PREFACE 

        The histories of World War II that I have read had very little to say
about the American occupation of Iceland from 1941 to 1945. The purposes of
that occupation - to secure Iceland from German aggression, to relieve British
ground and air forces that occupied Iceland in 1940, to secure the naval and
air bases in Iceland that were critical to the naval warfare in the North
Atlantic, and to provide an air base for the movement of large numbers of
aircraft from America to Britain - were all accomplished without major
incident. There was no ground combat and only a few intrusions by enemy
aircraft. From the beginning of the United States Army's involvement in
August 1941, the nature of the operation was classified and little information
was released to the public. This was particularly true of the aircraft warning
units, whose use of radar was a closely held secret.
        Even now, fifty-five years later, very little has been written. It is
generally known that the planes attacking Pearl Harbor on Dec 7, 1941, were
detected by an SCR-270-B radar which was not yet operational, but it is not
widely known that the same radar was in filll operational use in Iceland
before the end of September 1941. My intention in writing this book is to
provide a brief history of the aircraft warning units of the United States
Army Signal Corps that were deployed in Iceland, the Aircraft Warning Co TF4,
which became the Aircraft Warning Co, Iceland, which in turn became the 556th
Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion, and also to provide a place for
reminiscences of any members of that organization who might wish to contribute.
        I have relied mainly upon the official unit history files that are in
the National Archives, but have enlarged upon those accounts with help of the
cumulative memories of a few of us who have kept in touch over the years since
our time in Iceland. My hope is that these accounts will be of interest not
only to my flimily and friends, but to a larger community that may not know
much about the time and place.
        In looking back from the perspective of half a century, I find myself
impressed with how much a group of determined young people can accomplish when
given the opportunity and purpose that we were.



Allentown, PA, July 15, 1996    Lambert W Stammerjohn  


OFFICERS OF THE 556th SAW BN at CAMP ARNOLD and CAMP TINKER 1943

Bottom Stammerjohn, Maglhaes, Lowery, Baldwin, Lenz, Butz

Top ? , ? , ? , Jordan, Schroeder, Wicker, Helfer                    


History of the 556th SAW Bn in Iceland



        The Aircraft Warning Company Task Force 4, which became the Aircraft
Warning Comapny Iceland and grew to become the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning
Battalion, was formed to provide radar coverage and information center service
for the air defense of Iceland. Activated in July 1941, five months before the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it grew in two years from an initial strength
of 14 officers and 175 enlisted men to a maximum of 78 officers, 19 warrant
officers and 1374 enlisted men. In this time it installed and operated ten
radar stations, took over operation of three more from the Royal Air Force,
and built and operated two major and two satellite information centers. In the
following two years, three additional radars were installed to replace older
equipment, five other radars were shut down, the two satellite information
centers were closed, and the main information center was moved a second time
in a consolidation of operations. All operations ceased in May 1945 after the
surrender of Germany and the battalion was returned to the United States where
it was deactivated at the end of August 1945, shortly after the Japanese
surrender.
        To put the mission and accomplishments of the 556th into the
perspective of world events, we need to look at the United States position in  
world affairs before our entry mto World War II, or as the British call it,
the 1939-1945 war. After the initial defeat and occupation of Poland in 1939,
the war in western Europe between Germany and the allied British and French
involved no major campaigns. However, this changed suddenly in May 1940 with
the quick defeat and occupation of Denmark and Norway. Immediately after the
fall of Denmark, the British, with the consent of the Icelandic parliament,
placed an occupying force in Iceland to forestall any German move to
establish a presence there. At that time the Germans were known to have small
weather stations on the east coast of Greenland. Although the British
occupation of Iceland was a small part of the sweeping events in the European
war in 1940, Winston Churchili recognized its importance with the quote
"Whoever possesses Iceland holds a pistol firmly pointed at England, America,
and Canada. 9' With the evacuation at Dunkirk at the end of May 1940 and the
fall of France in June 1940, Britain was isolated in western Europe but was
widely engaged in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The security of the
North Atlantic convoy routes became both more difficult and more important to
Britain's survival.
        In 1939, the United States was aware of the developing situation in    
Europe but was not prepared for active participation in any conflict. At that
time the army had a strength of about 175,000 ground forces with the total in
all of the other services being about an equal number.  Maneuvers held in the
summer of 1939 at Plattsburgh, New York, were described by Lt. William H
Vogel Jr who participated in them as lacking in both equipment and manpower.
The start of the war in Europe in September 1939 changed our attitude on
military preparedness. In November 1939, the Neutrality Act was repealed
allowing sale of supplies and materiel on a cash and carry basis. In 1940,
President Frankin D Roosevelt declared an unmited national emergency in May,
and Congress enacted a peacetime military draft in September.
        In April 1941, the British established bases for air and naval forces
in Iceland to protect a vital portion of their North Atlantic supply route.
With bases in Newfoundland and Iceland they were able to cover most of their
northern convoy route with sea and air patrols. Also in April 1941, the
United States extended its security zone in the Atlantic Ocean eastward to
West Longitude 26 degrees and undertook the defense of shipping in the
western part of the Atlantic. In June 1941, President Roosevelt decided to
establish an American base in Iceland and the American presence m the North
Atlantic was flirther extended eastward to include this island which is only
about 800 miles from Norway and Scoiland. It was flirther agreed with Britain
that American forces would take over the defense of Iceland and relieve the
British garrison there. Also in June 1941, Hitler's Germany invaded Russia
thereby converting the Soviet Union from a relatively passive bystander in
Europe to an active ally and creating an eastern front that would divert
major German effort from Britain and the west. It also opened the need to
supply this new ally by sea by convoys to Murmansk. On July 7, 1941, U S
Marines arrived in Iceland as a first step in our occupation. Task Force 4,
including the Aircraft Warning Co TF-4, arrived in Iceland on August 6 to
establish an air defense capability there. The Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor was still four months in the future, but the United States Navy was
escorting convoys from the States to Reylgavik on a combat basis, and the
elements of Task Force 4 were working with haste to achieve a flill combat
ready status.
        At the time of the British occupation in 1940, Iceland was an
independent nation giving allegiance to the King of Dennmrk. It had become an
independent nation during World War I. It had a long tradition of self
government; it was the seat of Europe's first parliament, the Althing, which
met in 930 AD. In 1941, Iceland had a population of about 135,000 people. By
1942, American army, navy and air force personnel in about the same number
were stationed there. Most of the Icelandic population was in the capitol
city, Reyljavik, and in the other towns and villages located nearby in the
southwestern part of the island. In addition, there were fishing towns and
villages and small land holdings around the entire coast.
        Iceland is the second largest island in Europe after Great Britain.
East to west it measures about 300 miles, and from north to south about 200
miles. The northernmost part of the island lies just north of the Arctic
Circle. Due to North Atlantic currents which derive from the Gulf Stream, the
temperatures in the southern part of Iceland are surprisingly mild. The
annual average temperature in Reykjavik is only a few degrees lower than that
in New York City, but the summer average temperature is only about 50 degrees.
However the weather is often stormy with frequent high winds of gale and
hurricane force. Because it lies above North Latitude 63 degrees, there are
several weeks in the surner when it is light for 24 hours a day, and the
weather can be very pleasant. And conversely, in the winter the days are only
four hours long and the weather is often stormy. The interior of the island
was largely barren wilderness. The largest glacier in Europe, the Vatnajokull
is in the southeast part of the island. Although there were many hot springs,
in the early 1940s none of the known active volcanoes had ni~~jor activity.
The major geo-thermal wonder was Geyser which has given its name as a generic
term for spouting hot springs all over the world. And a major engineering
project brought hot water from some of the hot springs to Reyljavik to
provide heating.
        One of the most striking features of Iceland is its barren grandeur.
There are deep woods and the mountains rise steeply for several thousand feet
around much of the shore line. The highest mountain in Iceland reaches to
almost 7000 feet. The road net was rudimentary and not adequate to handle
large trucks and other heavy equipment. And much of it could not be used
throughout the year because of weather and flooding. Practical access to most
of the coast was by sea. All in all, the geography, climate and state of what
is now called the infrastructure presented major challenges to the troops
charged with establishing radar coverage and aircraft warning information
centers to protect the entire island.
        Although the Aircraft Warning Co TFA was formed in July 1941, the
story of American radar in Iceland begins on June 20, 1941, when 1St Lt
Albert J Gilardi, Tech Sgt Henry Sawyer, Staff Sgt John Hipp and Sgt Roy E
Irminger of the 1st Aircraft Warning Co, Fort Monmouth, NJ, were selected for
a reconnaissance mission to "Indigo". That same day, on telegraphic orders
from the Adjutant General's Office, Fort Monmouth, they proceeded by truck
and train to Charleston, SC, where they reported to the Commanding General,
1St Provisional Marine Brigade, aboard the US Navy transport USS Orizaba.
They sailed on June 22, arriving in Iceland on July 7, 1941, the day President
Roosevelt publicly announced the arrival of the United States Marines in
Iceland.  The directive which Lt Gilardi received in sealed orders enroute to
Charleston envisioned the deployment of the 1st Aircraft Warning Co and the
1st Operations Co and the AW Co's seven SCR-270-B radars in "Indigo". The
team was to reconnoiter potential sites for the seven radars. 
        Upon arrival in Reykjavik, Lt Gilardi made contact with the Royal
Corps of Signals and the Royal Air Force and learned that Mr Ewing, a
civilian engineer from the Air Ministry, was in Iceland on a similar mission
and that he had made recommendations for sites along the south coast of
Iceland. Three of these locations Grotta point, Olfils, and Vik Myrdal, had
been approved and construction had started or was imminent. A small Fighter
Control Room had been designed for plotting data from these radars.
        The last two weeks of July were spent in reconnaissance of the
southern part of Iceland, the Keflavik, Thingvallvatn and Vik Myrdal areas.
The first site chosen was on Thorbjorn, an extinct volcano near the village
of (irindavik. With an elevation of 785 feet, it was felt that this together
with the British stations already planned would give adequate coverage for
the critical Reylgavik area. But it was also learned that only in the
Reykjavik - Keflavik area were the roads and bridges capable of modest
upgrading to handle the heavy trucks and trailers of the SCR-270-B radars.
Elsewhere it would be necessary to construct the fixed station version, the
SCR-271. It was also learned that the roads would not pennit the building or
supplying of installations in the interior of the island. The first two weeks
of August were in reconnoitering the northern, northeastern and eastern
coasts of the island. Sites were chosen at Siglunes (north central), Skalar
(northeast) and Vattarnes (east). The British had studied and selected a
fourth site at Vesturhom (southeast). This reconnaissance was completed and
Catherine also was the site for all of the radio transmitters used for
communication with the radar sites, and later was the location of the radio
transmitter and large rhombic antenna used for communication from the Iceland
Base Command to the United States. Although this camp was an excellent site
for the radar and the transmitters, it was a difficult location for a tent
camp. The ground was rocky and the clay soil when wet would not hold pegs. The
camp was exposed to high winds and rain was common. Tents could be kept up
only by guying them to the trucks. Quonset huts were issued late in September,
and by October 10, all troops and equipment were installed in them. The
author commanded thiscamp early in 1942 and can attest to the winds and the
rain. At that time, in one storm with hurricane winds it was necessary to go
around to all the huts on a continual patrol to iusure that the corrugated
sheet metal shells remained nailed in place. That day we saw a number of
planes which were anchored in Skeijaijordur, Short Sunderland flying boats and
PBY5 Catalina amphibians, that capsized and sank in the high waves. Some
Icelandic cottages below us on the ridge were destroyed by the wind.  The 
The SCR-268 was a 200 MHZ radar designed for anti-aircraft gun laying. It had
transmitting and receiving antennas mounted on two booms that extended about
10 feet on either side of a central rotating pedestal. The pedestal could
rotate through 360 degrees in the horizontal plane and the booms could also
rotate to a 90 degree elevation. Designed to track targets and not to search
for them, the main antenna lobes were relatively narrow and the range was
short, about 25 miles. This made target acquisition difficult and the duration
of tracking short. The booms and antennas were also quite vulnerable to high
winds, making it necessary to tie them down during the all too common gale
winds. A civilian technical representative came to Iceland with us to modify
the SCR-268's to extend the range to 75 miles. Unfortunately, this fix did
not work and had to be removed. However, the use of the selsyn motors to relay
azimuth and elevation information and the removal of the A scopes (or range
scopes) to a Quonset hut, made operation possible in the less severe weather
conditions.  
        The second platoon that departed Camp Tripoli on August 29,
established Camp Sleepy Hollow at Thorkutlastathanes, about one mile east of
the village of Orindavik. There they installed an SCR-27~B radar and a tent
camp. This radar had good coverage south over the ocean and also to the north
over ReyljaV�.   The platoon of 33 men was commanded by 1st Lt Willard S
Magathaes and the second in command was 1st Lt Robert H Eberle. The initial
tent camp was located in a sandy gully with some partial protection from the
wind, but it was not suitable for the increasingly inclement weather and was
quickly replaced by huts when they became available in late September. The
camp was also the base for a platoon of the 21St Engineers under 2nd Lt Frank
Kohihoff.  They were building a road up the side of Thoii~orn, the extinct
volcano chosen as a permanent SCR-270-B site. The road was spectacular, a
single straight ramp which rose over 600 feet in less than a mile. Both AW Co
and engineer personnel worked on the road, which was completed without a major
mishap in December. There was one close escape with only minor injuries. One
night, one of the trucks carrying personnel and pulling a 2 wheeled trailer
carryng nitro-starch lost its brakes on this downgrade. It was only slowed
enough to avoid disaster by one of the men climbing over the tail gate of the
truck and setting the hand brake on the trailer.
        During the last week of August 1941, a temporary Fighter Control Room
was set up in a small Nissen hut adjoining the RAF Coastal Command Operations
Room at the Reykjavik Aerodrome. Equipped with a plotting table, a BD-72
switchboard and EE-SA field telephones, it was connected to the radar
equipment and the radio transmitters at Camp Catherine by 5 pairs of field
wire and from there to Camp Sleepy Hollow by radio. Later field lines were
laid to Camp Sleepy Hollow by the British Royal Signals. With two radars
ready, the Fighter Control Room went into operation on August 31. The radar
at Camp Sleepy Hollow became operational on September 1 RAF Olftis came on
line on September 5 and RAF Grotta came on line about September 15.
        On September 16, 1941, a large army force including the 5th Infantry
Division arrived in Rey~avik~ And on the night of September 15-16, the radar
at Camp Sleepy Hollow reported an echo from the vicinity of Faxafioi of great
enough strength to suggest several to many aircraft. This was at a range of
about 70 miles from the radar. This occrred just as the Controller and the
Filter Officer and the plotters were being relieved. The author was the Filter
Officer coming on duty; 1St Lt Newland Baldwin was the officer going off The
outgoing shift elected to stay, and being senior remained in charge. The
echoes were tracked for several minutes and then disappeared. Because of the
presence of the convoy m the harbor and the certainty that no friendly
aircraft were in that area, the Controller decided to scramble several P40's.
Since it was dark at this time and the fighters were not equipped for night
interceptions or navigation, this presented a serious problem in controlling
them and bringing them back safely. There were no runway lights, so all
available trucks in the area were positioned along the runway with their
headlights shining on it. All of the planes landed safely and the radar
reported no flirher tracks in that or any other vicinity. The radar return was
never flilly explained, but the author suspects from later knowledge that the
return was from the mountains north of Faxafloi and was due to refraction,
possibly from an inverted thermal.
        During the months of September and October, 1941, the three RAF radar
stations became operational. Telephone lines were completed to RAF Grotta and
RAF Olftis and both were reporting data to the temporary information center.
Detachments were sent to each of the three stations to study the operation and
maintenance of the equipment in anticipation of taking over their operation.
The detachment that went to RAF ~ik also set up and operated a radio link to
the information center. The author was sent to RAF Olftis in September as
part of the initial detachment. The officers and other ranks of the RAF
provided excellent instruction and hands on experience. At that time, the
commanding officer at Oltus was Flying Officer Douglas Gooderham, RCAF. His
second-in-command was Pilot Officer Eric Worthington, RAF. For most of us, it
was not only necessary to learn the equipment, but also to learn the mother
tongue as spoken by the English, the Scots, the Welsh and the Canadians and
to pick up the idiom of the RAF.
        Detailed planning for the first permanent information center was
started as soon as the temporary center was operationaL The site selected was
four miles east of Reykjavik on the Alafoss road. The center was housed in a
specially constructed Nissen storage hut that had floor space of 48~4 feet and
a height of 18 feet. There were two adjoining standard Nissen huts which
housed the radio and telephone equipment. The large floor space allowed for a
combined filter and operations map table that was about 15x20 feet. On this
was painted a map of Iceland and the sea approaches 150 miles east and south
and 75 miles north and west, and a map grid for plotting aircraft positions.
Around this central table was a two-tiered U-shaped balcony with positions for
a Controller (of fighter aircraft), a Radar Officer, an Aircraft Movement
Liaison Officer, an Antiaircraft Artillery Liaison Officer, and a Naval
Liaison Officer plus their assistants, status clerks and tellers. Plotters
connected to each radar station placed pips on the appropriate grid
coordinates as they were received. These pips were color coded to agree with
the colors of five minute segments on a master clock. This allowed the
observers to estimate aircraft speed. A filterer working at the table laid
down a series of arrows indicating the most probable direction and position as
derived from multiple observations.
        The center was adapted from the design that was used in the RAF
installations in Britain. No photographs of the operating portions of this
room were taken due to the highly classified information involved. The
security surrounding what we were doing and where we were was careflilly
maintained. Lt William L Zapponi was largely responsible for the room design
and the design of the telephone layout that was used. Lt Newland Baldwin was
responsible for the design and installation of the radio net that supplied
tactical and administrative communication.
        The Hickam Information Center was completed early in December 1941 and
replaced the temporary information center at 0800 hours on Dec 7, 194 1. The
Radar Officers initially assigned for shift duty that day were Lt Zapponi, 1st
Lt Clarence A Lundy, and 2nd Lt Lambert W Stammeijohn. The system, which had
grown to five radars reporting in to this center had been in existence just
under 10 weeks. At this point, flirther expansion was not possible with the
original personnel of the Aircraft Warning Co TFA. 
        The shortage of operating personnel had been foreseen. On Nov 13,
1941, a detachment of the 556th Signal Battalion, AWS (Separate), was formed
at Mitchel Field with 11 officers and 189 enlisted men. On Dec 11, 1941, this
unit left Mitchel Field and traveled to the Brooklyn Port of Embarkation where
it boarded the USA T Chateau Thieny and sailed the same day. Accompanied by
two other ships, the Chateau Thieny was convoyed by the battleship USS North
Carohna, a cruiser and three destroyers to Halifax, Nova Scotia. There the
Chateau Thierry joined a larger convoy which was accompanied by the USS Ar~
and numerous destroyers. Both legs of the voyage were characterized by bad
weather (not surprising in the North Atlantic in December). The Chateau Thieny
arrived in Iceland on Dec23, 1941. The detachment disembarked on Dec 24. Part
of it, 7 officers and 89 enlisted men, went immediately to Camp Hickam. The
remainder were housed temporarily at Camp Tripoli.
        At the arrival of this "second echelon" the Aircraft Warning Co,
Iceland, was redesignated the 556th Signal Battalion, Aircraft Warning Service
(Separate) per General Orders No 9, Headquarters, Iceland Base Command, dated
Dec 23, 1941. With the new detachment, the total strength was 25 officers and
366 enlisted men. The battalion was organized into two companies, the
Headquarters Company and Reporting Company A. The Headquarters Company
included the Plotting Platoon; Company A comprised all of the radar station
operating platoons.  Although the names are not recorded inthe official unit
history for 1941 (which was written in 1943), the author's recollection is
that at this time M~ (later Lt Col) Kenneth F March was the commanding
officer, Maj Charles Nellis the executive officer, and Capt Walter E Lotz,
3rd, the commanding officer of Co A.  The year closed with the battalion
operating two radar stations, Sleepy Hollow and Catherine, and the Information
Center at Camp Hickam. The RAF were operating two radar stations, Olflis and
Orotta, and were repairing a third at Vik which had been damaged by high
winds. The four radar stations reporting to the Information Center provided
partial coverage for the critical area of south western Iceland. Two policies
which were to characterize all later operations were already apparent. There
was a strong medical section attached to the battalion to provide coverage for
the remote locations, and a system of rotation of assignments for personnel
was in effect.
        The beginng of 1942 saw the start of the expansion of the radar 
system to include stations on the north, east and south coasts of Iceland, a
growth from four to eleven operatmg radars. Construction of the SCR-271-B site
on Thorbjorn, near Grindavik, had started in December, 1941. This unit, named
Vail, replaced the temporary site at Camp Sleepy Hollow. The construction
included the permanent installation of the antenna mount at the peak of
Thorbjorn and the installation of the transmitter, receiver, and operating
position in a nearby Quonset hut. The antenna mount was modified by adding a
selsyn motor to provide a remote indication of azimuth at the operator's
position in the hut. The radar as designed had an azimuth ring at the base of
the antenna which the operator read through a window in the operating van.
Two LeRoi gasoline-powered engine generators were located in a second hut
somewhat below the operating hut and in the crater of this extinct volcano.
Since the radar was originally equipped with only one engine generator, some
ingenious improvisation was needed to synchronize the two generators and
provide continuous power when switching between them. By April, camp
construction was under way in the crater. And on April 19, 1942, the Camp
Vail radar was operational, replacing the one at Camp Sleepy Hollow. Planning
and construction of this site were under the direction of 1st Lt Albert J
Gilardi with the assistance of 1st Lt Robert H Eberle.
        On Jan 13, 1942, a detachment of an officer and 15 enlisted men 
departed Reykjavik for Heimey in the Vestmanne~ar aboard the MS Eldoi.  They
were equipped to construct a camp and begin preparation of a site for an
SCR-270-B, to be permanently installed in the same fashion as the one at Camp
Vail. A second detachment of an officer and 15 enlisted men with the radar
equipment departed Reykjavik on Mar 27 aboard the 55 Deame. The radar was
sited just outside the village of Kaupstathur. This station became known as
Camp Page and was placed in operation on Apr 7, 1942. The first commanding
officer was 1st Lt Robert H Eberle. An interesting note about camp names is
that Camp Catherine was named by Lt Newland Baldwin whose wife's name was
Catherine. Camp Page was named by Lt Eberle whose daughter's name was Page.
Sometime in late 1941 we received a directive that camps should be named only
after deceased nillitary personnel. The author's recollection is that someone
quickly discovered that a Revolutionary War hero named Page was honored in the
naming of Camp Page.
        In February, 1942, the SCR-268 radar at Camp Catherine was shut down
and moved to Camp Cornell near Thingvellir to provide radar coverage to the
east of the Reykjavik area. This new site became operational on Mar 17, 1942.
The initial commanding officer was 1st Lt William H Vogel. Camp Catherine,
which was the site of the battalion's radio transmitters and the larger
transmitter used for communication with the States, became the headquarters of
Reporting Co A.
        Cooperation with the RAF in planning and operating the radar system
was close. A Wing Commander Jackson was assigned as RAF liaison to our radar
and fighter control operations. In November 1941, Major March went on several
weeks detached service to the United Kingdom to learn more about the operation
of the RAF home radar chain. In March 1942, 1st Lt William L Zapponi and 2nd
Lt Lambert W Stammeijohn were sent on detached service to the United Kingdom
to study the filter and operations centers and the home radar chain. They were
placed in the charge of the newly formed Electronics Training Group office at
the Embassy in London, and were given carte blanche by the RAF to go wherever
needed to obtain this information. The author spent much time at the HQ RAF
60 Group, talking with civilian and service technical people and visiting
radar sites, but also had a chance along with Lt Zapponi to visit the big
underground Fighter Command Operations Room at Bentley Priory, north of
London.
        In March, 1942, the 556th took over operation of the British ACH radar
located at Olfils. This camp was renamed Camp Lee.  Using the resources that
were at hand, one flirther radar was installed in the summer of 1942. On Aug
6, 1942, 2 officers and 35 enlisted men established a tent camp near the
village of Kefiavik and just to the north of the new airfield that was
constructed on that peninsula. Since there were not enough personnel in the
556th to man this station, the Signal Corps personnel were augmented by
troops from the loth Infantry (security) and the Field Arillery (wire and
radio communications). The initial commanding officer was the author, 1st Lt
Lambert W Stammeijohn. The other officer was 2nd Lt Joseph Samra, loth
Infantry. The SCR-270-B radar was the one that had been installed originally
at Camp Sleepy Hollow and was set up at Howard as a field installation. It
was operational on Aug 13, 1942. Huts for personnel were erected by the middle
of September.
        This was the total expansion possible with the strength of the
battalion in the summer of 1942. Recommendations for additional personnel and
equipment had been made by the Commanding Officer and the Commanding General,
Iceland Base Command, and had been approved. But flirther expansion and
implementation of the plans awaited the arrival of more troops.  On July 5,
1942,4 officers and 1 enlisted man (radio operator) accompanied the
detacliments of the 5th Engineers which left Reykjavik to construct camps and
radar sites at Siglunes, Skalar, Vattarnes and Vesturhorn on the north and
east coasts of Iceland. Each of these stations would be equipped with an
SCR-271 radar (the fixed station version of the SCR-270-B). On Aug 28, an
officer and 6 enlisted men, as a cadre for planned Company D, left Reykjavik
for Budareyri to establish a company headquarters and information center there. 1st Lt William Zapponi was the first commander of Company D.
The personnel, 31 officers and 687 enlisted men, needed to complete the
planned organization of the 556th Sig AW Bn (Sep) arrived in Reykjavik on Aug
31, 1942, aboard the SS Ormondie and SSDutchess ofBe~ord On that same date,
the organization of the 556th was expanded to include a Headquarters and
Plotting Company, Companies A and B (reporting) and Companies C and D
(composite). The additional personnel for Companies B, C and D were in this
arriving group. Most of the personnel were disembarked and stationed in
existing camps, permanent and temporary, but 4 officers and 137 enlisted men
destined for Company D remained on the Dutchess of Bedford to go to Budareyri.
On Sep 6, this ship was attacked by a Focke Wulfe 200 off Reydarijordur.
Several bombs were dropped without damage. When disembarked, the Company D
personnel moved to Camp Myer, the company headquarters near Budareyri.
        In the latter part of September, 1942, the 1st Reporting Platoon of
Co D moved by ship from Budareyri to Vattarnes and Camp Lockwood. The radar at
this site became operational on Oct 13, as did the information center at Camp
Myer.  On Sep 25, 1942, the Headquarters, Filter and 1st Reporting platoons of
Company C, left Reykjavik aboard the SS Lochnogar for Siglunes and Akureyri.
The 1st Reporting Platoon was landed at Siglu~order and conveyed to Siglunes
by tank lighter. The other platoons continued on to Akureyri and occupied Camp
Murphy. The first commanding officer of Company C was 1St Lt Robert H Eberle.
Camp Ray radar became operational on Oct 22. The information center at Camp
Murphy became operational on Nov 2. The author was briefly stationed at Camp
Ray prior to the completion of the installation of the SCR-27 1. It is his
recollection that he was replaced by 1st Lt Claude W Hiers, who was the first
commanding officer of the operational station.
        The 2nd Reporting Platoon, Company C (2 officers and 44 enlisted 
men), and the 2nd Reporting Platoon, Company D (2 officers and 44 enlisted
men), left Reykjavik on the SS Lochnogar on October 13, 1942. The Co D
personnel were landed at Budareyri Oct 15 and temporarily housed at Camp Myer.
The Lochnogar then proceeded to Skalar where it landed the personnel of 2nd
Platoon, Company C. The 2nd Platoon, Company D, was moved to Camp Evans on
Vesturhorn near Hofli in three echelons between Oct 22 and Nov 10. Camp Evans
reported operational on Dec 2 and Camp Greely on Skalar reported operational
on Dec 6, 1942. It is the author's recollection that the first commanding
officer of Evans was 1st Lt William Dixon. The camps at Ray, Greely, Lockwood
and Evans were isolated and remote. None were supported by road or trail. All
had to be supplied from the sea over relatively exposed beaches. Each of these
stations had a resident medical officer assigned. The wisdom of this was borne
out when it was necessary for an emergency appendectomy to be performed at
Greely. Shortly after the surgery the weather cleared enough for a PBY-5 to
land and to evacuate the patient to the base hospital in Reylqavik.  Also in
October 1942, the battalion took over the operation of the RAF radars at Vik
and Grotta, thus adding Camps Freser and Adams to the battalion. The complete
system as planned was now operational within sixteen months from the arrival
of the Aircraft Warning Co TFA in Iceland.
        The battalion had its first experiences in hostile action in 1942. On
Aug 14, an unidentified aircraft was first tracked by RAF ~ik at 0921 hours
heaiag west. At 1000 hours, the Navy reported that an aircraft was attacking
a convoy about 30 miles south of Grindavik. At 1030 hours, a track was picked
up about 25 miles west of the Kefiavik peninsula headed north. The track then
turned east about 10 miles north of Skagafios or Skagi Point as it was called
in the battalion history for 1942. The intruder was identified by intercepting
fighters and by observers at radars and ground observer posts as a Focke Wulfe
200. It was destroyed by the fighters over the ocean about five miles west of
Reyi~avik. The radar track was lost at 1100 hours. The radar officer on duty
was 1st Lt William H Vogel. The author remembers this event well because he
was at Camp Howard which had become operational only the day before. Despite
all of Lt Vogel9s coaching, Howard did not track this plane nor could I get a
visual on it.
        On Oct 18, 1942, the AAAIS reported sighting an aircraft identified as
a JU-88 headed southwest from Borgarnes at 1300 hours. It was picked up by gun
laying radars at 1331 hours. An interception was made by fighters and north of
Thingvallavatn it was disabled by one of the fighters crashing into the tail
of the JU-88. All contact was lost at this time, but the wreckage was later
found on Mount Esja. The radar officer on duty was Lt Aaron Goldman.
        On Oct 24, 1942, a visual sighting of a Focke Wulfe 200 was reported
by observers at Thingvellir at 0735 hours. This aircraft had previously been
tracked by radar. At this time at least one radar was tied down due to high
wind. All were ordered back on the air and some tracks were reported, but
radar contact was lost again at 0820 hours. Fighters which had been scrambled
at 0800 hours were ordered to land. The track was picked up again at 0836
hours about ten miles southwest of Reykjanes. It was tracked east and was lost
at 0859 hours about 15 miles south west of Thingvallavatn. The hostile was
engaged by fighters at 0910 hours. It was destroyed and crashed near Akranes.
The radar officer on duty was Lt Frank C Hesch, Jr. In addition to the
aircraft destroyed, Camp Lockwood at Vattarnes reported five sightings and
engagements with ground fire in October, 1942. Four of these were Focke Wulfe
200~s. One was aHeinkel 111.
        In retrospect, it appears that all of these flights were interested in
the convoys in the vicinity of Iceland and in the convoys and naval forces in
Hval~ordur and Reykiavik harbor. The activity at Vattarnes was probably due to
it being the closest point to their base in Norway and an obvious navigational
fix. This interest is not surprising since the strategic importance of Iceland
in 1942 was the protection of our shipping in the North Atlantic.
        In August and September 1942, construction was begun on two camps
located about seven miles east of Reykiavik on the Kaldadames road. Camp
Arnold was planned as the battalion headquarters and Camp Tinker was to house
a new Information Center and the personnel to operate it.
	The battalion was fast outgrowing the facilities at Camp Hickam. By
the end of the year, both camps had enough huts to house some personnel and
functions of the battalion.  During 1942, a smnall number of officers and
enlisted men were reassigned to the United States including twelve highly
qualified enlisted men who were sent to Officers Candidate School in March.
        In November an additional 99 enlisted men arrived from the States as
replacements for losses to OCS and for medical reasons. With this final
increase, the strength of the battalion at the end of the year was 58
officers, 2 warrant officers and 1137 enlisted men. New arrivals had been
assigned throughout the battalion, and officers and enlisted men with more
experience in Iceland had been reassigned throughout the battalion.
        By 1943 the role of Iceland in World War II began to change. It
continued to be a vital base in the Battle of the Ailantic, but with the
German arrnies more heavily involved in Russia and North Africa the sense
that Iceland was garrisoned to prevent a Geman occupation was fading. A new
role as an important way station for ferrying aircraft and crews to Britain
came into play.  In the spring of 1942, the only US Army and Army Air Force
personnel in Britain were attached the embassy staff By 1943, the US 8th Air
Force was growing rapidly there. The movement of bombers, fighters and crews
from the United States to Britain was accomplished by flying in stages from
Maine to Nova Scotia or Newfoundland and then to Iceland and on to Scotland.
A typical flight unit was a heavy bomber, B-17 or B-24, providing navigation
for four long range fighters. On several occasions the 556th's radar coverage
provided critical navigational assistance.  For the 556th Signal A W Bn, 1943
was the year that it reached its greatest strength and the year in which it
began a ni~~~or reduction in its tactical role. It was also the year that a
major rotation of personnel began and in which modernization of equipment
could begin.
        On Feb 26, 1943, the battalion was reorganized once again with a
Headquarters Co, Plotting Co, Filter and Communications Co, Co A Reporting,
Co B Reporting, Co C Composite, Co D Composite. This organization provided the
changes to facilitate the operation of the new Information Center at Camp
Tinker. In the latter part of April the Battalion Headquarters and
Headquarters Co moved from Camp Hickam to Camp Arnold. At the same time,
Plotting Co and the Filter and Communications Co moved to Camp Tinker. The
Information Center at Tinker became operational on April 28. And on May 6,
the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion (Special) was redesignated the
556th Signal Aircraft Waning Battalion "without change of station, strength
or assignment".
        In May 1943 Lt Col Kenneth F March, who had commanded the unit from \
its inception, was transferred to Drew Field, Florida. On May 21, Lt Col
Robert E Lowery assumed command with Major Willard S Magaihaes as the
executive officer.
        On Jun 19, 1943, the last major increase in personnel reached Iceland.
This detachment under the command of 1st Lt Max C Jordan consisted of 20
officers and 257 enlisted men who had been trained at Drew Field. The
detachment traveled by train to Camp Myles Standish, Massachusetts, on May 10.
On June 1, they proceeded by train to Boston where they boarded the SS
Hawaiian Shipper. They immedditely sailed to New York where they waited five
days to join a convoy. With the arrival of this detachment, the battalion had
reached its greatest authorized strength, 78 officers, 19 warrant officers and
1374 enlisted men, including 10 officers and 76 enlisted men in a medical
detachment and 1 officer and 1 enlisted man, chaplain and assistant.
        On Aug 5, 1943, one of our fighter aircraft, while in direct radio
contact with 2nd Lt Walter C Quednau at Camp Ray, shot down a four-engined
enemy aircraft off the northern coast of Iceland. The pilot reported the
position of the dQwned aircraft and the fact that there were at least six
survivors in a life raft. We quote the report made by 1st Lt Claude W Hiers,
Commanding Officer of Company C.
        On 5 August 1943, approximately 1545 hours, Lt Quednau, Commanding
Officer of Camp Ray, received information over the Air-Ground Radio from the
friendly fighter planes that a German four motor bomber had been shot down
approximately ten (10) miles north of Grirrisey Island. The pilot of the
friendly fighter aircraft said there were at least six (6) survivors from the
German bomber floating in a life raft and one appeared to be seriously
injured. The position of the life raft with survivors was approximately 42
miles from Camp Ray and 30 miles from the nearest point on the main land of
Iceland.  After receiving this information, Lt Quednau immediately telephoned
the Filter Center in Akureyri and asked permission to take their Army MT boat
out to capture the German survivors. Permission was granted by the Commanding
Officer, Northern Sector.  At approximately 1630 hours, 2nd Lt Quedhau,
Commanding Officer, Camp Ray; Captain Riley, Camp Medical Officer; M Sgt
Prichard, Platoon Sergeant; Sgt Lapsley, Supply Sergeant and TIS ~~illitts,
the MT boat driver left Camp Ray or Siglunes to rescue the German survivors.
They were armed with Thompson Sub-Machine guns. After the rescue party left
Siglunes Point they had to sail by compass as visibility was poor and they
could not see Grimsey Island or the fighter plane circling the German life
raft.
        The weather at the time the rescue party departed was very uncertain
and could prove very dangerous to a small boat in open sea. The wind was
approximately 10 miles per hour from the North-West, sea swell moderate,
visibility about 15 miles with a low brQken overcast.  As soon as the MT boat
left Siglunes, the fighter plane circling the survivors, was contacted by
radio from Camp Ray and told to be on look out for the MT boat and direct it
to the German survivors. The MT boat proceded to within ten miles of the life
raft before the fighter aircraft saw them and directed them to the raft. The
rescue party found the life raft and seven (7) unarmed survivors about 2000
hours. The rescue party searched the German survivors and had them board the
MT boat. They then proceded back in the direction of Siglunes.  At
approximately 1830 hours a 50 ft. Navy tank lighter arrived at Siglunes with
supplies for Camp Ray. It was immediately dispatched to go out and meet the
MT boat and accompany it back to Siglunes. The MT boat and the tank lighter
were directed together by the fighter aircraft, and made contact about 1 hour
after the MT boat rescued the Germans. The German survivors were transferred
to the tank lighter and both the MT boat and the tank lighter proceded on
their way back to Siglunes. After approximately 1 hour the MT boat and tank
lighter met an English ship "Great Admiral". The Germans were transferred to
the English ship and the MT boat and tank lighter proceded back to Siglunes.
Both the MT boat and tank lighter arrived at Siglunes at 0130 hours 6 August
1943."  For this action, the five members of the rescue party were awarded the
Soldier's Medal. As listed in General Orders No 59, Hq US Army Forces Iceland,
29 August 1943, they were:
        Captain Clarence J Riley, 0499891, Medical Corps, United States Army,
For heroism in Iceland on 5 August 1943. Residence at appointment: Providence,
Rhode Island.
        Second Lieutenant Walter C Quednau, 01634240, Signal Corps, United
States Army. For heroism in Iceland 5 August 1943. Residence at appointment:
Maywood, Illinois.
        Master Sergeant Harold H Prichard, 6925014, Signal Corps, United
States Army. For heroism in Iceland 5 August 1943. Residence at enlistment:
Grand Saline, Texas.
        Sergeant Thomas A Dapsley, 35476649, Signal Corps, United States Army.
For heroism in Iceland 5 August 1943. Residence at enlistment: McMee,
Kentucky.
        Technician Fifth Grade Paul Willitts, 32240916, Signal Corps, United
 States Army. For heroism in Iceland 5 August 1943. Residence at enlistment:
 Keansburg, New Jersey.

The medals were presented by Major General William S Key at a review on Sep
24, 1943. The battalion was represented by two companies passing in review.
They were the Filter and Communications Company, commanded by 1st Lt William
F Tracy, and the Plotting Company, commanded by Capt Lambert W Stammeijohh. A
photograph of the medal recipients taken then shows only four recipients. Lt
Quednau was on leave in the United Kingdom.  Sometime earlier in 1943, a
policy of allowing leaves in the United Kingdom had begun. By September a
number of small groups of officers and enlisted men had been granted leave.
Rotations of personnel to the United Kingdom and to the United States were
also started. In October, 111 enlisted men left the battalion on rotation.
During the year, 15 officers left the battalion and were reassigned as
follows:

AC, Adin (0) OCS, Miami Beach, Florida                  1
Chief of Staff; US Army, for subsequent reassignment    2
Drew Field, Florida                                     1
Eighth Air Force                                        3
SOS,ETOUSA                                              2
Army General Hospital                                   1
Third Air Force                                         5

The battalion historical report for 1943 does not identity the reassigned
officers by name. However, the following is a partial list of the original
officers of the Aircraft Warning Co TF-4 that had been reassigned by the end
of 1943:

1941 -	1st Norbert C Miller - US - medical
1942 -	Capt Walter E Lotz, Jr - US
1943 -	Lt Col Kenneth F March, Capt Albert J Gilardi, Capt Edgar M Matthews,
        Capt William L Zapponi, 1st Lt Clarence A Lundy - US
1943 -	Maj Willard S Magalhaes, Capt William Dixon, Capt Robert H Eberle,
        Capt Lambert W Stammerjhn, Capt William H Vogel - UK

        In September 1943, the 556th began to close the more remote radar
stations and filter centers and to concentrate coverage on the southern coast
and the southwest sector of Iceland, where the important naval and air bases
were located. Also a program to replace older radar equipment was begun. On
Sep 7, 1943, the SCR-271 at Camp Lockwood (Vattarnes) was taken out of service
and the camp evacuated. On Sep 10, the information center at Camp Larkhill
(Budareyri) was closed. And on Sep 11, the SCR-270-B at Camp Page
(Vestmanneyar) was shut down and the camp evacuated.
        On Sep 15, 1943, an SCR-602 radar was set up at Camp Howard to
supplement the SCR270-B. The SCR-602 had previously been used to prove in a
radar site in the Khambar Pass region above the Olftisa.
        On Nov 17, 1943, the two SCR-268's at Camp Cornell (Thingvellir) were
shut down permanently and the personnel moved to Camp Harrison in anticipation
of creation of a new radar site. On Dec 24, the SCR-271 at Camp Oreely
(Skalar) was closed. On Dec 25, Camp Evans (Vesturhorn) went off the air. And
on Dec 28, the information center at Camp Murphy was closed and the camp was
evacuated. The SCR-271 at Camp Ray (Siglunes) continued to operate until the
end of the year, but was shut down shortly thereafter.
        The personnel from Camp Page were assigned to Camp Cameron (Khambar
Pass) where an SCR-271 was being installed. This unit became operational on
Dec 31. The personnel from Camps Larkhill and Lockwood in Company D were
relocated in Camp Swansea which became a casual camp for personnel being
reassigned. At the end of 1943, the battalion was reduced in strength to 74
officers, 3 warrant officers and 1287 enlisted men.  The camp closings and
evacuations that began in 1943 were continued in early 1944. On Jan 6, Camp
Murphy (Akureyri) was evacuated. Camp Evans (Vesturhorn) was evacuated on Feb
20,and Camp Greely (Skalar) on Feb 26. And finally on Mar 7, Camp Ray
(Siglunes) was evacuated.  All of these personnel were relocated to Camp
Swansea. On Mar 31, Company C (11 officers and 202 enlisted men) left the
battalion and Iceland.
        Rotation of personnel continued for the first half of 1944 beginning
with the rotation to the United Kingdom of 1 officer (Chaplain), 1 warrant
officer, and 191 enlisted men in early January, and ending in July with the
departure of4 medical officers and 1 dental officer. During this period a
total of 19 officers, 2 warrant officers and 542 enlisted men left the
battalion, while replacements in the number of 10 officers and 220 enlisted
men arrived. Company C Composite was removed from the table of organization.
And in September, "old" Company D was redesignated Company C. At the end of
1944, the battalion strength was 56 officers, 3 warrant officers and 1037
enlisted men.

        On Apr 20, Major Frank E Herrelko assumed command of the battalion,
taking over from Lt Col Robert E Lowery, who was relieved due to illness. The
556th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion was to continue under the command of
Lt Col Herrelko with Major Homer E Hornung as executive officer until its
deactivation in 1945.

        Extensive modernization of the radar equipment was carried out in
1944. The SCR-271 at Camp Cameron (Khambar Pass) had become operational just
at the end of 1943. On Apr 15, a new SCR-5 88 was put in operation at Camp
Harrison (Kefflavik area). On May 8, a new SCR-271-EA was put in operation at
Camp Vail (Thorbjorn). This unit was located about half way down the mountain
on the southern face. It replaced the SCR-270-B which was one of the oldest
radar units in the army. On Nov 8, an SCR-27 1 -EA became operational at Camp
Howard (Keflavik) replacing the SCR-270-B which was first deployed at Camp
Sleepy Hollow (Grindavik). This was probably the first US Signal Corps radar
to be operated around the clock in an air defense mission. On Sep 15, The
British CHL radar at Camp Fraser (Vik) was taken out of service and salvaged
for usable parts. Camp Fraser was evacuated. On Oct 16, the British ACH radar
at Camp Lee (Olfi~s) was shut down and dismantled. Camp Lee was evacuated at
the end of the month.
        Sometime in 1943 or 1944, the baralion took over the additional
function of providing radio direction ftnding ([)F) coverage for aircraft
operations. DF equipment was operated at Camp Cameron and Cainp Vail, and
Camp Cleveland was established near Akranes as a third station. Other units
were in operation at Patterson Field and Camp Rising (Kefiavik area). With
these units in addition to the radars, the battalion was able to give valuable
assistance to friendly aircraft and to provide help in emergencies.
        On Feb 22, 1944, at about 1530 hours, the radars at Vail and Howard
were asked to look in a certain area for a lost B-17. At about 1635 hours,
both stations picked up a distress signal in this area and were ordered to
track it. At 1655 hours, Adams also picked up this signal and was ordered to
track it. Based on the filtered track information, fighters were sent out and
intercepted the B- 17. They escorted it to Meeks Field where it landed safely.
        On Feb 23, 1944, at about 1510 hours, a distress signal was picked up
by Fraser and Vail. Vail was immediately ordered to track this target. At
1514 hours, Howard also picked up the distress signal and was ordered to track
it. The target was a lost B-17 far off course. With the radar information
provided, Meeks Field was able to direct the aircraft to a safe landing there.
At about 1830 hours, Dec 18, 1944, Meeks Field reported that they had weak
radio telephone contact with a B-17 conting from Goose Bay, Labrador. The
aircraft reported only 45 ntinutes of filel remaining. The crew were
uncertain of their position and asked for assistance. At 1854 hours Meeks was
told that the plane had been stripped and that preparation was being made to
ditch. At almost the same time, Vail picked up a distress signal from the area
being searched. Upon being given their position by Meeks, the aircraft crew
decided to attempt to land there. Using the ifitered radar tracks, the
Aircraft Movements Liaison Officer was able to give Meeks headings that were
relayed to the aircraft. Directed this way, the aircraft was finally able to
sight the cone of searchlights over Meeks Field and land safely with only 25
gallons of tuel remaining.
        During the latter half of 1944, many of the battalions camps were
consolidated near Keflavik and Reykjavik. At 0001 hours Jul 16, a new
Information Center at Camp Hopkins ~eflavik area) became operational,
replacing the Information Center at Camp Tinker, which closed at 2400 hours
on Jul 15. All Tinker personnel were relocated to Camp Hopkins. The battalion
headquarters and the Headquarters Company moved from Camp Arnold to Camp
Hopkins on Jul 10. Camp Arnold was closed on Jul 31, when the battalion motor
pool moved to Camp Monmouth (Reykjiavik area). Camp Swanseen which was
occupied by Company D headquarters and had served as staging area for Company
C in its move to the United States, was closed on Apr 17, when Company D moved
briefly to Camp Curtis and then to Camp Monmouth.
        At the end of 1944, the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion was
oerating five radars, Adams, Cameron, Hairison, Howard and Vail, and an
Information Center at Hopkins.
        During the first five months of 1945, 21 officers and 189 enlisted men
went to the United States on rotation. The battalion received 6 officers and
29 enlisted men as replacements. In the same time 11 officers and 277 enlisted
men went to the United States on Temporary Duty. And 13 officers and 262
enlisted men returned from TD. The battalion's monthly historical reports for
this period contain no operational information but make frequent reference to
morale-boosting activity: the opening of an Sergeant's club at Camp Hopkins,
dances, ENSA show, skiing, ice skating, four motion pictures a week,
basketball, bowling, badminton, the formation of a battalion orchestra.
        The battalion historical report for May 1945 starts with the
following: 
        "Two weeks after Colonel General Gustav JOdI sat down in a dusty old
school room at Reims and unconditionally surrendered Germnny to the Allies,
the radar stations of the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion went off the
air.
        More than three and a half years of scanning the skies for enemy
planes were to the credit of this oldest of overseas radar units when at 2400
hours 21 May 1945 switches clicked on verbal orders from the Assistant Chief
of Staff; G-3, Iceland Base Command, and operators scrawled 'ceased
operations' on their log books."
        Steps were taken immediately to consolidate all companies at Camp
Hopkins. Operational control of the radar unit at Camp Howard was transferred
to the 1386th AAF BU NAD ATC (which the author suspects means Army Air Force
Base Unit, North Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command). The DF units at
Cameron, Cleveland, Patterson Field, Rising and Vail closed in May.
        Camp Adams (Grotta) also closed on May 31 All personnel returned to
Camp Hopkins. There was a flurry of activity to straighten out personnel and
equipment records. The first equipment turned in were gas masks and winter
clothing. The "point system" was announced. T5 Charles R Hill, whose World
War I serial number 407561 was always puzzling company clerks, died suddenly
of a coronary thrombosis on May 3, before he could apply for discharge under
the provisions of WD Circular 125, which granted civilian status to those
over 42 years of age.
        In June 1945, the consolidation at Camp Hopkins was completed. The
activity there was to keep the troops busy. A ball field was built and the
Information Center was converted to a gymnasium. Weapons and helmets were
turned in. And in July, the long awaited orders arrived: movement to the USA
on or about Aug 5. Twelve officers with technlcal specifications were
transferred to the US by air. Movement of personnel in and out within the
Iceland Base Command continued. The battalion had in effect become a
collection of personnel awaiting shipment to the United States.
        Camp Hopkins was evacuated at 1300 hours, Aug 6, 1945, by 25 officers,
1 warrant officer and 499 erinl:ed men, who boarded the SSDutchess of Bedford
at 1400 hours, bound for the United Kingdom and transshipment to the United
States. The battalion commander, Lt Col Frank E Herrelko, was Commander of
Troops. Late on Aug 9, the battalion debarked at Liverpool and went
immediately by train to Southampton and Camp C-18 arriving there the next day.
The battalion stayed in Camp C-18 for about two weeks which allowed time for
passes to London and other nearby places. The battalion was in C-18 on V-J
Day when the news was announced at midnight. Most walked into Southampton and
joined in the celebrations in the streets there. On Aug 23, at 1300 hours, the
battalion left Camp C-18 and boarded the British liner Queen Ehzabeth, which
sailed on Aug 26. Despite crowding and heavy weather it was a happy trip with
few complaints.
        The monthly report does not detail the arrival in the States, but
merely notes that the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion was deactivated
on Aug31, 1945. General Order No 48, ARMY SERVICE FORCES, New York Port of
Embarkation, Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, dated 31 August 1945, directed that
"personnel would be transferred to appropriate Reception Stations" and that
"no personnel would be reduced in grade as a result". With these practical
directives, the service of the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion was
ended, four years, one month and twenty-one days after the Aircraft Warning
Company TFA was activated.
        The official historical reports of the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning
Battalion end abruptly at this point. They are short and to the point. No
attempt was made to summarize or evaluate the contributions made by the 556th.
That was left for others to address in the fliture.
        The Aircraft Warning Co TF-4, the Aircraft Warning Co Iceland, and the
556th Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion were always shrouded in secrecy. Their
presence in Iceland was public knowledge, but the job they performed, the
equipment they used and their accomplishments were all secret. Indeed, the
word radar was a classified secret until the end of World War II. It is not
surprising that the vision and ingenuity, the dedication and hard work, and
the risk and courage that went into creating and maintaining this early radar
and fighter control system were not noticed either then or in the histories of
World War II.
        The function of the Iceland Base Command was mostly unknown to the
American public. The few news articles filed by correspondents read more  like
travelogues than accounts of mllitary activity. The initial secrecy was
necessary for military security during a critical part of the Battle of the
Atlantic. The purposes - to provide a secure base for naval operations, to
prevent German occupation, and even to serve as a eastern bastion for the
United States and Canada if Britain had fallen - were all accomplished.  The
progress of the war in Africa and in eastern Europe placed sufficient stresses
on Germany that no movement westward was forthcoriing and our forces in
Iceland were never severely tested. And with the flow of events, the base in
Iceland became additionally a waystation for the movement of aircraft and
crews from the United States to Britain. The aircraft warnng units played a
vital part both in the air defense and in the air transport role. The work was
important, but the nation~s attention was on the more critical and dramatic
aspects of the war. It is not surprising that the troops who persevered
through four years of difficult weather and field conditions thought of
themselves as the FBI - the Forgotten Bastards of Iceland.
        The importance of the work of the 556th Signal Aircraft Warning
Battalion goes well beyond its accomplishinents in Iceland. It was one of the
first, if not the first, United States aircraft warning organniation to go
into the field under combat conditions. It provided sorely needed experience
and training in the logistics and details of tactical operations. Several
hundred officers and enlisted men from the 556th went on to serve in other
theaters and other units. Many served in units of the Ninth Air Force in
Operation Overlord and throughout the subsequent campaigns in Europe. Others
returned to the United States to provide training and cadres for new units
being formed.






RADARS AND INFORMATION CENTERS -1941-1943
CAMP                    EQUIPMENT             OPERATIONAL
Reykjavik Aerodrome     Info Ctr              31Aug41
Sleepy Hollow           SCR270B               01Sep41
Catherine               SCR268                05Sep41
RAF Olfus, Lee          ACH                     Sep41
RAF Grotta, Adams       CHL                     Oct41
Hickam                  Info Ctr              07Dec41
Cornell                 SCR268                17Mar42
Page                    SCR270B               07Apr42
Vail                    SCR270B               19Apr42
RAF Vik, Fraser         CHL                    Oct 41
Howard                  SC$270B               13Aug42

Lockwood                SCR271                13Oct42
Myer-Larkhill           Info Ctr 1            03Oct42
Ray                     SCR271                22Oct42
Murphy                  Info Ctr              02Nov42
Evans                   SCR27I                02Dec42
Greely                  SCR271                06Dec42
Tinker                  Info Ctr              28Apr43
Cameron                 SCR271EA              31Dec43
Harrison                SCR5S8                15Apr44
Vail                    SC~71EA               08May44
Hopkins                 Info Ctr              16Jul44
Howard                  SCR271EA              08Nov44


Camp Catherine, the eastern white circle near Reykjavik, is not labeled. The
RAF Vik CHL was severely damaged by wind and not operational in Dec 41. It
became operational again in 1942. Between Sep 43 and Dec 43, the radars at
Ray, Greely, Lockwood, Evans, Page and Cornell and the Information Centers at
Murphy and Larkhill were shut down and the camps evacuated.