What functions and interests has NATO served in the period since 1985? Why has NATO not collapsed?

At the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, few of the participants could have envisaged how the organisation that was to emerge from this was to persist and grow stronger over the years of the Cold War. Surely none could have foretold the events that have been seen since its raison d'etre, the existence in Eastern Europe of a militarily powerful and ideologically hostile Soviet Union, dissolved after forty years of tension. Even more implausible would be the continued existence of the body after this time - if its primary purpose for being had gone, what justification was there for NATO's continued existence? It may be answered that, paradoxically, the very strength of NATO that allowed it to "win" the Cold War without any direct armed conflict between the superpowers taking place is its flexibility of organisation that allowed it to grow into more than an alliance of anti-Communist states, and now it is a security institution that can intervene to provide stability and resolve conflicts in areas that wouldn't have been its priority during the height of Cold War tensions. The intervention in the Balkans is the prime example of this, both with and without the remit of the UN. It is in looking at both historical evidence and theoretical postulating that we can gain an insight into the questions posed in the title, and attempt to derive some predictions about how NATO will evolve in the future.

The realist view of international relations emphasises the balance of power as the primary rationale behind the creation of alliances between states. Thus, according to the conventional view based on Walt's theories, NATO was created to balance the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Although Duffield has criticised the validity of the application of theory to the factual events that took place at the time of NATO's formation, these are not particularly relevant to this discussion. Instead, it is much more illuminating to examine their views on the reasons for NATO's continued existence. Walt's analysis rests on the assumption that there is a cost to joining an alliance (usually involving a reduction in a state's autonomy to conduct an independent foreign policy), and that there is a reluctance on the part of an alliance member to continue to bear this cost if the alliance no longer serves its function. He points to three main reasons as to why an alliance might end. The first would be due to a changing perception of the threat environment that presumably provided the purpose for the founding of the alliance in the first place. The most obvious way this would happen would be if the balance of power changed in such a way that the threat that was being countered dissolved, and there was no need for an alliance to provide support against an external threat. Alternatively, the main threat to be countered shifts, either due to a reduction in the belligerence of the enemy, or a rise in the strength of an ally. Finally, it could be the case that the members of the alliance find other means to protect their interests, and thus the alliance becomes superfluous or redundant in this regard. Walt points to the threat that the issue of nuclear weapons posed to the European-American alliance during the initial years of the Cold War, and this is backed up by Kissinger's analysis, where he highlights the indecision that could have emerged in a US administration over whether to promise a total nuclear defence of Europe in the event of a nuclear attack upon it (but not upon the US itself) by the USSR. This also involves the second set of reasons why an alliance might dissolve, namely a decline in its credibility in achieving its goals. If the allies doubt the material ability or determination of one another to their common goal, they may re-evaluate the alliance's arrangements. The nuclear question could have lead to a split in NATO had the US not reaffirmed its total commitment to defending its European allies were they to be attacked. Finally, there is the issue of domestic politics. As time progresses, the historical, cultural, and demographic factors that naturally bind two countries together may wane. If there is intense domestic political competition with the alliance as a salient issue, acting upon this may help domestic political interests. The most prominent example of this would be de Gaulle's removal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1967. Sudden regime changes, especially due to revolutions, would be likely to lead to a breakdown in organisational unity, and even in alliances who share a common ideology, such as Marxism or Islam, there are arguments over who should control the hierarchical system of command in such a movement.

It is clear that many of these forces would have been at work inside NATO at the end of the Cold War, most notably the fact that the threat from the Soviet Union had been nullified. That NATO survived this is testament to the outweighing considerations that support the continuation of alliances. Duffield identifies several external factors that fit this description. The most obvious reason for NATO's persistence was to counter any residual threat posed by whatever replaced the USSR and the regimes in Eastern Europe, an area still proliferated with nuclear weapons. Events have moved on from this, however, and with the exception of the nuclear dimension, it can no longer be maintained that the ragtag and morale-sapped Russian armed forces pose a threat to NATO interests. With the assistance of NATO, the East European democracies appear stable, partly due to the reassurances that such an organisation can promise, and in this case, NATO's action in assuring the newly democratic governments that they would not face external threats alone. As a result of this and programmes such as Partnership for Peace (PfP), the armed forces of these countries are being rapidly upgraded to in readiness for entry into NATO. The likelihood of conflict among these countries in the region thus seems remote. However, NATO still has a massive role to play in stabilising the most volatile area of Europe, namely the Balkans, where it has been active in both Bosnia (where it engaged in its first offensive military operations) in the form of the IFOR and SFOR forces, and currently in Kosovo. In light of this, there is a dark irony to Duffield's text where he writes, with remarkable prescience "[s]uch conflicts have the potential to generate large numbers of refugees or even to spill over onto the territory of neighboring [sic.] countries ... [i]n a worse case scenario, outside states might feel compelled to intervene, risking an expansion of hostilities."

In terms of internal considerations, Walt and Duffield both identify the same factors that would lead to NATO's continued existence. Firstly, there is the impact of institutionalism. After fifty years, it is unsurprising that there is a strong presence of formal organisations within the NATO structure that perform such intra-alliance tasks as military planning, procurement, and co-ordination. In any alliance structure, the stronger these are, the more likely it is to endure beyond the end of its original mandate. Top military officials also have a large degree of freedom to implement policy independently from their civilian masters. Secondly, NATO is now supported by a tract of current and former officials, journalists, academics, diplomats, and military commanders who have worked in or close to NATO and have experienced the utility its continued presence will bring. It is in this respect that the third point is made by Walt that the capabilities of NATO are worth keeping in some form, as there is no comparable security organisation to it in Europe (the OSCE being unarmed and the WEU infantile and subject to allegations of being a Europe-wide defence mechanism motivated by political considerations). As an effective defensive and offensive military force, with sufficient flexibility and adaptability, it should have to capacity to serve an interventionist purpose in conflict resolution in the future. Secondly, the ideological solidarity of its members is important, both in reassuring them that they have nothing to fear from one another, and in being an expression of commonly held beliefs and goals. The transparency of such an organisation as NATO, where sensitive information as to the strength and disposition of each member's military forces is routinely pooled reinforces this tendency. Finally, the presence of the United States in Europe, whilst not only giving security guarantees to European countries, means that the latter countries can limit their own armed forces and rely on the US to contribute the bulk of equipment to any operation. This reduces the tendency for conflict, as it is almost impossible to have a self-sufficient war machine with the relatively low numbers of men and machinery that European forces have to conduct every aspect of a conflict. As an intercontinental power, the US can give the impression that it is a neutral arbiter in European conflicts, acting as a counterweight to any fears that there may be a resurgence of German dominance following reunification (fears expressed by countries such as the Czech Republic among others, although not in a military sense though). The near-hegemony of the US in this respect saves the European countries resources they can devote to other matters, and thus NATO saves them either the redundancy of each developing a self-contained armed force or the heavy costs of starting an alternative pan-European defence organisation.

Extrapolating into the future, it seems that the demise of NATO is not, as some commentators have predicted, imminent. However, with the removal of its primary enemy, it will be necessary for a redefinition of the organisation's goals and priorities. If it is to be the operative organ of a body such as the UN, it will need to demonstrate it has the impartiality and effectiveness to carry out such a role - in this respect, a successful conclusion to the Kosovo crisis would boost its stature enormously. Yet this should not be interpreted as an advocation of a liberalist collective security ideal, for it is inconceivable that NATO would carry out a similar operation in Africa or the Far East. Yet with a tight enough remit as an organisation with the intended goal of preserving stability in Europe and the middle-Eastern region, it is possible to see a vibrant NATO carrying on such a role many years into the future.