Why has the Labour party done so little to reform the British Constitution?

At first sight, it would appear that the ability to alter sections of the (unwritten) British constitution would be easier than in other democratic countries. The executive in the Commons has the ability to push through the appropriate legislation (provided it can assure the necessary majority), there is no stated level of support needed (as is the case in the United States, where a two-thirds majority in both chambers is needed), and there is no supreme judicial check on the legislation passed by Parliament. These, it would seem, would make a suitable political climate for constitutional reform.
Furthermore, a party basing itself on a democratic internal structure and supported by the economic backbone of a country would seem sympathetic to allow more representative and balanced government than currently exists in this country. It is thus apparent that, given the lack of constitutional reform in Britain over the course of the last eighty or so years, there will be major barriers in other places that have prevented this change.
Firstly an examination of the theoretical possibility of reforming the constitution is needed. Despite the lack of a need for a stated level of support in the legislature, it is indeed necessary to have widespread support for the reforms proposed, or one risks a reversal of policy upon a change in power after the next General Election. This requires a mandate following an election or referendum. Secondly, the Labour Party itself is not the party one would obviously associate with reforms of this nature; that mantle would be held by the Liberal party. The Labour Party, as a socialist movement, seeks a change in the economic system of the country to eliminate the unacceptable features of market-driven capitalism. To do this requires the passage of tracts of legislation detailing the necessary changes. Given the ability of the British government to carry through legislation, it can be seen that the structure of power in Britain suits the goals of Labour (and indeed, socialism in general) to advance their cause. A powerful executive, an electoral system that produces majorities, and a judiciary which "knew its place," meant that the goals of socialism could be achieved through the existing power structure and have left a history of satisfaction with the current constitutional arrangements within the Labour party.
This can be confirmed by reference to various documents throughout the movement's history that show the lack of any disillusionment among the leadership regarding the suitability of the constitution for carrying out their plans once in power. The early Fabians proclaimed their faith in parliamentary institutions and their suitability for socialist purposes, once the House of Lords was removed. The constitution, in their view, offered the opportunity to complete the democratic revolution. Similarly, Ramsay MacDonald, first Labour Prime Minister (albeit in a coalition) in the 1930s, had as early as 1910 set out his opposition to reforms including proportional representation, the use of referenda, etc. He believed that a kind of constitutional collectivism should reflect the economic collectivism that Labour would bring; he was also anti-individualist. Harold Laski, writing in the 1920s as one of the foremost political thinkers of his day, rejected the ideas of referenda, devolution, and proportional representation, saying that it threatened to fragment government. He advocated change, primarily the adoption of a written constitution and a network of committees, but believed that this could still work within the present system. Even when he appeared to harden his opposition to the constitutional and political system in the 1930s, he still did not call for constitutional reform, and by the 1940s had returned to celebrating the current constitution. Furthermore, Herbert Morrison, a member of the Cabinet in the first ever solely Labour government of 1945-51 spoke of his admiration for parliamentary democracy of the kind that existed in Britain; he reinforced the belief, widespread among socialists at the time, that the constitution could be used for socialist purposes.
That is not to say, however, that there has always been a consistent opposition to constitutional reform. There have been individuals who have advocated changes to various parts of the system of government. Jowett in 1906 proposed plans for parliamentary reform, which involved making parliament more like local government; these plans were inspired more by his dissatisfaction with the Labour parliamentary leadership than any intrinsic merits they held.
Some ideas involved replacing Parliament with a form of worker's control or co-ordinated functional representation, more commonly known as "guild socialism." Proponents of this theory questioned the model of grafting socialism onto the existing parliamentary model. Finally, Webb's "A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain" (1920) showed that the architects of Fabianism also shared the doubts about the suitability of the parliamentary system for socialist purposes. Webb advocated the idea of a dual parliament instead, with both a political and a social dimension.
Despite these objectors, the general mood of socialism was favourable to the existing constitution. The acute economic difficulties of the 1920s put an end to this dissension, and instead a new mood of determination was formed, lead by Stafford Cripps, later to become Chancellor in Attlee's government. He urged the rapid execution of a radical socialist agenda, which involved the streamlining of parliament. No longer was there a need to diffuse and constrain state power; if anything, this new mood advocated strengthening still further the power of the executive.
Thus it is possible to conclude that part of the reason Labour has been reluctant to initiate constitutional change is due to a lack of will; once they had succeeded in winning an election they would be in a position to take advantage of the power at the government's disposal to implement their socialist agenda. So it was therefore in their interest to do nothing that would jeopardise that power.
It is quite obvious that in order to govern, one must be the party of power; Labour's ability to carry out its policies has been curtailed by the short period it has spent in office; since the end of World War Two, it has spent only 17 years in power out of a possible 52. Had it been in power for a longer period, we may have seen a development in policies that dealt with the issues we are discussing here. Essentially, for single-term governments, economic and social issues are more pressing than matters of constitution, and even then the second half of the term may be dogged by fears of defeat at the next election, and effort devoted to reversing unpopularity rather than passing legislation.
It has more often than not been the case that a Labour government has been faced with more important issues to deal with than constitutional reform. During the 1920s and '30s, there was a massive economic downturn across the developed world, which was the pressing concern of the contemporary coalition governments in Britain. This depression was only resolved with the onset of the Second World War, which was directed by a coalition government under the control of Churchill. Once the war was won, Labour was returned for the first time ever as the sole party of government, and not only that, but had a landslide majority of well over 150 seats.
This mandate was, unsurprisingly, not a signal from the electorate for the government to engage in a programme of constitutional reform; on the contrary, that was probably the last item on the government's agenda. Britain in 1945 was almost bankrupt, with many of her cities and industries in ruins. The process of recovery and rebuilding took precedence over any constitutional reform that the government would have proposed. Reconstruction of the tangible was imperative; the constitution was the least of the ordinary person's worries.
Towards the end of the forties, Labour became split over the issue of welfare funding, and subsequently lost the next election. Throughout the 1950s, this legacy of division remained, with the party effectively split between supporters of Gaitskell and Bevan. Further splits occurred over the issue of nuclear disarmament. Labour was to return to government 13 years later, and this only thanks to Macmillan's committal of electoral suicide as a result of the "night of the long knives" in which he sacked one-third of his Cabinet for fear of a challenge to his leadership. Neither had the Suez debacle done the Tories any favours. Still, the swing to Labour was not a reflection of any great enthusiasm for socialism; it was a simple "worst of two evils" situation. In the end Labour's majority was so slender - just four seats - that there was no question of dealing with complex issues at that time. Labour only gained a mandate after an election in 1966, gaining a majority of 98 seats over the Conservatives who were now lead by the dull Edward Heath.
From 1966 onwards, Labour set about trying to reform the House of Lords. Specifically, Labour was concerned about the ability of the Lords to frustrate and delay Commons business. However, it was initially unclear what form the reforms should take. At an inter-party conference held in late 1967 and continuing into 1968, it was agreed that the Lords would be reformed into a two-tier system with voting and non-voting peers, with hereditary peers allowed to serve their time, but not replaced upon their deaths. There would be an inbuilt but small government majority, and the amount of time a Bill would be allowed to be delayed would be just six months. However, as a White Paper was beginning to be drafted, Conservative opposition emerged from members of the Shadow Cabinet, who saw Labour's decline in the polls and successive by-election defeats at this time as an opportunity to go on the offensive. This opposition wanted a postponement of the date of reform until after the next election, saying that the government could not reform when it had no popular support. Meanwhile, Tory peers were eager to debate the White Paper and reform the Upper Chamber as quickly as possible lest the chance be lost. Eventually the White Paper was prepared by May 1968, but a devastating counter-plot saw this plan for reform replaced by more urgent and drastic measures, with several issues resolved at the inter-party conference watered down. This modified White Paper had a rough passage through the Commons, with many Labour MPs voting against it. Although it cleared the Lords easily, the subsequent Parliament (No. 2) Bill was delayed by backbench opposition in the Committee stage, and with a lack of cross-party co-operation, it was feared that it could drag on through the summer of 1969 and upset the rest of the government's legislative agenda. Eventually, the decision was taken to withdraw the Bill just after Easter in 1969.
This defeat showed how difficult it is to achieve constitutional reform without a widespread consensus of support. Yet it was also reflective on the inability of this particular government (led by Harold Wilson) to govern effectively and decisively. Although further commitments were made to see the programme through if returned in the 1970 general election, Labour's defeat meant that it was not to be seen whether a second attempt would have proven any more successful than the first.
Labour returned to government in 1974 as part of a coalition with the Liberals. Six months later, they strengthened their mandate by calling another election, and were returned with an overall majority. Once again, however, it was pressing issues of an economic nature that dominated the political scene; Heath's administration had been on a downward slope after the miner's strike of 1972, and the industrial unrest continued. More immediately, the 1975 referendum on Britain's membership of the EEC occupied much of the government's attentions. However, the government was able to publish a White Paper proposing a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh assembly in November of that year. This provoked much debate - nationalists thought it gave the regions too little power, the Conservatives too much, and Labour backbenchers from both wings of the party rejected the idea as a barrier to nation-wide state planning. With a majority of 40% of voters needed in both the referenda to be held in 1979, it was difficult to see a positive outcome for the devolutionists, and in the end the Welsh voted 4 to 1 against devolution; the Scottish "Yes" majority was nowhere near what was needed to satisfy the electoral criteria. Thus another attempt at reforming the constitution failed.
Any further attempts to produce legislation of a constitutional nature were quashed by the crises that dogged the final years of the administration, firstly the economic turmoil that resulted in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailing Britain out of trouble with a �3 billion loan, and the worst industrial relations problems to date, when numerous industries shut down in what became known as the "winter of discontent" in 1978-9. This resulted in a defeat for the government in a confidence motion, and at the resulting general election, Mrs. Thatcher swept to power.
Thus at all times when previously in power, the Labour party has either been unable to introduce legislation dealing with constitutional reform due to other, more pressing matters regarding economic or other problems or, when it has attempted to carry out such reforms, they have been defeated.
Finally we must turn to the current administration, which appears to be reversing this trend with devolution for Scotland and Wales (and possibly the re-establishment of power at Stormont in Northern Ireland), the abolition of hereditary peers in the Lords, the strengthening of metropolitan area government (including a Greater London Council and Mayor of London), and the introduction of proportional representation all being considered or actively implemented. Are these reforms destined to go the same way as those previously tried and failed attempts? It would seem not. Firstly, the colossal majority Labour has in the Commons means that the government could seemingly alienate half its MPs and still win any vote comfortably. Secondly, there appears to be no imminent economic catastrophe to deal with (this could change depending on the severity of the impact of the crisis in south-east Asia). Labour inherited a stable and prosperous economy. Britain's international and especially military commitments have been reduced, and although troops remain in Bosnia and the Gulf, there are no huge foreign garrisons like Hong Kong to look after. Moreover, for perhaps the first time ever, no two nation states are openly at war with one another. On the domestic front, the government appears to have the support of the people to carry out these reforms; the lack of immediate crises have left time to finally deal with these constitutional issues. The resurgence of nationalism in the Celtic nations undoubtedly played a part in the swift adoption of these policies, as perhaps did the input of the Liberal Democrats, as already stated, the natural party of constitutional reform. On the other hand, it is unclear whether the passage from hereon in will be as smooth as it has been to date. Welsh devolution again suffered from mass apathy, with a turnout of less than 50% - in effect, only one voter in four voted for devolution, hardly a strong mandate for change. There is yet a danger of a legal challenge to the result on the grounds of irregularities. Northern Ireland remains a disaster zone; anyone who thinks that any agreement reached at the talks will result in a workable form of local government, much less an end to violence, is living in cloud cuckoo land. Schools and hospitals are emerging as issues that the public wants swift action on. Finally, that most damaging of issues, sleaze, threatens to rear its ugly head again (although given the slickness of Mr. Mandelson et al. I suspect the impact on the government will be less than on the last administration - witness the Bernie Ecclestone affair and Robin Cook's marital difficulties). These issues could side-track attempts at constitutional reform.
It is perhaps a perfect correlation with our earlier stated beliefs that the current state of affairs is helpful to socialism that these changes should arise now, given that New Labour has, bar a few maverick old-timers, abandoned socialism. It no longer pursues nationalisation or interventionist forms of government, and thus has no need to push through vast quantities of legislation to achieve this redundant goal, and thus New Labour is much more amenable to constitutional change that would weaken the executive.
In conclusion, Labour has tried in the past to change parts of the constitution, but has failed due to the overall incompatibility of the reforms with the means of achieving the stated goals of socialism. Even when it did attempt to introduce reform, it often found other issues more pressing, and any reforms were challenged and defeated. Now, with a combination of huge Commons majority, stable economic conditions, lack of need for the institutions of the strong executive for socialist purposes, and public mood interested and desiring change to reflect the "Cool Britannia" image, it seems that New Labour will finally address these constitutional issues and be remembered for significant reforms in this area, which will set Britain for the new millennium.