Distinguish among realist, internatinal society and liberal approaches to international order.

The study of international relations is, as with many social sciences, perennially dogged by the dispute over whether the discipline is to be classified as a science or art, and consequently there are ongoing arguments over whether a historical or purely scientific approach should be taken to research and analysis undertaken in this regard. The situation is further complicated by the introduction of seemingly synonymous terms such as international order, international system, and international society, which in fact contain entirely different meanings and implications. Before turning to the different historical approaches that have been taken in the study of international relations, it is necessary at the outset to in some way define what international order is. This is not a straightforward exercise, as the different perspectives outlined in the title have their own interpretation of order based on which level of actor (individual, state, or the human race as a whole) is seen as the dominant player in international affairs. However, order could perhaps be classified as a pattern of relations between these different actors on an international basis, which has a particular purpose for those actors, ranging from mere self-preservation to peaceful and harmonious coexistence and co-operation with the other actors. At this point the different perspectives diverge, as not only the goals that would be achieved are widely dispersed, but the differing foundations of each model lead to predicted outcomes that are alternately optimistic and pessimistic about the chances for the achievement of any form of international system or society - the former being (according to Bull�s definition), a situation where states make their decisions on the basis of what they think other states will do (i.e. they will act "strategically"), with the latter being a more utopian position of states being aware that they share common values and interests and drawing up common to rules to promote this. Clearly then, an international system can exist without an associated international society.

This leads us to a discussion of the first view, of which Bull is one of the leading proponents, namely the realist approach to the study of international relations. The basis for this perspective is that there is anarchy in the world order - not in the sense that there is permanent chaos and disorder, but in the stricter definition of anarchy as the absence of government - there is clearly no international or "world" government that all actors are subordinate to. Nonetheless, there is a strong Hobbesian premise that the state of nature in international affairs is the same as that for domestic ones; namely that actors are predisposed to conflict, that war is inevitable, and that periods of peace are mere interludes between conflicts. This position is vulnerable to the counter-arguments made by Bull, based on the additional realist premise that the primary actor is the nation-state. Bull maintains that international anarchy is not a barrier to the development of industry and commerce, that the existence of armed forces will allow internal developments that lead to economic advancement to take place, in contrast to the domestic case. Secondly, notions of right and wrong, as well as property rights have had considerable longevity in international history, in contrast to Hobbes� predictions. Finally, it is clearly the case that states are very different actors from individuals - the state does not devote all of its resources to ensuring its survival at the expense of all else, and states are not as vulnerable to sudden attack as individuals are. Waltz�s illumination of the international system as being a "self-help" one is supportive in this respect. Thus Bull believes that some form of international order can occur in the absence of international governance. This is not to say that no conflict in the world - indeed, the supremacy and fragmentation of the nation-states operating in a world with weak international institutions generates enormous concern for security, and with states competing with one another to preserve their national interest, the potential for conflict is ever-present. The key point is that active co-operation is more difficult to achieve in a realist world than in other models. Each nation is jockeying for position, securing its existence primarily by means of deterrence - a strong state is not one with an absolute level of political, diplomatic, economic, or military power, but possesses instead the ability to defend itself from any potential aggressor, and perhaps also the ability to coerce other states into changing their policies.

The importance of the anarchical nature of realism leads on to the major theme that pervades this approach, namely that of the balance-of-power. A decentralised system allows for greater diversity than would be the case with, for example, an empire. Since this is inconsistent with the realist�s assumption that states naturally tend to increase their power through expansionary conquests or destruction of their enemies, the use of force is necessary to ensure the survival of the decentralised system. The idea of transferring power to a higher international authority is regarded with suspicion by realists, unless that authority can be derived from the power of their particular state, and, as Waltz points out, the states can be assured that the central authority will protect the interests of its client states. Consequently, if the major powers agree to the goal of the preservation of state autonomy, wars will be limited and constrained by this overriding goal. Balance-of-power analysis can be split into two contradictory beliefs in the actions of states: balancing, where smaller states will join with others to balance the threat posed by a larger one (larger and smaller do not refer to geographical size or economic resources, etc. but rather to relative power as described above), or bandwagoning, where smaller states ally themselves with those that may threaten them in an attempt to appease the potential aggressor. Both of these proposals are intuitively plausible, and historical evidence suggests that a broad theory of how a particular state will act in a given situation cannot be derived; instead, each situation must be analysed on its own merits in terms of the unique set of strategic, military, and diplomatic factors as well as the state and individual actors involved when trying to explain (or even predict) outcomes. Walt may claim his survey of the alliances of the Middle East conclusive, but it seems unlikely that this can be applied to other theatres of conflict.

By contrast to the assumption that international conventions, laws, and treaties can be flouted when necessary that realists make, the integrity of such accords is one of the dominant themes in the international society approach to international order. The international system gives weight not just to states, but also to their citizens as well, whose preferences can influence a state�s foreign policy, and as such will direct the ends of diplomacy away from war and towards institutions that provide for collective security. States to not exist in a totally anarchic environment, as they recognise certain international rules and norms that they can all observe. An early believer in this system was Woodrow Wilson, who thought that through sacrificing some of their sovereignty to the League of Nations, states could coexist more easily as public opinion would filter through to the League thereby promoting international society values. However, the failure of the League discredited this view for many decades, and it was not until the end of the Cold War that arguments strengthened markedly in favour of a system of collective security, democracy, and rule of international law, with some proponents holding up the 1991 Gulf War as an example of how this could be achieved with member states of the United Nations acting so as to secure this "new world order." The counter-arguments to this viewpoint are numerous, and can be divided into two groups. Firstly, in terms of the Gulf War itself, it is obvious that all the conditions - military, domestic political, and international diplomatic - were right to afford support to the Coalition effort, backed by a broad anti-Iraq international consensus. The war was also fought over control of oil resources as over territorial sovereignty alone. This is not to belittle the action taken by the Allies, but merely to highlight the point that it has not been the case since that there has existed unchallenged international support for similar ventures, nor domestic political acceptance of the need to commit forces among contributing nations, nor the moral force of international law and/or UN resolutions. So on a second level, analysing the situation since 1991, instances such as Somalia, Bosnia, and the current Kosovo crisis demonstrate that the view taken that an international society approach was to emerge from the aftermath of the Cold War was fallacious and over-optimistic, and with new Russian-American tensions emerging all the time, there seems as remote a possibility of it occurring now as it did at the height of the Cold War itself.

Finally, there is the liberal perspective, which focuses on the growing interdependence between nations as an explanation of why conflicts could become more unlikely. The key figures in the economic and financial sectors of a country would put pressure on the government not to undertake such a conflict, as they would recognise that a war that affected the financial structures in one country would almost inevitably be imported to their own country. Thus domestic interests would assure that the domestic government did not undertake actions that threatened the economic and financial integrity of the domestic country. In a liberal model, wars arise not from the innate shortfalls of the international system or human nature, but from the misperceptions and miscalculations of certain actors, such as dictators or too powerful military-industrial complexes that can act independently from the economic pressure described above. This view gained following from the late 1970s when the emergence of deregulated international capital markets highlighted the interdependence that existed among most of the world�s national economies. As this has grown, so it has been argued that the utility of military power has ebbed. Certainly punitive measures such as economic sanctions are now used more widely, but as has been shown repeatedly, these are no substitute for direct military intervention in removing a particular regime (e.g. Iraq, Libya, and Serbia-Montenegro have all withstood many years of UN sanctions). Furthermore, the domino effect caused by the contagion of financial collapse that has occurred in the last twelve months may paradoxically increase belligerence among certain nations if they feel that the economic strength of those that would oppose them is diminished; good examples would be China�s attitude to Taiwan, or rogue nations such as North Korea or Iran developing weapons of mass destruction if the US becomes subsumed in economic catastrophe.

Inasmuch as this discussion so far has examined three perspectives each of which highlight particular actors as being important to explaining outcomes in international relations, it must also be noted that this is only one method of approaching this subject. In recent years, increasing research has been done using advanced mathematical models incorporating statistical methods to explain patterns in IR, the development of formal theories based on logical inference and deduction, and also the extension of examination to include reflectivism that challenges the bases on which theories are built, claiming that our "constructions" are influenced by our own language and culture. Each of these approaches contain their own different justification and sphere of validity, and thus to concentrate on the theories laid out above at the expense of these other approaches is to ignore other valuable areas of international relations research.