Forms of Utilitarianism

While it may seem that following the utilitarian doctrine would be a straightforward and uncontroversial exercise, differences have grown up among philosophers as to the best way to implement the moral code of utilitarianism. Indeed, it is not a single doctrine; there are several different interpretations of it, each of which lays down different guidelines as to the best way of ensuring the maximisation of happiness.
Until recently, the predominant view was that of act-utilitarianism. This interpretation held that in order to evaluate the rightness and wrongness of an action, one must examine the consequences of that particular action, as set against all other alternatives available, including the option of inaction itself. On the basis that one action among a number of alternatives promotes the most pleasure or happiness, or does the most to minimise pain, that action is said to be the right action, and the course of action that should be followed. Act-utilitarianism can be termed a direct moral theory, as the happiness-maximising principle is applied directly to the actions themselves.
On the other hand, there is what is known as rule-utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness and wrongness of an action can be judged not by whether it maximises happiness, but rather by certain moral rules that would maximise happiness were everyone to follow them. In this instance, the test or evaluation of utility is not to be applied to individual acts, but rather to kinds of actions. Therefore, we assess actions by asking whether or not they are permitted or forbidden by moral rules or principles, and it is only in examining which of these moral rules and principles we should follow do we apply the utilitarian test. The moral rules are adopted because if everyone were to follow them, they would, as I indicated above maximise happiness. The only time the action is evaluated by its consequences is when two rules differ over the permissibility of an action, or when there is no rule governing the given action. Because of this application of the maximising principle to rules as opposed to the actions themselves, this doctrine is known as an indirect moral theory.
Yet there are also different forms of rule-utilitarianism. These arise over the emphasis placed on the rules, whether they are "actual" or "possible." Some are based on accepted and practised moral principles, others postulate hypothetical moral principles that would be most useful. Other theories stress the generalisation principle, i.e. the idea of considering the outcomes if everyone adopted (or failed to adopt) a certain rule. The result is that it can be difficult to compare the two types of utilitarianism, as there as different forms of rule-utilitarianism, and a widely acceptable and agreed version has not been forthcoming.
Nonetheless, there must be reasons for the emergence of rule-utilitarianism, despite its own inability to form a single, coherent theory. These reasons have to do with the weaknesses of act-utilitarianism. It is said that rule-utilitarianism is more in keeping with our common moral beliefs and values than act-utilitarianism is. Take as an example the idea that we should always keep promises that we have made. Our traditional moral principle says that we should try whenever we can to keep promises. Act-utilitarianism would advocate the breaking of promises if keeping them were to promote less happiness than another alternative that involved the breaking of the promise. Rule-utilitarianism would circumvent this problem by maintaining as one of its rules that promises should be kept, even if by doing so there is a sacrifice of pleasure that could have been obtained by choosing another alternative. Put another way, general satisfaction would tend to be maximised if everyone kept their promises, rather than breaking them for the sake of inducing some more pleasure. Although this may seem illogical if people are obliged to carry out courses of action that do not yield the greatest happiness, it can be proposed that in an act-utilitarian environment, promises (perhaps in the form of contracts) which involved dealings with large amounts of pleasure would not be made, whereas in a rule-utilitarian environment, they would, as we could be more certain that the promise(es) would be adhered to. Similar arguments can be applied to the tenets of not lying, committing murder, or other moral principles; in this way, rule-utilitarianism has incorporated elements of our moral inclination as absolutes, rather than allowing circumstances to arise in which an act-utilitarian could condone these things; as a result, it is thought to be superior to act-utilitarianism because of this.
Another weakness of act-utilitarianism is the fact that we are required by it to assess the consequences of our actions when choosing the morally correct course of action. However, this poses major problems. Are we expected to consider an infinite series of events that could perhaps be set in motion by the action we are contemplating? The classical example given is that of a person who tenses the muscles in his fingers, which are placed on the trigger of a gun, which is pointing at a person whose death would trigger (sorry, no pun intended) World War I. Should the assassin consider all of these possibilities as consequences of his action? Another example is this: suppose during his childhood Adolph Hitler is rescued from drowning in a lake by a passer-by. Would an act-utilitarian have stopped to consider the likelihood of Hitler becoming a dictator responsible for some 20 million deaths before jumping into the lake? Furthermore, do we include future, as yet unborn generations, in our deliberations, or only those who exist now? Do we limit our evaluation to humans, or include animals, or all life forms capable of experiencing pain or pleasure?
These examples illustrate the difficulty of drawing a line in the chain of causality where one can say that the consequences of one particular action have come to an end, and the person who carried out that action can no longer be held responsible for them.
Furthermore, it is also apparent from the given examples that many consequences cannot be predicted by the person considering the action. As a result, can any action be said to be right or wrong beforehand, given that we are not fully able to predict the outcome? Would this not leave an element of chance in all our decision-making?
As well as this, there exists a problem concerning total utility and average utility. Which is better, one person who is supremely happy, along with nine other miserable people, or ten reasonably contented people? Given that the total amount of utility is constant, there is a difficulty in deciding between these alternatives.
Act-utilitarianism can also be criticised as being a form of negative utilitarianism. This is because in evaluating actions, only one is called the "right" action; all others are "wrong." Yet it could be the case that none of the alternatives are wrong in that they produce pain; they promote happiness, yet not as much as a particular action that is judged "right." Should it be the case that these other actions be condemned merely because they do not promote sufficient happiness?
So there seem to be solid grounds for the development of a new form of utilitarianism that resolves these weaknesses, and rule-utilitarianism has appeared to improve on its predecessor in some areas by taking account of these weaknesses. However, this is not to say that rule-utilitarianism is itself free from criticism or innately preferable as a theory; there are several grounds on which it has itself been attacked. Firstly, the sheer number of versions of rule-utilitarianism that have been proposed work against the theory. Which interpretation is one to take? How are we to decide which rules to take, and which to ignore?
Another objection can be illustrated by the example of a person who is deciding whether to vote in a case where it will involve some hardship to them. Because there would be little or no effect on the outcome if one person fails to vote, and the hardship endured by voting would not occur if we failed to vote, an act-utilitarian would support the abstention of the person in question. However, a rule of moral obligation relating to politics would surely suggest that we have a moral duty to vote. It would clearly be wrong not to vote, as if most people abstained, this could give rise to a tyranny, or some other form of unacceptable political authority. Thus far, rule-utilitarianism has improved on act-utilitarianism by reversing a decision that would have been taken in accordance with act-utilitarianism, but against our moral views. However, some rule-utilitarians would in fact come to the original judgement in a slightly different way. Their argument would run that, given that one knows that a large proportion of the population isn't going to vote, and the undesirable consequences will arise even if you do vote, as you cannot make a difference to the general apathy, it would not be wrong to avoid the hardship that voting will incur on you, given that you cannot change the outcome.
This conclusion would clearly seem to be in contrast to what we think as morally correct. The inconsistency arises over the differing assumptions made over the situation; in the first instance, a hypothetical "What if everyone failed to vote?" was considered. However, in the second case, the premise has been modified so that we are now considering whether everyone in fact would abstain.
Thirdly, rule-utilitarianism can be accused as being a form of rule-worship. A rule-utilitarian advocates the upholding of a rule even if breaking it were to yield more happiness. Yet how disastrous would the consequences of breaking a rule for the sake of extra happiness be? Despite the rule-utilitarian's assertion that it would be better for people to obey the rule than break it assumes that there is no middle ground between everyone doing something and no-one doing it, whereas it is clearly the case that there is a middle ground where some people do something, and some people don't. The result would seem to suggest that the refusal to break a generally beneficial rule in cases where it would be beneficial to do so seems irrational and a form of rule-worship.
Another accusation levelled at rule-utilitarianism is that it can be seen to collapse into act-utilitarianism itself, i.e. one can end up in a situation where the only rule to be followed is "maximise total utility," which quite clearly is the objective of act-utilitarianism. The reasoning behind this partly follows from what I have just said; given an exception to a general rule that produces beneficial consequences, there is an implication that the rule should be modified, so as to read something along the lines of "do this except in the case of this." Thus, when an act-utilitarian would openly break a rule, a rule-utilitarian would modify theirs; but in essence, they would end up doing the same thing given the same circumstances, and thus the two doctrines are equivalent. This is evidence supporting the two forms of utilitarianism being extensionally equivalent, i.e. the actions one ends up taking are the same regardless of which doctrine you follow. Furthermore, as modifications to rules would have to deal with an infinite number of contingencies, one can suggest that rule-utilitarianism would become so complex that in the end all rules would be disregarded save the single one of "maximise happiness." Given the fact that both theories suffer from weaknesses, it is difficult to evaluate one as being superior to the other. Neither are entirely satisfactory as a basis for moral judgements, and while rule-utilitarianism was generally considered preferable due to its incorporation of moral principles, its own weaknesses are quite seriously detrimental to its own credibility. It also fails to clear up the problem of total verses average utility. Furthermore, if we are to accept that there is no difference between the two, then comparison is irrelevant, as we only have one theory, albeit in two different guises.
More recent work has suggested that utilitarianism would be a better theory if it concentrated on the satisfaction of people's desires rather than giving them satisfaction alone. However, this theory falls down on the attempt to give weightings to different people's desires, which does not improve on the act-utilitarian's difficulty of applying figures to utility.
That there are different forms of utilitarianism; or, at least, different ideas about how to decide on actions, even if the end decision is the same, prompts the question of what view Mill himself took. Indeed, this has become one of the primary debates of this century, and arguments have been advanced for both cases, with authors pointing to phrases and clauses from Mill's text as evidence that he was pursuing one or the other. However, it seems unlikely that Mill was consciously aware of the debate he was to provoke; presumably, his primary goal was to advance utilitarianism in itself, and not worry about different forms of it.
However, it is necessary to examine some of the arguments on either side to see if it can firmly be established that Mill was an act- or rule-utilitarian.
To begin with, let us look at Urmson's view that Mill was a rule-utilitarian. He points to places where Mill has talked about both "moral rules" and "secondary principles;" Mill also talks about "the application of a law to an individual case." Surely these laws and secondary principles refer to the general rules about keeping promises, not committing murder, not lying, etc. (indeed, Mill lists those rules that he is in favour of in "On Liberty") Furthermore, in talking about the relationship between utilitarianism and justice, Mill again makes it clear that in his opinion right and wrong are derived from moral rules. In addition, Mill mentions "tendencies of actions," which implies that general kinds of actions and not individual actions themselves are to be evaluated, again, this is consistent with a type of rule-utilitarianism.
On the other hand, we have Crisp, who disagrees with Urmson's interpretation of Mill; Crisp believes, rather, that Mill was an act-utilitarian. When Mill talks about the general law, Crisp believes he is talking about the act-utilitarian moral rule of maximising happiness. He also refutes the claim that because Mill uses the word "tendency," he is a rule-utilitarian, as Bentham himself used the word, and was most certainly not a rule-utilitarian. He (Crisp) also believes that Mill can be interpreted as not attaching as much weight to moral rules as Urmson thinks; instead, Crisp believes Mill thought of the rules of helpful "rules of thumb" to be referred to in certain circumstances to aid making a decision, but that the ultimate criterion of judging an action's rightness remained the extent to which it added to happiness or prevented pain.
Thirdly, we can make reference to Quinton, who, like Urmson, believes Mill to be a rule-utilitarian. He also points to Mill's use of tendency, in the sense that as stringent calculation of all possible alternatives is, as we have seen, time-consuming and impractical, the accumulated experience of the history of the human race gives us advice on the tendencies of moral actions, which are secondary to the utilitarian doctrine itself. Secondly, he believes that the phrase "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness" is further evidence, arguing that individual actions do not produce tendencies, but that only groups of actions do so.
Thus in the same way as we have differing opinions over the form utilitarianism should take, we also have considerable disagreement over which view Mill subscribed to. It seems that a resolution of the debate is still quite a way off.
Indeed, this sentiment may be applied to this entire topic; as we have seen, all of the forms of utilitarianism we have considered are open to criticism, and until such time as someone develops a watertight interpretation of utilitarianism, assuming one exists to be found, the debates will continue well into the future.