Has Parliament been losing its influence over the executive during the twentieth century?

Parliament is the central institution of British political life, and has held this position since the end of the Civil War in 1645. With the rise of mass circulation newspapers in the middle of the last century, its actions became more accessible to a larger proportion of the population; thus from around the 1850s it became the centre of popular political attention also. This popularity is rooted in both the antiquity of the institution and its feeling of permanence; the buildings themselves provide a focus, and rank among the most instantly recognisable political landmarks in the world, along with the White House and Congress in the USA and the Kremlin in Russia. This longevity allied with a national history of resistance to invasion from foreigners, and a geographical detachment necessitating independence and self-reliance on the part of the people it represents, explain the pride and high esteem in which it is held. Furthermore, in the first half of this century, the electorate has held three key beliefs about it; firstly, that it is ultimately adaptable to function in any economic or social conditions; secondly, belief in its representative nature, and thirdly, the responsiveness of the institution to the pressure of the electorate. Its fundamental legitimacy can be demonstrated by the fact that even those groups that were dissatisfied with the current system of government in no way sought to sweep it aside. High electoral turnouts in this period (over 80% in many cases) further reinforce this admiration. However, in the latter half of this century, concern has been raised over the apparent trend in growth of executive power over the legislature, and the change in the role of the MP from that of obstructer and scrutineer to that of supporter of a particular government regardless of the issue. Falling turnouts have been labelled as evidence of a detachment that has arisen between the bodies of government and the electorate, and have been used as ammunition to call for a radical overhaul of the way in which government business is conducted. To see if these allegations are justified, we must examine how parliamentary procedure has changed over this period, and also investigate the altered role of the backbencher, as well as look at how the nature of the executive business and accountability has been affected. If it can be established that there has been a serious and undesirable shift in the dispersion of powers between executive and legislative branches of government, then there may be grounds for conducting further investigations into how this might be resolved.
Any changes in the functioning of parliament in this century have their roots primarily in the reforms in procedure that were carried out between 1811 and 1902, which transformed the House of Commons from its seventeenth century role of grievance and obstruction to its modern position as the obedient tool of executive government. The resultant changes have been gradual and have occurred as the result of a cumulative effect on a body that is generally conservative in nature, but the instruments by which these changes were brought about were sudden and rather blunt; no major overhauls have been carried out since just after the turn of the century. The most important changes were the passing of the First and Second Reform Acts in 1832 and 1868 respectively, and also the drastic reforms in day-to-day business of the House in 1902, which devoted most of the week to government business, and reduced the time available for private measures to just one half-day per week. The Reform Acts increased greatly the proportion of the population eligible to vote, and required MPs to devote more of their time and attention to satisfying the needs of their constituency. The novelty of voting to many of these new electors combined with a new form of representation through which they could express their grievances and problems they faced at a specifically local level required the MP to pay more heed to such problems.
Furthermore, the growth of party organisations from the late nineteenth century brought about an entirely new system of allegiance inside Parliament. Previously, groupings were loosely defined, with many members openly refusing to describe themselves as either "Conservative" or "Liberal" in any sense; thus there was a large degree of cross-voting. Party structures arose partly in order to give the new enfranchised voters an easy way in which to make their decision about which candidate to vote for; with the swell in numbers, it was no longer possible to communicate a candidate's personality to the entire electorate. Therefore by ascribing to a party label, they could assure the voters that they shared certain views that would encourage support. Since the mid-nineteenth century, this is how the majority of voters chose which candidate to vote for. This also helps to explain why there have rarely been independent MPs in Parliament; party labels reflect much more about a candidate's views and are more reassuring to the electorate than the classification "independent." Once inside Parliament, the need for party cohesion to be successful in pursuing a legislative agenda means that rebellion is now rare. The issue is rarely important enough to risk not only bringing the government down, but also the threat of the MP losing their seat and allowing the opposition to accede to power. Thus the importance of the backbencher has decreased as the party structure has strengthened. Free votes on matters that are uncontroversial are a rarity, but for complex moral issues, the private member still retains some power (e.g. issues such as homosexuality and abortion have been decided in such a way).
As the backbencher's role on the floor of the House has declined, so it has grown in other areas as the use of committees has increased. With the increase in the size of government's legislative programmes, transferring most business away from the main debating chamber has the result that many bills can proceed at once through different committees, rather than having all business be debated. This accelerates the achievement of a government's programme. As most committee business is conducted in the public eye (especially given the televising of some committee proceedings), it is difficult to sustain the accusation that this has undermined the accountability of the executive. Although there are cases where the committees can split along partisan lines (for example, when a recent committee enquiry into the power of Tony Blair's Press Secretary Alistair Campbell concluded that his intervention was not excessive), there are also cases where they can deliver embarrassing rebuffs to the government (such as the conclusion that the New Deal programme is not achieving its targets), and so in some cases may strengthen backbenchers' ability to scrutinise the governments activities. This is welcome given that the other main check to the executive, namely the House of Lords, has certainly lost much of its power during this period, most notably in the 1911 Parliament Act, which established supremacy of the Commons over the Lords after the latter had provoked the only major constitutional crisis this century by persistently rejecting the 1909 Budget. The inbuilt Tory majority in the Upper Chamber can be both an asset and a liability; the power exists to check a Labour government, but use this power too often and a dissolution over the issue (which has never happened) could prove costly were the Conservatives in opposition in the Commons and the government used the election as a vote on the issue of "peers versus the people."
Another important area that suggests that the Commons has been losing its control over government is evidenced by the declining attendance of the Prime Minister in the chamber. There are four reasons why he or she would be present; to answer questions, to make statements, to make speeches, and to participate in debates. Of these, only in the statement-making area has Prime Ministerial activity increased over the course of this century. They answer fewer questions, partly because this role has been somewhat transferred to the Leader of the House, so the only time when the Prime Minister answers questions is at PMQs. However, this has become largely a ceremony of style over substance, where the aim is not to answer the questions at all, but score points off the Leader of the Opposition and offer soundbites while avoiding any questions that may be embarrassing. Secondly, the number of speeches that they make in Parliament has declined, as has participation in debates; indeed, the only participation is normally in the form of an introductory speech, after which they leave the chamber rather than get involved in any bruising encounters. However, the number of statements made has increased, although it did fall during the first half of the century. This can be attributed to the number of extra-parliamentary and especially international conferences and meetings that they attend and are required to comment on. International crises must be explained to MPs, as well as areas of domestic politics for which the Prime Minister has particular responsibility (e.g. the civil service and intelligence and security services). Given the number of scandals that have occurred in these particular areas recently, it is not surprising that the number of statements made to the House has increase. However, the authors of this study (Dunleavy and Jones) can offer no solid explanation for this decline in parliamentary activity by the Prime Minister other than an obvious reduction in accountability. They point out that increased complexity of the PM's role is not a factor, as the fall in attendance came mostly after the decline of the Empire; their suggestions involve devolving responsibilities to Ministers, and the fact that Parliament has become less important in policy-making. This seems plausible given the dramatic rise in the reliance on numerous and diverse think-tanks since the mid-1970s, which now appear to supply the government with more policies than backbenchers or constituents; given the strong links between these groups and key figures in the influential spheres of economic, industrial, and academic life, it is perhaps not surprising that they have become more important in determining policies.
Despite this however, there do remain important checks on the executives' power; firstly, there are the constraints of time, which have become ever more apparent recently, and the problem of what the government's supporters can be persuaded to accept (although given the increase in the number and specialisation of the Whips, this does not seem particularly convincing). We have seen how in a situation where the government's majority has been small, individual or groups of backbencher's have held the power over the executive (e.g. the Maastricht rebels or the Ulster Unionists in John Major's last administration). Thus while Parliament's changed role, incorporating increased professionalism that has reflected developments in the social and economic structure of the nation, may have diminished the control of Parliament over government, the House still performs a central role of government, and as long as that exists, no government can afford to ignore Parliament completely, or else they run the risk of a dangerous and damaging backlash against the executive.