"The President of the Republic has emerged as the effective head of the executive. He does not "solicit;" he commands: the prime minister and the government are not his equals but his servants" (Wright, 1989, p34). How did this come about? Was it an inevitable consequence of the constitutional arrangements of the Fifth Republic?

The constitution of the Fifth Republic, which was drawn up in 1958 under the guidance of de Gaulle, was intended to create a system that would banish the instability of the Fourth Republic. To do this, it would seem that clear definitions of where certain powers, most notably the executive ones, lay would be an essential ingredient in it. Although arguments over where power lay were not explicitly responsible for the failure of the Fourth Republic, in order to create a system that allowed for substantial political movement, this form of clarity would seem to be a prerequisite. Yet the current French constitution is decidedly vague in specifying whether Prime Minister or President should wield the bulk of executive power. The President has the power to appoint the Prime Minister, but articles 20 and 21 state the it is the Prime Minister who is put "in general charge of the work of government" and who "decides and directs the policy of the nation." The only provision for total presidential control is in article 16, which allows the President to assume dictatorial powers if there is an imminent threat to the republic. This provision has only been invoked once. Apart from that, the only decisions the President can take without prime ministerial approval are when to dissolve the National Assembly (with the restriction that once done, this cannot be repeated within the following twelve months), to refer laws that might contravene the constitution to the Constitutional Council, to appoint three judges and the president of the Constitutional Council, and to address messages to parliament. The President also has the right to refuse to sign ordinances and decrees discussed in the Council of Ministers concerning the appointment of senior officials. Apart from these, all other decrees are made by the Prime Minister on his own. These powers cannot be considered substantial by any means; they are exceptional in the sense that they are not the type of power that will be exercised in the day to day running of a government - they can only be invoked periodically, and the majority are not powers of decision, but correspond to the concept of the major part of the President's role as one of arbitrator as laid down in the constitution. He can prevent decisions passing in order to subject them to fresh examination and have their legitimacy checked, or he can submit them to a referendum.
These powers are clearly not what de Gaulle was after in writing the constitution, so why not explicitly lay down that the President would be the head of the executive, set out precisely what powers he should have from the start, and not have to go through the process of assimilating power over the course of the next few years? The answer lies in French history, which is littered with warnings of the dangers that were associated with creating too powerful a figure as the head of the political system, namely violence and disruption. Undoubtedly the turmoil associated with Bonapartism was a factor that meant a strong President might not be accepted, but more recent history, as shown by P�tain's regime during the occupation, also occupied a large part of the mass consciousness, less than fifteen years after the end of the war. Thus de Gaulle realised that it would have been difficult to establish a completely presidential system, and he settled for "sharing" power with the Prime Minister, and being elected by an electoral college. De Gaulle would not accept being elected by the parliament as he hated the institution, but could not push for election by universal suffrage, as the last time that had happened, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte had won and set himself up as Emperor. It was because of the wariness of a strong executive inspired by history that the constitution was as loose at is was.
In practice, however, it is obvious that the President enjoys far greater powers than the constitution specifies. De Gaulle controversially interpreted it as giving the President authority of State as entrusted to him by the people. The introduction of election by way of direct suffrage in 1962 gave the President the right make the claim that he had a mandate from the people that was equal in stature to that of the National Assembly, which was also elected by direct suffrage. Thus, as authority resided in the people, the directly elected head of state was the holder of that authority, and was mandated to exercise it as he saw fit. The change in electoral system was hugely important in the acquisition of powers by the President.
The development of the presidency was also due to the character of the incumbents, most notably de Gaulle, who as first President shaped the institution, but also his successors, who were happy to accept the powers he had acquired for the position. De Gaulle's desire to create a strong presidency stemmed from the historical failures he had lived through in the 1930's and 40's, and especially the political inaction that had in part contributed to the ease with which France had been overrun by the Germans in 1940. He was determined that France should not be humiliated in such a manner again, and also resolved to halt the decline of the state. To do this, he believed that a strong, centralised government was required, and he was determined to prove it. Yet at the same time he realised that such leadership would have to be legitimate and democratic; he was in no way a dictator, and often warned against the dangers of dictatorship. However, in 1967, Val�ry Giscard d'Estaing, later to become President himself, attacked de Gaulle for concentrating too much power and too many decisions in his own hands. Eight years earlier, the head of the National Assembly, Chaban-Delmas, had defined the areas of presidential power as foreign affairs and defence. De Gaulle however, rejected this, saying that it was the presidential prerogative to define his own areas of responsibility. In practice, De Gaulle did concentrate on these areas, but was never afraid to intervene in any area of policy that he saw as important.
Although the groundwork was laid for the presidency by De Gaulle, his successors added their own interpretation of the constitution to the position by extending the range of areas in which it was considered acceptable for the President to exercise policy control in. De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, had been Prime Minister for six years prior to being elected President, and brought to the post an interest in economic and political affairs that he had developed as Prime Minister. Thus these areas became assimilated into the remit of the Presidency. This continued upon the election of Val�ry Giscard d'Estaing in 1974; owing to his background in the financial inspectorate, and long tenure spent at the Finance Ministry under de Gaulle and continuously throughout Pompidou's premiership, he was unwilling to relinquish any policy-making power in this area, as well as his other interests in social and environmental concerns. He once declared that there were only two areas where he would not interfere: justice and information, but both had already been invaded by his predecessors, and he himself to some extent was involved in matters concerning the French media. Thus it would seem that by the time Fran�ois Mitterand was elected in 1981, there was no area of policy that the President could not intervene in if he saw fit to do so.
As well as the broadly defined areas of policy-making where the President can exercise control, there are also special cases where they can intervene. The first of these involves sporadic intervention, usually as a result of ministerial deadlock or government division on a particular issue. In this case, the President would have to intervene in order to impose a solution on the government from above. Other times when this would have been required are when a problem had proved intractable to such an extent that presidential influence was required to resolve it. Finally, there were occasions where situations were explosive or threatened to become so; to resolve these, the President would have to become involved at times he would normally have left decisions to the government. Secondly, there were interventions of a personal nature, where a president took action to satisfy a particular whim; for example, Giscard d'Estaing insisted on a change of tempo for the Marseillaise among other things. Overall, the President has the power to intervene in almost any area that he wishes.
France potentially possesses a unique situation where the Prime Minister and President are from different political persuasions. This potential has become actual at three times in the recent past, in the form of cohabitation, twice under Mitterand, and at the present time with Chirac president having to face a left-wing coalition in the National Assembly. Cohabitation offers a chance to be the exception to the rule of presidential leadership; with a healthy majority in the National Assembly, the government can become the centre of domestic policy making. This was noted in the first period of cohabitation between 1986-88, where Mitterand could criticise and delay the government's domestic policies, but could not ultimately block them. In this period most major domestic decisions were taken between the Prime Minister and the minister concerned, with the President excluded from the decision-making process. It was only in the areas of foreign policy and defence that the President remained dominant, as was laid down in the constitution. If cohabitation becomes commonplace, and with three periods of it in the last decade, there is evidence that it may well become so, then this may signal the end of the domination of the President in the executive.
In conclusion then, the acquisition of powers by the President was a gradual process that was initiated by de Gaulle based on a controversial interpretation of the constitution, and was added to by the areas of interest of each of his successors. I do believe that this was inevitable, but not because of the constitutional arrangements, which quite clearly, were they ever to be followed, would not give the President as much power as he currently enjoys. Instead, it was a consequence both of de Gaulle's desire for a strong executive, linked with his memories of the past, and the legacy of the Fourth Republic that lead to the creation of a strong executive. The Fifth Republic is forty years old this year, and it seems that the French may have found a balance between government weakness and executive strength leading to dictatorship.