What differences is made to policy outcomes by Congressional party change?

The doctrine of the separation of powers that is at the heart of the American political structure that has deliberately produced multiple occasions when the two elected branches of the government have been under the control of differing parties has not, as might have been expected, resulted in multiple constitutional crises or prolonged periods of stagnated activity on the part of these branches. In contrast to the French idea of cohabitation in the Fifth Republic as a temporary and undesirable phenomenon, the purpose of making this an inbuilt feature of the American system was to ensure adequate safeguards in the form of checks of one branch of government on the other. That the system has not broken down can be attributed to several factors; the fact that party labels do not imply homogenous beliefs either within or between separate branches, the pragmatism that is forced upon nearly all politicians once they are elected, and the power Congress in particular possesses to pursue its own independent legislative agenda. This latter feature shall be the primary concern of this discussion.
The occurrence of divided government as mentioned above can be traced in large part to the low rates of turnover in congressional elections that has left it in control of one party for long periods of time; the Republican landslide in 1994 was the first time they had been in control of the House since 1952. As many as 90% of incumbent Congressmen are returned when they stand for re-election. The fact that party change is so rare makes the attempt to analyse its effects on legislative output difficult; the world in 1994 is very different from the last time there was a change in the majority party in the legislature. The differences in personnel, policy objectives, and political and social landscape could all be used to explain any inconsistencies between the results in the 1950s and the 1990s. On the other hand, focusing too much on the impact of the 1994 changes may not yield enough results to formulate any general trend, as there may be extenuating circumstances that explain particular consequences that applied in this period but were not present in the 1950s. The conclusion that must be drawn from all this is that there is simply not enough regular change in the composition of Congress that can be either readily compared with other past changes or that could not be explained by particular individual circumstance. For that reason, it is difficult to see any concrete theories being produced as a result of study in this area.
Nonetheless, the changes that were made to the institutional structure and procedures in the House in the wake of the Republican victory in 1994 cannot be ignored, and may support the hypothesis that party change is not an important factor in determining policy outcomes. The impact of these reforms depends on the view one holds as to the weight that should be given to the procedures of the House in determining outcomes. There are two theories of note here: one states that tinkering with rules and structures are mere efficiency-enhancing devices only, that do not have a significant effect on the policies that Congress pursues - they are simply changes that enable a pre-determined outcome to be met with greater speed in the legislative process. The alternative view is that the whole purpose of reforming the rules and procedures of the House is to affect and develop the eventual policy outcomes. Looking at the actual changes in the 103rd Congress may provide some answers. Firstly, the traditional seniority system that operates in the Congress whereby committee chairs are allocated on the basis of age and duration of service as much as by qualification was abandoned somewhat. Secondly, the number of committees and subcommittees was reduced by 12%. Thirdly, there was a large influx of newly elected Republican Representatives who for the most part were highly conservative, dedicated to the "Contract with America" that had been the basis for the landslide, and were extremely loyal to the party leadership. The intended result of such changes was to reduce the ability of the committee system to act as an independent locus of power - independent, that is, from the Speaker. Gingrich personally cemented these official reforms through persistent interference and control of their activities; virtually no committee business of any significant note could take place without his knowledge and approval. Added to this was the implementation and use of task forces to investigate and direct policies on some issues, which further undermined the committee structure in some areas. The consequences of all these changes appeared to be in line with what the leadership was intending; power was shifted away from the committees and subcommittees to the Speaker, with many becoming subordinate to the House party leadership. Such reforms, whilst carried out with the intention of strengthening the ability of the leadership to shape the House agenda to their advantage and to increase party cohesion on policy may be perceived as being overkill, however; the inflow of fresh, loyal blood described above may have been sufficient alone to guarantee a successful legislative programme without such drastic reforms of procedure, and the concentration of power portrayed by political opponents (especially from the executive branch) as greedy and a dangerous precedent, could well have accounted for much of the political backlash directed at Gingrich himself.
This backlash by political actors in particular demonstrates another characteristic of the strategies that must be pursued in order to achieve policy goals through Congress. Party discipline as compared with Westminster carries much less weight, and on many issues there can be significant cross-voting (although roll-call votes usually induce partisan divisions). This shows that it is necessary to build a coalition from among both parties present in the House in order to pass any bill; certainly this is nominally more straightforward when the executive had a majority from its own party, but any motivated minority taking a stand on a certain issue could threaten to vote against the congressional leadership and defeat them; this would lead to the Speaker having to try to find allies from the other party to pass a bill. Thus party change will not automatically ensure the passing of a bill for which there is internal opposition from the majority party; reforming procedure and rules is not sufficient for passing legislation without the necessary level of support. No amount of tinkering would negate the necessity of finding a majoritarian consensus from the members to pass a law, and wholesale reform of the chamber is highly unlikely. This fact is simply a reflection of the innate ability of Congress to kill bills it doesn't like; from this point of view, procedural reform can help policy outcomes, but it is not the only obstacle that must be overcome in order to achieve them.
A further factor that determines the success of policy outcomes ahead of congressional party composition is the power available to the Speaker at any one time. As we have seen from the case of Gingrich, this has to be managed carefully; he had the potential to use his power to push the "Contract," but pushed the limits of his authority and alienated many of his former supporters in the process. The power, style, and role of the Speakership undoubtedly vary over time according to the personality of the incumbent and the acceptability in both political and public actors as to what is an acceptable level of power that can be accumulated at any one period in time, but this has been particularly true in the last two decades, mostly due to the rapid expansion of the mass media. Dedicated news channels, live broadcasts of Congressional debates, talk radio and the Internet have contributed to the Speaker becoming public figures and celebrities as well as mere Congressional leaders to educated Americans. This has imposed new responsibilities on the Speaker external to their legislative role, and has spawned an increased number of press secretaries, as well as necessitating improved relations with the press. However, there are also other causes that explain the increased power (or potential thereof) at a Speaker's disposal. The prevalence of divided government, especially the executive/legislative split that has persisted since the end of the Second World War, has given an incentive for the Speaker to "go public" in much the same way as a President will attempt to appeal directly to the electorate to build a coalition of support over the heads of legislators. Secondly, a new type of legislator has emerged in recent decades, who is more comfortable with the media, but is also more electorally vulnerable (the double-edged sword of a wide-ranging media is that it proves equally adept at spreading scandal as spreading a politician's message), who looks to his party leadership in the chamber to provide cover. Purporting to support this view is the claim that party expectations of their leaders have changed, and they want more public leadership from them. However, this last point seems inconsistent with the alleged decline of party structures in recent years; if partisan cohesion inside Congress has increased, then it is likely that party changes would have a greater impact on policy outcomes in the future; on the other hand, if the notion of a new paradigm stereotypical legislator is misplaced, then those steps it is necessary to take in order to pass legislation at present may not change at all. A further counterargument is that even if expectations about leadership have risen, they obviously do not extend to moral integrity.
The consequences of such changes have included the empowerment of the Speaker by television in much the same way as the President. News and talk-show appearances by the Speaker have risen dramatically in recent years, although these may include countering White House spin as much as promoting his own agenda. Speakers can now hope to influence the entire legislative environment rather than just bargain within the confines of Congress. However, the intrusion of the media into the legislative process may result in a pandering to the new audience by the House; there is already evidence that Congressmen are incorporating opinion polls and public surveys into their decision-making process; given the lingering doubts over the ability of the media to provoke and engage in constructive and high-quality public debates on serious and complex issues, the threat of declining quality of Congress' deliberative actions and legislative output remains. In summary, however, it appears that the role and power available to the Speaker at any given time is much more of a determinant of the legislation produced than the nature of the party organisation in the Congress' chambers. Party change may produce revisions of the procedures and rules of legislative activity, but these will flounder without a coherent coalition of support behind the proposed policy agenda. Thus, recalling the qualifications set out earlier, it can be concluded that these elements are more important to policy outcomes than the fact that a particular party is in the majority in the legislature.