What dimensions of change are identified by those who argue that globalization and interdependence are transforming world politics?

Strange has described "globalization" as "a term which can refer to anything from the Internet to a hamburger." Such a statement succinctly captures one of the major problems with the word, namely that it has become an all-pervasive, and yet paradoxically unclear, concept, consequently both often-quoted and commonly misunderstood. Scholte's article elucidates these problems by highlighting several of the different definitions that have been put forward describing what globalization is or represents; the diversity of meaning of even such a small sample of the definitions as Scholte provides illustrates the problems of disentangling normative interpretations from positive ones. There are further complications over trying to decide how old the idea of global relations is, with some claiming that it dates from the heyday of ocean trading, whilst others maintaining a focus on the communication and information revolution of the late twentieth century. Clark addresses these issues in providing a justification for his examination of the phenomenon of globalization as one of the defining characteristics of the last one hundred years. He argues that to concentrate, as for example Bretherton does, on the post-W.W.II period alone entrenches the notion of a "century of two halves" that leads to a sudden and unrealistic discontinuity setting in after 1945. Secondly, he refers to the notion of globalization as a distinctly economic phenomenon that can be used to distinguish between itself and "internationalisation." In the latter, national economies maintain superiority over the emergence of any forms of standardised international markets. This can be contrasted with the current integration and interdependence of, for example, the world's financial capital and equity markets where the sophistication of modern technology allows continuous trading to take place instantaneously. Finally, this can be added to by the supposed emergence since the international crises of the early-1970s by international markets and economies, linking producers in one country to suppliers in others. Again, however, this definition suffers from restricting analysis to a short period of recent history.

This introduction demonstrates how difficult any approach to the topic of globalization is. Nonetheless, there is abundant literature to contrast different points of view on the issue in an attempt to find commonalties between the various perspectives. Scholte provides his own definition of globalization as "processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place." He contrasts this with internationalism which he takes to refer to "a process of intensifying connections between national domains." He points to five areas where manifestations of this definition of globalization have occurred. The first is the paradigm example of the communications sector, which is most usually cited as being the strongest feature supporting the concept of globalization, with reference being made to computer technology, telephony and networks, and the rise of the electronic mass media. These examples show that in terms of this area of activity alone, globalization can be traced back as far as the invention of the first telegraph messages in the middle of the 19th century. Although undoubtedly growing at a vastly increased rate in the 1990s with the diffusion of innovations such as the Internet, it would be foolish to claim that earlier breakthroughs such as radio and television had any less of an impact on people's lives than computers do today. Secondly, there is the organisational sphere, in terms of the growth of companies, associations, and regulatory agencies than operate transnationally, ranging from multinationals such as Ford and Coca-Cola to pressure groups such as Greenpeace, and NGOs such as the Red Cross, all of which operate in many different countries simultaneously. Thirdly, the recognition of international ecological problems that affect many countries simultaneously has necessitated the co-operation of governments, sometimes through supra-national bodies, to counter these ecological predicaments. Fourthly, as has already been mentioned, there is the production dimension, whereby international capital markets become integrated so as to resemble a single world market. Finally, there is the military consideration - the development of systems that have a global reach have led to power and threat projection capabilites available to the possessors of these systems that surpass any previous military might - thus ICBM missiles, spy satellites, and aircraft such as the B-2 enable any point of the globe to be watched and attacked by, in this case, the USA.

This final point may lead to worries over the volatility and instability of any future world order, especially if these weapons proliferate to any extent. Yet the ideas of economic integration and interdependence have been seen as checks to the inclinations states may have to engage in military conflicts with one another. As far back as 1912, Angell developed his thesis of how this mutual need between states for economic survival would make war irrational and, hopefully, would convince policy makers to avoid it altogether. That this was not the case could be attributed to their short-sightedness and addiction to the tradition doctrine of realist models of international order, but the prescient nature of Angell's study appears to be diminished by the 1997 UN Human Development Report, which concludes that trade patterns had barely changed in the 1990s from the position in the 1930s, with capital transfers being of equal magnitude, and yet migration of workers reduced due to increased restrictions on immigration between nations. The conclusion must be drawn that these figures demonstrate that there has been insufficient integration even in the contemporary world for economic considerations to dominate those that would lead to conflict. Further, the asymmetry with which globalization has been experienced means that the countries of the Third World that have not undergone tremendous advances in technology and economy cannot view the economic case for avoiding conflict as compelling either.

This qualification must be combined with others to show that globalization as a phenomenon is not a homogenous and utopian process that leads to universally desirable outcomes. As well as the propensity towards economic benefit for developed countries, it cannot be seen as a panacea for the world's problems, particularly economic and social development in the Third World. The "trickle-down" effect that might be expected to benefit all countries as a result of expanded wealth in developed countries does not appear to be particularly strong. Further, as 90% of world investment flows are to the US and Europe, this suggests that North/South disparities will grow, not diminish, in the future. Heightened inequality combined with perceptions, regardless of their validity, of an encroachment of Western (particularly American) culture to these countries may provoke backlashes against this order, and lead to increased insecurity in these regions. Thus from this perspective, globalization does not necessarily lead to a strengthening of democratic values. Scholte also points out that many of the new supra-national organisations that have grown out of the processes of globalization suffer from a lack of legitimacy and accountability to those whom they affect (e.g. the European Commission, the IMF). Strange would go further than this, arguing that the spread of world markets has made these forces more powerful than the states that previously controlled them, and that this declining authority of the states is demonstrated by the amount of power that it routinely transferred to other institutions. However, this does not seem to square with the increased government expenditure and intervention in economic activity in the post-war period. An alternative assertion would be that the increased flows in world trade that have arisen have led to a demand from citizens for more protection from the vagaries of the markets from their authorities, and that had the governments neglected this desire, there would have been a backlash against the unfettered spread of trade. Moreover, the delegation of authority to independent bodies can be seen as an attempt to lessen the impacts that unrestricted economic activity would have, as these bodies could draw on expert opinion to regulate these trade flows to avoid damaging disturbances. The liberalisation of economies is not demonstrative, as Hirst and Thompson would have us believe, of a control of markets over government, but instead is government-led in recognition of new economic circumstances. An analogy would be with financial markets - these did not become liberalised simply because the technology existed to make them so, but instead the reforms were initiated by governments so that their citizens could benefit from the advantages these had to bring. The argument of Strange, etc. also ignores the vast areas where governments retain control to legislate within their own territories; too often this is overlooked in favour of the "intrusion" of new bodies.

Where does this leave the state? According to Scholte, there are two possibilities as to how globalization ultimately affects the state; firstly, it changes the state's constituency, such that governments now have to advance global as well as purely national interests in pursuing their policy agendas. The alternative (not that these are mutually exclusive outcomes) is a reduction of interstate war, with modern conflict more likely to be manifested through internal conflicts, stemming from such sources as insurrections that challenge the legitimacy of a country's regime. This latter prospect is given weight by a consideration of the way in which globalization may affect the developing world, especially in the post-Cold War period where the influence of the superpowers has diminished now that security interests have been moderated. Reaction against "neo-colonialism" may take the form of uprisings against the "complicit" domestic government, leading to international spillover effects. Moreover, the end of the Cold War could have a dramatic impact on the very future of globalization itself. Clark among others has argued that it has merely been a phenomenon that states have used as long as it has suited them to advance domestic interests. This seems far-fetched given the amount of progress that has rested on the initiatives of the private sector acting independently on the basis of economic incentives alone. This author would maintain a positive outlook on the process, and given that the protection of cultural diversity can be assured and the importance of territorial boundaries is not likely to disappear in the near future, it is a process that should be broadly welcomed.