What factors led to the end of the Cold War?

The rapidity of the decline of the Soviet empire in the period following the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe (and indeed, the speed of reforms that had been undertaken in the entire period following Gorbachev's accession to power in 1985) were remarkable from the point of view of a simple bystander - for those who had spent a lifetime investigating, studying, and claiming to understand the intricacies of the bipolar system, its disintegration was a stunning blow to those from all international relations' traditions - liberal, realist, and institutionalist - who had proclaimed the contemporary system in good health and predicted its vibrancy well into the next century. That these prophecies were disproved in such dramatic fashion demonstrates not only the dangers of entering the business of making predictions (as Gaddis points out), but also challenges the faith in which one can use these models to understand not only the Cold War period itself, but also the new system that has replaced it. If trust in the traditional schools of international relations is to be restored, it is thus necessary to examine why they were inadequate in predicting the end of the Cold War, and then improve and direct them to the post-Cold War world. This requires an understanding and investigation of why the conflict came to an end in the fashion it did.

There are, of course, many divergent views concerning the timing, nature, and significance of the change that has taken place in the last fifteen years or so. However, such events as the break-up of the Soviet Union, the end of East-West tensions, conflicts in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, and the potential for a long-term settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict have stimulated renewed academic interest in the causes and consequences of change. Many of the examples mentioned here stem from the breakdown of the overarching conflict that existed during the Cold War, and this gives an added impetus to seek out the reasons for its cessation. Two features have been identified as been critical (although there are others) - the first is the end to bipolarity, and the second is the end of the East-West conflict. These are not synonymous, as the former refers to a shift in the distribution of power within the international system, whereas the latter discusses changes in a specific international conflict. The polarity of the international system primarily concerns realists who focus on systemic factors to explain patterns in international relations. Most agree that there has been an end to bipolarity, but disagreements persist as to when and why this change took place. For example, Mearsheimer concentrates on the Soviet Union's military and political withdrawal from Eastern Europe as the key event; facing this is the view of other realists who focus on the break-up of the Soviet Union as a state. These differences are the very reason why realism can be so heavily criticised in predicting change - cause and effect are disputed between the opposing points of view. Stemming from a failure to define adequately a definition of a measure of polarity, one could either argue that the withdrawal from Eastern Europe or the end of the Soviet Union were the cause of, or resulted from, an end of bipolarity. If one takes the former point of view, that these were triggers to the collapse of bipolarity, such as Waltz, then there is a difficulty in explaining what prompted these changes. The actions of the Soviet leadership in withdrawing from Eastern Europe - such a vital sphere of influence in pursuing a balance of power against the US and its allies - appear to contradict the fundamental realist tenet that leaders seek to maximise their states relative power and security. On the other hand, attempts to overcome this objection are less convincing still. In trying to blame bad policy decisions by Gorbachev or Shevardnadeze as responsible, this runs into the counterargument that states that if this were the case, alternative policies would surely have meant that bipolarity would have persisted. Furthermore, to suggest that policies were ill-advised requires realists to move away from systemic factors in explaining outcomes and look at national unit or even individual human actors to explain outcomes, something that is anathema to realists.

Investigations focusing on the importance of the resolution of the East-West conflict have been undertaken by both realists and non-realists, and most concentrate on the actions of the post-1985 Soviet leadership. Garthoff in particular gives near total credit to the manner in which Gorbachev conducted his reforms, but further applies this to a basis of inevitability of collapse that was built into the Soviet system from the beginning. Thus he maintains that it is simply not the case that the West "won" the Cold War through geopolitical containment and military deterrence, nor by the Reagan Doctrine and military build-up as Wells claims. The view highlighting the role of Reagan's defense initiatives in ending the Cold War claims that this forced the Soviets to acknowledge to failure of their economic systems and the inability to compete with initiatives such as SDI (or Star Wars). Whilst this seems an appealing view, it ignores the fact that even during the latter stages of the conflict, the Soviets maintained advantages in many areas of equipment, most notably fighter aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems (which was why Reagan was so eager to develop an American response in the form of SDI). Thus on Garthoff's interpretation, the West's role, while necessary, was not primary in the ending of the Cold War. Containment's contribution was to successfully stalemate Moscow's attempts to advance Soviet hegemony, and give time for the flaws in the Communist system to become exposed - not through an arms race leading to economic breakdown, but instead through the emergence of a new generation of Soviet leadership who were both willing and able to abandon their ideology after realising that it had produced a poor system at home and failures in foreign policies abroad.

Whilst undoubtedly more balanced in its refutation of the pro-American view as to the factors that led to the end of the Cold War, Garthoff's view must be examined critically against the backdrop of the thawing of East-West relations that took place over the post-war period. As Lebow and Risse-Kappen explain, major improvements took place in East-West relations long before Gorbachev came to power in 1985. The twin peaks of tension during this time have been identified as being between 1948 and 1953 (with confrontations in Central Europe, Korea, and the Taiwan Straits being characteristic) and between 1958 and 1963 (again, with confrontations in Europe and Taiwan, but also the near war-provoking crisis in Cuba). Especially since this time, there has been no event that had pushed the superpowers to the brink of war, even during the so-called Second Cold War of the late 1970s and 1980s. This later period was, according to these two authors, "a pale imitation of its predecessor", and a time where strategic parity and fewer theatres of confrontation meant that the Third World became an area of limited competition. By the time of Gorbachev, the Cuban Missile Crisis was 23 years in the past, the superpower's took each other's commitment to avoid war for granted, and had entered into a series of agreements that regulated their strategic competition and interaction. Trade and cultural links between the two were well established also. Put in this context, it seems excessive to credit the entire ending of the Cold War on just on person in this way - instead, it appears to be more accurate that the measures Gorbachev undertook were the final phase of a reconciliation that had been proceeding (albeit tentatively) since the death of Stalin in 1954. That it was he who could successfully steer such reforms through the Soviet bureaucracy and elites is a testament to his skill in adapting domestic and foreign policies to his new perception of reality and convince the people and the politicians of their validity. These reforms marked the last step of an ongoing process that resulted in the total erasure of substantial differences between the superpowers that had contributed to the Cold War. The lack of strength of belief in substantially competing ideologies not only ended the conflict, but also broke the Soviet Union apart. President Reagan's attitude to the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union was again necessary, according to the post-revisionist school, but not dominant in the events that unfolded. Comparative differences between Reagan and Eisenhower (for example) can be attributed to different assessments of long-term Soviet intentions by the two Presidents. It took many signs of goodwill and several meetings with Gorbachev to convince Reagan that his Soviet counterpart was sincere. It is less important to explain the reasons for the shift in Reagan's position as it is to acknowledge that it actually took place, because it gives rise to a need to determine a reason for that shift, which involves looking at individual actors at this time. Again, we see how it is necessary to look beyond simple systemic and state-unit level actors.

Even had this not been the case, and had changes in the systemic order been the sole initiators of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War, it is still clear that realist theorists failed completely to foresee this. Whilst acknowledging that international relations is not capable of, nor is intended to, make specific predictions about the unfolding of world events, it seems obvious that a shift in the organisation of the world and the end of bipolarity (assuming that this is the case) are of such magnitude that some warning should have been cited by scholars in this area. The explanation of why this was not the case focuses on the surprising stability that the Cold War produced, such that this concentrated minds on explaining why a nuclear stand-off in a bipolar system should produce such a "long peace." As a result, all notions and examinations of change were, as Lebow and Risse-Kappen put it, "pushed ... out of the pages f the principal journals and into the obscurity where [they] lingered until quite recently." The Cold War ended largely due to a change in attitude and ideology of one of the two sides in the conflict. That this was not predicted was the result of the inflexible focus of the political commentators, who proved more dogmatic in the clinging to their portrayal of the Soviet leaders as gain-seeking and risk-prone (rather than loss-avoiding and risk-averse) as American politicians. This unquestionable loyalty to their established order ironically surpassed the excesses of the very Soviet leadership that they espoused a total understanding of.