such flights.
h. Patrol: To protect or defend Allied property will be done under the direction of TCC, by assignment.
i. Emergency Homing: Will be the duty of an FDP Controller during all operational hours. Aircraft in distress, or Mayday, will be given priority over all other types. The FDP will so arrange its facilities to be of greatest possible efficiency in handling and emergency operation. The Controller may direct the aircraft to any location which is safest as determined by immediate known conditions. The FDP Controller may dictate the emergency procedure of the aircraft, thereby taking exceedingly important responsibility for all concerned.
IV ASSIGNMENT
1. The TCC Duty Senior Controller will issue all Control Orders and assignments to the FDP GCI Duty Controller. The most expedi- tious means of communication will be used for liaison between the TCC and FDP Controllers. The TCC Controller will coordinate the FDP as follows;
a. At the time of assignment, pass all full responsibility of Aircraft control to the FDP Controller.
b. Notify the FDP of any important information in regards to:
(1) Change in Field Order Plans or assignment
(2) Status of weather, communications, aircraft emer- gency field, available E\A warnings
(3) New or important targets in relation to the mission under FDP control.
(4) Emergency conditions and the TCC Facilities avail able during such time
(5) Relieve the FDP of mission responsibility in case of equipment failure.
V CONTROL PROCEDURE
1. At the FDP, all elements of control during operational hours will be under the complete jurisdiction of the GCI Duty Controller or Controller on duty. FDP personnel and equipment will be at the GCI Controller's disposal for the greatest possible control efficiency.
2. A Controller will plan and execute all the facilities of his mission so that every phase of control can be brought to use during any mission. A mission, depending on its type, requirements and objectives will be carried out to the best of his ability and at his discretion in relation to controlling. He will consider the following items in acceptance and control of any mission.
a. Possess the latest information for aircraft involved, including bases, weather, targets, maps, field order and commun- ication.
b. Communicate with the mission flight leader at the earliest moment of VHF allowance, establish the correctness of the mission, and give any changes in pre-planned order.
c. Find and follow the flight from its base, to its desti- nation, and home, on the visual scope of Radar. Use D/F, IFF or any other method of identification of fixing available to maintain the position and track throughout the mission.
d. Advise the flight leader, or pilot concerned, of dangerous weather conditions, flak areas over the target or course, E/A plots as given by TCC; and stand by to navigate the pilot, by vector, to any position or area requested.
e. Keep the flight oriented, notify the leader when his fl- ight is off course or target, and be prepared to home emergency aircraft at any time during the attack. He may advise the flight of its proximity to a safe area, and their steer to base, giving the distance in minutes of flying time.
f. The Controller will aid the flight on its return trip by checking their position frequently, giving steers as requested, advising of IAZ Areas during late flights, and notifying the leader or pilot of his entrance into friendly lines.
g. All Controllers will observe the important elements of R/T conversation concerning:
(1) Military security
(2) Clarity and accuracy of information
(3) Channel priorities during emergency
h. The FDP Controller may refuse to accept responsibility for the safety or success of any mission if he deems it impossible or improbable because of limitations such as:
(1) Mechanical failure
(2) Power failure
(3) "Jamming" scope failures
(4) subordinate equipment failure.
The TCC Controller will be immediately notified of any limitation which will affect the controlled mission, and he will re-assign or so arrange the mission so that it can be controlled.
3. The items set forth in paragraph 2, section V, must be considered as policy suggestions and not as set rules. A GCI Controller must consider any possible control point, and may pattern his methods of control, of R/T, or of mission direction to fit whatever situation may arise. He must be aware of all conditions pertaining to the aircraft under his control and consider them as his responsibility. The Communications at the Controllers command must be available and clear for use to successfully complete ny controlled.
VI CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITIES, FDP
1. Cooperate with the FDP Company Commander in solving problems of control and filter work.
2. Maintain liaison with the FDP Filter Officer in order that TCC may receive accurately plotted information on controlled flights.
3. Activate the FDP Equipment and Personnel to the best advantage and most continuous use for aiding aircraft.
4 Train or require the training of personnel in the direct use of control equipment. At the discretion of the FDP Chief GCI Controller, Enlisted personnel of the Air corps, or Signal Corps will be trained in all phases of control. These will be known as Deputy Controllers, but will not act only under the direct supervision of the Duty Controller.
VII DIRECTION/FINDING
1. D/F Crews will be under the control of the FDP Controller. The Group Channel or channels used during actual control may be used on the D/F set for fixing during a mission unless otherwise commanded by the TCC Chief Controller. During hours of non oper- ation, the D/F channel will join the TCC #2 Net. Other regulations on D/F are given in par 5b, XIX Tactical Air Command SOP 100-30.
VIII VHF COMMUNICATIONS AND ELEMENTS:
1. See SOP XIX Tactical Air Command 100-50
2. VHF operators will log all control, all pilot air-ground conversation. Individual FDP Code may be used to facilitate log- ging excesses, but complete "story" must be available from the VHF Logs. Important items, such as conversation between pilots which indicates a state of emergency; e.g."Hello Rudy, Blue-two here. I've got fire in the cockpit." VHF logged, this might be 1300 Blue 2 cockpit fire".
IX IFF PROCEDURE
1. See XIX Tactical Air Command SOP 100-50 (not included)
This SOP was a first at the Aircraft Warning Unit Training Center. The first version, which follows, was written primarily for the operational training period prior to shipment overseas at Drew Field. Prior to this it was a practice for the units undergoing final operational training to rely on classroom learned procedures which were not necessarily written down by the unit. In the final evaluation of units to be shipped to combat situations the battalion got very high marks and this was one of the factors. At the end of this operational training the SOP was improved and published. After the reorganization and field training in England the SOP was again changed for the Forward Director type of operation which would be used in Combat. The SOP proved to be useful in orienting assigned and attached troops in combat. In combat it was used to fill in before the 19th Tactical Control Group wrote their own Standing Operating Procedures in the Winter of 1944. There is no record left in the unit histories of the final combat version, probably because the 19th Tactical Control Squadron issued their own version which the 563rd used in combat from about December 1944 and on. The final SOP for the XIX Tactical Air Command integrated the operations from Radars to Airfields. The issue letter was as follows with the Standing Operating Procedure attached.
Subject: Standard Operating Procedure To: All Concerned
1. The purpose of the standard operation procedure is to obtain uniformity of operation and reduction of orders and instructions. Normally the standard operating procedure will be followed. Situations arising wherein variation produce more efficient results will be prescribed in orders.
2. Company commanders are responsible that pertinent informa- tion contained in the standard operating procedures are made known to the lowest element of their command who must know the informa- tion in order that each procedure undertaken may be assured of success. It will be concerned.
3. This standard operating procedure will be effective upon receipt. Additions or changes will be published when appropriate and added to this publication when issued.
4. Superseded data will be removed and destroyed.
By order of Lieut Colonel McBRIDE
MAURICE E. BYRNE
Major Signal Corps
Executive
1. GENERAL. The detailed duties of staff sections are set forth in Chapter 1, Staff Officers Field Manual FM 101-5. This reference will be used in all cases as a standard operating procedure unless modified by theCommanding Officer. In case of conflict of the above reference with this SOP, this SOP will guide. All previous standard operating procedures memorandums and bulletins are hereby rescinded.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS TO BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER.
a. Correspondence of special importance or interest of the commanding officer.
b. Communications relating to irregularities within the Battalion.
c. Communications containing censure, criticism or commenda- tion to the battalion or its various units.
d. Important orders and instructions from higher echelons.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS TO BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
a. Communications of special importance not covered by existing policies or instructions.
b. Accidents or damage involving personnel, installations or equipment which are of a serious nature.
c. Communications in which the proposed action disapproves a recommendation of the Company Commander.
(Editors Note 31) At the time this original SOP was written it was not known that the operation of the Fighter Control Information Center would be handled by the 563rd or an Air Corps unit, (turned out to be the 312th Fighter Control Squadron). In fact the Air Corps failed to acquaint us with this until about March of 1944. I remember that the filter center personnel of the battalion were stationed near Andover and we were continuing the Information Center training and using improvised equipment as we had not been issued any filtering hardware for an operation center. In the meantime the Air Corps had allotted this equipment to the 312th FCS. In the spirit of the 563rd the men made their own hardware out of tin cans and imporvised a mobile Control Center with 2 1/2 ton trucks and pyramidal tents.
d. Applications for leave, detached service or other absence of the head of any staff section.
e. Matters covered by paragraph 2 in the absence of the Commanding Officer.
4. CORRESPONDENCE TO BE SIGHED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER
a. Communications addressed to civilian officials.
b. Correspondence in which it is desired to emphasize that theCommanding Officer has given his personal attention.
5. CORRESPONDENCE TO BE SIGHED BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
a. Correspondence mentioned in paragraph 4 in the absence of the Commanding Officer.
6. CORRESPONDENCE TO BE SIGNED BY THE ADJUTANT
a. All correspondence not listed in paragraph 4 and 5.
7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADJUTANTS SECTION.
a. Organization and maintenance of a message center in Battalion Headquarters.
b. Organization of the headquarters file section other than matters pertaining to supply, personnel and technical matters.
c. Coordination and forewarning of all reports prepared by staff heads of Company Commanders.
8. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-1 SECTION
a. Coordination of the personnel reports required by higher headquarters consolidating when necessary.
b. Coordination of the personnel functions in all companies.
c. Inspection and supervision of all administrative functions in companies
d. Custodian of the Forms 66-1 and 201 files for all officers.
9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-2 SECTION
a.Intelligence functions directed by higher headquarters.
b. Cryptographic security officer for the battalion.
c. Custodian of classified documents and cipher devices used in Battalion Headquarters.
10. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-3 SECTION
a. Preparation of all field orders, march orders, training directives and master training schedules.
b. Coordination of use of training equipment
c. Preparation, revision, publication and distribution of Standing Operating Procedures
d. Preparation or consolidation of all reports to higher headquarters of all things pertaining to training, operation or tactics.
e. Custody and maintenance of a technical and tactical library at Battalion Headquarters.
11. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-4 SECTION
a. Preparation or consolidation of all reports to higher headquarters pertaining to supply.
b. Supervision and responsibility for the functioning of all supply throughout the battalion.
12. COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
a. The Communications officer of the Headquarters and Plotting Company will also be Communications Officer for the Battalion. He will be responsible for the installation and maintenance of all signal communications employed within the Battalion Headquarters and the Information Center, except the inter-room and intra-room communications that are provided for the information center equipment. He will supervise all other communications.
b. He will assist the S-3 in the issuance of instructions, SOP as pertains to communications, line route diagrams, SCI, allotment of call signs and frequencies to all radio nets.
13. GAS OFFICER
a. The Gas Officer will supervise the operation and instruc- tion of unit gas officers and maintain liaison with gas officers of higher echelons.
14. MOTOR OFFICER
a. Supervision of the operation and maintenance of all motor transportation
15. CHAPLIN
a. Supervision of the spiritual welfare of the command.
16. SURGEON
a. Advisor to the commander on all matters pertaining to health and sanitation
b. Training of all troops in military sanitation and first aid, coordinate with the S-3
c. Location and operation of medical aid stations and evacuation service
d. Training of Medical troops.
17. POSTAL OFFICER
a. Safeguarding and breakdown by companies of all mail service.
18. UNIT JOURNAL
a. A unit journal will be kept by the Battalion. It is under the supervision of the S-3. The journal is a chronological record of one days events of the unit. It will contain a record of all important decisions that were made and of all tactically important written messages and orders received and sent by headquarters and the action thereon. The journal is supplemented by the journal file. This file contains copies of all the messages, orders and other documents arranged in the order of entry in the journal. They serve as a permanent record of the operations of the unit and are the basis for the war diary. The work sheet affords the staff officers a convenient means of keeping memoranda for their own ready reference map.
19. OPERATIONS MAP
a. A single map will be kept at the Battalion Command Post, this map will incorporate the situation and operation map. All data pertinent to the situation is plotted. The map should be posted up to date at all times by correcting, or adding information that can be shown graphically. The prescribed symbols are used whenever possible, and notes may be used to explain, or to take the place of symbols. Such notes should be placed on the margins where they will not obscure important data or terrain features. The S-3 is responsible for the keeping of this official map. The informa- tion plotted on the map will include: Location of Radars, ground observers, relay stations, wire and other obstacles, anti-aircraft weapons automatic weapon, Observation posts and command posts, boundaries between units, dumps, aid stations and supply establish- ments, shelled, bombed or gassed areas, adjacent, higher and supporting units.
20. HEADQUARTERS AND PLOTTING COMPANY
a. Will consist of four platoons, Headquarters Platoon, Filter Platoon, Operations Platoon and Communications Platoon. In addition a medical section will be attached.
b. Headquarters platoon will consist of 1 A team less 1 2nd Lt., 1 M/Sgt (542), 1 Sgt (261), 1 T/4 (089) all to the communica- tions Platoon, 1 T team and 3 P teams.
c. The Filter Platoon will consist of 1 E team, 1 L team and 6 F teams
d. The Operations Platoon will consist of 1 E team
e. The Communications Platoon will consist of 12 I teams, 2 J teams, 1 2nd Lt., M/Sgt (542), S/Sgt (261), T/4 (089) all from the A Team
21. REPORTING COMPANY A
a. Will consist of three platoons, Headquarters Platoon, 1st Reporting Platoon (EW), 2nd reporting Platoon (GCI)
b. Headquarters platoon will consist of 1 B team and 12 I teams
c. The 1st Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 C team, 1 P team and 1 S team.
d. The 2nd Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 C team, 1 S team, 1 J team and 1 P team
22. REPORTING COMPANY B
a. Will consist of three platoons, Headquarters Platoon, 1st Reporting Platoon (EW) and 2nd Reporting Platoon (GCI).
b. Headquarters Platoon will consist of 1 B Team
c. The 1st Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U Team
d. The 2nd Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U team
23. REPORTING COMPANY C
a. Will consist of three platoons, Headquarters Platoon, 1st Reporting Platoon (EW) and 2nd Reporting Platoon (GCI).
b. Headquarters Platoon will consist of 1 B Team
c. The 1st Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U team
d. The 2nd Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U team.
24. GROUND OBSERVER COMPANY D
a. Will consist or three Platoons, Headquarters Platoon, Ground Observer Platoon and Reporting Platoon
b. The Headquarters platoon will consist of 1 B team
c. The Ground Observer Platoon will consist of 24 M teams, 3 P teams and 1 S team
d. The Reporting Platoon will consist of 1/2 U team, 2 N teams, 1 S team and 1 P team
25. GROUND OBSERVER COMPANY E.
a. Will consist of three Platoons, Headquarters Platoon, Ground Observer Platoon and Reporting Platoon.
b. The Hean will consist of 1 B team
c. The Ground Observer Platoon will consist of 24 M teams, 3 P teams and 1 S team
d. The Reporting Platoon will consist of 1/2/U team, 2 N teams, 1 S team and 1 P team.
NOTE Tentative tactical considerations dictate the following employment for tactical purposes: 2 Officers in the L team of the Filter Platoon of the Headquarters and Plotting Company will be placed on Special Duty with Ground Observer Companies D and E, one officer in each Company, for the purpose of commanding the ground observer platoons in these companies. The 12 I teams in thlatoon of Reporting Company A will be put on Special Duty the Headquarters and Plotting Company for use in the Communications Platoon. The T/Sgt (953) in the U team divided among the Ground Observer Companies will be assigned to Company D. The Sgt(824) in the U team divided among the Ground Observer Companies will be assigned to Company E.
The purpose of the procedure outlined below is to relieve the company Headquarters of some of the burden of keeping track of the enlisted men to develop leadership among the non-commissioned officers to improve the control of the command as a whole to impress the platoon officers and non-commissioned officers with their responsibilities: to raise the general morale by making the training more realistic and to improve the physical coordination of the command as a whole.
27. BREAKDOWN OF THE COMPANY
a. The Company will be divided into platoons paralleling the T/O. Each Platoon will be assigned an area and a barracks for which it will be responsible.
b. The Headquarters Platoon will consist of the company administrative overhead, administrative overhead for battalion headquarters, transportation,supply and mess personnel.
c. All personnel over 38 years of age, CCD, or others awaiting discharge physically or technically disqualified and overages will be placed in one or more complete platoons in Headquarters and Plotting Company
d. Each platoon will be divided into squads of 10 to 12 men.
e. The organization will be built up around key positions. Each key position will have an assistant who will act in the absence of the key man. Their key position and assistants are as follows
Platoon Commander Officer
Asst Platoon Commander Officer
Platoon Sergeant NCO
Asst Platoon Sergeant NCO
Squad Leader NCO or acting NCO
Asst Squad Leader NCO or acting NCO
28. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR OFFICERS.
a. Our primary purpose here is the training of troops for combat operations. With this objective always in mind, Officers will spend every available moment on training. Office work will be left to the enlisted clerks. A properly organized office staff can carry the bulk of routine administration paper work.
b. It is the responsibility of the Company Commander to insure that officers are detailed as training instructors. Schools for officers and Non-commissioned officers will be held after training hours to insure each instructor is well qualified in the subject of instruction for the following day.
c. All officers will participate in physical exercise at each period prescribed by the training schedule.
d. One officer in the Company will stand reveille each day.
e. One officer in each platoon will stand retreat each day. He will make an inspection of all weapons in the platoon before the retreat formation. He will also inspect personnel at the retreat forma- tion.
29. DELEGATION OF DUTIES
a. Company duties as outlined in paragraph 30,31,32,33 and 34 will, where practicable, be delegated to platoon officers and warrant officers as additional duties.
30. DUTIES OF THE COMPANY TRAINING OFFICER
a. He will post the training schedule on the officers bulletin board the company bulletin board.
b. He will clearly designate, at least 24 hours in advance, the exact area in which each class is to be conducted the time the class starts the equipment to be brought by the individual soldier the uniform to be worn and other remarks deemed necessary for the smooth functioning of the class.
c. He will notify instructors concerned of any change in training directed by Battalion Headquarters. This will be done at least 24 hours in advance of the proposed change.
d. He will cooperate with instructors in the manufacture, requisitioning or procurement of training aids and training equipment.
e. He will be custodian of company training material and property which is not picked up by the company supply
f. He will keep the Company Supply, Mess and Transportation officer informed at least 24 hours in advance of any requirements that may be made of him in accord with training procedure.
31. DUTIES OF COMPANY ATHLETIC OFFICER.
a. He will be in charge of the obstacle course and responsible for its maintenance.
b. He will keep records pertaining to the physical achievement of the men in the entire company
c. He will supervise athletics at all periods of organized athletics and will be assisted by other company officers designated from time to time by the Company Commander.
32. DUTIES OF THE COMPANY SUPPLY MESS AND TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
a. He will store, requisition, preserve, inspect and distrib- ute all company supplies in accordance with AR's.
b. He will handle all details pertaining to mess and transpor- tation as required for training purposes or movements as requested by company officers, and authorized by the Company Commander.
c. He will coordinate matters of supply, mess and transporta- tion for all Company functions.
d. He will be responsible to the Company Commander for First echelon maintenance of company vehicles.
33. DUTIES OF THE COMPANY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
a. He will coordinate all company administration matters except those pertaining solely to supply, mess and transportation.
b. He will supervise the operation of the orderly room.
c. He will conduct all normal routine administration and sign for the Company Commander. he will prepare outgoing correspondence for the signature of the Company Commander.
d. He will maintain the company files and most appropriate data on the bulletin board and will inspect the bulletin board frequently to insure that all superseded and outdated information is removed.
e. For all the above duties he will employ the company clerks.
34. DUTIES OF PLATOON COMMANDERS OR ASSISTANT PLATOON COMMAND- ERS ACTING IN THEIR ABSENCE
a. He will appoint squad leaders and assistant squad leaders for each squad and recommend platoon and assistant platoon sergeants.
b. He will divide his platoon into squads assigning 10 or 12 men to to each squad.
c. He will be responsible to the Company Commander for the appearance and behavior of all the men in his platoon and the condition of their clothing and individual equipment.
d. He will be responsible that members of his platoon report for formation and classes or details at the designated time and place with the proper equipment and prescribed uniforms.
e. He will be responsible to the Company Commander for the disposition of each man in his platoon during duty hours.
f. He will be responsible that men in his organization who have medical or dental appointments or are alerted, will be ready at the proper place and time.
g. He will assign and reassign men to squads in his platoon and keep the records he deems necessary to facilitate the same.
h. He will keep the organization progress chart up to date.
i. The platoon commander will handle breaches of discipline in his own platoon with the exception of cases to be handled by court martial or cases which occur off the post, or where a delinquency report in concerned. Such cases will be handled by the Company Commander.
36. DUTIES OF THE PLATOON SERGEANT OR THE ASSISTANT PLATOON SERGEANT ACTING IN HIS ABSENCE
a. He will be the assistant to the platoon commander.
b. He will call for the report from his squad leaders at all formations and report the number absent to the First Sergeant. At each class he will report the absentees to the instructor
c. He will form the platoon and be responsible for getting his platoon to the proper place at the proper time with the proper equipment and uniform
d. He will be responsible to the Platoon Commander for the appearance of the individuals of the platoon as well as the policing of the barracks and platoon awill be responsible to the Platoon Commander that all assigned to details report at the proper time and place and to the proper person.
f. He will check with the squad leaders to be sure that those men who have medical and dental appointments keep them.
g. He will, at all times, keep an up-to-date roster of members of his platoon. For this purpose he will retain a card file. A card will be made up for each man assigned to his platoon. This card will initiate with company headquarters and will come down to the platoon when the man is assigned to the platoon. If the man is reassigned to another platoon the card will be sent to the new platoon. If the man is transferred out of the Company the card is sent back to company headquarters to the dead file. This card will always be marked in pencil with the most recent squad assignment of the man in order that the man may be readily located if necessary.
37. DUTIES OF THE SQUAD LEADER OR THE ASSISTANT SQUAD LEADER ACTING IN HIS ABSENCE.
a. He will habitually keep a roster of the men in his squad being prepared to check roll at any time.
b. He will know the whereabouts of all men in his squad at all times.
c. He will be responsible to the platoon sergeant for the cleanliness and appearance of all his men and their individual equipment at all time.
d. He will be responsible to the platoon sergeant to get his men to the proper place at the proper time with the proper clothing and equipment
e. He will not be authorized to excuse men from school, detail or other duty.
38. CONCLUSION
a. The success of the system depends upon whether the squad leader has constant check and control of the men in his squad in order to accomplish this, all requests for details, medical appointments, dental appointments, pass and furloughs must go through the squad leader. The squad leader will be responsible to the platoon commander for the disposition of his men at all times during duty hours. Obviously, squad leaders must be checked frequently to determine their efficiency and sense of responsibili- ty.
b. Men appointed as Non-commissioned officers must not only be capable of meeting normal duty requirements but they must be fully aware of the responsibilities of their position. Non-commissioned officers who do not meet the requirements of the grade in every way must give way to more competent men. Non-commissioned officers are the backbone of the Company and the importance of having capable men in these positions cannot be stressed too strongly.
39. INTRODUCTION
a. In order for the Ground Observer team to function properly, and to insure the reception of intelligent information at the Information Center rapidly and accurately, it is necessary that a uniform procedure be adopted. This procedure, must of necessity be carefully observed by all Ground Observer units in Operational Training in this battalion.
b. With this objective in mind, the procedure contained herein has been set forth as a standard.
40. TEAMS
a. The ground observer team must be a flexible unit, and the number of members will depend on the type of coverage desired.
b. The teams will be grouped together in sections but may be deposed in any manner as dictated by the tactical situation.
c. One ground observer team will operate an observation post.
d. A Relay Station will consist of one relay team and usually one ground observer team.
41. CHIEF GROUND OBSERVER
a. He is in charge of each ground observer post and duties are as follows
b. Selection of site for location of post
c. Spacing his observers. Since each observer can see for about five miles to either side with conditions of normal visibili- ty, spacing of observers at six mile intervals should provide adequate overlap for good coverage.
d. Cover. Because of the short time normally spent at each location both observer scouts and the relay station crew will limit themselves to the simplest facilities. Those should include
(1) Construction of foxholes and slit trenches at spots well covered by shrubs or trees for the protection of personnel from ground or aircraft fire.
e. See that observers under his jurisdiction do not violate radio net discipline.
f. Supervise camouflage in order that it will be consistent with the terrain around the post. Remember, the best defense for ground observers is to avoid detection
43. REPORTING OBSERVATION POST TO RELAYS STATION
a. The sections of each ground observer platoon will be numbered, and each relay station will assume the number of its section or platoon. Outlying observation posts will be lettered to distinguish each post from the other of thee same section.
b. Information on aircraft will be reported by observations posts to the relay station in polar coordinates, according to the following procedure
(1) Alphabetical name of there reporting post
(2) Direction and distance of aircraft from the post
(3) Direction of flight
(4) Number of aircraft
(5) Identification of aircraft
(6) Altitude of aircraft in thousands of feet
44. VOICE TRANSMISSION
a. Post to Relay Station- An example of a report would be:
Able, East five miles, going South, one P-40, at four.
This means that observation Post 4, is reporting one aircraft five miles to the east of its post, flying in a southerly direction at a height of 4,000 feet.
b. Relay station or Net Control Station to Information Center. At the relay station, a radio operator at the receiver will plot on a small grided plotting board. A teller operator will read grid coordinates from then pass them on to the information center, using the following procedure
(1) Relay Station number (same as section number)
(2) Grid coordinate
(3) direction of Flight
(4) Number and identification of aircraft
(5) height in thousands of feet
c. Example of Relay Station or Net Control Report:
2 Nan 3468, South, one friendly bomber, at 6
This means that Relay Station number Two reports a flight in position 34 (abscissa) 68 (ordinate) in the major grid square N, flying at a height of six thousand feet.
Reports made at night or in conditions of poor visibility should be rendered as "heard". To render a "heard" report, insert the word "heard" after post or NCS identification.
45. CW TRANSMISSION
a. While it is desirable to use voice transmission whenever possible in reporting plots, it may occasionally be necessary to use continuous wave (code) transmission to cover the reporting distances involved. For the efficient reporting of plots by CW in such instances, a different procedure is required.
b. Normally CW, when necessary will only be used from the Relay Station to the Information Center. This procedure for reporting grid coordinates from the Relay Station in code gives information in the sequence a voice reports. Plotting information is all contained in two groups of numbers and letters. The first group will contain one letter and five numbers, while the second group will contain six numbers. The two groups together represent the following in order
c. First Group:
(1) Number of relay or net control station transmitting the plot is necessary only when more than one station is reporting to one Plotter.
(2) Letter indicating the major grid square in which the plot is located
(3) and (4) Numbers indicating the abscissa of the plot to the major grid square, the first number indicating the basic grid square in which the plot falls, the second number indicating the abscissa of the of the plot within the basic square,
(5) and (6) Two numbers indicating the ordinate of the plot in the major grid square, in the same manner as the abscissa was indicated by the previous two numbers.
d. Second Group:
(7) Number indicating direction in which the flight is moving. This may be any number from 1 to 8, representing the eight principal points of the compass directions, starting with North as 1 and proceeding around the points of the compassn a clockwise direction so that
1. North
2. Northeast
3. East
4. Southeast
5. South
6. Southwest
7. West
8. Northwest
(8) Two numbers indicating the number of aircraft. If there are less than ten aircraft in the flight, a zero is used as the first number of this two number group.
(9) One number representing the type of aircraft. Numbers are assigned the type of aircraft to represent the type according to the following class identification table
1. Hostile bomber
2. Hostile fighter
3. Hostile transport
4. Hostile observation
5. Sound Plot
6. Friendly bomber
7. Friendly fighter
8 Any transport
9 Friendly observation
0 Unknown
(10)One number giving height of flight in thousands of feet
First Group Second Group
Direction
of No of
Relay No Grid Square Grid Coord Flight AC type Alt
2 H 6545 3 03 5 4
c. If CW is used from Post to Relay or Net Control Station, report in the number code of the following sequence
First Group
1. Number of letter designating post identification
2. Number identifying Net Control Station or Relay Station, to which the plot is reported.
3. Number denoting sector in which plane is sighted (use one of the numbers in Chart in Paragraph 7).
4. Number denoting miles away from post
5. Number showing direction of flight (use Chart in Par.7)
Second Group
6. Two numbers denoting number of aircraft. If less than ten (10) insert a zero before number viz: three aircraft should be shown as 03
7. Number designating type
8. Altitude of plane using one number for each thousand feet.
f. Assume that post number w, reporting to NCS number 4,s sights two P-40's three miles north of the post going south at an altitude of 6,000 feet, the following report in the number code would be rendered:
24135 2356
g. If planes are heard instead of seen insert letter "h" after NCS number and the number 5 in place of the plane. This shows it to be sound plot.
24H135 0256
46. ROUTINE REPORTS
a. "ALL WELL" Reports. It is not contemplated that incoming plot will normally be acknowledged wither by the relay station or by the plotter at the Information Center. Routine "ALL WELL" reports will be made by each observation post by transmission of the post letter followed by the word "null". The frequency of these reports will depend on the situation. Thus observation post "A" would report "Able null". Such reports will be made only if no plots have been reported by the post in a designated period of time. The time of each post reporting its "null" should be specified by the officers in charge. These reports should be sent at staggered intervals.
b. Administrative Messages. Periodically, as required by the situation administrative traffic will be handled offer the net. Such time shall be set aside by the Unit Commander or higher headquarters.
47. LOG SHEETS
a. Log sheets will be kept at each Observation post and Relay Station. All plots reported will first be entered upon this log sheet.
b. Ground Observer will put his initials in order provided, after transmission of each plot
c. Under "Remarks" indicate any unusual occupancy or action of aircraft such as "Circling", "Strafing", "Bombing", etc.
48. WEATHER.
a. In accordance with an existing AR, the weather will never be sent over the air in clear text. A coded sheet to cover will be issued by the next higher headquarters.
49. FALSE GRIDS
a. During Operational Training, true grid coordinates will not be sent to Information Center but shall be coded in the false grid coordinates in use by the battalion during such training period.
50. OPERATIONS BOARD PLOTTER.
a. The Operations Board Plotter plots all information told him by the OPS Teller. Thus, he reproduces on the operations board any flight exactly as it appears on the filter board.
b. He will plot with 3 colors of arrows, red, yellow and blue as indicated by the color clock. When a color is reported the color clock he will remove all previous arrows of that particular color.
c. The OPS plotter will not ask the OPS teller to repeat any information, unless instructed to do so by the controller.
d. The OPS plotter calls to the raid orderly for a card stand, giving target designation, no of AC and height.
1. Solid Red Flag for Hostile
2. Solid Green Flag for Fighter
3. Yellow "F" Flag for Friendly
4. Yellow "X" for unknown
e. Card stands displaying the proper designations and data will be kept at the head or the proper tracks at all times by the OPS plotter.
f. If the OPS board plotter gets two flights called at the same grid reference, he will use only one set of arrows, and carry both of his flight identification markers at the head of the one track.
g. Raid Orderly is responsible to the OPS Board Plotter and must furnish to him the exact display equipment requested. To aid him in doing this as quickly as possible he should
1. Keep all cards filed in numerical order.
2. Know what the next new raid will be numbered. He should have that number in a card stand ready for the OPS Board Plotter.
H. He will use the following order in marking the card stand. From top to bottom
1. identification
2. Raid Number
3. No of AC
4. Height
5. Speed
51. All other functions will be as per WD Standing Orders for Radar Filter Room.
52. GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
a. The transmission of information from Radar Stations to the Filter Room must be accomplished in the minimum time with complete accuracy. The use of radio to accomplish this is not the most rapid means however, in most mobile installations, radio will be the only rapid means of communications available. In an active theater, radio is more dependable than wire 53.SIZE OF NETS
a. The present table of Basic Allowances provides for two (2) Radio Sets SCR-188A per Reporting Platoon. One of these is used at the Radar Station, and the other at the Filter Room. This means that each Reporting Station will be in a two station net. However, if it happen that insufficient sets or personnel are available to accomplish this, up to three reporting platoons can report in one net on a single frequency. Any more then three stations in one net will seriously reduce the effectiveness of the net.
54. EMERGENCY ASSIGNMENTS
a. In a two station net, it has been found advantageous to use a different frequency for each station if the frequencies are available. This is generally termed the Duplex Method. It will generally be difficult to obtain a sufficient number of frequencies in this country, but easy in foreign theaters. The Radar Station transmits, and the Filter Radio Station transmission on another frequency. The Duplex Method is more difficult to use than the single frequency or Break-in method, but is more secure and less vulnerable to jamming.
b. Another possible method of operation places each radar reporting platoon on a separate frequency. At the information center, there is a separate radio receiver and radio operator for each reporting platoon, but only one transmitter for each three to six reporting platoons. The Information Center operators take turns using the transmitter. Each such operator should have his own key. A signal system is necessary to indicate when the transmitter is sin use. This prevents two operators from attempt- ing to use the Information Center transmitter at the same time. Targets will generally have to be receipted for in groups. The system described is not desirable, but it provides for the economical use of transmitting equipment and maintenance personnel. When all stations are at true normal distance, a number of high power transmitters are saved.
55.NET CONTROL STATION
a. In all cases, the Filter Station in each net is the Net Control Station (NCS), and will follow the procedure for a NCS as outlined in "Combined Radio Telegraph (W/T) Procedure, FM24-100.
56. SPEED
a. The speed of transmission in any net will always be the speed of the slowest operator in the net.
57. GENERAL
a. All radio teams are essentially the same in that they have the same mission and use procedure standard throughout the armed forces. However, because of the special requirements of Aircraft Warning, the composition and specific duties of the operating teams require special definition and discussion.
58. RADAR RADIO TEAMS.
a. The group of men that operate the radio station in a reporting platoon is called the Radio Section. The Section is made up of as many 3 men operating crews as there are tours of duty. Each three men operating crew is called a Radar Radio Team. This term is composed of
(1) One Operator, Radio
(2) One Recorder, Radar (see Fig 1A)
(3) One Electrician, Radio
b. The duties of the men on the radar radio team are as follows:
(1) the Operator will transmit all information given him to the Filter Radio Station as quickly and as accurately as possible. The Operator is responsible for the maintenance of Radio discipline at his station. He is responsible for the correct tuning adjustments of the transmitter and receiver, and correct frequency calibration with the net Control Station. He will adjust his frequency to zero beat with the NCS once each hour. He is responsible that all messages sent are coded and that all traffic received is promptly delivered to its destination. He will transmit Radar reports as urgent messages. Reports should not be more than one minute old. All reports sent will be sent in the same order that they appear in the Log. He will keep a Station Log and Number Sheet
(2) The recorder will perform his duties as outlined in the 'Standard Operating Procedure for his Radar. He will sit in such a position that the radio operator can read his log and transmit reports directly from his Log.
(3) The Radio Electrician is always on call to make repairs within the limit of his ability, tools, and parts. He will conduct preventative maintenance periodically, and will include the Power Plant when it is separate from the Radar Power supply. He will turn in to the Supply section all damaged and worn out parts for replacement.
59. FILTER RADIO TEAM
a. The personnel at the Filter Radio Station have different duties and responsibilities. The team is composed of
(1) One operator, Radio
(2) One Converter-Teller
(3) One Electrician, Radio
b. The Duties of the Filter Radio Team members are as follows
(1) The operator will control the communications net. He will assure that the proper radio discipline, procedure and frequency is used. He will copy all radar reports in a radar log, and locate the log sheet so that the converter-teller can readily see it. He will keep a Station Log.
(2) The converter-teller is a member of the plotting platoon. His duties are outlined in Memorandum 55-10, which outlines False grid procedure. When no false grid is used, this man will only be a teller, transmitting his data direct to the filter board plotters as it is logged by the radio operator.
(3) The Radio Electrician is always on call to make repairs within the limit of his ability, tools, and parts. He will conduct preventative maintenance on the equipment for which he is responsi- ble. He will turn in to the supply section all damaged and worn out parts for replacement.
60. In order to attain continuous and satisfactory communica- tion between Radar and Radar Filter Room, many factors must be considered. Among those that will directly affect radio operations are
Weather
Distance between stations
Frequencies
Location of individual sets and antenna systems.
Of these, only the latter can be selected or controlled by the Aircraft Warning Organization. Therefore, it is essential that this one be as perfect as possible to get the best operation.
61. SPECIFICATIONS
a. The following requirements have been found to be necessary in order to obtain reasonably good operation.
b. Radio Station Section (MOBILE)
(1) The radio station should be located approximately 200 to 500 yards from the Radar. This is a distance sufficient to eliminate most of the electrical interference caused by radar equipment.
(2) The radio transmitter should be located to the rear of the radar with respect to the normal area of sweep
(3) If the proper wire is available for transmission of power, the Radar power supply should be used for Radio, and the radio power plant kept on "stand-by"
(4) When set up, the antenna should be installed with due consideration given to the camouflage problem in addition to the usual technical considerations. For an ideal installation, the antenna should be located on high ground with no large obstacles in the direction of the Filter Room. When hills interfere, the effectiveness of the array will generally be reduced, although the condition is often unavoidable.
c. Radar Radio Station (FIXED)
(1) The radio station should be located as far from the radar operations building as possible. If the barracks or bivouac area is at some distance from the station, radar traffic should be told by wire line to the radio station.
(2) The antenna should be placed so that it will get the least interference from the radar, and also give optimum communications performance.
(3) The radar power supply may be used for the radio equipment whenever possible. As the radar power supply often supplies power for the barracks installations, this should generally be no problem
c. Filter Center Radio Stations
(1) The receivers should all be located side by side in the communications room of the filter center, each receiver plainly marked with the code name of the reporting platoon it is to serve
(2) The transmitters should, whenever possible, be located from on-half to two miles from the Filter Room. This arrangement requires the use of remote control lines between the transmitters proper and the communications room at the Information or Filter Center.
(3) Transmitters should be on high ground with no obstructions near the antenna
(4) Antennas should be so arranged in order that each gets the best results with the particular station in its net.
(5) Commercial power should be used whenever it is available.
(6) A stand-by installation is almost mandatory because the entire AW System is dependent upon continuous communications facilities at the Information Center.
62. ADMINISTRATION
a. The types of traffic that come under this classification include all messages that have the routine classification of "Urgent" or Priority" or "Routine. Every effort will be made to handle administration matters by radio, holding the use of messengers to a minimum. In this command priority administrative traffic will be given precedence over radar traffic. In a theater, the reverse will normally hold. The hours for dispatch of routine administrative traffic are from 2200 to 0400, and when ever the radar is shut down. If more that one reporting platoon is in a net, each radar radio station must be careful not to interfere with the reporting of another. This is best accomplished by scheduling each station for its administrative traffic during the periods listed above, and also by sending target reports in groups of two or three, then pausing to allow the other stations to report if necessary.
b. Nets will be opened using Combined Radio Telegraph W/T Procedure. Thereafter, all contact will be made and all traffic except radar reporting will be handled with "Q" signals.
c. All messages will be encoded, using the current code as prescribed in the Signal Operation Instructions (SOI). Nothing will be sent in the clear, unless the message itself includes the phrase "authorized in clear" and the original of the message filed bears the signature of the officer authorizing such transmission.
63. TACTICAL
a. Radar reports and other Radar Information will always be considered as having urgent classification.
b. (1) The average radar report will consist of a series of jumbled letters and numbers. It is absolutely necessary that each of these be transmitted accurately, because incorrect information is often more dangerous than none at all.
A sample report might be SM645015f03
(2) If more than one reporting station is in a single net, every station in the net will send the first letter of its code as the first of a report or message
for example LSN645015 carries "L" as the identifying letter
.
c. Procedure
(1) Continuous wave (CW) transmission will be used.
(2) When the recorder starts to receive a report from the radar team The operator will send a V followed by the code identifier. Immediately following this, he sill transmit the coordinates as noted in paragraph 2 above. If there is more than one coordinate to send, a separate sign (II) will be transmitted between coordinates. At the end of each coordinate or series of coordinates, K will be transmitted. A pause will always be made after each three coordinates sent in close succession, if there are other reporting stations in the net. This will allow the other reporting stations to transmit their coordinates. If the NCS receives the intelligence, he will acknowledge with an R. If he fails to receive it, he will send IMI and the report will be repeated until it is either received, or is more that a minute old, at which time it is canceled. Break-in will be used, if possible, and the transmitting operator will be "broken" by the NCS as soon as a report or correction is necessary.
(3) In the handling of administrative traffic the regular call letters will be used. This will identify to the receiving operator as to what type of traffic is coming through. Regular call signs identifying "Administrative Traffic" code identifiers indicating "Radar Traffic"
(4) If there is more than one reporting station in the net, the same procedure will be used by each reporting station. However, if the traffic is heavy at all stations, the NCS will designate an order of reporting, so that stations will not interfere with each other.
(5) If for reasons of security, the NCS has been ordered to remain silent, the reporting stations will utilize the same procedure as outlined above except that after the transmission of the coordinate once, he will transmit IMI and report the entire transmission starting with V followed by AR instead of K.
(6) A good operating team, operating at a speed of 10 words per minute, should be able to handle between 5 and 6 average radar reports per minute.
d. There may be from time to time additional information to send, or questions that the Filter Room wants to ask. Rather than take time to encode the messages, a short abbreviated prearranged code is used. This is complete enough to cover most tactical situations. The current code appears in the Signal Operations Instructions
e. If the radar reports are being made faster than the radio operator can handle them, it becomes his duty to see that none are sent which the Recorder has had on his log more than one minute. Any that have been on the log for one minute or longer and which have not been sent forward will be scratched off the log and not sent at all.
f. Visual reports will be plotted on the plotting board, and the recorder will enter the information in his log. The altitude will be estimated.
64. CONCLUSION
a. The requirements of an efficient Warning System are stringent. Speed, accuracy and teamwork must be achieved before an organization is prepared for combat duty, and this can be attained only through standardized procedure. No one phase is the most important part of the Warning System. Each is equally important, and the success of the system depends on all. Radio communication is a necessary link in the chain of successful interception and must be a strong link if the mission of the Aircraft Warning Service is to be realized
65. REFERENCES
Combined Radio telegraph (W/T) Procedure FM24-10
Signal Communications FM24-5
Training of Signal Communications Personnel TM11-450
The Radio Operator TM11-454
TM's in reference to types of radios used.
66. INTRODUCTION
a. Speed and accuracy are the most important considerations in the Aircraft Warning System. Wire communications affords the fastest, most accurate and most reliable means of transmitting information from the radar stations to the Information Center. In order to obtain the most from this type of communications, however, the operating personnel must be well trained in the correct procedure and well disciplined in the use of available facilities.
67.OBJECTIVE
a. The objective of the various types of wire communications is to transmit the information from the radar station to the Information Center, accurately, securely and in a minimum amount of time.
68. GENERAL
a. When reporting by wire visual reports will be made. In making these reports the information will be given to the plotter and recorder. The plotter will plot the target and call the grid coordinates to the recorder. The recorder will log the grid coordinates and any other information received. In the remarks column he will note that it was a visual report.
b. The reporting line between the radar station and the filter room is an operational line and may only be used for administrative and other matters when the line is not required operationally. Such matters should, where possible, be dealt with on the line during the maintenance period of the station.
c. Under no circumstances will the reporting line be left unmanned at either end.
69. OPERATING PROCEDURE
a. For purposes of uniformity, the description of the operating procedure will begin with the plotter and recorder since all radar equipment employs a plotter and recorder. The operations previous to the time the plotter and recorder receive the informa- tion is described in the standard operating procedure for the particular type of radar used.
70. TELEPHONE
a. Crew, when reporting by telephone, no additional personnel is required.
b.Equipment
(1) the plotter and recorder will have head and chest sets partied on the line to the operators. Their transmitter switches will normally be in the "off" position.
(2) The radar teller, who will be the radio operator on the shift will have a head and chest set in the reporting line
(3) The reporting line at the information center is connected directly to the filter room plotters head and chest set.
c. Operating procedure
(1) The plotter plots the targets as received from the operating crews.
(2) The recorder will log any additional information received from the operating crew such as altitude, number of aircraft and identification.
(3) The plotter will convert the target to grid coordinates and call them to the recorder.
(4) The recorder enters the grid coordinates on the log and removes his hand allowing the teller to see the log.
(5) The teller reads the information from the log to the filter room plotter
(6) The report will contain, in order, the following informa- tion:
Station identification (if two or more stations are partied
Number of aircraft
Identification
Altitude (if determined)
(7) All reports must contain grid and number of aircraft. The other information is omitted where not applicable.
(8) A typical report is Orange Nan Fox sev-ven too ate fi-if thw-ree AC showing niff wun fi-if.
(9) Broken down this reports means Orange-station code name used with two or more stations partied. Nan Fox sev-ven too ate fi- iv is the grid coordinates, thu-ree AC number of aircraft, showing niff Identification (narrow Wun Fi-iv altitude in 1,000 feet (15,000 feet)
(10) When no IFF is indicated no mention is made of it. If a broad IFF is indicated the letters SOS is used.
(11) The recorder will log the number of aircraft and altitude as two digits but one digit may be used in reporting
(12) The phonetic alphabet and numerals will be used at all times
(13) Should the traffic become too heavy for the plotter to convert all targets to grid coordinates the recorder will assist in converting.
(14) The radar teller and filter room plotter teller will never refer to aircraft as such but will use the letters "AC instead. They will not use the words thousands, altitude, foot or height.
71. TELEGRAPH
a. Crew, when reporting by telegraph the radio teams which would be normally employed on radios will operate the nets.
b. Equipment
(1) The instrument at the radar station will be located near the plotter and recorder. The three positions will be arranged so the telegraph operator can easily see the recorders log, and the recorder can see the plotting board.
(2) The instrument at the Information Center is located in the communications room. The communications room teller will sit where he may see the operators log and relay the information by use of a head and chest set to the filter room plotter.
c. Operating Procedure for telegraph is the same as that for radio.
72. TELETYPE
a. Crew
(1) The telegraph printer teams consisting of three operators and installer repairman, will be added for each reporting platoon. One team will be at the radar and one at the information center.
b. Equipment
(1) The teletype instrument at the radar station will be located near the plotter and recorder, using the same arrangements as for telegraph.
(2) The instrument at the Information Center will be located in the communications room of the Information center the operator will wear a head and chest set to relay the reports to the filter room plotter.
c. Operating procedure
(1) The plotter plots the target as received from the operating crew.
(2) The logs any additional information as to number of aircraft, altitude, and identification received from the operating crew.
(3) The plotter converts the target to grid coordinates and calls them to the recorder who enters them in his log.
(4) The teletype operator will send the information from the recorders log without the preliminary call up.
(5) The operator will receipt for the report by sending an "R" and then call the information to the filter room plotter over his head and chest set.
(6) Each report will start a new line and the receipts for each will appear on the end of the same line.
(7) Should several stations be netted and the traffic become heavy the operator at the communications room will designate a reporting order for the radio station
(8) The reporting sequence is the same as that described for telephone.
73. GENERAL
a. The first grid plotting board is operated by one plotter- converter. At the radar station the plotter, who is a member of the radar operating team, gets his information from the same operator and azimuth teller, if the latter is used on the team. He tells the false grid information to the recorder. At the filter room, the converter is a member of the plotting platoon. He gets the false grid plots from the radio operator, and tells the true grid plots to the filter room plotter.
74. EQUIPMENT
a. Radar station off the early warning type has a wooden plotting board with the true grid and azimuth circle printed on it. A range arm is fastened to the board at the center of the circle. The false grid is overlaid on the board. The plotter converter plots the true grid and reads the false grid.
b. Radar Station of the GCI type must use an illuminated board since the operating room is blacked out. >[> c. The filter room uses the same equipment as the radar station early warning type. His procedure is to plot on the false grid and read the true grid to the filter room plotter.
75. MESSAGE CENTER PERSONNEL
a. The message center personnel will operate under the direction of the Adjutant and will consist of the following personnel.
Message Center Chief Senior enlisted specialist
Code and Authentication Clerk
Messengers
The following listed personnel are not included in the message center personnel list but must work in close coordination with the message center in order to accomplish the mission of handling of messages in the minimum amount of time, employing the proper means of communication to each message and finally obtaining the greatest accuracy, security and speed.
Radio Operators
Operators of Panels, Flags, Lamps, etc
Telegraph operators
Telegraph printer operators.
76. OUTGOING MESSAGES
a. Message center chief
(1) Receives message from writer, scans message for legibility, sufficient address, signature and form in general.
(2) Enters "time filed", "message center number" and "how sent" on message form in the appropriate place
(3) Draws diagonal line through next unused number on the numbers wheel, and enters on line after the number the following remarks concerning message: From-To-How sent-Urgency classifica- tion.
(4) The duplicate, (or if no duplicate, a skeleton copy) is filed in the live file of the unit to which the message is addressed.
(5) If the message must be encoded before transmission, he hands the message to the code and authentication clerk.
(6) Receives serviced original message from operator and files in dead file of unit to which message is sent then destroys duplicate in live file.
(7) Completes X mark on number sheet
b. Authentication and Code clerk.
(1) If message is in the clear he determines the authenticator according to the system being used and places it in the correct location on the message if the message is in the clear. he then disposes of it by giving it to the operator of the means concerned.
(2) I message is to be encoded he encodes message making one copy of encoded message.
(3) He is very careful in encoding to repeat all entries made by the chief on top line of message form and replaces the address, signature, urgency classification and operating instructions from the clear message by placing the radio operators heading below the word "Message" on the message form such as AB1 V CD2 Y O
(4) When encoded he determines the authenticator and gives the completed message to the operator of the means selected.
(5) He services the original clear message which has been encoded by writing "Encoded" followed by his initials or personal sign.
(6) He places the serviced original message which has been encoded in the "Clear " file
c. Operator of the means selected.
(1) Completes radio heading as begun by code and authentication clerk or places radio heading at top of message form.
(2) Transmits, obtains receipt, and services message by placing his personal sigh and time of receipt in a clear place at bottom of the message form
(3) Returns serviced message to chief.
77. INCOMING MESSAGES
a. Operator of means which the message was received.
(1) Copies incoming message in duplicate and services
(2) Sends both copies to code and authentication clerk
b. Code and Authentication clerk
(1) Receives message in duplicate from operators or a single copy and skeleton from the chief.
(2) Determines the correct authenticator according to the system being used and compares this value with that shown on message
(3) If the message had the correct authenticator on it, the word "Authenticated" will be written or stamped plainly on both copies of the message or if the message did not have the correct authenticator on it the phrase "not Authenticated" will be written on both copies of the message. he then gives the duplicate or a skeleton to the message chief
(4) If the message is in code he decodes the message making one copy of clear message, using the retained original message
(5) When decoding he repeats the radio call up and station serial number on the clear message. Replacers remainder of the radio heading by inserting address, designation of sender, urgency classification, and operating instructions in correct place on clear message. he reports the authentication on the clear message.
(6) He sends the single clear message which has been decoded to the chief who time stamps it "in"
(7) If the message is in the clear he authenticates it and gives it to the chief who time stamps it "in"
c. Message center chief.
(1) Receives single copy of incoming messages by local, special or scheduled messenger from other message center or pigeon loft or ground panel.
(2) He time stamps such message in blank space and makes a skeleton
(3) He sends the original and skeleton to the authentication and code clerk for authentication
(4) In the case of a code message he receives duplicate of skeleton from the authentication and code clerk which he time stamps and files in the live file
(5) Dispatches message by messenger on local delivery list listing message center designation at the top, showing the message on the list by number, by time stamping the delivery list "out"
(6) Dispatches local message with delivery list and message
(7) Local messenger delivers message to addressee, obtaining signature and time of receipt on the delivery list
(8) Messenger initials and returns list to chiefs
(9) Chief receives completed delivery list and takes corre- sponding duplicate short skeleton from live file staples or clips the two together, and files in the deaf file of the unit from which the message came
d. The messenger delivers the message to the addressee, obtaining the signature and time of receipt on the delivery list. Initials and returns to chief
78. RELAYED MESSAGE
a. Operator
(1) Receives and copies message in duplicate, services and sends both copies to the chief
(2) Receives message to be relayed from the code and authentica- tion clerk if message has been re-authenticated or encoded, and transmits it (3) Services message which has been transmit- ted and returns it to the chief
b. Message Center Chief
(1) Receives message to be relayed in duplicate from the operator or receives single copy of message from scheduled or special messenger which is to be relayed. Makes skeleton copy of single copy messages
(2) Time stamps the message indicates the means it is to be relayed with and places duplicate or skeleton copy in live file of unit from which the message came
(3) If the message must be re-authenticated before transmission the original is handed to the authentication and code clerk or if clear message is to be transmitted by radio it is handed to the authentication nd code clerk
(4) He receives completed delivery list from the messenger if message was dispatched by messenger and removes duplicate or skeleton from the live file, places delivery list and the duplicate or skeleton together in the dead file or receives serviced copy of message from the operators, files it in the dead file, and destroy duplicate or skeleton which is in the live file if transmitted by other means.
c. Code and Authentication clerk
(1) Never decodes relayed messages
(2) Encodes message received in clear text to be transmitted by radio exactly as in an outgoing message being extremely careful to show for the benefit of the operator the retransmission instruc- tions necessary to route the message to its destination
(3) Determines the authenticator according to the system being used and places it in the correct location on the message
(4) Disposes of message sent by messenger by sending back to chiefs or by sending to operator or means selected, other then messenger
79. TECHNICAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES NOT INCLUDED IN THIS PUBLICATION
a. Certain procedures are not provided for in this publication because they are prescribed by the War Department or are included in other tentative manuals. For reference the are as follows Filtering Procedure--Chapter IV " Radar Filterer's Manual" Hq AAF AW Drafting Procedure--"Tentative Drafting manual for Aircraft Warning Hq" 4th Tng Bn G.O. Filter Room-- "Standing Orders for Fixed Ground Observer Filter Centers" Hq AAF Radar Filter Room--"Standing Orders for Radar Filter Rooms" Hq AAF SOP for SCR-588__"Tentative Operating Procedure for Radio Set SCR- 588" Hq AAF SOP for SCR-602--"Tentative Operating Procedure for Radio Set SCR- 602" Hq AAF SOP for SCR-270--"Tentative Operating Procedure for Radio Set SCR- 270" Hq AAF Performance Test Procedure "Section IV Radar Performance Testing Manual" Hq AAF Siting Procedure--"Siting of Radar Equipment" AAFSAT Radar RCM Procedure--"Radio Counter-measures on Air Defense" AAFSAT SCR-270 Log--"TM 11-1310 equipment Performance Log Instruction Book" WD SCR270 Installation, Maintenance Procedure "TM 121-1117D" WD RC150 Installation Operation and Maintenance "TM 11-1117 WD
80. GENERAL
a. The organization of a motor column depends primarily on the tactical and traffic conditions likely to effect its movement. The main column may be organized into serials and march units to facilitate column control. the management of the main column is handled by the column commander, assisted by the column trail officer, commanders of serial and march units, and such traffic control personnel as may be posted along the route. Necessary ambulances and medical personnel and necessary maintenance vehicles, equipment and personnel, accompany the column to care for march casualties. Detached parties, operating apart from the main column, are detailed to perform special duties in connection with the march. Such parties may be provided by a higher headquarters for general assistance to several columns, or they may be detailed from the march column itself. Often it will be possible to combine one or more of the groups indicated below. When so combined, they are collectively referred to as the advance party
81. COMMAND
a. Movements of organically motorized tactical units are made under the direction and supervision of the senior commander in the column.
b. Motorized columns carrying organic equipment, and supplies likewise move under the command of the senior officer, or non- commissioned officer present in the column and each individual vehicle is commanded by the senior officer or man riding therein
c. Movements of troops or supplies in non-organic vehicles are in the absence of orders to the contrary, commanded by the senior line officer present. In this case the motor transport officer accompanying the vehicles acts only as a technical advisor to the commanding officer of troops. However, if the troop or supply movement is being handled by the staff of a higher headquarters as part of a large move, command arrangements are as follows:
(1) The motor transport units are organized, staffed, and a commander of troops and a convoy commander are designated by higher headquarters ordering the move.
(2) The convoy commander designated by such orders is responsi- ble both for the technical operations of vehicles and for the movement of the column. Orders to convoy operating personnel in this case are given only by the convoy commander and his assis- tants.
(3) The commander of troops exercise no control over the movement of the convoy or of individual vehicles, except in a tactical situation, then the decision rests sole with him. the troop commander is in all situations responsible for the adminis- tration and discipline of the troops being transported.
(4) Whenever a tactical situation can be anticipated, the seniors combat troop commander will be placed in command of the convoy, the motor transport acting as his technical advisor.
d. The following are the officers exercising control of the movement
(1) Column commander is the senior officer with the column or the person designated by him to exercise command
(2) Control officer is an officer designated by the column commander, who rides in the central car, normally at the head of the column and regulates the march. Upon occasion he may direct the load truck to regulate the march and may and should, drop out of the column to observe the march, and double banking the column police the same with reference to speed, distance, discipline and the like
(3) Trail officer rides in the trail car, at the rear of the column or element thereof, usually is the Motor Maintenance officer. He polices the column from the park to the IP and supervises the initial movements thereto. During the march he:
(a) Inspects disabled vehicles and decides whether to repair them on the spot, or take them in tow
(b) Reports location of tail of column to control officer when called on to do so.
(c) Notes infractions of march discipline and takes immediate corrective action
(d) Prevents vehicles of either column from passing from the rear whenever this operation presents a traffic hazard.
(e) When the column halts he posts the necessary guards, warning flags, lights or flares to warn traffic approaching from the rear
(f) In case of a disabled vehicle not possible to take in tow, he is responsible that all traffic precautions are taken or displayed and carefully notes locations for report to column commander for future wrecking or salvage operations.
(g) Prior to the beginning of the search he thoroughly familiar- ized himself with the route, including detours and alternate routes. Provided himself with all data, maps, etc., procurable and in the event that an element or elements of the column become lost, he reorganizes the same without delay and assumes command thereof proceeding to the prescribed destination or rejoining the column, at which time he resumes his normal post and duties
82. PLANNING AND PREPARATION
a. The running of a successful convoy requires careful planning and a constant supervision on the part of the officer in charge. A successful convoy is one which clears the IP at the exact time prescribed in the orders and reaches its destination without accident or loss of time, vehicles, personnel or equipment, and having arrived at the destination, moves off the highway in a prompt and orderly manner to areas or lanes previously selected and marked. With a number of vehicles traveling on the road, much time and money (in gasoline, `etc) can be lost not to mention complete fumbling of the tactical situation, should the convoy run out of gasoline or go astray. Days may possible be required to obtain the needed supply. therefore careful planning is imperative if there is to be andy certainty that the convoy movement will run smoothly. All the care and skill of the planning officer (that time permits) is well spent.
83. PREPARATIONS
a. Check that you have competent drivers and that they are familiar with the type of vehicle they are assigned to drive and that an assistant driver is assigned to each vehicle
b. Assign the best driver to the lead position, since improper driving of the lead truck will prevent even good drivers in the rear trucks from doing a good job.
c. Check all vehicles before starting
(1) Mechanical faults in engine, brakes, battery, generator, windshield wipers, lights (especially trailer and stop lights), trailer couplings and safety clips
(2) Check gasoline, water, oil and air on all vehicles. Include spare tires
(3) Check for a full complement of tools in each truck, including winch shear pins
(4) Check all vehicles for lubrication, include inspection of the rear and transfer cases, grease cups, etc
(5) check fire extinguisher
d. Pick the route and overnight stops with care
(1) The route and other pertinent data will probably be prescribed in the march or Warning Order, together with maps or march gear. Study this data carefully and obtain clarification of anything not entirely understood
(2) If you do not know the route well, select a capable and experienced reconnaissance officer to go over the prescribed route and at least the alternate route, in time to return, if possible, at least one full day before the start of the march
(3) Obtain all information possible on condition of the roads and bridges, etc. from any units which have recently traveled the proposed route. Particular emphasis should be placed on the location and character of road blocks, time distance between various points marking off distinct sections of route, and types, conditions and widths of surface including shoulders.
(4) Pick overnight stops whenever possible at military posts, camps, stations or bivouac areas, since obtaining supplies is much easier in such locations
(5) When military establishments are not on the route and overnight stops are necessary, carefully study the terrain and determine the terrain features on the map that will help prevent stopping at an unsuitable location.
(6) Do not try to cover too much ground in any single day, since fatigue of drivers is extremely dangerous. Three hundred miles is a practical maximum on good roads, and, under the same conditions, 250 miles is average. With poor roads and inexperi- enced drivers, considerably less mileage must be expected
(7) Knowledge of the following will be of inestimable value
(a) Limiting features (clearance widths and heights and culverts and underpasses
(b) Location of turnouts for concealment, cover or protection from hostile attacks (mechanized or air), turn around facilities, detours, by-passes around congested areas, bottlenecks, possible ambush sites and road blocks.
(c) Maximum gradients and length of steep hills, condition of fords, etc., and an estimate of pioneer engineer work necessary as well as the time, equipment, material and personnel involved.
(d) Location and characteristics of mines and contaminated areas, and estimate of personnel, equipment and materials required for neutralization or decontamination.
(e) Data on at least one alternate route, if the movement is over any considerable distance, to the same destination
(f) Secure gasoline credit cards if travel is to be performed in the Continental limits. In other areas, be sure that there will be gas supplies at various points along the route, and whenever possible notify the supply depots of your arrival in advance. Where gas supply is impossible, be sure that sufficient gas is carried in the convoy. Figure into the expected mileage a surplus supply to cope with any unexpected situations.
(g) Obtain instruction from the finance officer in regard to emergency procurement.
(h) Make the last truck in the convoy a maintenance truck, and have extra oil, gas, water, small parts, first aid kit, tools, tow chain and any wrecking tools available.
(i) If the first stop is to be a military post, camp or station notify the commanding officer of such an establishment on the preceding day by radio, telegraph of your arrival, stating the number of officers and men, whether quarters and mess are desired, the type and number of such meals, the expected time of your arrival and whether large amounts of supplies (such as gasoline) are required. All this will aid in the obtaining what you need when you arrive.
(j) Instruct the personnel of the last truck of their mainte- nance duties. <[> 84. MOVEMENT
(a) Halts for rest stops should be made 15 minutes at the end of the first hour and 10 minutes at the end of every two hours thereafter. Refer to reconnaissance report for determination of rest stops in congested areas and adjust halts accordingly
(b) Switch drivers at each stop, if sufficient drivers are available. Rest stops should not be made in congested areas due to lack of latrine facilities and the traffic problems generally caused by parking. Pick a suitable spot for the lunch stop, in the shade when possible. Post guards on the convoy and in a theater of operation disperse the vehicles for protection from air attack
(c) The lead vehicle must travel at the speed of the slowest truck. The lead truck must not slacken speed going down all but the steepest hills, as the heavier trucks need the additional speed in order to negotiate the next rise without excessive shifting of gears.
(d) Ride the lead truck on the shoulder of the road several times, to be sure that the shoulder is not too soft for the heavier vehicles. Do this prior to each stop. Avoid parking on a hill or curve unless the vehicles can be pulled well off the road. Do not park on approaches to bridges or other places where traffic may be tied up due to congestion. When going through congested areas, clear the intervals between vehicles and reduce speed. Request police escort through large cities. Have men refrain from giving destination, type and organization of the convoy in their conversa- tions with civilians encountered along the route. Such conversa- tions should be held to a minimum. When necessary, stop the lead at intersections, and without stopping the convoy eave the convoy in the right direction.
(e) Check all suspicious bridges for load carrying capacity. If the owner of the toll bridge refuses passage to the convoy, show the order, unless secret and instruct him to charge the cost of the toll to the authority shown on the orders. Should this fail, let the situation govern the action. Armed force is never to be resorted to in the con>tinental limits or friendly country but such things as stopping traffic on the road by having the convoy parked at the bridge entrance will often suffice. Such methods are to be resorted to only after all normal methods fail. When necessary to drive through water, drive very slowly. Report all accidents and obtain the names and statements of all witnesses.
(f) Stopping at a post overnight
(1) Send a truck ahead whenever possible to make final arrangements.
(2) On arriving at the post gate , call up the adjutant for instructions to where to park, mess and quarters.
(3) Call the officer of the Day if the adjutant is not to be found
(6) Arrange to mess as near the normal mess time as possible and request the type and number of noon lunches required.
(7) If the men are to arise the following morning for a long trip, do not allow them to go to town at night and order an early lights out.
(8) If the next days trip is long, leave as early as possible in order to get the maximum number of daylight driving hours.
83. MAINTENANCE AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
a. Have a good maintenance man ride in the maintenance truck. This truck is to stop whenever a vehicle drops out of the convoy.
b. The towing of a vehicle for long distance is a difficult and dangerous job. It is hard on both drivers and trucks. Make every effort to repair inoperative vehicles on the spot where the breakdown occurs.
c. Do not stop the convoy when a vehicle drops out since in most cases the trouble is minor and quickly repaired. If, after inspection of the damaged vehicle, it is found impossible to make the necessary repairs, put the load onto the remaining trucks of the convoy. Abandonment applies only to vehicles other than radar vans.
d. It is essential that sufficient precautions be taken to safeguard against the possibility of convoy operations as well as other emergency.
(1) In hostile country, have the assistant driver a Thompson sub-machine gun man, with the stock removed. This latter will allow for easy operation in the cramped quarters of a truck cab
(2) In case of an air raid, disburse the trucks as widely as possible, then have the men leave the trucks and disperse them- selves.
(3) When parking in dangerous country, set up weapons in strategic positions and have those manned at all times.
(4) After a gas attack, have all portions of the trucks that men came in contact with decontaminated and if possible, decontami- nate the entire truck and its contents to reduce the fumes.
(5) During a blackout, drive very slowly and very close together. Drivers must be instructed never to show other than blackout lights, under any conditions. Under very difficult conditions have a men walking in front of each truck or riding a fender to aid the driver.
(6) During bad weather, drive slowly and when necessary use chains. Have a winch truck or two near the head of the column to "snake" the vehicles across the bad spots in the road, etc.
86. OPERATIONAL RADAR SITE
a. The position of the radar, within the designated area is the first priority, inasmuch as the characteristics of the Radar equipment over certain terrain conditions requires extended and definite consideration of antenna site position. The Radar Platoon Commander will make his own selection of the site and bivouac within the area designated by the tactical plan.
b. Beginning at the time that the platoon is released to the command of the RPC at either a Control Point on Motor March, or an assembly area, or at an Operational position, and the RPC is ordered to occupy bivouac within a defined area, he becomes in effect the Officer in Charge of the Motor march column and he is responsible for the movement of his command in accordance with SOP for Motor Convoy. In addition he is responsible to make disposi- tion of his various components and personnel to achieve the best possible technical and tactical results from a standpoint of Operation, Security, Defense, Camouflage, Supply and Communica- tions.
87. RECONNAISSANCE
a. The Commanding Officer makes a reconnaissance for the purpose of selecting and exploring the route from the point where the platoon was released to him to the area designated for bivouac. He also selects the best location in the area for cover, defense, security, shelter and evacuation.
b. He will sketch a plan showing the route of ingress from the last main highway, with location of prominent land marks and speedometer mileage to cross roads, road junctions, orientation etc., in sufficient detail and scale to serve as a guide map for one not familiar with the terrain to find the bivouac. He will show on the sketch the location of the various components of the platoon such as the Radar vans, antenna, Radio units, mess, supply, headquarters, medical aid station, heavy weapon emplacements, BAR, shelter areas for personnel, road circulation, observation and alert gaud posts, documentation stations and alarms. He will also sketch the location of and route to alternate site, details of which should be completely prepared not later than the day following actual occupation of the present bivouac.
88. LOCATION OF ARMAMENT
a. The location of armament is based upon the reconnaissance of the ground bearing in mind the approaches available to the enemy, vulnerability of the position to mechanized attack, field of fire and final protective lines of automatic weapons, and available of the machine guns and anti-aircraft fire, remembering the Machine gun is capable of defense against mechanized attack as well as antis aircraft.
89. PRIORITY
a. The priority of vehicles in the convoy so that they may pull into the area in the order needed as follows
b. Signs and stakes will have been placed to mark the positions of the various components. Guides have been assigned to lead the several components to their positions. Plans will have been made for the use of the wrecker and winch trucks which road conditions etc adverse to the movement into the bivouac area.
c. Normally, the bivouac will be occupied during the dark hours, generally just before daylight following a night movement. Therefore the first action after rolling into the area with each element in its designated position will be the quick and efficient camouflage of all vehicles, installations and personnel. During this time the area guard has been posted. Following this in order of priority will be:
(1) Dig in by constructing slit trenches around all operational positions and fox holes near quarters. Care will be taken to insure that this operation does not destroy camouflage security
(2) Dig in emplacements for machine guns including slit trenches for operating personnel
(3) Dig in fox holes for automatic weapons
(4) Put Radar into operation and install Radio
(5) Sand bag equipment
(6) Lay defensive wire
(7) Install Administrative communications
d. All protective measures will be installed before any thought is given to sleep or mess. When sufficient progress has been made to offer security to personnel installation of mess, supply and headquarters facilities may be worked concurrently with the installation of the Radar and Radio utilizing the various specialists in their own function.
90. OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER SITE
a. The Commanding Officer Headquarters Company will be responsible for the protection and local security of the Control center and Battalion Headquarters as well as his own company headquarters
b. Upon the alarm signifying the approach of enemy, all headquarters personnel will report on the double to previously prepared positions for the defense of the area. This plan will work in coordination with the troop commanders of other branches in the vicinity of the control center. Plotting functions will cease upon direct order of the officer in Charge of the Control Center only. Defensive measures will be necessarily based upon the utilization of small arms. The priority of vehicles will be as follows:
c. Order of priority for installation will be
All defensive and protective measures will be installed before any thought is given to slee sufficient progress has been made to insure security to personnel and installation of the of the mess, supply and headquarters facilities may be worked concurrently with the installation of the Plotting and Radio equipment utilizing the various specialists in their own functions.
92. TEMPORARY BIVOUAC
a. All functions in a temporary bivouac will be the same as in an operational bivouac except that the technical equipment will not be set up with execution of administrative radio
90. RADAR PLATOON, HEAVY
a. Orders for the movement of a Reporting platoon may normally be expected to specify that the unit is to remain in operation until a given time and be ready to move at a given time after. If so, the Platoon Commander has some additional time to prepare the other actions of his command for the move. However an order or the tactical situation may necessitate a movement at any time. The following preparations will effectuate a rapid movement with a minimum of confusion.
(1) Assemble Officers, Warrant Officers, and key NCO's
(2) Acquaint them with the orders, time of movement, availabil- ity of transportation, and whether it is to be a complete move or a shuttle.
(3) Direct the Warrant Officer to disassemble the radar and prepare it for movement using the Radar crew on duty at the time of the disassembly, assisted by one other crew
(4) If a complete move, direct the administrative officer to lead the mess, supply and headquarters material and impedimenta so as to not interrupt normal operation until shutdown. For these functions he will employ the mess, supply and administrative personnel. If a shuttle movement he will split the overhead personnel so as to maintain such facilities at both positions as are necessary
(5) Direct the Platoon Sergeant to take charge of filling and marking of latrines, filling of fox-holes, and police the area, camouflaging the abandoned installations. For this function he will employ the remaining operating crew.
(6) Direct the Radio Chief to disassemble and pack the radio equipment and pick up the wire using the radio personnel
(7) Direct the Senior Medical Aid to check the sanitary conditions and report back the condition before the area is evacuated.
(8) After final inspection assures the platoon commander that the readiness for movement is completed according to plan he gives the order to move.
b. If the movement is a shuttle the Platoon Commander will accompany the forward echelon with the Warrant Officer and such overhead personnel as are necessary plus one of the operating crews and half the radio operators. The Supply Sergeant and the Mess sergeant will go in the first echelon. The Administrative Officer and the Platoon 'Sergeant will stay with the rear echelon. The supply sergeant will accompany the shuttle vehicles back so as to report to the Administrative officer any requirements or special arrangements that are necessary due to the move. The Administra- tive Officer will then lead the remainder of the equipment and personnel and complete the move.
94. RADAR SECTION LIGHT
a. Normally the light radar section will move intact. The operating crews will load the radar, the mess personnel will load the mess equipment and rations and the radio operators will load the radio equipment and pick up the wire. The preparation to move will involve the same general plan as the heavy radar.
96. BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
a. Each staff action will be responsible to move the equipment pertaining to his own section. The s-4 will furnish the necessary transportation.
97. COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
a. Normally, Company Headquarters will be superimposed on one of its platoons and will move with that platoon. In case of shuttle movement, the Commanding Officer will go with the first echelon and the Supply Officer with the rear echelon.
98. GROUND OBSERVER POSTS
a. Normally, Ground Observers will move by nets. All personnel in one net will move together. This is because of the limited range of their equipment, since when one moves it looses contact with the relay station. If movement is by foot each post will move forward in squad columns with the squad leader at the head.
99. RADAR EQUIPMENT
a. Before equipment is destroyed in the combat area, the Platoon Commander must make a quick estimate of the tactical situation to determine the necessity for destruction. If the equipment is to be destroyed, the following equipment will be destroyed by the persons indicated.
b. The Administrative officer will keep a 5 gallon can of gasoline in the close proximity to the storage area of restricted and classified documents. Burn each sheet separately, crumpling it if the time allows. Saturate, with gasoline, and ignite from a distance of 6 feet.
c. The power man on the shift will destroy the engine, generator, rectifier with an ax, smashing the magnets, carburetor, distributor, with a sledge. Cracking the head and block with a sledge. Destroy all meters wit a pick or sledge. Brake off commutators on all alternators with a chisel and hammer. Saturate several fused termite bombs on the engine head of each engine and on the generators and alternators. Fire the gasoline. If there is a rectifier unit in the power van smash all the meters in the unit, open a hole in the case with an ax and set off the gasoline by tossing a hand grenade into the hole. For the destruction of the power unit, the power man will be assisted by one operating crew.
d. Large installations such as antennae for radars will be destroyed by using one half pound packages of nitro-starch. Tied to the framework the selsen motors, drive meters and the base and midpoint of the tower. Telephone and telegraph equipment will be destroyed by crushing. All test instruments and meters in the maintenance van will be smashed and the drawers emptied out on the floor in a pile. The pile of parts will be smashed with a sledge and the entire van saturated with gasoline and ignited.
100. PLOTTING EQUIPMENT
a. Each plotter will remove his head and chest equipment and destroy the transmitter and receiver units by hammering. The telephone operator on duty will destroy the switchboard by hammering the front panel and shearing the switch handles. He will cut the cords and the wiring connected to the switchboard. The frameman on duty will destroy the mainframes by slashing the relays and wiring with an ax. He will then cut open the back side of the switchboard and destroy all circuit components with the ax. The Wire Chief will cut all the cords and cables and pile in a heap, saturate with gasoline and burn. All information will be cleared from the plotting boards and paint spilled over the surface. The tables and balconies will be piled in a heap and ignited by the Filter Officer.
101. MISSION
a. The mission of this plan is to reduce to a minimum the disruption of normal operations incident to any form of chemical attack likely to be projected on the field. The plan is intended to include measures deemed necessary for defense prior to attack, during attach, and after attack.
102. SITUATION
a. The area is susceptible to chemical attack both by spray and bomb.
103. DEFENSIVE PREPARATION
a. A map of the area will be kept up to date showing locali- ties of all gas alarms. The gas officer of each organization will be responsible for the location of suitable alarms in his area. In the case of the Radar Platoon, the second in command will be the Gas Officer.
b. Each unit will instruct men as gas sentries, and as soon as the first alarm is given the sentries will report the alarm, on the local alarms. In the case of isolated units the responsibility will rest with the second in command (who is the gas officer or non-commissioned officer). Personnel in charge of storage facilities and mess installations will immediately cover all food and other material.
c. Gas proof shelters not being available, officers and men will immediately put on gas masks at the first alarm and report to their prearranged positions, if they are members of decontaminating groups or will continue normal operations if they are not
104. DURING ATTACK
a. All orders from the gas officer or sentries will be obeyed immediately. Any violations will be reported to the Commanding Officer. The Gas Officer only will give the signal for the "All Clear". Any contaminated personnel will report immediately to the first aid station for treatment.
105. AFTER ATTACK
a. The gas officer and non-commissioned officer will reconnoi- ter their zones for she effect of gas. Each unit will have their decontamination personnel trained and will have available required material.
b. The Gas Officer will submit his findings to the Commanding Officer and priority instructions for decontamination will be given. The Gas Officer will supervise decontamination within their zones. All food and water will be inspected by the Medical Officer.
c. The Gas Officer will submit to the Commanding Officer a report consisting of the following
(1). Unit or units affected by the Chemical Attack
(2) Time, place and duration of the Chemical Attack.
(3) The meteorological conditions sat the time of the attack
(4) The Chemical agent used
(5) The number and type of aircraft and method of chemical dispersion
(6) The size and number of chemical bombs used
(7) The extent of area and facilities covered by the attack
(8) Area and facilities contaminated with persistent agents which are to be decontaminated or evacuated.
(9) The number and nature of casualties
(10) Any defects noted in chemical protection equipment or supplies
(11) Deficiencies noted in chemical defense plan
(12) Description of chemical material found
(13) Notation of samples of contaminated earth, duds, or unidentified objects forwarded
(14) Recommendations
106. GENERAL
a. Knowing that the enemy is capable of dropping paratroops and that he will try to put your site out of action, the platoon leader will make definite plans against paratroops landing.
b. He will place men on high ground, camouflaged to observe in all directions for paratroops. At the sight of paratroops he will blow three (3) long blasts on a whistle, repeated on vehicle horns or klaxtone thereby alerting the platoon. he will give the information to the Commanding Officer and continue to observe.
107. RADAR PLATOON
a. The Commanding Officer will quickly establish sufficient troops to cope with the situation. This group will move out to the area of the landing of enemy in a skirmish formation, scouts out and will take sufficient force to envelop their position. The area and roads will have been previously reconnoitered. It is necessary to attack before the enemy have a chance to form a defense. He will no doubt try to assemble under cover of woods, so a careful search must be made to assure that all have been put out of action.
b. The Platoon Commanding Officer will lead the attacking force. It is possible for paratroops to be dropped after darkness so every precaution must be taken to always be alerted for any attempted attack at the time, especially at dawn. Barbed wire entanglements will help defend the site.
c. The BAR man will move out in the attacking party. The .50 Cal machine gun crews will man the guns and be prepared to fire at planes or use the weapons for ground defense.
d. The radar and radio men on shift will remain with their equipment and continue operations. They will be prepared to destroy equipment on orders of the second in command or officer remaining with equipment in accordance with SOP "Destruction of Equipment"
108. PLOTTING PLATOON
a. The Commanding Officer of Headquarters Company will quickly assemble sufficient troops to cope with the situation. This force will be employed as in paragraph 107 a and b
b. The information center personnel and radio men on shift will remain with their equipment and continue operations. They will be prepared to destroy equipment on orders of the second in command or officer remain with the equipment in accordance with SOP "Destruction of Equipment"
109. GENERAL
a. The organization will be able to perform its primary mission even if certain equipment is required to be sacrificed. The major items of equipment which each platoon may sacrificed under this condition is listed below.
110. HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
a. Radio sets will be reduced in the communication room dy netting. Two radars will be netted into one FCS station. Each pair of ground observer relay stations will be netted into the FCS station. One net will still be used for each cross telling channel. The number of command sets will be reduced to one and the channels to the airports for the control of Company B will be netted to one NCS station. With this number of radio sets in use the remaining radio sets will be sacrificed and equal number of teletypewriters MSC188 will be sacrificed
b. If the requirement is stringent enough the entire wing operations room will be sacrificed including the AN/TM-1 and associated tentage and auxiliary equipment. This will only be done on direct order from the Air Commander.
c. All tentage used for purposes other than Radio and Information Center shelter will be sacrificed. All officer equipment and supplies other than the bare essentials will be sacrificed. One switchboard BD72 will be sacrificed. Fifty six (56) telephone sets EE-8a will be sacrificed. Tree (3) Converters M209 will be sacrificed. One company drafting set, one transit, one each of Unit equipment, second echelon set no 2,5 and 7, one- third of all GI Cans, Officers Mess equipment, all safes, and one Frequency Meter set SCR-2311 will be sacrificed
111. REPORTING COMPANIES
a. All office equipment and supplies other than the bare essentials will be sacrificed. All tentage, except the radio shelter will be sacrificed. Officers mess equipment, one switch- board BD72, All telephone EE8a except five per radar and two safes will be sacrificed.
112. GROUND OBSERVER COMPANIES
a. All office equipment and supplies other than the bare essentials will be sacrificed. All tentage, except the radio shelter will be sacrificed. Officers mess equipment, all large tools except tools in individual kits, one switchboard BD72 will be sacrificed. All telephone except five (5) per radar will be sacrificed. Two (2) safes will be sacrificed.
Following is the Standing Operating Procedure for the MEW Radar pertaining to FDP5 operated by the 738th Signal Air Warning Company and assigned to the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion. This procedure was written by the 19 TCG. I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1. To prescribe the organization, mission and employment of the MEW of this Group
II. ORGANIZATION
1. The MEW unit of this Group will consist of
a. Twenty-one (21) GCI( Ground Control Interception) Controllers; Technical and administrative personnel, as required by Signal Corps Tables of Organization for MEW's; at least two (2), preferably four (4) Direction-finding Crews; and three (3) or four (4) VHF Radio-Telephone crews, as required by Tactical Control Center operations.
b. Equipment will include a minimum of six (6) SCR-5734: a minimum of two (2) D/F SCR-575, which will be at the disposal of the MEW Controllers; Teletype facilities, including TG 7B; one complete ANTT/Q set for internal communications; Control plotting equipment as directed by the Signal Corps Section.
2. Personnel and Equipment may vary according to the requirements set forth by the Tactical Control Center and MEW Senior Controller and will be furnished by the 738th Signal Air Warning Company and other units of the 19th Tactical Control Group.
III. CAPABILITIES.
1. The MEW, under direction of the Tactical Control Center, is designed and organized to be of utmost assistance to all Allied aircraft in problems of Ground to Air Control. It will be expressly responsible for aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command, either in the offensive or defensive combat operations. Chief types of missions at the MEW are as follows;
a. Close support: The direction to and from the combat area or target of fighter or fighter bomber aircraft on close support missions shall be responsibility of the MEW Control on missions assigned to the unit.
b. Armed Reconnaissance: Armed reconnaissance for the destruction of the enemy or the protection of friendly troops. MEW will direct aircraft to any target of opportunity, any target assigned by TCC, or to any aircraft for the purpose of identifi- cation or destruction. The aircraft leader will be briefed in most cases, thus requiring only stand-by aid from the MEW controller.
c. Bomber Escort: When specified in field order or when directed by TCC, MEW will rendezvous fighters with their bomber formations at any location within range. The entire mission will be monitored by VHF in order to give E/A warnings, aid in naviga- tion if necessary and facilitate homing for any aircraft on such mission.
d. Fighter Sweeps: Offensive fighter sweeps deep in enemy territory will be controlled with every available facility to eliminate range handicaps. Squadron leaders will be advised when efficient control is no longer possible, and when warnings can no longer be given by VHF.
e. Enemy Aircraft Interceptions: Interceptions of enemy aircraft will be accomplished during all missions when identifi- cation is confirmed by the pilot. A Controller will not direct a pilot to attack any other aircraft unless full identification has been accomplished. A controller may direct his controlled flight to any suspected flight, depending on the requirements of the mission, but he may not direct the flight from its responsibilities or its objective. Night fighter missions will differ from the above in that MEW Controllers will intercept any unidentified aircraft in XIX Tactical Air Command area. All Fighter, Intruder, Gangster, and Photo missions run at night will be controlled by MEW and controllers will keep all flights identified. Positive identification is the responsibility of the night Fighter pilot.
f.Pin-point target bombing: Pin-point target bombing will be conducted in accordance with 19th TCG SOP for BACU units. MEW will rendezvous fighters for BACU mission, and monitor VHF channel to assist and coordinate such missions throughout the time of flight.
g. Reconnaissance Flights: Reconnaissance flights for weather information, enemy activity, photography, calibration, or any other military subject will be carried out at the request of TCC. Information will be gathered and passed to TCC. Degree of control to be exercised will depend on weather conditions and assistance needed.
h. Patrol: Patrols to protect of defend Allied property will be done ;under the direction of TCC by assignment.
i. Emergency Homing: An MEW Controller will be assigned to give emergency headings to any aircraft during all times the station is operational, Aircraft in distress, or "Mayday", will be given priority over all other types. The MEW will so arrange its facilities to be of greatest possible efficiency in handling any emergency operation. The controller may direct the aircraft ;to any location which is safest as determined by immediate and known conditions. The MEW Controller may dictate the emergency procedure of the aircraft, thereby taking exceedingly important responsibili- ty for all concerned.
j. Night Photo Missions: One MEW Controller will concentrate his full effort on Night Photo missions. He will identify each mission by track number on the plotting screen, will monitor channel and warn of unidentified aircraft in immediate area, and will take aircraft over targets, when requested to do so, advising exact moment to drop flash bombs and take photos.
k. Night Gangster Missions: MEW Controllers will have previously designated ground reference points and will take aircraft to any of these points or any number of miles on any azimuth from any of these points. Warnings will also be given of unidentified aircraft. All night aircraft will be steered around IAZ's whenever conditions warrant. In cases of emergency when aircraft must take shortest possible routes Controllers will notify AAA at TCC at once.
IV. ASSIGNMENT
1. The TCC Duty Senior Controller will issue all Control Orders and assignments to the MEW Duty Chief Controller. The most expeditious means of communication will be used for liaison between the TCC and EW Controllers. The TCC Controller will coordinate the MEW as follows:
a. At the time of assignment, pass full responsibility of aircraft control to the MEW Controller.
b. Notify the MEW of any important information in regard to:
(1) Change in Field Order Plans or assignment
(2) Stratus of weather, communications, aircraft, emergency field, available E/
(3) New or important targets in relation to the mission under MEW Control.
(4) Emergency conditions and the TCC facilities available during such time.
(5) Relieve the MEW of mission responsibility in case of quipment failure.
V. CONTROL PROCEDURE
1. At the MEW, all elements of control during operational hours will be under the complete jurisdiction of the chief controller on duty. MEW personnel and equipment will be at the MEW Controller's disposal for the greatest possible control efficiency.
2. The Duty Chief Controller will plan and execute all the facilities of the MEW station so that every phase of control can be brought to use during any mission. A mission, depending on its type, requirements and objective, will be carried out to the best of his ability and at his discretion in relation to controlling. He will consider the following items in acceptance and control of any mission.
a. Possess she latest information on aircraft involved, including bases, weather, targets, maps, field orders, and communication.
b. Communicate with the mission flight leader at the earliest moment of VHF allowance, establish the correctness of the mission, and give any changes in pre-planned orders.
c. Find and follow the flight from its base, to its desti- nation, and home, on the visual scope of Radar. Use D/F, IF or any other method of identification of fixing available to maintain the position and track throughout the mission.
d. Advise the flight leader, or pilot concerned, of dangerous weather conditions, flack areas over the target or course, E/A plots as given by TCC and, stand by to navigate the pilot, by vector or any position or area requested.
e. Keep the flight oriented, notify the leader when his flight is off course or target, and be prepared to home emergency aircraft at any time during the attack. He may advise the flight of the proximity to a safe area, and their steer to base, giving the distance in minutes of flying time.
f. The Controller will aid the flight on its return trip by checking their position frequently, giving steers as requested, advising of IAZ areas during late flights, and notifying the leader or pilot of his entrance into friendly lines.
g. All Controllers will observe the important elements of R/T conversation concerning:
(1) Military security
(2) Clarity and security of information
(3) Channel priorities during emergency.
h. The MEW Chief Controller may refuse to accept responsi- bility for the safety or success of any mission if he deems it impossible or impractical such as:
(1) Mechanical failure
(2) Power failure
(3) "Jamming" scope failure
(4) Subordinate equipment failure.
The TCC Controller will be immediately notified of any limitation which will affect the controlled mission, and he will reassign or so arrange the mission so that it can be controlled.
3. The items set forth in Par 2, Sec V, must be considered as policy suggestions and not as set rules. An MEW Controller must consider every possible control point, and may pattern his method of control, of R/T, or of mission direction to fit whatever situation may arise. He must be aware of all conditions pertaining to the aircraft under his control and consider them as his responsibility. The Communications at the Controllers command must be available and clear for use to successfully complete any controlled mission.
VI. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF CONTROLLER
1. He will have all positions, necessary to efficient control manned by capable personnel.
2. He will not issue orders other than operational instruc- tions nor will he reprimand individual members of the crew: he will issue all his communications through the crew chief or Filter Officer on duty.
3.He will keep all controlled flights identified on the plotting screen so that they may be told to the TCC as such.
VII. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL CONTROLLERS
1. Before taking over from the off going controllers they will thoroughly acquaint themselves with all operations in progress or pending.
2. In the event of the off going controllers having any aircraft under control, they will not be handed over to the relieving controllers, until they are convinced that the latter are thoroughly conversant with all details concerning the aircraft and the control of them, and the operations in which they are engaged.
3. Prior to operations, time permitting, all controllers will study the front line situation, flack areas and plan of attack as displayed on the maps of the army liaison officer.
VIII. D/F BEARING AND FIXES
1. The D/F station at this control station will be crystallized on the channels where they are most needed. Watch will be maintained to insure that all possible fixes are coming from the TCC and/or the status fixer board, and that those are being properly and quickly displayed on the tote board provided for this purpose. Two men of each crew will be specialists on the D/F tote board.
IX. VHF COMMUNICATIONS AND FM NETS
1. See memo 160-50 SOP XIX TAC
2. Responsibilities of R/T monitors
a. 11 VHF radio channels will be maintained and R/T logged on forms provided. Abbreviations may be used but it is of great importance that all logs can be read and understood. Times must be entered in column provided in all cases.
b. Everything said over every channel should be logged. All messages from one flight to another, intercom must be logged so far as possible without interfering with logging of messages between ground and air.
X. IFF PROCEDURE
1. See 100-45, SOP Mark III IFF, XIX TAC
A word about the siting of Radar. The Radar's all had to locate themselves on the ground in terms of the grid coordinate. The coordinate was arrived at mainly from large scale maps on which one can usually spot where you are to within 50 meters on a map with a scale of 1/250,000 and to within 2 meters on a 1/10,00
scale when they were available. Sometimes maps of 1/100,000 and 1/25,000 were available when there was no maps of a scale of 1/10,000 available. Units were also furnished a French Army Artillery terrain feature guide which had the locations of church steeples, road crossings and other features surveyed in to within a fraction of a centimeter. When you were lucky enough to be near one of these the coordinate could be calculated by measuring the distance or pacing it off. All units were also furnished with a surveyors transit to aid in getting accurate directions and distances from known points.
Another use of the transit was to measure the angle of height of obstacles surrounding the radar location. This was necessary in order to get an estimate of the expected range of the radar when in this site. The obstacles were usually lines of trees, hills and mountains. If the obstacles were too high they would shut off radar radio waves and prevent the radar from seeing low flying aircraft. Also when controlling aircraft an obstacle would limit the distance you could follow the aircraft when it was flying at a given altitude.
Anyone who is spotting or following aircraft has to consider the curvature of the earth. For example if the radar had a range of 100,000 yards out (about 57 miles) then the aircraft would have to be at an elevation of about 2,000 feet or higher before it could be seen. To make this more complicated if there were about one degree of obstacles in front of the radar then there would be another 5,000 feet added and the aircraft would have to be over 7,000 feet altitude to be seen. The attached charts show the effect of curvature of the earth. Anotheion above sea level. For one thing the higher the site is above the terrain over which the air will be observed then the further you can see because this elevation negates the effect of curvature of the earth. Locating at a higher elevation has one more benefit and that is the radio communications which is usually line of site can go further and therefore the radar site can be longer distances from the TCC. There is also a problem that usually
goes with a high elevation site and that is that you start getting ground echoes of hills and mountains further. When following an aircraft and that aircraft passes through one of these ground echoes he is completely lost to the radar until he emerges from the ground echo locality and this leaves the pilot exposed to unknowns during this period.
Following is the Report on the SCR-582 by Lt. Robert A. Homan to the MIT Radiation Labs in Cambridge, Mass. This is the field operation report on unit SCR-582 Mark III, serial No 7, which was the unit assembled by Lt. Homan and Lt. Wetherill in Cambridge and assigned to the 563rd Signal AW Battalion for operations. The report is dated 14 November 1944.
"During the first two months of operation in the field some major troubles were experienced with SCR-582 but since then only minor faults have occurred.
The only injury in transit has been a broken pin on one of the high voltage rectifiers. The spark gap and T-R box have been the main source of trouble. However, a large part of the spark gap trouble was not the fault of the gap itself, but of the power unit. The gap will operate satisfactory at 59 cps to 62 cps, but is very sensitive to variations in frequency. The PE95 power units are satisfactory when new, but after a few hundred hours become very difficult to keep from varying slightly, even with no change in load. The reversible A-C Azimuth motor makes this condition worse because of the heavy starting current. The design of the gap does not tend toward ease of adjustment. Very Little adjustment can be made without removing the complete cap assembly. Experience on this unit and unit no 9 has shown ;that the T-R box must be kept polished for it to give proper operation. The sharpness of the stub tuning gives a good indication of its condition. The percentage of bad T-R tubes has
been much higher than was to be expected.
The following is a report in chronological order of the major troubles.
At 137 hours the T-T box and tube were replaced and a Chaffee type mixer was installed, replacing the pound type double barrel mixer. Crystals burned out immediately except when minimum R-F coupling was used. The T-R tube appeared to be operating properly. A 200K, 1/2 Watt resistor was placed to stop oscillations should they be present. This did not change the operation. Another T-R tube was installed, but it failed to fire. A third T-R tube was installed and proper operation was obtained. Maximum F-F coupling could be employed and operations appeared to be slightly improved.
At 176 hours the fuse blew out on the A/R unit. Resistors R34 and R35 burned out because of a shorted winding in the main transformer. This unit was one of the two containing unpotted main transformers. A potted transformer was installed and R34 and R35 replaced. Satisfactory operation was resumed.
For some time after this trouble was experienced with tubes going bad. This trouble finally cleared up and for the past two months no trouble has been experienced with the A/R unit except for markers as noted later.
At approximately 400 hours the efficiency of the set dropped although the echo box ringing time and meter reading were normal. The permanent echoes were poor and very few targets were being picked up. Maintenance which could be performed while still keeping the set on the air as much as possible did not help. At 408 hours the set was taken off the air to find the trouble.
The crystal as tested and found to have a back to front ratio of 300 to 200 ohms. A new crystal with a ration of 5100 to 220 was installed. The T-R tube was firing and appeared to be normal. After 30 minutes operation the crystal ratio was 1800 to 220. Some drop is normal with a new crystal, and although this drop was somewhat high it was not considered too unreasonable.
The gain in Receiver no 14 was down so it was replaced with receiver no 13. Oscillations appeared on the scopes. Receiver no 18 from unit no 9 was installed but the oscillations persisted. it was then found that vibrating cable no 5 eliminated the oscilla- tions. Two loose connections were found in the Amphenol connector and were resoldered. This eliminated the oscillations. Receiver no 13 was reinstalled. Using the Signal Generator, Receiver no 13 and the pre amplifier were realigned. There was no noticeable improvement.
The A/R unit began operating spasmodically at this time. Four 6SN7 tubes and a 51K resistor were bad. These were replaced and the A/R unit operated properly.
The spinner table was found to be loose so it was removed and three 1/4 x 20 holes were tapped. The main spinner bearing appeared to have never been greased, so it was packed and the table was replaced. While on the table was being tightened all R-F plumbing was removed and cleaned. There still was no improvement in operation.
The Klystron was replaced, but with no improvement.
The Magnetron was replace, but with no improvement.
It was then found that the T-R box tuning stubs gave very little control over the tuning. A new T-R box, tube and mixer were installed. The T-R tube did not fire so another tube was in- stalled. This tube fired and appeared to be normal, but the stub tuning was still very poor. A T-R box, tube and mixer from unit no 9 were installed. There was still no improvement in stub tuning or set performance. The T-R tube was replaced by the tube from the T- R box last used with the round type mixer. Sharp[ stub tuning was obtained. The ringing time was 3.1 miles and the permanent echoes were very good. The set was put back on the air.
Shortly after this, arcing was heard at the slotted section. The arcing was at the flexible bullet and the transformer in the T- R Tee. The bullet was replaced and the edges of the transformer were buffed. The arcing was stopped, but it reoccurred later and could not be stopped. However the efficiency was not impaired. As noted later in this report, the arcing was found to be caused by the Magnetron.
At 534 hours the fuse blew in the A/R unit. Resistors R24 was burned out, caused by a shorted winding in the pulse transformer, T3. T3 was replaced by an unpotted OA18 transformer and R24 replaced. The pulse transformers had to be respaced because of the size of the OA18 transformer.
Shortly after this the five mile markers became unstable. Indications were that the pulse characteristics of T4 were bad. It was replaced by and A18 transformer and resistor R30 was reduced in value. This gave stable markers out to 85 miles. Since that time the markers have again become unstable, and are not functioning properly at this time. This condition has not been corrected since it involves removing the unit from operation for some time, and the unit is operating properly except for these markers.
At 634 Hours the overcurrent relay kicked out and would not hold upon starting again. The spark gap was replaced using the same pothead cable, but this did not help. During the process of locating the trouble the resonant choke, the pulse-forming network, and the high voltage supply filter condenser were changed. The trouble was finally found to be in the pothead cable. The insulation had broken down where the cable connects into the pothead at the resonant choke and pulse forming network.
At 821 hours the spark gap began splattering the PPI tube and then kicked out the overcurrent relay. The pin spacing was changed, but with no improvement. The spark gap was changed but it did not help. Upon trying to start up there was a large amount of flashover to the rotary pin which had already gone past the stationary pin. A complete new set of pins was installed but made no improvement. There was still flashover and the gap fired intermittently with as much as one or two seconds pause. Tests indicated that the fault was in the pulse transformer. The pulse transformer was changed, but with no improvement. The Magnetron was changed but this did not help either.
The next morning all panels were removed from the modulator and various tests were conducted. The weather prior to this day had been very damp and the set had not been operated after nightfall on the four preceding nights. This morning the sun was shining and there was a warm breeze. About the middle of the morning the flashover stopped, but the spark was still erratic and the undercurrent relay would not hold. The pins were respaced and the gap would then run without kicking out relays. However there was bad splatter on the PPI tube.
That afternoon the PE95 power unit was sent to ordnance to have the valves ground. It would not hold constant frequency although the variation was slight. Upon getting the power back the next day the spark gap ran smoothly and there was no splatter on the PPI tube.
The arcing in the T-R Tee was gone. This arcing had been due to the characteristics of the Magnetron.
At 725 hours a British 20KVA Lister Diesel was speeded up from 50cps to 60cps and used as the power for this set. The Diesel is being carefully watched and maintained, and no detrimental effects have resulted. Since then the PE95 power unit has been used as the standby power supply
Very little trouble has been experienced with the spark gap since this change. Some splatter occurs during very damp weather. This generally occurs late at night, but clears up early in the morning. Splatter also occurs after an adjustment of the pins but clears up within 30 minutes to an hour.
At 1405 hours the modulate blower was changed. It had become very moist. Although the bearings had oil on them they were badly worn. The base of the blower was strongly magnetized, and it is thought that this might be the cause of the excessive wear.
The operation of this set is difficult and the training of operators requires time because of the type of azimuth control employed. Using a reversible A-C motor as it does, time is lost when it is necessary to stop on a target. Even the best operators often experience difficulty. No more that four targets can be tracked at one time if they are at different angles of elevation.
An Amplidyne or similar system would greatly increase the operational efficiency of the set. Such a system should be obtained if at all possible.
On 14 November of 1944 Lt. Jack F. Roberts, the company's chief radar officer forwarded the following technical report in response to requests from higher headquarters signal sections
"Subject: Technical report on Light Weight Radar, British type mark 111; Similar to American SCR-602; and, American SCR-584.
Company D, 563 Signal AW Bn, has had 12 of the British Type light weight Radar Sets in operation since 15 April 1944. Recently 6 of these type radars have been replaced with the American SCR-584 units. During early operation of these sets, Most of them were of the portable type (tent models). Later all of the tent models were
(Editors Note 32) The battalion was particularly pleased to obtain this US made microwave unit for use as a mobile LW unit on an US made truck. The disappointing note to Lt. Homan's report occurred shortly after the report was written when the unit was transferred to Company A and east of Luxembourg city and a German Cavalry unit came in one night and blew it sky-high, a total loss. As can be seen above the presence of an Electronic Engineer was a must. We were lucky to have Lt. Wetherill and Lt. Homan assigned to us as their experience with US microwave was invaluable in integrating the SCR584 units into the Battalion as BACU units. The Radar Men in the other FDP and LW units had problems associated with their sets but they were not documented The SCR582 was experimental with report required.
replaced with the mobile type (mounted in British one-ton Fordson Radio vans). All personnel for the operation and maintenance of these units were trained on the American SCR-602 equipment and after being sent overseas received around 21 days of training n British Radio Schools on the British Light Weight Radar.
The difficulties encountered with this equipment will be enumerated below under the captions of the various components of the radar set.
TRUCK: This radar equipment is mounted in a British Fordson one ton radio type van. This vehicle has rear wheel drive only. The total weight of the truck with the radar and power plant is nearly 7,000 pounds. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in moving this vehicle in and out of the various sites, especially where unsatisfactory roads are available, and in many cases it has been necessary to use another truck (that has 4 wheel drive) to get this van in and out of location. It is suggested this vehicle be made of the 4 wheel drive variety. No spare wheel or tire was provided for this vehicle which causes a delay hazard when moving the van in convoy. A spare wheel and tire should be provided.
TRANSMITTER T.3154: No special difficulties have been encountered with this component. When replacing transmitting tubes made by the different American manufacturers difficulty has been encountered in getting the transmitter tuned to the proper operating frequency. Usually serious arcing occurs throughout the transmitter which at times is uncontrollable. Also many of the tubes refuse to oscillate at any frequency. This is generally true of the RCA type tubes. Canadian tubes seem to give the best results. Rectifier tube trouble has been encountered; a new tube usually correcting the difficulty. The blower motor which cools the transmitting tubes is a constant source of trouble, both mechanical and electrical trouble has been experienced. On many of the blower motors the bearings are of the oil-lite type and after a few hours constant operation( 50 to 100 hours) the mechanical vibration becomes excessive and the electrical interference is noted on the oscilloscopes. This trouble has been partially corrected by drilling oil holes in these bearings and by removing the motor from the unit and cleaning and greasing same at least every 48 hours. It is also essential that a spare blower motor be kept on hand in the spare parts at all times. In some cases electrical breakdown has occurred in the artificial line. It appears that if a variac was provided in the power input circuit of the transmitter, the transmitter could be tuned up with a reduced plate voltage thus eliminating the possibility that full plate voltage might cause unnecessary arcing when tuning the transmitter. Since a variac of suitable size has never been obtained, this modification has never been attempted by this organization. No major difficulties has been experienced with the modulator unit or the vacuum tube type spark gap.
RECEIVER R.3168: No major difficulties has been experienced with the receivers (each unit is provided with a spare receiver), other than the replacement of by-pass condensers, resistors and tubes. In some isolated instances the tube sockets have been found to be defective and would not make proper contact with the prongs on the tubes.
INDICATING UNIT TYPE 60 (Range oscilloscope): This component has caused very little trouble other than the replacement of tubes, by-pass condensers and resistors. In some isolated cases, trouble has been encountered by the "jittering" of the sweep trace on the cathode ray tube. It is believed this trouble is not caused by a defect in the range unit. The variable potentiometer in this unit, in some cases, have been of poor quality and have been replaced
INDICATING UNIT TYPE 74 (PPI)and POWER UNIT TYPE 228: No special difficulty has been encountered with the PPI unit, other than the normal replacements. Great difficulty has been experi- enced with the PPI power unit. This trouble has, in every case, been due to the breaking down of the high voltage transformer in the unit. These transformers have a life of from 2 to considerable over 4000 hours. Replacements on these transformers have been very difficult and in many cases unobtainable for long periods of time. The cause of this transformer failure has been more or less undetermined by British Engineers and to this date no satisfactory replacement has been issued. The degree of efficiency of this PPI unit is a subject of wide debate. In many instances, target information fails to show up on this oscilloscope and in order to give efficient operating information, many operators use only the range oscilloscope for targets and fall back on the PPI sweep for the azimuth. On all sets a mechanical azimuth indicator has been improvised (the sets were not provided with a mechanical azimuth indicator) which is used in cases of total PPI failure.
SWITCH UNIT TYPE 95 (T&R box): The main difficulty in this unit has been the burning of the contacts on the phase/antiphase switch. In many cases a severe arc occurs and results in mis- matching in the small transmission lines within the unit and causing electrical breakdown. Replacement of these switches has been difficult.
CONTROL PANEL TYPE 7 (Voltage Control): No difficulty has been encountered with this unit, especially the voltage control regulators. In some isolated cases the power cable female socket has given difficulty due to poor contact which caused severe head which melted the Niphan from which this plug is insulated.
GENERATOR SET In general it can be stated that this engine performs very satisfactory and the regulation of the AC alternator and the DC generator is quite satisfactory. The oil and gasoline consumption is quite low. However, this engine must be provided with un-leaded gasoline for satisfactory operation. During much of the operation, it has been impossible to secure unleaded gasoline. During this time considerable difficulty was undergone with these engines. The trouble encountered was mainly due to sticky valves and excess carbon in the cylinder heads. During the period red- leaded gasoline was used, it was not al all uncommon to have a complete overhaul on each engine at least every 36 hours. In attempting to overcome this difficulty various experimental measures have been taken; such as increasing the valve clearance for exhaust valves, both decreasing and increasing the clearance on the intake valves and increasing the spark adjustment. None of these experiments seemed to improve the operations of these engines with leaded gasoline. Replacement parts for these engines has been very difficult and in many cases none were carried by the service depots. The starting of this engine is a time quite difficult, especially during cool or cold weather.
MOUNTING AND ANTENNA: No difficulties have been undergone due to the mechanical mounting of the equipment or due to the method of mounting the antenna array. However during transit the antenna arms are taken off of the framework braces and carried on top of the radar van. Due to this method of carrying same, the antenna di-poles become bent, especially when moving into, or through, a wooded area. Some vans have been provided with an improvised protective shield on to top of the vans in order to protect the antenna di-poles when the unit is in transit.
IFF EQUIPMENT MARK111: All units are provided with this type of IFF equipment. Generally speaking, this type of IFF is highly unsatisfactory mainly due to the fact it is not of the directional variety. Considerable difficulty has been experienced with this IFF equipment. Replacement of tubes, resistors, condenser has been frequent in some installations. In order for IFF to be used effectively with these units, it is suggested a modern directional type be installed.
The best account of the operation of Company D that can be given is the report of 1st Lt. Jack R. Roberts the Radar Officer for the company.
"On 10 April 1944 Company D consisted of 14 Officers and 19 Enlisted Men who were detached from the 563rd Signal A.W. Battalion and attached to the 21st AAA Group for rations, quarters and tactical employment and further attached to the 635th AAA Bn for administration. This authority was obtained by Par 1, SO 50 dated 8 April 1944, Hq 563rd Bn. By verbal orders from the Commanding General of the 51st AAA Brigade the company was attached to the 118th AAA Group for rations, quarters and tactical employment and further attached to the 635th AAA Bn for administration.
On 16 April 1944 the entire company moved, using it's own organic transportation, to Kent, with Company Hq. near Woodchurch. The various sections of the company were moved to predetermined sites for tactical operations with the various batteries of the 633rd and 635th AAA Battalions. These sites, which totaled 6 included the Company headquarters site, were in command by Lt. Roberts, Lt. Martinsen, Lt.Owen, Lt. Kenny, Lt. Cobbs and Lt. Altman. This operational setup included two lightweight portable radar sets at each site with wire communications direct to the various battery Command Post operations rooms. The primary objective of this tactical employment was to give aircraft warning service to the various gun positions which were used for protection of the six airfields used by the fighter bombers of the Ninth Air Force.
On 10 May 1944, the 118th AAA Group was transferred to the Eighth Air Force and the 21st AAA Brigade, this company was placed with the 21st Group for tactical employment and further attached to the 635th AAA Battalion for administration.
The operation of this company in giving early warning reporting aircraft warning service was considered very important, inasmuch as complete and accurate information was given the various AAA organizations aiding in the shooting down of several hostile aircraft in this area. When the V-1 bomb attack was made on the U.K., these robots were intercepted by the radars and such information as was necessary was given to the AAA Gun positions which aided in shooting down many of these bombs. This information was given to the AAA organization with considerable risk to the Personnel and Equipment of the company. Several of these robot bombs landed in the immediate vicinity of the various sites, however no personnel casualties resulted and no equipment was damaged, with the exception that the antenna tower on one LW unit was damaged by 50 cal. firepower from the fighter aircraft which were used in combating the robot bombs.
During the operation of these various sites, many inspections were made by many general Officers, which included Brig. Gen Curtis, C.G. of the 51st Brigade and Brig. Gen William L. Richard- son C.G. of the 9th Air Defense Command. Due to the sincere interest shown by these officers, arrangements were made by them, to replace all of the portable radars with mobile radars (mounted in Ford trucks) and to provide each radar with IFF equipment. Also these officers made arrangements to have the information from the various radars transmitted to a gun operations room where British AAA batteries were given any useful information that might be used in combating hostile aircraft and Robot Bombs.
Due to the many organizations to whom this company furnished aircraft warning information, on 3 June 1944, this company was placed on attached service direct with the Ninth Air Defense Command for administration and tactical operation by Par 6, SO 154 Headquarters 9th Air Force, dated 3 June 1944.
On 12 July 1944 all tactical operations of this company were stopped and on 13 July 1944 the Company moved using it's own organic transportation to a Port of Embarkation in order to move to the continent. The trip across the channel to Omaha Beach was made under very adverse conditions. Due to the very rough water and storms, the unloading dock at the beach, on the continent, had been broken up. After some 36 hours of waiting for the weather conditions to improve unloading of equipment was started. Two barges were being used and after being partially loaded with equipment and personnel, broke away from the ship in which the channel crossing was made. These barges with equipment and personnel were unable to make shore for 15 hours and considerable difficulty was experienced in the saving of men and equipment. The entire company personnel and equipment was unloaded and on shore within 96 hours after the channel crossing. From Omaha Beach, the company moved to Levast, France, in accordance with the verbal of the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Defense Command.
Organizations that this company worked with in the Levast area included the 71st Fighter Wing and the 566th Signal A. W. Battal- ion.
On 3 August 1944, "U" team #3, which included Lt. Cobbs section and Lt. Altman's section were relieved from attachment with the 9th Air Defence Command per Par 13 GO 187 dated 27 July 1944, and placed with Headquarters Company of the 563rd. This group was sent back to the U.K. for the purpose of studying a new the of radar set.
On 13th August 1944, the company was further attached to the 564th Signal A. W. Battalion for administration and tactical employment, per Par 2, GO 36, Ninth Air Defense Command dated 12 Aug 1944. With "U" team #3 detached from the company the strength was 10 officers and 127 Enlisted men. Eight Enlisted men (radio operators) being on detached service to the Ninth Air Defence Command.
The unit was moved via its own organic transportation from Levast to Chateaudun of 30 August 1944.
The 564th Signal A.W.Battalion was assigned the tactical employment of providing aircraft warning service in connection with the defense of the Paris area. Since this Battalion had only British GCI equipment, this company was assigned to provide the early warning service and to provide gap filling between the GCI radars. This program called for one LW section north of Paris, One section south of Paris and two sections east of Paris. Company headquarters was established at Morangis. These radars were on a full 24 hour operating schedule and all plots were reported via radio and wire to the large filter room of the 564th Battalion which was also the headquarters for the Second Air Defense Wing. During this tour of operation the LW radars of this company were responsible for giving early warning service on many hostile flights in the Paris area. This information was in turn given the GCI units via the filter room and interceptions were made by the P- 61 Night Fighters. V1 bombs that were sent toward the Paris area were also plotted by means of the LW radars. During these operations all of the LW radars were visited by British Technical officers of the RAF who were making a survey of British Radar being used by the American forces. All site commanders were complimented on the siting of these radars and the excellent way they were operated and maintained. The commanding officer of the 564th Battalion highly commended the officers and men of this company for the effort put forth on this work.
In accordance wit Par 3 GO 224 Ninth Air Force dated 24 October 1944, the company, except Lt. Owen's section, was relieved from attachment to the Ninth Air Defense Command and rejoined the 563rd Battalion and established company headquarters near Toul on 25 October 1944. Lt. Owens and his section were moved to the Belgium area with the 564th Battalion to provide early warning service.
During the period of time this company has been on the continent many of the enlisted personnel have been of great value in apprehending stray German soldiers in the various localities where the sites have been located. Due to the isolated spots of these sites, such prisoners were turned over to the F.F.I.
Due to the fact that this company has been a part of a Battalion instead of a separate Company, the supply problem has been very acute since the supply sources are not set up to deal with individual Companies of a Battalion. The same has been true with special services equipment and supplies, however, with the constant efforts of the Company Commander, Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr. and supply officer, Lt. Gordon P. Wilson, these difficulties have been cut to a minimum.
The report for November and December, by 1st Lt. Jack F Roberts follows:
November 1944
This company had headquarters near Toul, France, having moved to this location on 25 October 1944. Operations consisted of one light weight radar at this location. Lt. Martinsen was in charge of one light weight radar in the vicinity of Thelod, France; Lt. James Kenny in charge of one light weight radar in the vicinity of Thiaucort, France, Lt. Owen and his platoon have been relieved from the 9th ADC per Par 1 GO 244 dated 14 October 1944, Lt. Cobbs and Lt. Altman's platoons were located near Mannonville, France and engaged in the operation of SCR584's and training with this equipment.
On 4 November 1944, 1st Lt. Wetherill and 5 E.M. were attached to the company from headquarters company and their equipment which consisted of 2 unmodified SCR-584's replaced the light weight radars of Lt. Robert's platoon. Immediately personnel of this platoon began training and actual operation of this new equipment.
Lt. Altman and his close Support unit platoon with Lt. Martinsen's Light weight reporting platoon moved to near Deline, France for close support work in connection with the XII Corps. This move was accomplished on 16 November 1944. Shortly thereafter missions were attempted, several of which consisted of strafing, photo reconnaissance and bombing.
On 25 November 1944, Lt. Cobbs Close Support Platoon and Lt. Kenny's reporting platoon moved to near Distroff, France for close support work with the XX Corps. Several satisfactory missions were conducted from this site.
Both of the close support units received field orders for their daily missions from their respective Army Corps Headquarters, via motor courier.
The only difficulties experienced by these units in their operations was the difficulty in picking up the mission aircraft over the rendezvous point.
The different Light Weight units reported into the different FDP's whichever was nearer to the LW site.
Company Headquarters was moved to near Pemerville, France on 13 November 1944. the SCR584's of Lt. Roberts were used to give early warning and low angle coverage over the Nancy, France area.
Lt. Owen's LW Reporting Platoon moved to the vicinity of Sierch, France on 21 November 1944. This unit reported into FDP3 from this new location.
Company Headquarters was near Remereville, France, having moved to this location on 13 november 19444. On 9 December 1944 Company Headquarters was moved to near Metz, France. Lt. Roberts Platoon continued operations with modified SCR584's and reported to FDP1 and assisted in the control of many day and night fighters due to automatic tracking device which this radar is equipped with.
Lt. Cobbs Close Support Unit moved to near Tromborn, France which offered a better site and nearer the XX Corp's front line. This move was accomplished on 6 December 1944. Lt. James Kenny's LW Reporting Unit was also moved to near this location, in order to aid in the close support operations. Lt. Altman and Lt. Martin- sen moved their respective units to near Gras Tenquin, France which offered a better site and nearer the XII Corp's front line. Both of the close support units operated in connection with several "pin-point" missions for both the XII and XX Corps. On 21 December 1944 Lt. Altman and Lt. Martinsen moved their respective units in the vicinity of Sarregumines. No operational missions were handled from this site, however, since the XII Corps required this unit to move in the vicinity of Luxembourg on 23 December 1944. (see Battle of the Bulge, Ardennes operations).
On 25 December 1944 Lt. Owen's LW Reporting platoon moved to the vicinity of Anqeviller which offered a better operational site for a LW radar, and continued to report into FDP3. On the first 12 hours of operations from this site this operating crew reported over 800 plots to FDP3.
During the latter part of December all operating units were confronted with an unusual amount of German air activity and all units undertook special precautions as far as security measures were concerned. The close Support Units were still confronted with the difficulty of picking up mission airplanes over the rendezvous point.
Special arrangements were made with the XIX TAC special services to show motion pictures at company Headquarters daily. By so doing, the different Platoons could send men to this Headquar- ters on their ration truck and enjoy the motion pictures shown and tat the same time pick up their rations thereby eliminating a separate run of this special service feature. This being the one of many ways in which this Company has is endeavoring to cooperate with General Eisenhower's "save rubber" campaign. (see Editors Note 34 below).
On February 11th of 1945 on breakup of Company D Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr. issued the following letter to his men:
"Most of us have been together for approximately two years, and in this length of time have covered quite a few places. Now the time has come when we will go our separate ways. In this period we have had a job to do and we can all say that we did our best. As some guy once said, "It is not the winning or losing but how you played the game", we all know that we have tried to play a clean, hard game.
So, in parting, I wish to thank each one of you for the splendid co-operation you have given me and tell you that you are a bunch that I have been proud to work with.
If I came from "Merry Old England", I would say "Cheerio,
Blokes", but being just another American, I'll say:
"So long, guys, all the best in the world to you"
[Editors Note 34]--- For a time when Company D LW units were brought back into the 563rd operation they were designated as LW5, LW6, LW7 and LW8. At first it was thought that they would be attached to FDP1, FDP2, FDP3 and FDP4 but operations necessitated varying assignments. Later on the units with SCR584's were redesignated as BACU1, BACU2, BACU3 and BACU4 with intent of adding a unit to each FDP4. Here again the operation requirement required an assignment varying with the tactical conditions. Lt. Clarence T. Wetherill and Lt Robert A. Homan and their men also participated in modifying the SCR584's into BACU's}.
/p
The following report was written by Thomas C. Craig who was a member of Company D and was the senior repairman in Lt. Emre Altman's BACU1.
" I was in D Company under command of Capt. Arthur G. Root. We were a LW radar unit in training and were issued a British Radar mounted in a Fordson Van of about 3/4 tons. After D-Day and after arriving in Normandy we returned to England. The radar technicians from the units of Lt. Cobbs, Lt. Burns, Lt. Altman and Lt. Dworshak were sent to Great Malvern, Worstshire 12 hospital unit for training on radar Set SCR-584. The rest of the operators and officers were sent to a RAF training school for Airplane Control. Our instructor for the SCR-584 was a technician from a AAA unit as the SCR-584 was an Anti-Aircraft Radar whose output was input to a M-9 Computer and it controlled four 90-MM Anti-Aircraft guns.
After return to France, we had no equipment, but were assigned controllers from the 19th Tactical Air Command. The Captain in charge of controllers, S/Sgt Donald E. Anderson, S/Sgt Vickers and myself returned to England and altered the SCR-584's to Ground Support per blueprints of the Radiation Labs of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We drove two Radars back to Southampton and returned to France. If I am not mistaken wee stopped at Battalion Headquarters. I still have my notebook from the school and the blueprints for all alterations of the SCR-584 that I was the technician on. The picture of the SCR-584 in the History of the 19th Tactical Air Command Signal Section history and published by them in 1945 (Signals) showed an SCR-584 that I was the technician on. My immediate officer was Lt. Emre Altman.
Later in October 1995 Craig made this report:
"I first must go through, in an orderly manner, my training before joining Company D. I went to 13 weeks of Radio School and upon completion was sent to the Southern Signal Corps School at Camp Murphy, Florida. This was located at Hob Sound, Florida. This school gave instruction for Radar Sets SCR-270, SCR-271, SCR- 268 Air Borne Units and SCR-602. Instruction was given to U.S. Army Officers, Enlisted men and U.S. Marine Corps. This school had its own Mess and Security and we were assigned to companies so that everyone in the company took the same course. I was given training to become a Radar Repairman (973). My training was on early warning portable radar SCR-602. This was a Canadian made radar with a spark gap modulator. Upon completion of training in late August or Early September 1943 I was sent with the weeks graduates to Drew Field, Florida. After arrival I was processed and was moved to the early warning LW training units which was Company D of the 561st Signal Air Warning Battalion which was located at Bradenton, Florida. (see page 7 for camp activities). All companies D were the same in the Signal Air Warning Battalions from the 555th through the 570's. Each company had a Guide On of orange displaying the Company. This camp was commanded by a West Point Officer and sat retreat marched for review between Camp headquar- ters and the Company area. The company area was two rows of tents with a company street in between. Companies were identified by the Company Guide On. Each company consisted of 16 platoons. Each platoon consisted of 1 cook, 1 truck driver, 2 CW radio operators, 1 stationary motor mechanic, 6 radar operators, 2 radar repairmen and was commanded a Lieutenant.
This camp had a centralized mess, motor pool, radar pool and guard detachment. Each company allotted needed personnel when called for. About the last of the September of 1953 I was transferred to Lt. Emre T. Altman's platoon of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion from the 561st Signal Air Warning Battalion as they were short of repairmen. I stayed with this same unit until I arrived back in the United States on the 27 of October 1945.
Company D at the beginning was commanded by a Captain from New York, but he was relieved of his duties after I believe failure to pass Signal Corps inspection shortly before going overseas. Also, after being in the field with radar sets at Punta Gorda and Wachla, Florida. Lt. Altman, S/Sgt Francis Pepper and I held a long discussion and we all felt we could not operate 24 hours a day and provided the security that was ordered with the personnel.
When we were deployed overseas and we were issued radar sets, Company D platoons were paired. Radar sets issued were British LW (Light Warning) sets mounted in a Fordson van and was identical with the one we trained on with the exception of the modulator. Also the power supply was greatly improved going from 2 cycle motors to a 2 cylinder Raliegh Motor Cycle engine. All power was 120 volts at 400 cycles.
On page 20 of the History of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion the reference to Company D the history omits the LW units of Lt. Altman and Lt. Charles Cobbs as they were paired together with Lt. Martin Dworshak's and Lt. Donald Burn's platoons. This record is after the 3 August 1944 as both LW platoons left these officers and about 15 men in France. Lt. Altman's and Lt. Dvorshak's unit operated in the U.K. about one mile east of the Ashford Airport on the road from Ashford to Hythe in Kent. I personally never saw or visited any of the 7 other LW units from drawing the sets in the U.K. and on. We always operated apart from others. I guess the one time we might have met was on the Liberty ship going to France.
We setup a LW unit in France but departed after about ten days for training. I might be of some interest to you to know that Lt. Charles F. Cobbs father worked with Lt. Col. William L. McBride in the American Tel and Tel. Lt. Cobbs father was an electrical engineer and at that time lived in East Pepperell, Mass.
The concept of BACU (Battle Area Control Unit) was thought up by The Radiation Laboratories, British Branch to overcome the problem of hedge rows in France. This was told to me by two of their employees. They visited our site with BACU1 and BACU2 about every two weeks. I can only guess as there were 12 total class number 16 men in other units going to this one month course in the U. K. They also supervised units in other areas. They related to me that all new plotters in the units we would be employed in the Pacific would be Electronic. Only about one half of the personnel on the roster of Company D is on the list. I still have the note book and blueprints for all changes required to alter the SCR-584 to a BACU unit. Range on the SCR-584 was originally 30,000 Yards and was enlarged to 100 miles. This was mostly done by change the PRF (pulse recurrence frequency). As a two Oscilloscope radar and not counting the PPI (plan position indicator), the first oscillo- scope was a 2,000 yard tracking oscilloscope which could pickup any part of the 100 mile oscilloscope. The Radiation Laboratories were the ones who procured a Diesel generator for us with transformers so we could have a well regulated power of 60 cycles as most of the system used 60 cycles for reference in tracking. The antenna dipoles spun at 1800 cycles and the incoming signal was beat against 60 cycles for a differential for tracking.
I will give the officers and repairman for each of BACU1 and BACU2 as follows (see Appendix XVIII)
The campaigns of the officers and men of Company is a little different than the rest of the battalion. Company D had the five battle stars in the European Theater with a sixth star for the ground combat in the U.K. Also we earned the American Theater Ribbon while we were training in Florida as we were on the South Florida net covering the Gulf of Mexico.
Thomas Craig's report also reported this interesting information not recorded elsewhere.
"When Sgt Vickers, Anderson along with Lt. Austern and myself picked up SCR-584's in Burtonwood Army Depot there were about 325 sets in stock and we took the first two altered and had them working before departure, then we landed them on Utah Beach and took the Red Ball Express to the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion headquarters. On map L of the Ardennes Campaign on December 28, 1944 the town of Godbrange is off the road that runs between Luxembourg to Echnach. Godbrange is about two miles from Radio Luxemburg at Junglister, Luxembourg. We moved with the XII Corps from just northeast of Sarre Union, back to Nancy, through Metz to Luxembourg City then northeast to Godbrange."
Thomas Craig also reported that Lt. Altman's Platoon was BACU1 was shipped as BACU2 and Lt. Cobbs platoon was BACU2 which was shipped to the Pacific theater as BACU1.(see Editors note 35 below). BACU2 re designated as BACU1 was being shipped to the Pacific Theater but was diverted to New York when VJ day arrived.
{Editors Note 35--- The fighter control for the invasion of Japan was to be handled by the XIXth Tactical Air Command, the 100th Fighter Wing and the 19th Tactical Control Group, and two of the BACU units were designated BACU1 and BACU2 of the task force. Lt. Col. William L. McBride had been transferred to the 19th TCG where he was Executive Officer and Maj. Byrne had been transferred to the 100th Fighter Wing where he was the
Wing Radar Officer.]
Woodrow Carlile preserved a copy of a letter given to him by Col. McBride when he wrote home to one of his WW I buddies. Woodrow had accompanied Lt. Col. McBride on several occasions when he visited various WW I battle fields. The letter Lt. Col. McBride wrote was as follows:
"Dear George:
Now that we are allowed to tell of places twenty five or more miles from our present location, thought I might forward a few line that might be of interest to you and the old gang. Of course I was in Paris, shortly after its liberation, and all the things you read regarding the joys, hilarity, and etc., definitely were true. It is the same care-free, joyous Paris that it was when we all went through, AWOL, in 1918, however, I did miss Bill Ewen, and it's still the number 1 city for any one's money.
I did not get to my favorite city of Soissons, but C'est le guerre: I hope to go back there. Naturally, I had to go through Meax and Le Ferte (remember)? on my way out, we stopped at Chateau Theirry, and on the hill overlooking the Meause and the city, there is a most beautiful moment dedicated to our dead. I have been informed that it was erected at a cost of over 30,000,000 francs: wonderful to behold, and it states that the Germans were held there in June of 1918, and that the big drive began July 1918, as we well know, and that of the 310,000 men taking part, 67,000 were casualties. I wish that you all might be able to view it. it also has an overlay of the area of battle on a high marble slab, giving the divisions, and ground gained by each.
Approximately 7.2 Km northeast is Belleau and the woods, we all remember so well, and the once terrible wheat fields are now serene and quiet, and one would never know a war had occurred there. The church the YD rebuilt is on the corner and it is truly beautiful, thrilling me beyond words. The priest of Chateau Thierry, upon learning I was there, and had been in the great battles of 1918, along with the Mayor, came over to my vehicle and spent a pleasant hour in reminiscing.
The church is kept immaculate, and you would be more than proud of, and to behold the results of our contribution to the little town that cost us so heavily in real men. The names of our dead are inscribed in it's walls, by the regiments participating, and an artistic placque of General Edwards hangs upon the wall. The YD is on each window, and above the door of the church by the YD, as a monument to it's dead in France.
The Germans shot holes in ten windows and knocked off a small piece of stone high above one window, otherwise little or no damage was done. A former member of the 103rd Infantry sig is most thrilling to be one of the first to inscribe my name upon this honored roll. Gazing upon the names of our departed dead made me wonder.
The Boche stole the large American and French flags from the church. I asked the Mayor if anything could be done to make immediate repairs, and was informed that a commission had been formed in Paris, to repair damage, but if possible he would like to have the flags replaced. He also stated that six vestments for the little altar boys of eight to ten years old, were taken, and that they cannot be replaced now. It is just a thought, but if the YD would like to makes theese people in Belleau happy, send the mayor of Balleau, two flags and vestments for the little lads, as the remaining people are few and poverty stricken.
Almost opposite the church is the entrance to the Belleau cemetery. Assuming you have seen many pictures of it, I shall try to give you a few added details. The cemetery is in charge of a supervisor and four aides, who are continually beautifying the plots, and as a result it is a most awe inspiring sight.
On either side of the entrance are erected stone houses for the visitors,, and a beautiful hand-book, containing the names and countries, numbers, and etc., upon a mantle in the lobby of the main building and so help me, hun wrote "Hail Hitler" on the front page. The son of a ____. Crosses, row upon rod--YD plenty. The first one I saw was Bill Daily, 101st Infantry, Hq Company, killed July 15,1918. Above is a beautiful Chapel and monument, and of course the Huns had to fire into it, ut it can be easily repaired. It stands part way up the hill of Belleau, and upon the very spot from which the big drive of July 4th began, and looks down upon a peaceful valley, and the woods that was once a place of destruc tion and death, is now the most quiet spot on earth. Time changes all thing.
(Editors Note 37) The reference YD means the Yankee Division, the 26th Infantry Division. On another occasion Col. McBride took me on a tour of some of the WW I action sites he remembered and he showed me the exact spot where he had pitched his tent at one of their bivouacs in 1918. I never recorded where that location was but one could see he was mentally reliving old memories. That same day I do remember that we stopped at the Chateau at Hatton-Chatel on the heights above Hattonville. In the Chateau they had a visitors register and He made a note in the register that he had been there in 1918. Probably on could still find his entry. Another aside is that on 29 August 1993 the Defense Department announced that the 26th Infantry Yankee Division was to be deactivated. The newspaper comment filled in that it was formed in 1917 but its roots date back to the 17th Century. It was formed from units that patrolled the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636 and fought the British at Lexington and Concord. In WW II the unit was under Patton's Third Army in the Battle of the Bulge. When I read the news I could not help to think that Col. McBride must of turned over in his grave. S/Sgt Bernie Cavanaugh, who served in the Division during WW II echoed this and was quoted as saying "this is a miserable day".
Well, George, I trust this little missive will be of interest to you, and the boys of 1918. As time progresses and I re-visit scenes and places we knew so well, I shall forward my impressions to you.
Winter is gradually descending upon us: cold, rainy days, early darkness, and biting winds is the order of the day, but C'est Le Guerre. Say hello to J.T. Burks, and all the boys. So long for now. Regards and best luck.
P.S. Yankee Division men may want to read this."
Lt. Frank Van Camp (now Lt. Col.) was Commanding Officer of FDP4 and in combat kept a log of events. Lt. Woodrow W. Cole was the administrative officer and 2nd in command of the Platoon. The Technical officer was Warrant Officer Reginald J. Stark (now Lt. Col.).
In the Log book he also reported Locations of FDP4 from January 9, 1943 to September 10,1945. His FDP was inactivated on 28 December 1944 as an FDP4 and the platoon continued to function in a different role. All the sites up to VE day were with the 738th Signal Air Warning Company. Following is a list of all the locations of the platoon as recorded by Frank in at the end of the log. The original log itself was donated to the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Field, Alabama.
Recorded in the log is brief mentions of visiting inspecting Generals and those included a visit by General Eisenhower on the 28th of March of 1944 near Andover, England. On April 5th 1944, logged at 1950 hours, probably when the FDP4 was still at Andover, there was a visit from General Quesada, commander of the IX Tactical Air Command which was under the 9th Air Force. The XIX Tactical Air Command was probably under his command at that time and later the XIX TAC would be split out and operate directly under the 9th Air Force and support the U. S. Third Army and the IX TAC would support the U. S. First Army.
Lt. Van Camp had organized the Platoon operators into four crews, each crew was to man a shift. Among those named in the log were
S/Sgt Rogoff was mentioned as communications chief and also he and T/4 Reinhard was mentioned radar repairman on October 21 1944. On May 1st 1944 these tellers were mentioned
The following Air Controllers probably assigned from the 312th Fighter Control Squadron mentioned on March 28th 1944 were Lt. Sulfen and Lt. Bechtold
On March 31st 1944 the log notes that a General and Colonel
arrived to inspect. Inspections were so frequent that no names were mentioned. On April 5th 1944 General Quesada arrived again for an inspection which lasted from 1850 to 2010 hours. A copy of the log now resides at the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Georgia
The steamship S.S. Queen Mary was owned by the British Cunard White Star Line. The Captain of the ship was Commodore Sir Gordon Illingworth during this period. For this particular trip the Queen Mary sailed from New York Harbor probably on 22 January 1944 and arrived at Gulock, Scotland on 28 January 1944. The Queen Mary was docked on the north side of Pier 90 in New York Harbor for loading of troops. About 11,000 troops were loaded and besides the 563rd SAWB the 564th SAWB was another unit to make this trip. There were a number of other units loaded who cannot now be identified. I remember there was an Anti-Aircraft unit because one of their Officers was a school mate of mine. There was also a Royal Canadian Air Force unit because I remembered that there was a number of Pilot Officers who were designated to assist me in duties pertaining to my assignment as B Deck Commander. I also remember that there was a U. S. Field Hospital unit loaded because they were assigned quarters on A deck in "Picidilly Circus" which was the locations of shops in peace time. They were forward in those rooms and also forward of the Ship Troop headquarters where I reported. This area was also in front of the Grand Saloon. Needless to say this area had all the Nurses in it and the area was immediately declared "off limits" to Men. There was Naval troops aboard because one of my bunk mates was a Naval Commander. Others in the troop command were Lt. Col. McBride who was assigned the herculean task of Mess Officer and Commander of D Deck. The Mess itself was set up in the boarded up Ship Swimming Pool. I also believe that Lt. Col. Higginson was commander of C deck. There was a Marine Gun Crew that manned the rear deck and although I think it was U.S. Marines it could have been British Marines.
The destination port was at Gulock, Scotland which is about two miles West of Greenock, which was the railroad terminal which the troops were loaded on the Southbound railroad trains. Jim Buchanan of the 564th SAWB is in possession of a book named the "Queen Mary" which is an engineering description first published in 1936. In 1960 this book had pages added with some history of the operations from 1941 to 1952 and perhaps beyond. Oddly enough this history had no mention of the trip made by the 563rd SAWB and the 564th SAWB. All it says is that during January 1944 the ship had just returned from a repair dock in Clyde, Scotland and shortly after that but before January 1944 also underwent repairs in Boston, Massachusetts.
The accident causing the need for repairs was a very interesting incident that had occurred to sailing that transported the 563rd SAWB and 564th SAWB.
The Queen Mary had sailed on 27 September 1942 from New York to Clyde, Scotland with 10,398 troops on board. It was on this trip that the Queen Mary had a collision that provided the most tragic incident in the ship's long career. On Friday October 2nd, the HMS Curacoa, a twin-screw anti-aircraft light cruiser of 4290 tons displacement, 450 feet in length , assigned with six destroyer anti-submarine screen, to Guard the Queen mary, sighted her at a given position in about Longitude 12 degrees West. She had come over from New York without escort until then, relying on her speed and planned zigzag, known as "Zig-Zag 8", for her chief defence. The zigzag took about 40 minutes to complete, steering to port and starboard, and her speed was taken as 28 1/2 knots. Her mean course was 106 degrees, and it was calculated the ship would advance on it 93 percent of the total distance run. The Caracoa's best speed was 25 knots, and so the Queen Mary, despite the zigzag would ultimately overtake her
escort. At 12:20 Captain Boutwood of the Curacoa sent a hand signal to his convoy,which was still well astern.,
"When you are ahead I will edge in astern of you"
His duty, or course, was to guard the transport against air attack. They were now in a zone where the danger was increasing, and although the sea was rough with a heavy westerly swell running, the weather was fine and clear, with visibility extending for miles.
By 1:30 PM the Queen mary was close astern of the cruiser. The Curacoa had a compliment of 430 officers and men, and in broad daylight, under a shining sky, just 42 minutes later, the Queen Mary had killed 329 of them. Her bows struck the Curacoa on her port side aft at a fine angle and divided the warship into two parts, which sank almost immediately. By the hard practice of the war the Queen Mary steamed straight on, over and through the wreck, the still living, the dying and the dead. American soldiers rushed to the rails and threw life belts into the sea, and the Queen mary summoned help from her destroyer screen. In her engine room, her engineers felt a slight bump and thought she had hit a large wave. Captain Illingworth in his chart house, just having checked his estimated time of arrival asked his Junior First and navigating Officer, Samuel Joseph Wright to check his figures and, when they had agreed, told Wright to send for the signalman and make the signal.
"Mr. Wright had called the signalman," said Illingworth in evidence, "and then we felt a bump. I said, "I wonder what that is, I wonder if we are being bombed". We always expected to be bombed. We never were, howevthe bridge. I said to the Quartermas- ter, who was steering, "Was that a bomb?" He said, "No, Sir, we hit the cruiser'.
The first "MOST SECRET EMERGENCY" despatch from H.M.S. Bulldog to the Admiralty, C. in C.W.A. (Commander in Chief Western Approaches) at 14:20 read:
"H.M.S Curacoa rammed and sunk by Queen mary in position 55 50 N 08 38 W.
"Queen Marys' damaged forward speed 10 knots"
The bows of the Queen Mary were badly damaged and bent round to the port, but the collision bulkhead held well at 13 1/2 knots and without assistance she arrived safely in the Clyde.
The maximum speed of the Queen Mary was 28 1/2 Knots. When in convoy it had to drop back to convoy speed which usually 18 Knots. When traveling alone the speed was upped to maximum to avoid the German "Wolf Packs" (Submarines) by sheer speed and the zig-zag maneuver. With the zig-zag course the progress was about 30 1/2 miles for each hours run although the ships speed in the water was 32 3/4 miles per hour. Assuming the distance from New York to Gulock as 4800 miles the crossing under full speed would be 156 hours or about 6 1/2 days from port to port. There was also the loading time and the debarking time to add to this. On the Atlantic trip very high waves would be encountered when entering the Irish Sea. I estimated the waves at times to be over 100 feet as they seemed to be higher than Bridge deck. Some of the men suffered prolonged sea sickness. In the Irish Sea storms large quantities of salt water would splash over the deck and down the stairs between decks. I did not hear of and injuries on this trips but one of the Stewards told me that in peace time almost every trip a passenger would get a bone fracture falling down stairs. One thing that kept the men from roll and pitch injuries was that they were restricted to their bunk area most of the time and only going on deck for a limited time each day.
Long after WWII the Queen Mary was docked at San Pedro, California and was setting on the beach and used as a hotel and museum. I noted that some of the areas I thought I was familiar with had been altered greatly during the post war period when it was making regular Trans-Atlantic voyages. In particular I noticed that some of the state rooms, particularly around "Picidilly Circus" had been converted to shops and restaurants and I could not find the stateroom I used during the crossing.
Here is a previously unreported item of history which was submitted by Lt. Paul E. Bechtold, who was attached to Company C as the FDP3 Controller from the 312th Fighter Control Squadron. It is dated 1 July 1945. His report was as follows:
"The following commentary is a condensed history of activities by FDP3, Forward Direction Post in Company C which were units of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion under Lt. Col. William L. McBride and the 312th Fighter Control Squadron under Maj. Noble L Hull.
1. A. The mission assigned FDP3 essentially was to support units of the third US Army, including Air Warning, Fighter/Bomber direction, E/A interception, Pinpoint bombing, Bomber escort, Night Fighter patrols, and emergency homing. The latter two were operated as standby to more specific equipment. Through many such missions were successfully accomplished in this capacity. Fighter Bomber direction missions accounted for more than 600 of the 1,000 missions controlled from that one site.
B. FDP3 undoubtedly set an ETO record for continual operation, with more than 152 uninterrupted days. The US front pulled up to the Moselle River in preparation for its final victorious push. FDP3 took its place on the left flank near the city of Luxembourg. After having been pushed back from a front position, 9 miles forward, by a ground attack directly upon the station. The succeeding months brought battle activities swinging in a narrow circle around the station, which itself was at no time further than 12 miles from the Moselle-German Line.
C. September 27th Brought the first FDP directed bombing on a small town 20 miles southeast of the site. Five months later, this same town was still a bombing target when the great 3rd army push began. The battle for Metz, forty miles south, was the first large fighter bomber objective. Railroad mounted Artillery and rocket shells, from behind the German Lines and in and around Luxembourg and in an arc around Luxembourg, were stopped by reconnaissance and bombing, largely under control of FDP3. During this time the city and station were being shelled for three nights, but few enemy airplanes were allowed through. In early December two ME 110's were destroyed in the immediate vicinity, after interceptions with airplanes from the 354th Fighter Group.
D. The first signs of a German counterattack came on December 11th, when "business" became pressing, when as many as 100 Fighter Bombers were being controlled at one time. For a period of 21 days the entire station either worked or stood at readiness 24 hours a day. On December 20th, the vicinity was strafed by ME 109's, followed that night by the dropping of enemy paratroopers. Personnel of FDP3 not only elected to continue full operation, but aided in the capture of a number of enemy troops in Luxembourg. Because of nightly paratroop drops, and the enemy holding a spearhead only four miles from the equipment, Christmas Eve saw the civilian population in an anxious state.
E. 1. Three major contributions of control during this period and the breaking of the Bastogne Siege were as follows:
2. Reconnaissance planes, under FDP3 control, discovered a large enemy vehicle concentration on the evening of January 4th, in the area of Prum. Night Fighter Airplanes covered the area for the night, and the following day brought XIX Tactical Air Command its greatest haul of enemy M/T's, the largest number for World War II. More than 600 vehicles were destroyed. This was the turning point in the Ardennes roll-back of Field Marshall Von Runstedt and his highly dangerous effort.
3. The sole rescue of more than 25 aircraft (8th AAF Bombers, 9th AAF A/C, and transports). Exceedingly poor weather conditions would otherwise have caused the loss of such planes and their valuable personnel. Five crippled or lost friendly A/C were landed at field A-97 in a single days work. The state of emergency was such, that at times direct VHF communications replaced the direct land line from Ripsaw 3 to A-97 operations, in order to facilitate immediate landing instructions. It was also due to accurate grid coordinates from the station plotters and controllers that several"bailed out" pilots were rescued by the GO3 Ground Observer posts often within the sight of enemy lines.
F. Activities swung from the north to the Third Army's drive up the Moselle River from Trier to Coblenz, and again, FDP3 was in a central position for almost al important missions. As the other control units moved into the "Push" positions, FDP3 was able to execute and absorb the extra work required. While the original siting was for a great part responsible for the complete success of the mission, the credit for continual operation was due to the efforts of the Company C technical and maintenance men, and the excellent network of communications to higher headquarters and operating points.
2. A. So that a more graphic picture we presented, the following statistical figures are given, representing the period between 19 September 1944 and 12 Mar 1945:
B. 950 Squadron Sorties
C. 8,780 aircraft controlled
D. 58 E/A destroyed by controlled friendly A/C
E. 24 blind Bombing missions in conjunction with BACU's
F. 78 Night Fighter missions as standby for moving MEW
G. 33 Distress emergency airplanes brought to safety
H. 5 Fighter Bomber Pilots retrieved by grid coordinate and Ground Observer Personnel
I 152 days of continual 24 hour per day schedule.
Following is an account submitted by Capt. Fanklyn Glassow on 25 October 1995 outlining his experiences.
"In January, 1943, 1st Lt. Franklyn Glassow was relieved of assignment to the 554th Sig AW Bn at March Field, CA, and ordered to proceed to Oakland, CA, to take command of a cadre of 27 EM and one Oeld, Florida. Upon arrival at Drew field the cadre became Sig Hq and Hq , AWI, 14th Ftr Cmd. Personnel were added to this company, and it was transferred to the 563rd Sig AW Bn in Octo- ber,1943.
The entire 563rd Bn departed 'Drew 'Field to go on maneuvers in central Florida near the town of Bartow. At the conclusion of maneuvers members of Co C enjoyed a BBQ of two roasted pigs and 100 lbs. pf turkey along with a barrel of beer before returning to Drew Field.
In January, 1944, the battalion boarded a train to travel from Drew Field to a camp at Nyack on the Hudson River in N.Y. to prepare for embarkation to the European Theater of Operations. Within a few days the battalion was transported to the Queen Mary in which we crossed the Atlantic Ocean without escort to the Firth of Clyde near Glasgow in Scotland. A train took us to a tent camp at Henley on the Thames where we were confined to camp for about 30 days. Company C went on several marches around the country side to relieve boredom, get a look at our surroundings and get tome exercise.
Following the assignment of British Radars, Company C was ordered to a training site near Beaulieu just south of Southampton. Company C moved again to a location about five miles SE of Turnbridge Wells where we occupied the grounds of a ruined mansion. A third move was to a wooded area behind a flax farm further east in Kent. Our maneuvers in this area included dispersal of our ground observer posts along the channel coast, one of which occupied Pevensey Castle, a well-preserved fortress erected by Romans and Normans. In June of 1944 we prepared our vehicles for moving off an LST through water to a beach in France. Our location was directly in line with the V-1 Buzz Bombs the Germans began sending to London. For a few days we tried to shoot them down with our 50-caliber machine guns, but then our area was declared a zone where fighters were to shoot at them. One was hit directly over us and exploded about 100 yards from our camp, creating a huge crater. Our medics rendered first aid to some children cut by flying glass.
Company C's next move was to a rain-soaked camp near Southamp- ton where be boarded an LST and crossed the Channel on July 4, 1944. We landed on Omaha Beach and noted that all U.S. vehicles made it off the LST to the beach with no trouble, but all the British vehicles had to be towed through the surf. While Company C was waiting to follow the Third Army out of Normandy, a jeep occupied by Lt. Frank Jane
k and 3 EM strayed into a mine field and was blown up, injuring all occupants. Lt. Janek managed to crawl out a d call for help. Lt. Joe Eichbaum and two medics from Company C rushed to the scene, and Lt. Eichbaum lead the medics through the mines field and with their help rendered first aid and carried the injured men out of the mine field and got them to a field hospital. This action resulted in award of the Silver Star Medal to Lt. Eichbaum and Bronze Stars to each of the medics.
When the Third Army broke out of Normandy in late July 1944, their advance was so rapid that our first significant stopping point was a woods just west of the city of Orleans close to the Loire River in central France. Company C was ordered to operate operated this location while the rest of the battalion continued on toward Germany. While at this location Company C learned of a German supply depot in a large cave beside the Loire River that contained hugh stores for submarines that docked at St. Nazaire. We were able to drive a 2 1/2 ton truck into the cave and load it with non-perishable rations and several cases of wine. our supply sergeant kept the wine in locked foot lockers, and each time we obtained our supplies from a new depot, a few bottles were given to the issuing personnel. Needless to say, we often received favored treatment. When the threat of a German army in southern France was thwarted, Company C was ordered to move to a position in southern Luxembourg.
In September of 1944 the company moved to a previously selected position in southeastern Luxembourg. The company arrived in Luxembourg late in the afternoon and set up tents in an orchard surrounded by a stone wall. Vehicles were parked outside the wall, and sentries were posted to guard them during the night. About 1:00 PM a German patrol opened fire on Company C, putting bullets through a number of vehicles and hitting a newly arrived experimen- tal U.S. radars with a rocket, completely destroying it. The attack lasted only a few minutes, and no personnel were injured, largely because of the stone wall, although bullets pierced the upper portions of some tents.
Infantry solders nearby advised us to move since were only about four miles from the Germans and within artillery range. Fortunately we had selected an alternate site that looked good for operation of the radars. It was about twos miles south of the city of Luxembourg and 15 miles from the Germans. Following repair of a cable that had been severed by a bullet in one of our main radars, Company C operated very successfully at this site from September, 1944 to March, 1945.
Initially we bivouacked in a densely wooded area near the radars, but on of our resourceful EM uncovered a vacant chateau just outside the woods and suggested we move into it. We were able to house most of the company in the chateau which proved to be quite comfortable during the winter of '44-'45. Some of our talented EM managed to scrounge some lumber and build a small barracks which housed those who didn't fit into the chateau.
Company C had two small radars in addition to the two main radars. The small units were located approximately in the center of Luxembourg. When the Germans launched the Battle of the Bulge, our small radars were missed by about 1/2 mile. We moved them to a safer position and moved Lt. David Schultze's five ground observer posts to positions along the souther \n flank of the Bulge.
In March, 1945, the Third Army was on the move into Germany. Company C crossed the Mosselle River and then the Rhine River over a pontoon bridge. Shortly after entering Germany the company liberated an enclosed trailer which the company carpenter quickly equipped as a neat orderly room. it served us well as we proceeded further into Germany. There were two brief stops in Germany at vacated military camps and another in a small town where we took over a hotel building. Since Company C was the only Allied unit in this town, the mayor came to us daily for orders. In this period as we moved rapidly into Germany, Company C accepted surrender of German soldiers on several occasions.
Our final location was near the German town of Ansbach and was within sight of a vacated military air field. company C took over three apartment buildings from a group of about a dozen. these apartments had housed German soldiers and their families associated with the nearby air field. The company was comfortably house at this location and celebrated the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 9,1945.
In spite of being narrowly missed by a Buzz Bomb, being shot up by a German patrol in Luxembourg and earning five battle stars, Company C completed its mission with credit to itself and without a single casualty due to enemy action. members of the company can be proud of the valuable service they rendered during their 16 months of action in the European Theater of Operations
The XIX TAC published a pamphlet "Seek and Destroy", the story of the XIX TAC which was issued to the troops so they could send it back home to show their part in combat. One of the chapters in the pamphlet follows because it gives another version of the Battle of the Bulge. A copy of this pamphlet was sent in by Douglas Rainbow, the original was given to him by his father, now deceased, who was T/Sgt William R. Rainbow the Communications Chief of Company A in combat. The pamphlet is in color and features what is thought to be one of the few reproductions of the XIX TAC insignia which is reproduced below. An original pamphlet is in possession of Douglas Rainbow whose address is
Following is an extract from Seek and Destroy which is headed up with the following letter from Maj. Gen. O. P. Weyland as follows:
"This is a story about the officers and enlisted men who have made our tactical Air Command one of the most powerful weapons in the Battle for Germany. Without their hard work, courage, loyalty and self-sacrifice, joint air ground operations could not have been achieved their present high degree of effectiveness.
The record of the XIX Tactical Air Command represents one of the greatest chapters in the history of Air Power and I am proud and grateful to every individual in the command who helped this story become true.
The history continued as follows.
DECEMBER 1944
Bastogne becomes the American rock of defense in Belgium as German forces in a great counter-attack lunge for the Meuse River. XIX TAC joins the 101st Airborne Division to form an unbreakable ring around the town. Enemy forces under the imperus of their initial breakthrough, surge forward many miles through thinly held American lines. But Bastogne never is taken.
Hovering constantly above the beleaguered town, XIX TAC Thunderbolts keep the desperate Germans at bay, abort attempts to infiltrate the Bastogne ring, burn fuel stores and supplies, take heavy toll of enemy troops and transportation.
Never have air and ground cooperated in such unison. For ten days the 101st Airborne holds the pivotal road center of Bastogne while German armored columns vainly try to crack through. Every large enemy effort is headed off and blunted by XIX TAC.
During the first days of the Battle of the Bulge, XIX TAC hangs a deadly net above the German spearheads. Roads are littered with wrecked equipment. Towns overrun by the Germans are bombed and set afire. When fog comes to shroud the battle area on 28 December, Gen. Von Runstedt's drive has lost its momentum. Initiative passes to the Americans.
This is reiterated proof that close air-ground coordination pays off.
New Year's Day, Maj. Gen. Anthony G. McAullife,(Then Brig. Gen.) Commander of the 101st's heroic stand at Bastogne, visits the XIX TAC "Raiders" group. To its new commander, Lt. Col. Leslie R Bratton of Hastings, Neb, he expresses his appreciation:
"If it had not been for your splendid cooperation we should never have been able to hold out. We were able to hold the vital road junction at Bastogne with your aid. I thought flak in Holland was bad, but the stuff your boys flew through here was worse"
The next several weeks see Nazis being squeezed slowly from the salient and driven back towards the Siegfried Line, while XIX TAC chews away at German attempts to reinforce and resupply forward elements.
The crescendo of destruction is reached when XIX TAC again upsets the German cart on 22 January. Attempting a daylight withdrawal, Germans clog roads between Prum and Viaden and along the Our River. They stream eastward in ten mile long columns, vehicles lined bumper to bumper.
Concentrations are spotted early in the day by an army liaison cub pilot. Relays of thunderbolts race to hamstring the massed traffic. Diving through breaks in the clouds, Thunderbolts hammer long columns of trucks, tanks, self-propelled guns, horse-drawn vehicles.
For eight hours fighter-bombers punished German convoys. By nightfall destruction totals are greatest in XIX TAC history. Destroyed are 1179 motor vehicles; more than 100 others damaged. Close behind rampaging fighter-bombers, advancing American troops move towards the Siegfried Line. Bastogne and "The Battle of the Bulge" are history.
Bastogne adds another bright chapter to the story of XIX TAC. Ahead are other chapters. SIC TAC also could look back on a story- -a story of important and significant tasks well done
AUGUST 1944:
General Patton's crushing right hook opened the way toward Paris. Punching ahead 20 to 30 miles a day, the drive exposed and weakened his right flank. The XIX Tactical Air Command went the task of protecting a whole army's flank.
Successful execution of this bold plan was a vitally important tactical victory, underscored by the surrender of 20,000 enemy troops. For the first time in history an entire army capitulated to an air command as well as to a ground unit.
A resistant chain of air armor had been thrown above the Loire River bounding the long flank to the command's tactical reconnais- sance group fell the job of locating sizable concentrations. Attacks were snuffed out as soon as they were planned by thorough drubbing from the air. German Gen. Erich Elster's hapless Huns, harried by French Forces of the Interior, finally were cut off from Germany by the junction of the Seventh and Third U. S. Armies.
With cessation of terrorizing air attacks as the primary of condition of surrender, Gen. Elster threw in the towel to Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon of the U. S. Ninth Army and to Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) O. P. Weyland of the XIX TAC on 16 September 1944. This was concrete acknowledgment that an "idea"--close air-ground cooperation--had paid off.
Surrender to Gen. Weyland was the payoff of more than an idea, it was the logical conclusion of ceaseless training, of the will to win. It was the angry answer to an arrogant challenge. It was the reply of mechanics working in the winter with numbed hands or delicate engine changes, of tense, steel-nerved pilots who matched front line GI Joe for guts, of paper shufflers in specialized office machinery, of responsibility-ridden CO's--all contributing, all necessary to the big show at the Loire.
Surrender was the highlight. Back of it was a victorious history. Each GI and officer contributed to a holocaust unequaled in aerial warfare history. They were important parts of a new, powerful weapon. Destroyed in 10 months were 1351 enemy aircraft, 15,501 motor vehicles, 1,743 tanks and armored vehicles, 1,708 locomotives, 10,561 rail cars, 1,642 horse drawn vehicles, 1,794 gun positions, 270 vessels and barges, 255 bridges, 188 fuel and ammunition dumps.
Back in late 1943 (the "Mild and Bitter" era) the real sig- nificance of "tactical air command" was envisioned by only a few imaginative military men. The man in the street and the GI on the ground knew little of the paralyzing power of the air-ground machine. yet now, one year later, the tactical air weapon has been developed to peak efficiency, is acknowledged as a vital factor in all large military operations.
Development of the weapon is not only the story of the tac- tical air commands of the Ninth Fir Force alone. It symbolizes the entire Allied war effort. The effective character of the present organization is due to unprecedented inter-service cooperation, to adequate supplies and, above all, to imagination and foresight of frenzied organizations, speculation and experimentation during pre- invasion months.
A broad outline of the tactical air command "idea" was conceived and developed by top drawer Washington military planners in 1942 and 1943. It was practiced in maneuvers by units training in the States. Basic techniques were improved during the victori- ous North African campaign. Now, under the impact of battle experience, the form of the weapon still is changing. Early in the war in general pattern was hammered out, in many respects almost literally, for today's air-ground organization is the happy result of a well-balanced debate between the ardent disciples of Gen. Billy Mitchell and those of Hannibal.
A blueprint of the "idea" landed win the pre-invasion workshop that was England in 1943 where the welding and fusion began. The VIII Air Support Command's 1st Fighter Division (provisional), large composed of 44th Bomb Wing personnel, fresh from the States, began experimenting with air-ground tactics at Aldermaston Court, near Reading, Berkshire. Key personnel from the IX Fighter Command then emerged from the sands of North Africa to add battle experi- ence to the testing ground.
Careful plans were laid for direct cooperation with an army in the field. Growing rapidly, the command soon split into two units; IX Fighter Command which went to Middle Wallop, and IX Air Support Command, later the XIX Tactical Air Command, which returned to Aldermaston. IX Fighter Command continued and integrated the activities of the two tactical air commands until late July, 1944.
Gen. O. P. "Opie" Weyland took over the XIX Tactical Air Com- mand on 4 February 1944. Not long after, the command was given two wings and seven groups for training and fighting---to the great relief GI's and officers who had been spending weary weeks guiding non-existent planes around the skies, plotting hypothetical targets and forever moving very real tents and equipment over English countryside.
Grueling cross-channel operations, which were to form such an important part of the softening-up process, began 13 April 1944, when seven fighter bomber groups and their wings settled down at advanced bases in Kent. Four of the groups had been flying long- range bomber escort from bases in East Anglia, the other three were straight from the States. They played hell with enemy rail and motor transport, participated in semi-strategic bombing, helped the planned isolation of the enemy south of the Seine River by bombing rail and road bridges. Their command of the air, was demonstrated by the destruction of 276 enemy planes (115 in the air) during the Luftwaffe's periodic bursts of energy prior to D-Day.
Yawning pilots climbed into their Mustangs and Thunderbolts each day when the first sunlight stretched across the channel, often flew three of four missions lasting until dark. Ground crews on hand to refuel, rearm and repair, sweated out each mission and worked late in blacked-out hangers to have every possible plane ready for action the following morning.
The phase was keynoted by "Liaison and Learning". EM's and officers went to RAF operational centers to learn what the English had found out to coordinate their activities with the greater overall invasion plan. Simultaneously, others trained and planned with ground officers of units later to be part of the air-ground team.
Reconnaissance planes of the command flew for months over the heaviest flak defenses in the worked to photograph every detail of the invasion coast. The mission was as dangerous and as important as that of fighter-bombers.
"There is nothing more frustrating," said 1st Lt. Clyde B. East of Chatham, VA, a recce pilot, "than riding over the stuff someone below you is throwing up and not being able to do more than take pictures of it. What I wouldn't have given for one big bomb."
Early the wet morning of June 6, fighter-bombers roared down runways while it still was so dark pilots could not see the control towers. They flew that day and during the next days of assault in continuous, successful beach patrols to keep Allied troops free from air attacks. Within a short time the angry eagles also were clawing enemy troops and transports with destructive armed reconnaissance missions.
The groups moved to the continent as soon as strips were prepared--often while possession of the field itself was in violent debate. One thunderbolt group, commanded by Col. Morton D. Magoffin, of Deerwood, Minn, actually had to reverse its traffic pattern because of enemy flak positions. Weary pilots, along with everyone else at the base, spent unhappy nights diving into foxholes while Allied and Germany artillery exchanged blows. "Close air cooperation" probably never before had been so mean- ingful to the participants
S/Sgt Wade W. Frazee, of Oakland, Md, an armorer, had a narrow escape while on the job one afternoon:
"I was on the wing of a P-47 loading ammunition when three ME- 109's came down low and made a staffing pass. Ack-ack boys crippled one flying about 300 feet over me. It crashed down the runway. I just stood there on the wing until what was happening dawned on me. I hit the foxhole until it was all over, then went back to get the Thunderbolt ready for its next mission".
Incidents like this didn't prevent Sgt Frazee from servicing his plane's guns so well they fired 25,290 rounds without a stop- page.
Units to come in later assault waves (July and August) had been given something other than warm beer and Piccadilly Circus to remember England: flying bombs. Many units were located just under the "main highway" for V-1's, and pilots gained grim satisfaction in destroying them while returning from missions.
Nightly bull sessions under canvas were something like this:
"Here comes another!"
"Hell, no! That's an airplane"
"Oh, yeah? I never heard an airplane that sounded--OH-OH, it stopped"
"Well, there it went. I'll bet that was five miles away."
"Five miles! That wasn't an inch over two miles. By the one just before this sounded....."
The command's advance echelon came to France 2 July 1944 and moved to Nehou, joining Third Army Headquarters to plan for the job ahead. At last the "idea" and weapon had finished the "Plans and Training" Base, Groups, Wings, Command headquarters, all were prepared to give air cooperation to an army in the field, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third.
That was one week after the famous "Operation Cobra" in which a good portion of the whole Allied Air Forces participated. American troops massed along a line from St. Lo westward through Periers and Lessay were being held up by a lack of maneuverability and by terrain well adapted to defense. "Operation Cobra" was an all-out air attack on enemy positions in one small sector south of the Periers-St. Lo road followed by an all-out infantry -armor drive. Heavies, mediums, and fighter bombers made their bomb runs in waves. Group pilots reported "planes at all possible levels."
"For a while", commented Lt. Col. Frank S. Perego, of Can- adaigua, N.Y., "it looked as if we would have to signal with our arms in order to make a turn."
Air blasting shook the Nazis down to their socks. Rapid tank columns finished demolition of the tottering hedgerow line. One week after the epoch-making attack, Third Army and XIX TAC began the razzle dazzle end run that was to reach the enemy' ten-yard line one month later.
As Gen. Patton's armor coiled south and east towards Rennes, Nantes, and Lavel, enemy air opposition was so weak planes could fly 30 miles ahead of the armored spearheads in search of targets. Often air activity was halted by low rain clouds, but with the weather permitting, groups flew as many as five missions a day-- some squadron averaging as much as 11 hours and 41 minutes aloft.
The Breton Peninsula overrun in a few days, the bulk of the air and ground power wheeled and headed towards Paris. Some units were assigned the job of clearing out stubborn pockets in the ports. St. Malo surrender 17 August 1944. An ultimatum had been sent to the Col in command and while a squadron of Thunderbolts weighted with 500 pound bombs hovered menacingly overhead, he read "...the planes now over your forts will begin to dive bomb..."
The white flag was run up. P-47's and bombs went off to hit targets elsewhere.
Brest continued to hold out. Because of the call for air cooperation there and because of the advance on Paris, the command was forced to attack simultaneously on fronts 350 miles apart. Effective operations under these conditions demonstrated the flexibility of Allied air power. They were also a tribute to the harried operations sections in the commands, the wings, and he groups.
In one of the attacks on Brest, a squadron of Thunderbolts led by Lt. Col. Joseph L. Laughlin, of Omaha, Neb, now commanding the group then under Col. Magoffin, spotted a concentration of enemy shipping in the harbor. Slipping through a small hole in the clouds, Col. Laughlin destroyer a light cruiser while other Thunderbolts damaged a destroyer and 14 additional ships. It was one of the few cases in which fighter-bombers have destroyed a warship of cruiser class.
Armored columns often raced so far ahead of the general ad- vance that one of the important functions of fighter-bomber pilots was to report positions of our own armored spearheads. In this fluid situation Air Support Parties from XIX TAC attached to units of the Third Army proved indispensable in effecting the smooth cooperation between air and ground that was to become classic. They rode close to the heads of columns to identify strong points that sometimes were only a few hundred feet away and then watched fighter-bombers pulverize them.
One Tactical Air Command GI was pinned down by German machine guns spitting fire from hedgerows on both sides. While bullets tore into his trailer he called to a squadron of Thunderbolts overhead. In a couple of minutes both sides of the field were "policed up" by 96 machine guns.
A patrol was completely cut off by a German counterattack. A call for "all available aircraft" not only freed it but caused the complete rout of the enemy counter-thrust.
Many complications of air cooperation could not have been anticipated. Gen. Patton's army drove so rapidly that XIX TAC sections in charge of operations had to get larger scale maps to keep track of columns that ran off more detailed maps. Pilots had to check their well-conditioned impulses to blow up every bridge. Wrecked bridges in this type of warfare only served to slow progress of the troops. Front lines and "bomb-lines" moved so fast that greatly extended communications sometime made keeping situation maps up to date impossible. Long planned systems for rapid identification of ground units from the air were put into effect.
Capture of Gen. Elster's army climaxed the drive. Although credited as a great accomplishment it did not overshadow other fighters whose work all over the front vied with the river roundup in importance.
To the north fighter-bombers increased the destruction and congestion in the Argentan pocket where retreating German vehicles were jammed. Rocket-bearing fighters from Col. Anthony V. Grossetta's Thunderbolt group roared up and down the columns in search of tanks. In one mission they reported rockets blew open and destroyed 17 Tiger and medium tanks. Later in the day 13 more thick skinned tanks were punctured and left burning by the same pilots.
In from a squadron mission which had destroyed hundreds of vehicles, 1st Lt. John A. McNeely, of Clevland Ohio, said
"It would have been hard to shoot at the road in any place and not hit a German car or truck. We followed the roads right down, over hills and around corners until we ran out of ammunition. When we looked back, fires were flickering all along the roads."
Spotting a few Germans in a field, another squadron of Thunderbolts from the group commanded by Col. Robert L. Delashaw, of San Antonio, Tex, buzzed low for a strafing attack. Just before making their pass they saw nervous Nazis waving white flags. As the P-47's roared over their heads other jittery Ger-mans joined the first few. In a matter of minutes there were about 400, all frantically waving white cloths. Guarded by relays of cocky Thunderbolts, they formed columns of fours on the road and trudged off to Allied lines. The pilots radioed the nearest fighter control station to pick up the prisoners.
Air opposition grew as TAC planes stabbed at numerous German airdromes ringing Paris. Occasionally Mustang and Thunderbolt pilots were diverted from dive-bombing and strafing attacks by formations of enemy fighter. But the enemy gained only temporary diversion by these attacks. Nazi losses invariably exceeded the number they shot down. The battle for Paris airfields was climaxed 25 August 1944 , when the crack Pioneer Mustang Group commanded by Col. George R. Bickell, of Nutley, N.J. shot down 36 fighters and destroyed 13 more on the ground.
The main show still was ground cooperation and the weapon worked more smoothly every day. Gen. Patton presented the Bronze Star to Gen. Weyland for meritorious service with this commendation
"The superior efficiency and cooperation afforded this army by the forces under your command is the best example of the com-bined use of aid and ground troops I have ever witnessed."
"Due to the tireless efforts of your flyers, large numbers of hostile vehicles and troop concentrations ahead of our advancing columns have been harassed or obliterated. The information passed directly to the head of the columns from the air has saved time and lives."
"I am voicing the opinion of all the officers and men in this army when I express to you our admiration and appreciation for your magnificent efforts"
Close liaison between army and air command kept XIX TAC headquarters on the move. Weary GI's packed and unpacked tons of maps, radios, papers and miscellaneous equipment nine times in the trek across France. Harassed M/Sgt Thomas F. Quealey, of Brooklin- e, Mass who had repeatedly pitched and struck numerous administra- tive tents and the large "circus tens' used for combined operations snapped
"We're not only mobile, we're portable"
Chairtroopers suspected that some day they would each a town be- fore Gen. Patton's armor.
Communications, strained to the breaking point by the rapidity of the advance, was one of the greatest problems. While each move of Army's headquarters brought it in closer contact to its elements, the contrary was true of XIX TAC. Demands for ground cooperation had scattered the groups over a large section of central France. In 30 days communications men net-worked all of Brittany, most of the area between Paris and Loire River, and 140 miles beyond. Altogether, more than 500 miles of main trunk tel- ephone lines were laid by the hard-working communications teams.
Crews stringing lines to Air Support Parties at the front shared the misery of the infantry. They not only dodged shells and snipers but also took prisoners. When rapid communications were necessary they worked 18 to 20 hours a day setting up new lines, repairing old ones.
Not content with merely doing their job, these men also de- vised new ways and means of improving communications. T/Sgt Fred W. Warden, of Venice, Calif, developed a method of rewiring radio circuits that permitted transmission of homing signals to pilots on all wire channels, increased accuracy of transmission, and lengthened the range of transmission over 150 mile. Sgt. Warden was awarded the Bronze Star.
The Wings did a great deal in these days of difficult com- munications. Stationed at fighter fields, they maintained vital intergroup and ground-air coordination. The Army or Ground Liaison Officer also contributed much to their coordination. The GLO made certain that pilots always were well briefed on the latest positions of friendly troops.
Important functions were carried on through the Wings: operations reports from groups to command headquarters, field orders from command to groups, the abundance of routing paper work that is one of the unromantic but essential functions of any large military unit.
Groups often moved unto airfields in the wake of evacuating Germans. Usually they spent more time repairing their own bomb damage than anything the fleeing Nazis had been able to destroy. Control towers were erected on the edge of bomb packed runways; complicated repairs were made in the open because hangars had been blown up: functions of personnel, intelligence, operations, plans and training and supply sections often had to be kept at the usual high level of efficiency in the midst of the most primitive field conditions. War-weary typewriters rattled out detailed reports by flashlight while persistent rains helped keep the situation fluid.
Airdrome squadrons, normally the first Air Force units to reach an advanced landing strip, often performed near miracles in speedily rearming and refueling fighter and recce aircraft, and in rearing damaged planes. Little known even in the Air Force they came into their own during the sweep across France. To them must go a large share of the credit for the mobility of XIX TAC groups.
The offensive swept by Paris and stopped only when troops of the Third Army had occupied Nancy and had come within shelling distance of Metz. Here, the swollen Moselle River their moat, the ancient citadel of Metz their pivot, the Germans made a stand. During the next months Third Army consolidated, Regrouped and resupplied for the drive into Germany itself. With XIX TAC it continued to polish that deadly weapon--well knot air-ground attack.
Continual overcast and rains prevented a bang-up overture for the "Twilight of the Gods", but given the slightest chance Thunderbolts and mustangs pounded the concrete Maginot and Sieg- fried Lines. More important, they sided the attrition phase of the Battle of Germany.
Twice, during bitter fighting around Chateau-Salins, east of Nancy, squadrons took off under forbidding conditions to answer an Army call for help. Crusher were dangerous German tank counter- attacks.
Gen. Patton wrote to Gen. Weyland in part:
"...I feel that special emphasis should be placed on the truly heroic action of the 509th and 510th Fighter Bomber Squadrons which on 14 September, in support of the 4th Armored Division, took off in un-flyable weather, uncertain whether or not they could ever land. These units intervened at the critical moment of a tank battle, and by their skill and daring very materially assisted in the defeat and destruction of the enemy"
Sometimes unpredictable weather crossed pilots by closing in on emergency airfields all along the front where XIX TAC aircraft were scattered. Despite hostile elements, fighters went aloft tuned like Swiss watches. Skill, ingenuity, and mechanical craftsmanship of GI artisans of the flight line cannot be overrated. Working under arduous conditions ground crews made miracles S.O.P.
As groups leaped across France in nomadic fashion, even clearing cow pastures was necessary to set up airstrips as close as possible to the front lines.
The sudden flood which lapped over the Pioneer Group was one of the special events staged by Mother Nature on the road to German frontiers. Swollen by weeks of steady rain, the Marne River and its adjacent canal broke cross-country and almost inundated the group. The resulting scene must have resembled the famed trek of George Rogers Clark and his men across the flooded Ohio plains in early American history.
The modern"pioneers" waded waist deep in swirling waters to recover equipment, paddled around in dinghies and hastily impro- vised rafts, and finally navigated amphibious jeeps generously loaned by the ground forces.
Taking this amphibious operation in stride, a few days later, on 1 December the group knocked down three planes over Karlssruhe to celebrate its first anniversary of combat. A year before it had been the first to fly the new long range P-51B Mustang on escort duty with heavy bombers over Germany.
It was on one of these early long range escort missions that Col. James H. Howard of St. Louis Mo. then a squadron commander and later the group's commander, won the Congressional Medal of Honor. Single handedly he engaged a formation of more than 30 enemy fighters, which swooped down on a box of Fortresses. He kept them at bay by superb flying, he destroyed three and prevented enemy fighters from getting at the bombers. Conservative Col. James H. Howard, who was a "Flying Tiger" ace in China, claimed only three, but the heavy bomber crews thought the figure was closer to six.
On 24 August 1944 the Pioneer Group was awarded the Presi- dential Unit Citation
"for outstanding performance in combat against the enemy" their efforts "Being instrumental in the successful development and execution of long range protection of heavy bombers"
Except for local salient the Third Army front during October resembled an elongated S stretching from Thionville behind Metz, across the Moselle River, it curled several miles before Nancy to the Seventh Army front.
Ahead were Germans, entrenched in the commanding positions of the hills and ridges of Lorraine to set up house apparently for the winter. These well-chosen positions of vantage were ferreted out by vigilant recce planes, than accurately blasted by fighter bombers.
Thunderbolts and Mustangs slipped down between the hills to jab at front line troops and artillery positions. Like angry bees they buzzed German soldiers into a perpetual foxhole to foxhole hop- skip-and-jump.
Mere sight of a plane was enough to send the enemy scrambling for his foxhole, but even these places of refuge were far from safe when fighter bombers hit at almost vertical angles. Thousands of Psychological Warfare leaflets were released by Thunderbolts and Mustangs, urging the Germans to trade Hell, Hitler and Himmler for the safety of American PW cages.
Closer to Germany behind the rugged terrain of Lorraine, fighter bombers swept the Saar River and the Rhineland, always alert for enemy troop movements by rail and motor transport. Pilots bombed targets then strafed until ammunition ran out.
As the Third Army rolled back the borders of German occupied territory fighter bomber attacks were intensified. An Ordnance survey showed that Thunderbird's and Mustang's now were using five times as much ammunition per sortie than they did from D-Day to the St. Lo breakthrough, twice as much as they used during the closing of the Falaise-Argentan gap.
Few German targets escaped. Statistics revealed that there was less than one gun stoppage for every 5100 rounds of ammunition fired. GI ingenuity had much to do with this fine record. An ammunition booster developed by S/Sgt Albert Braun of Natrona, Pa produced a record in his group of 6800 rounds fired per plane without a stoppage. Sgt. Braun's invention prevented gravitational pull from disrupting flow of ammunition to a plane's guns when the pilot pulled out of a steep dive. Braun, a veteran of 20 years service in the Air Force, also is credited with modification of the gun sight now in use by his group. He was awarded the Bronze Star.
In October the P-61 Black Widow added "Intruder" missions to its nightly patrols. Prowling over Germany as soon as darkness fell, it seasoned with deadly spice the day's bill of fare provided by P-47's and P-51's.
These "fly by nights", powerful as medium bombers, equipped with radar devices, bristling with firepower, pounced on enemy rail and motor traffic. Germans who had heretofore ventured out under cover of night in comparative safety now were faced with unrelenting round-the clock staffing attacks.
This day and night mauling gave the Germans "50-caliber-itis". Occasionally they tipped their hands to Thunderbolt and Mustang pilots. One jittery German flak battery let fly at a flight overhead. Investigation disclosed a tank detraining point hidden by trees and a string of flat cars from which tanks were being driven off into the woods. Thunderbolts soon destroyed eight tanks, 20 freight cars, the locomotive and unloading ramp. As a gesture of gratitude, strafing and destruction of the ten flak positions along the tracks were saved for last.
Small wonder that German soldiers plodded into PW cages muttering "Jabos".
Enemy air activity was sporadic and almost nil close to the front lines. The Luftwaffe usually was cautious and unagressive, seldom seeking combat. The reluctance to fight was hard to ex- plain. Once, more than 20 ME-109's circled above a flight of four Mustangs strafing rolling stock on the deck but showed no signs of wanting to break up the party.
Meanwhile, units of the Third Army had entered Fort Driant, most formidable of outposts guarding Metz. Thunderbolts, in what was termed by Third Army as "one of the closest air-ground missions of the war", bombed pillboxes and emplacements ate the Fort's entrances to breach the way for infantry. Later that same day, 3 October 1944, the versatile Thunderbolts scattered as incipient German counter-attack in the area.
Active all along the front, Third Army sometimes made unusual requests for air attack. Blowing of the Etang de Lindre Dam, east of Dieuze, was one of these. XII Army Corps had advanced past Nancy to the Seille River. Ours division had made the crossing and was in danger of isolation from Corps if Germans loosed the Lindre Dam waters into the Seille River valley. To snatch this threat from German hands, XII Corps commander requested XIX TAC to breach the dam, the resulting flood to be controlled by front-line engineer battalions.
Because precise, pinpoint bombing was required, Thunderbolts supplemented medium and heavy bombers. For the first time in this Theater fighter-bombers were assigned such a mission.
On the afternoon of 20 October 1944, Col. Joseph L. Laughlin had two especially briefed squadrons in the assault on the dam. Wheeling out of murky Lorraine skies at 7,000 feet, Thunderbolts howled down to within 100 feet of the dam's surface to drop their 1,000 pound bombs, then dived through the intense flak again to strafe enemy gun positions.
Later that afternoon another squadron returning to the dam found water pouring through a shallow 10 foot gap near the top. The Seille River had risen four feet. Two days later all but the center of Dieuze was under water, and the flood had gone 12 miles beyond the town.
A spokesman for XII Corps said the blowing of the Lindre Dam and preventive flooding of the Seille River contributed to the success of XII Corp's offensive launched two weeks later. So successful was the flooding that Corps was able to combine local offensive preparations against enemy lines where the Seille had inundated them in the vicinity of Dieuze. XII Corps was ready for the big offensive.
This was the background of the drive on Germany launched 8 November 1944.
Despite low clouds and icing conditions, fighter-bombers flew two and three missions that day pushing airfields, marshaling yards, troop concentrations and artillery positions. Silver Thunderbolts bombed and stafed the CP of an SS Panzer Grenadier Division completely destroying the buildings housing the G-2 and G- 3, killing most of their occupants. Prisoners taken by ground units admitted the attack caused great confusion just as the Am- erican offensive was beginning to roll.
Pilots worked closely with ground controllers to remove troublesome enemy obstacles and on-the-spot targets. Reconnais- sance planes scoured the area, calling out targets invisible to ground forces. As one Air Support Party officer Capt. Albert G. Kelly, of San Jose, Calif, put it
"When we needed air, it was there"
This was probably the best description of air-ground coordination.
German troops and convoys withdrawing from Metz to avoid encirclement by Third Army pincers were pounded unmercifully by Thunderbolts. Bombs, rockets and bullets poured into Nazi columns from Metz east to the Rhine. Fighter-bombers ran up great totals of destruction.
First Lt. Arnold Mullins, of Bieg Shoals, Ky, flying with the group commanded by Lt. Col. J. Garrett Jackson, of Alteus, Okla, commented
"There's as much stuff on the road as there was at Avranches only here it's not packed as tight as it was there. At the end of the day I could see fires scattered all the way from the front back to the Rhine"
Thunderbolts and Mustangs destroyed 170 motor vehicles, 141 locomotives, and 630 railroad cars, besides 21 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground, during November 17, 18 and 19.
This was the tempo of XIX TAC's activities in November. Planes were sent aloft on 18 days, 13 more than the weatherman would have settled for at the beginning of the month.
Taking off from rain-soaked fields, often so muddy it seemed impossible for fighters to wrench their 1,000 and 2,000 pound bomb loads from the ground, pilots flew through heavy clouds, rain, snow, and with "just enough visibility to see the flak"
Some pilots forsook available leaves to fist front lines. First Lt. Richard H Parker, of Portland Ore, and 1st Lt. Francis "Buzz" Norr, of Tremonton, Utah, examined the wreckage in a wooded area they had bombed and stafed the day before. They talked things over with tankers and dough feet they had supported all the way across France. They found that there certainly was a basis for "Mutual admiration societies"
As December rolled around XIX TAC fighter bombers and recce groups moved close to the German border. Third Army broke through the Maginot Line and entered the Saar Valley to assault the Siegfried Line defenses across the Saar River.
Fighter bombers of XIX TAC spearheaded the advancing infantry and armor ranging ahead of front lies to batter German positions and potential counter-thrusts. In a message to Gen. Weyland, Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, XII Corps commander said:
"I wish again to express my appreciation for the outstanding part contributed by units of your command in supporting the successful attack of the XII Corps on the Maginot Line."
Two Thunderbolt groups, commanded by Col. Laughlin and Col. Jackson, were singled out for particular praise. Col. Jackson's group attacked enemy gun and troop emplacements holding up the 16th Infantry Division on the far side of the Saar River. This attack enabled the 16th materially to enlarge its bridgehead.
Later in the day, Col. Laughlin's "Maulers" took timely action on a strong counter-attack on the 3th Infantry Division. The "Maulers" aided the 35th in stopping the German tanks dead in their tracks.
A three way squeeze forced the Germans back from their salient. Ground forces hit the bulge from north and south while Fighter bombers hit ceaselessly from the air.
Air ground teamwork, a weapon forged and polished in battle from normandy's beaches, through Avranches, along the Loire, past Paris, across the Moselle, over Metz to the German Saar reached new heights of effectiveness in the battle of the Bulge. Long months across France and into Germany had fashioned an air-ground team which would acquit itself well in the campaign ahead.
XIX TAC story is of men who made its achievements possible. But further tasks lie ahead.
Gen. Weyland in his message to his command on its first ann- iversary, 11 December 1944 indicates the spirit of the XIX Tactical Air Command.
"There will be many tough days ahead. We must not relax now. I call upon each and everyone of you to continue to do a superb job and not to give the enemy a moments relaxation. We must continue to fly seek and destroy the enemy wherever we may find him"
The XIX Air Support Command was activated on 4 January 1944 under the Ninth Air Force. It was redesignated the XIX Tactical Air Command in April 1944, moved to the U.S. in August 1945, inactivated on 31 March 1946 and disbanded on 8 October 1948. The XIX TAC had two wings the 100th Fighter Wing and the 303 Fighter Wing.
The commanders of the XIX TAC were
Following is a partial list of units attached to the XIX TAC headquarters:
Following is a few known Staff members of the XIX TAC
In the book Patton's Third Army, Charles M. Province stated.
"The story of the Third Army was also a story of true and trusting teamwork between the ground forces and the new power of the airplane. The XIX Tactical Air Command became part and parcel of the Third Army, just as surely as General Patton was their commander, too. General Patton and General Weyland were the best of friends and the best of professional soldiers."
In February of 1944 General Weyland was given command of the XIX Tactical Air Command and was assigned to work with General Patton. General Weyland recalled the following.
"Initially, this was not looked upon as a highly desirable assignment. General Patton had achieved a reputation as being hard to work with, and he had a rather low regard for air power. however, this was to change rapidly as the XIX Tactical Air Command and the Third Army went into battle together. I visited Patton's several headquarters and combat divisions to indoctrinate them in the capabilities of modern tactical air power. In turn, he visited my combat units at their advanced fields. This was something new to him. He watched aircraft armorer's load on bombs and refill machine gun magazines, communicators check and tune the all- important aircraft radio, and mechanics repair and service the airplanes. The immaculately dressed army commander frequently got oil and grease on his hands and clothes--but he enjoyed it. He sat in on combat briefings before missions and listened to intelligence debriefings after the missions. He quickly achieved a new respect for air power. Whereas many ground commanders still believed that tactical air power should be subordinated to the ground force commander, General Patton agreed with me that he would command the ground and that I would run the associated tactical air forces. At the same time we both laid our cards on the table. We planned and executed our respective responsibilities in the closest of coordination. And he always kept his word.
General Patton kept close tabs on the performance of the XIX Tactical Air Command during the first few days of the Normandy breakout, and one day asked me to come offer to his living van. He Said
"I've never seen anything like the way your planes have cleared the way ahead of my tanks. Goddamnit, we'll stick together and roll right into Berlin. How about a drink, Opie?"
General Patton was the greatest army field commander I have ever known--and I've worked with a number in combat. He was audacious, but sagacious. Despite his colorful language, he had his own version of religion. Being a cavalryman, Patton believed in open warfare and in the old cavalry adage of , "When in doubt, attack." His philosophy suited me perfectly, because it enabled the tactical air command to fight most effectively. When friendly ground forces flush the enemy into the open, tactical fighters can hit them mercilessly with rockets, bombs, and machine gun strafing. We were agreed that, if at all possible, we should keep the initiative. We never let the enemy get set. We kept him off balance. Down to the last soldier and airman, the Third Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command considered themselves to be the best battlefield team of our time.
From an early attitude of skepticism, General Patton went to the other extreme. He thought that the XIX Tactical Air Command could do no wrong.
The XIX Tactical Air Command completed 1767 tactical recon- naissance missions and 77 Photograph reconnaissance missions resulting in the distribution of 3,205,670 aerial photographs.
The XIX Tactical Air Command completed the following feats;
The targets either destroyed or damaged by the XIX Tactical Air Command included
The A-3 section of XIX TAC issued this recapitulation on 1 September 1944.
"Durintg August the groups under operational control of this command flew a total of 12,292 fighter-bomber sorties. One hundred and fourteen aircraft were lost, but many of the pilots bailed out safely over friendly territory or found their way back through enemy lines. Our pilots claimed 165 enemy aircraft destroyed in aedrial combat and 56 on the ground. Complete claims as follows
Figures give only a partial picture of the results obtained during this crowded month of operation, since smoke, dust and the fleeting nature of fighter-bomber attack frequently make assessment impossible. After many attacks which pilots dismissed simply as "NRO" (no results observed), ground troops reported "guns silenced" or "results excellent" and were seen to move forward.
Pilots claims against ground targets include destruction or damaging of the following:
Stationary targets attacked by bombing or strafing, or both, include the following:
Reconnaissance aircraft flew a total of 599 missionns during August, of thich 522 were successful.
Missions flown consisted of the following:
In awarding Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland the Bronze Star, General George S. Patton commended the XIX TAC as follows:
"The superior efficiency and co-operation afforded the army by the forces under your command is the best example of the combined use of air and ground troops I have ever witnessed.
Due to the tireless efforts of lyour flyers, large numbers of hostile vehicles and troop concentrations ahead of our advancing columns have been harassed or obliterated. The information passed directly to the head of the columns from the air has saved time and lives.
I am voicing the opinion of all the officers and men in this army when I express to you our admiration and appreciation for lyour magnificent efforts."
Following is a list of the few known addresses of staff and command officers of the Wing
It was thought appropriate to include some data about the 4th Signal Air Warning Training Battalion. As a training command this battalion was the father of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion. Col. William L. McBride was in command of the 4th SAW Bn and the 563rd was assigned to his battalion to train. In addition to this Lt. Robert O. Schurke was Adjutant of the 4th SAW Bn and Maj. Maurice E. Byrne was S-3 Plans and Training Staff of the 4th SAW Bn. In addition to this Capt. Thomas J. Slattery and Capt. Franklyn A. Glassow were company commanders in training status under the 4th SAW Bn.
(1) Radar vehicles
(2) Personnel carrying vehicles
(3) Camouflage material
(4) Radio equipment
(5) Mess and Supply
(6) Medical Aid
(7) Platoon Headquarters
(8) Maintenance Vehicles or Wrecker
(1) Plotting Equipment
(2) Radio equipment
(3) Personnel carrying vehicles
(4) Camouflage material
(5) Maps and supply
(6) Battalion Headquarters
(7) Medical Aid
(8) Company Headquarters
(1) Camouflage of installation and personnel
(2) Dig in slit trenches for operating personnel and bivouac
(3) Installation of plotting equipment and radios
(4) Sandbag equipment
(5) Lay defensive wire
(6) Lay administrative communications
Lt. Col. Battalion Commander
Maj. Executive Officer
ADJUTANTS SECTION
1st Lt. Adjutant
WOJG Asst Adjutant
M/Sgt Sergeant Major (502)
Pvt Clerk, General (055)
T/5 Clerk, Typist (405)
T/5 Clerk, Typist (405)
Pvt Orderly (695)
Pvt Basic (521)
Pvt Basic (521)
Pvt Basic (521)
COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON
2nd Lt. Communications Officer
M/Sgt Communications Chief (542)
S/Sgt Wire Chief (262)
T/4th Frameman (089)
S-1 Section
1st Lt. S-1
Sgt Chief Clerk (052)
Pvt Clerk, General (055)
t/5 Clerk, Typist (405)
S-3 Section
Capt. S-3
Pvt Clerk, Supply (835)
T/5 Draftsman (070)
Pvt Draftsman (070)
S4 Section
Capt. S-4
1st Lt. Supply Officer Pvt Clerk Supply (835)
WOJG Motor Officer T/5 Mechanic, General (121)
T/Sgt Motor Sergeant (813) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
S/Sgt Mess Sergeant (824) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
S/Sgt Supply Sergeant (821) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
T/5 Armorer (903) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
T/4 Motor Mechanic (914) Pvt Truck driver, Lt (345)
T/5 Motor Mechanic (914) Pvt Truck driver, Lt (345)
T/5 Clerk, Supply (835) Pvt Truck driver, Lt (345)
Robert A Homan
2nd Lt. Sig C
Technical Officer
Sincerely
Arthur G. Root, Jr
Thomas Craig"
Glasgow (Debarkation) Scotland Jan 9 1944
Winchester England Jan 12
Leightons Buzzard Jan 26
Swanage Feb 8
Durnford Feb 22
Henly on Thames Mar 14
Andover Mar 17
Lenham (Maidstone) Apr 14
Sittingborne Apr 30
Headcorn Jun 1
Winchester (Marshaling area) Jul 3
Southhampton (Embarkation) Jul 8
Omaha Beach (Crossing) Jul 9
St Pierre Eglise France Jul 10
Gouberville Jul 13
Chateaugrion (Rennes) Aug 8
Montfort (Le Mans) Aug 27
Comteray Sep 5
Franchville (Toul) Sep 15
Fort Oct 9
Serres (Nancy) Nov 14
Erstroff Nov 25
Audon Le Tiche Dec 27
Longwy
Immerath Germany Mar 17
St Joann (Kassel) Apr 2
Alsfeld Apr 9
Nurenburg Apr 27
Munich Aug 15
Igolstadt Sep 7
Munich Sep 10
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Crew 4
Crew Chiefs
Sgt Fiebing Sgt Keith Sgt Jortner S/Sgt Fox
Acting Crew Chiefs
T/5 Skwarck T/5 Pond T/5 Jackson Sgt Schiefer
T/5 Cronin
Sgt Cummings
Cpl Knight
Pfc Gainor
Paul E. Bechtold
1st Lt. Air Force
312th Fighter Control Squadron"
R.D. #2 Lakeport Road
Chittenango, NY 13037 Ph (315)-687-3550
O. P. Weyland
Major General
Commanding"
Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada 4 Jan 1944
Col. Clarence E. Crumrine 1 Feb 1944
Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland 4 Feb 1944
Brig. Gen. Homer L. Sanders 23 May 1945
Col. Roger J. Browne 5 Jul 1945
Brig. Gen. James W. McCauley 25 Oct 1945
Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada 8 Feb 1946
Brig. Gen. Homer L. Sanders 25 Feb 1946
932nd Sig Bn
448th Signal Construction Bn
4th TAC Squadron
Coleman, Glenn C. Col. TAC Signal Staff Officer
O'Hern, Wayne L. Lt. Col. TAC Asst. Signal Staff O
Bert Maj. TAC Signal Staff O
Frerking, Harlan W. Lt. TAC Signal Staff O
Gaffney, John Lt. TAC Telephone Section
Mishelow, S. W. Capt. TAC Signal Staff O
Zorn, Seymour Capt. TAC Signal Staff O
Reed, Chauncey T/Sgt TAC Wire Chief
Schaafsma, Willen S/Sgt TAC Radio Section
Van Zandt, George Tech/4th TAC Telephone Section
Fowler, Bertrand Maj. Commanding 932nd Signal Bn
Harkins, Bayard Capt. Commanding Co A 932nd S Bn
Converto, Joseph Lt. Co A 932nd Signal Bn
Krashoc, Joe Lt. Co A 932nd Signal Bn
Crapson, Carmon L. M/Sgt Co A 932nd Signal Bn
Huffhines, Elmer E. Capt. Commanding Co D 932nd S Bn
Piette, Paul A. Lt. Co D 932nd Signal Bn
Graves, John M/Sgt Co D 932nd Signal Bn
Parton, George W. M/Sgt Co D 932nd Signal Bn
Ogden, Joseph, Jr T/Sgt Co D 932nd Signal Bn
Birdi, Hazura S. Tech/3rd Co D 932nd Signal Bn
Schatzel, George F. Cpl Co D 932nd Signal Bn
Karabush, Irwin Pfc Co D 932nd Signal Bn
Miller, William G. Maj. Commanding 4th TAC Sq
Smith, Clarence T/Sgt 4th TAC Sq
Missions 7,326
Sorties 74,447
Tons of bombs dropped 17,486
Naplan tanks dropped 3,205
Rockets Launched 4,599
German planes destroyed 1,640
Aircraft lost 582
Tanks and armored cars 3,833 Supply Dumps 220
Motor vehicles 38,541 Military installations 1,730
Locomotives 4,337 Gun installations 2,809
Railroad lines cut 2,585 Highway and rail bridges 285
Marshaling yards 974 Misc naval vessels 654
Towns and villages 816 Misc targets 3,010
Factories 3,664
Destroyed Probably Des Damaged
Enemy aircraft (in aerial combat) 163 16 34
Enemy aircraft ( on ground) 56 4 28
Totals 229 20 62
4,058 motor vehicles 2,956 railroad cars
466 tanks and other armor veh 155 barges and other craft
598 horse drawn vehicles 18 merchant vessels
246 locomotives 8 naval vessels
222 gun positions 17 airfields
39 marshaling yards 7 headquarters
11 ammunition dumps 44 troop concentrations
18 fuel and supply dumps 58 barracks and buildings
3 radar installations 122 rail lines cut
Tactical Reconnaissance 320
Photo Reconnaissance (Day) 258
Night Photo 12
Total 599
Sanders, Homer L. Maj. Gen. Commanding General
5716 Madeira PL NE Alberquerque, NM 87110-1211 (505)- 881-7982
States, Charles A. Col. G-4 Staff Officer
9201 Old Castle Road Valley Center, CA 92082 (619)- 749-2464
Click here to send message to WEBMASTER