FOREIGN VIEWS ON PATANI
The Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand
In the case of the Malay-Muslims, their relationship with the Thais and the Thai state is unfriendly and often hostile. While the Malay-Muslims view the Thais unfavorably, the attitudes of the Thais toward the Malay-Muslims are described in the pejorative khaek which literally means "guest" or "visitor" in Thai. However, the term khaek is generally used to identify a group of people with dark skin, specifically those from South Asia, such as Indians, Pakistanis, etc., and those from the Middle Eastern region or those who Thais perceive to be Muslim (including Malaysian Muslim). In the eyes of Thais, khaek are "ethnocentric, lusty (male), lazy, dirty, selfish, untrustworthy, poor, narrow-minded, cruel, uncooperative, stupid, unfriendly, and very religious."
Unlike the Sino-Thai relations, the Malay-Muslim-Thai relations started with conflicts and hostility. While the Chinese and Thais interact in a relatively "equal" terms, the Malay-Muslims perceive their relationship with the Thai state as one of the conqueror and the conquered. Historically, the Sultanate of Patani was forcefully incorporated into the Siamese state from the sixteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Pattani was cut off from the Malay states. In 1909, while the Raja of Patani was removed, Patani was split into seven states and later reorganized into three provinces, Patani, Yala and Narathiwat, the current home of the Malay-Muslim, and local Malay rulers were replaced by Thai officials onward.
The Malay-Muslims constitute roughly sixty percent of the whole Muslim population in Thailand. On the contrary to the "Thai-Muslims:--non-Malay Muslims or Muslims who have assimilated to Thai culture—the Malay-Muslims see themselves as an "outgroup" in their own land governed by "foreigners." Their strong adherence to Malay language and Islam, coupled with the geographic distance from the central Thailand present major barriers in their relations with the Thais. Furthermore, the attempt by the government to integrate them into the Thai society is regarded as an expansionist threat. Several long-term government policies only worsened the situation.
According to Uthai Dulyakasem, the expansion of secular education into Malay-Muslim areas has not only failed to bring about peaceful assimilation, "but it also intensified, if not created, ethnic conflict between the Muslim Malays and the central government." (20) During the first half of the twentieth century, administrative centralization, the expansion of secular education, Thai language and Buddhist ethics provoked resistance from the Muslim community. Since the 1932 revolution there have been several separatist movements. Organizations such as the BNPP (National Front for the Liberation of Patani), PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization) and BRN (National Revolutionary Front) were established during the 1960s. Even after the government adopted more conciliatory and accommodationist approach toward the Malay-Muslims in the 1970s (as a response to the separatist movements), hostility still persists.
Indeed, besides historical, cultural and religious differences, and the conflict of autonomy, some observers regard economic deprivation of the mostly rural and poor Malay-Muslims as an important factor in the cleavages. The argument is supported by the fact that separatist agitation increased when the economic condition deteriorated in the 1940s and 1960s.
Conclusion
In summary, these three cases of ethnic minorities roughly represent an overall picture of ethnic communities in Thailand. It is evident that except for the comparatively successful Sino-Thai relations, the historically assimilationist policies of the Thai government toward minorities in the case of the Malay-Muslim and the Hmong minorities have backfired. Whereas the Chinese fit well into the Thai society due to their significant role in the economy and the compatibility of the two cultures, the Hmong and the Malay-Muslim remain second-class citizens. Many Hmong still do not have legal title to their land or possess clear legal rights to citizenship.
Any attempts to ease the conflicts by the Thai government will not succeed as long as they still deliver cultural and religious insensitivity. For instance, according to a prominent Thai-Muslim politician Surin Pitsuwan, a mosque in the lotus shape built as a gesture to promote Islam cannot be seen as anything but a symbolic affront to the Islamic crescent. As for the Hmong, the main connection that keeps the Hmong-Thai relations peaceful now is King Bhumipol whose personal patronage is highly respected by the hill-tribal communities.
The relationship between the Thai state and the ethnic minorities will not improve under assimilationist approach. In fact, the 1992 August burning down of 34 schools in the South, for which the BRN and PULO were automatically accused to be responsible by authorities, reflected the still much alive tension and mistrust between the two parties. And whether or not the torching was done by the Malay-Muslim separatists or by the old power Army clique to destabilize the government, the underlying message is that this ethno-religious conflict begs more serious attention and certainly the implementation of more sensitive government policies toward minorities in Thailand.
References
1) Nicholas Tapp, The Hmong of Thailand: Opium People of Golden Triangle, Report No. 4 (Anti-Slavery Society: Indigenous People and Development Series, 1986), p. 60.
2) David Brown, "The State of Ethnicity and the Ethnicity of the State: Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1989: 47-62.
3) Cynthia H. Enloe, "Ethnicity in the Evolution of Asia’s Armed Bureaucracies," in De Witt C. Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnicity and the Military in Asia (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981, p. 2, cited in David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, Spring 1988, p. 55.
4) Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," p. 55
Mizan Khan (103), 01/04/95
Updates
Deepa Khosla, February 1996
Kathie Young, September 1999
Muslims in Thailand
Total Area of Thailand: 514,000 sq. km
Capital: Bangkok
Country Population: 60,037,000 (U.S. Census Bureau estimate 1998)
Group Population: 1,801,000 (3%) Patani Malays
Overview
Adherents of the Islamic faith currently comprise 3% of the population of the Buddhist state of Thailand (around 1.75 million people). Of these, nearly 80% are ethnic-Malays who live in the southern provinces along the border with Malaysia: Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkhla. While all Muslims in Thailand are excluded from full participation due to the infusion of Buddhist ritual in the Thai state, it has been the Malay-Muslims of the south who have been the most adamant in their refusal to be subject to Buddhist authority or to identify with the Thai nation. Even among Malay-Muslims there are different modes of response to Thai sovereignty. The Malay-Muslims to the west, in Satun province, speak mainly Thai and are fairly well integrated into Thai society, whereas those to the east, centered on Patani, speak mainly Malay and have waged a continuous, though sporadic, resistance to Thai authority since the early 20th century.
The southern provinces of Thailand remained an economically neglected area well into the 1970s. Prior attempts at establishing Thai regional administration in the "Patani" provinces through coercion and policies of assimilation had stimulated strong, though unorganized, local resistance. As the central government expended greater effort to bring this area under control, the resistance became better coordinated. By 1981, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) were able to field a formidable force (around 1,600) against Thai troops.
A change in government policy in the mid-1980s toward regional autonomy, greater social and economic development, and religious toleration, combined with a clemency program, was mostly successful in stemming the tide of the insurgency. In 1988 there were less than 300 armed "bandits" operating in the Muslim provinces. Religion-based conflict, however, has not been resolved. There were reports of ethnic demonstrations and renewed terrorist activity in the south in 1988 as a result of religious controversies between Malay-Muslims and Thai authorities. Violence erupted again in the late 1990s, but the separatist guerillas seemed to receive much attention from the general Islamic Thai public.
Demands for cultural and religious autonomy have mostly replaced the separatist demands of the 1970s and early 1980s, although the much smaller armed resistance has tended to become more radical and fundamentalist. These more modest demands have met with some degree of success in the southern provinces, as Thai officials have begun to adapt policies to fit better to Islamic teachings. It is, however, unlikely that full integration of the Malay-Muslims will be accomplished as long as Buddhism retains its preeminent status in the Thai state.
Chronology
1990
March: Thai police arrested a Muslim suspected of involvement in the murder of three Saudi diplomats in Bangkok in early February.
June: Libya has denied backing Muslims in southern Thailand. The denial was conveyed to a Thai Ambassador attached to the Foreign Ministry by a Libyan envoy based in Manila. Although Thailand and Libya established diplomatic relations back in 1977, they have not yet set up permanent embassies in their respective capitals. Libya categorically denied reports of training Thai Muslims in sabotage tactics. Libya stated that it granted scholarships and job training to a large number of Thai Muslims, but it was not aware if some of them were bad elements.
1991
February: In predominantly Buddhist Thailand, some leaders of the minority Muslims who mainly live near the southern border with Malaysia, have denounced Saddam Hussein's action in Kuwait. However, in a split among the ranks, some Muslims endorsed Iraq's &pi0;holy war', defying the leaders. Gradually a Muslim backlash has developed against the Gulf war. On February 3, the Bangkok Post wrote the following editorial: "Much against Thais' wishes, it now looks like this country has become embroiled in the Gulf war -albeit in an indirect manner....To avoid complication, the central government in Bangkok should open a serious dialogue with the Thai Muslim population in the South to assure them that Thailand is not - and does not want to be - a direct party to the Gulf conflict" (02/03/91).
July: Kelantan's Parti Islam state has reportedly been giving shelter to rebel Thai Muslims.
December: For the first time, the new Thai Constitution recognizes the right of minorities to practice and propagate their languages. It also provides support for the administration of Islamic affairs and the teaching of minority languages. In the past, Thai Muslims had to contend with the rigidly assimilationist policies of successive Thai governments. Muslim minorities form a large majority in the four southern provinces: Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Satun.
1992
September: For the first time in Thai politics, four Muslims were elected to the national Parliament under the general elections that resulted in the formation of a coalition government. In the Democratic Party-led new government, headed by Chuan Leekpai, an ethnic Chinese, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament were chosen from the Muslim community.
December: The police suspect that Thai Muslims were behind a bomb blast in a Bangkok bus terminal. Investigators found a piece of paper with a message in Jawi, a script used by Thai Muslims in the south.
1993
July: Malaysia's Prime Minister paid an official visit to Thailand. Mahathir Mohamad assured his Thai hosts that the "Malaysian government never supported the gangs of bandits or terrorist movements operating inside Thailand".
September: The Thai military has blamed rebel Muslims for three attacks involving arson at schools, the ambushing of trains and buses and the fire-bombing of a Buddhist temple in provinces bordering Muslim-dominated Malaysia. The regional commander of the Fourth Army based in southern Thailand says "the BRN (National Revolutionary Force) were responsible for the violence"(IPS, 09/03/93). However, Thai political analysts and observers reject such claims. Their rejection is reinforced by a muted and unusually restrained response to the crisis on the part of the military.
1994
April: A bomb blast at a railway station in southern Thailand killed three people and seriously injured more than a dozen. Most of the victims were women and girls standing near a noodle stall.
Update 02/24/96
September: A senior member of the PULO has been arrested by police forces. Daud Krongpinang is reported to be behind most of the major sabotage incidents in the south (BBC, 09/21/94).
September 29: A brief gun-battle with Thai soldiers has resulted in the deaths of at least three members of the Barison Revolution National movement. (Reuters, 09/29/94).
October 21: A former leader of Thailand's small Shi'ite community has been jailed for 31 years on charges of sedition and insulting the Thai monarch. The charges against Sorayuth Sakunasantisart (Dr. Shamsuddin) stem from disturbances in southern Thailand in 1990. Sorayuth is alleged to have led a campaign in the province of Patani to protest government plans to designate a local mosque as a historical site and tourist attraction (Reuters, 10/21/94).
1995
January: Security for Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and other national VIPS has been increased following an apparent sabotage attempt in Hat Yai. Two suspected saboteurs died when a home-made bomb they were carrying accidently went off. Police have discovered further explosives at the house of one of the victims (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/05/95).
January 9: There is still much confusion over which organization was responsible for the bomb blast at Hat Yai on January 5. The Special Branch claims that the New PULO was responsible for the blast while other officials believe it was the work of Shi'ite Muslims who were seeking revenge for the imprisonment of their leader, Sorayuth Sakunasantisart (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/09/95).
January 11: Thai army intelligence reports claim that a new dissident group known as the New PULO was formed in 1993. The leader of this new organization is reported to be Harun Muleng. The government blames the New PULO for the torching of more than thirty schools in Yala, Patani, and Narathiwat in August, 1993 (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/11/95).
January 16: The Malaysian government has warned Thai Muslim separatists living in Malaysia to halt terrorist activities against Thailand or face expulsion. Malaysia has been known as the safe haven for groups such as the BRN (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/16/95).
February: A bomb planted near the provincial governor's residence in Yala was defused yesterday. A letter left at the scene stated that the New PULO was concerned over the government's response to an incident at Yala Teacher College last year when female Muslim students wearing the hijab (traditional Muslim dress) were barred from attending classes. The government conducted an investigation but did not remove the teacher involved despite the recommendations of local officials. Yala religious leaders do not believe that the New PULO was behind the bombing attempt and instead attribute it to other forces who are seeking to create tension in the area (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 02/01/95).
February 19: A government soldier was injured during a clash between a government patrol and members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional in Yala (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 02/19/95).
March: Reports indicate that the Thai military will be providing anti-insurgency advice to the Burmese junta. Relations between the two countries have been improving despite frictions over cross-border incursions by the Burmese army fighting the Karen rebels (UPI, 03/03/95).
March 26: Security measures have been increased in Thailand's five southern provinces in order to counter possible subversive activities by Muslim separatists. A highly-placed source (who was not named) states that the BRN has declared its intention to form independent Islamic states in the areas of Songkhla, Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun. The BRN is also alleged to have set up a Muslim Commando Unit to conduct non-violent separatism in both rural and urban areas (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 03/26/95).
April 14: Old tires were burned on fourteen bridges and roads in Thailand's southern provinces and officials believe that a new Muslim separatist organization is responsible. The organization, the Tentera Jihad Islam (TJI) claimed responsibility for the attack. The TJI is reported to have begun its campaign in January when its men attacked a police station. Officials state that the TJI is a loose organization comprised of disgruntled members of the New PULO and the BRN. The BRN are reported to be less active due to its internal conflicts, defections and government suppression (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 04/14/95).
May: Three members of the Border Patrol Police in Yala province were seriously injured when they stepped on a landmine. Police believe that the mine was planted by the BRN (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 05/20/95).
June: A clash between government forces and Muslim separatists in Yala resulted in the death of one soldier. It is not known if the rebels were members of the BRN, which is known to be active in the area (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 06/28/95).
July: Snap elections were held on July 2 following splits within Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai's five-party coalition government. The Chart Thai emerged as the single largest party, winning 92/391 seats. Banharn Silparcha was appointed Prime Minister; he heads a seven-member coalition called the Thai Development Front (Reuter Textline: Business Monitor, 12/22/95).
August: A military unit was reportedly attacked by members of the BRN in Yala. One soldier was wounded (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 08/02/95).
October: During the past month, several Muslim separatist groups are reported to have demanded protection fees from local businesses in the southern provinces (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 10/31/95).
August 1996: Days after police defused a 15-kilogram bomb in Yala, another bomb exploded at a school in Narthiwat. Those who claimed responsibility for the bombs pledged allegiance to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). Despite pledges from the Thai army that security would be heightened in the southern provinces, the Muslim residents of this region expressed great concern over the events. (South China Morning Post, August 14)
1997
April 3, 1997: Thai paramilitary forces killed four members of the separatist National Revolutionary Front (BRN) in Narathiwat. Officials and members of the press in Thailand referred to the rebels as communists rather separatists. (AFP, April 24)
April 24, 1997: Approximately 10 rebels claiming to represent a new Muslim separatist faction in southern Thailand executed 4 workers at a rubber planatation in Yala and took a fifth female worker hostage. Later reports indicated that the rebels were members of the PULO. (AFP, April 24, May 4)
May 4, 1997: Border patrol police in Yala killed two New PULO members during a clash with a group a rebels. About 15 guerillas had seized food and supplies from local villages prior to the deadly clash. (AFP)
October 1997: The King signed into law a new constitution which guaranteed "the most sweeping free press laws in Asia," according to an organization for journalists' rights and protection. (AFP, March 26, 1998)
October 16, 1997: Leading Thai Moslems elected former Bangkok parliamentarian Sawasdi Sumalayasak to be the Advisor to the Thai King on Islamic Religious Affairs. (AFP)
November 12, 1997: Officials for the country's Interior Department announced that security had been enhanced in southern Thailand following the resumption of local bombings by Muslim separatist groups. (AFP)
December 1997: A series of small bombs exploded throughout southern Thailand, including one bomb on a major bridge and one near a police station. No person or group immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks, and officials blamed "miscreant teenagers" and "drug traffickers" for the bombings. Local residents, however, suspected that bands of Muslim separatists were responsible for the incidents. The Prime Minister called for heightened security in the area and increased intelligence gathering. (AFP, December 15)
December 30, 1997: A bomb exploded at a school fair being held in the province of Yala and left 3 teenagers dead and another 12 people injured. Police suspect that the blast was retaliation for the arrest earlier in the week of four men associated with the PULO. The Minister of the Interior called for security in the region to be taken over by the military rather than local forces. (AFP)
1998
January 1, 1998: Police killed one terrorist after he and a colleague had thrown a hand grenade at a police post in Narithwat. (AFP)
January 4, 1998: During a meeting in Malaysia, the Thai foreign minister warned that the international economic development zone in southern Thailand could be jeopadized by suspected Muslim separatist violence. (AFP)
January 16, 1998: The Thai army launched a large-scale security operation in the Muslim-dominated provinces of the country, incorporating both military and police officials. (AFP)
January 18, 1998: Thai Muslim leader Sawasdi Sumalayasak visited with local Muslim chiefs in the country's southern provinces in an effort to ease simmering ethnic tensions ignited by recent bombings. Sawasdi Sumalayasak called on Muslims to work together and with Thai officials to insure security in the region. (AFP)
January 22, 1998: Officials arrested three men, allegedly connected to the New PULO, as suspects in the recent terrorist attacks in southern Thailand. The three men confessed to a series of attacks and encouraged New PULO members to end the campaign of violence. A fourth suspected leader was arrested three days later. (AFP, January 22, January 23, January 25)
January 24, 1998: A village leader in Narthiwat was shot six times as he approached a mosque. Authorities believe that the attack was carried out in retaliation for the apprehension of separatist terrorists earlier in the week, as the victim was an alleged New PULO informant. (AFP)
February 8, 1998: In an effort to ease ethnic tensions in southern Thailand, the country's police chief met with Muslim leaders and assured them that corrupt officers in the southern provinces would be removed from duty. Some Muslim leaders allege that recent terrorist attacks in the region were in retaliation for corrupt and discriminatory police behavior and were not part of a Muslim separatist movement. (AFP)
February 14, 1998: Two police officers in Yala suffered injuries during a grenade attack on their car. The assailants escaped, nobody claimed immediately responsibility for the attack. (AFP)
February 16, 1998: A gang of men armed with AK47s attacked seven Thai police officers in Yala. Authorities arrested three Muslims suspected to be involved in the attack the following day. (AFP)
February 22, 1998: Suspected leaders of the Muslim separatist group New PULO in southern Thailand are believed to have escaped to Malaysia, en route to European and Middle East destinations. (AFP)
March 9, 1998: Reports indicate that separatist terrorists in hiding in Malaysia told Thai Muslims in Malaysia that they would be subject to arrest if they returned to Thailand, spreading concern and confusion among the Thai communities. (Bangkok Post)
March 10, 1998: In anticipation of the expiration of an offered amnesty offer, fifty Moslem separatists--not suspected of specific terrorist acts--from BRN surrendered to Thai authorities, but the Thai interior minister noted that over 100 rebels remained at large. (AFP, March 12)
March 15, 1998: A bomb exploded near a busy market in the province of Patani, leaving 5 women and a 2 year-old girl wounded. No one claimed responsibility for the explosion at the time of its detonation. (AFP)
March 23, 1998: A delegation of Islamic diplomats expressed optimism that a peaceful resolution would be reached in southern Thailand after the officials toured the provinces. Leaders from the region offered their support for a peace plan between the Muslim separatists and officials in Bangkok. (AFP)
April 4, 1998: Reports indicate that Thai Rangers shot and killed a separatist guerilla in the mountainous region of Narathiwat during a firefight. (AFP)
June 13, 1998: Three BRN gunmen executed a 24 year-old they suspected to be a government informant in southern Narathiwat. (AFP)
June 15, 1998: A gunfight broke out between police in Narathiwat and suspected Moslem separatist rebels. It was unclear whether the rebels were members of BRN (AFP)
December 8, 1998: On approaching the fiftieth anniversary of the UN's Declaration on Human Rights, analysts praised Thailand, relative to its regional neighbors, for its progress on ensuring and respecting the rights of all people. (AFP)
1999
January 28, 1999: The state-run Thai Government Savings Bank announced plans to open additional Muslim bank counters in the south of the country after pilot projects proved to be a success. The policies of the Islamic counters reflect Muslim principles; for instance, the bank is "interest free," providing customers instead with periodic dividends. (AFP)
July 1999: After months of troubles, a European ratings agency announced that all six of Thailand's major banks were "on the road to full rehabilitation." (AFP, July 1)
Risk Assessment
The Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand apparently has lost much of the momentum that drove it in the 1980s. While violence has flared up in the region because of BRN activities, the flare-ups have been relatively short-lived and have had little success in gathering public support. As one Islamic leader in the country noted, "The Malay/Muslim community in the south no longer supports its [separatist] cause because of a fundamental shift in government policy in the last few years to be more sensitive to the needs of the Malay residents and their religion." (Abdul Halim Ismail, in AFP, March 23, 1998). And while the various Muslim separatist organizations are often the most likely suspects in violent attacks in the south, it is not always clear that the Muslims have been responsible. Overall, observers doubt that any separatist organization has the ability to engage in a large-scale campaign.
As noted, the decline of the intensity of and support for the separatist movement is related to (if not caused by) efforts led and/or supported by officials in Bangkok to reduce the marginalization of Islamic communities in the country. These efforts have been lauded by leaders of the Islamic community and by outside observers. But Muslims in Thailand would be quick to point out that members of the community still face systematic problems. Especially troubling are reports of police mistreatment aimed at Muslims.
Concern arose that discriminatory behavior in the country might rise when Thailand's economy went into deep recession, but this outcome seems to have been mostly avoided. The economy is now in recovery, which should provide solid conditions for the government to continue its efforts to improve the conditions of Muslims--and all other residents--in the country.
References
Daipi, Hawazi, "Thai Muslims: A Community in Transition," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 24, 1996.
Daipi, Hawazi, "Thai Muslims Take Steps to Preserve Malay Identity," The Straits Times (Singapore), July 1, 1996.
The Europa Yearbook, Far East and Australasia 1993.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1990-93.
Keesings Record of World Events, 1990-93.
Nexis Library News, 1990-99.
Phase I, Minorities at Risk, overview compiled by Monty G. Marshall, 07/89.
US Dept. of State, Human Rights Report 1993 and 1994.
People Group Information (Source PIN):
Country: Thailand
Language Spoken: Malay, Patani
Population of People in this Country:
2,384,000
Population of Language Speakers in the World: 2,384,000
% Christians of this People in this Country: 0%
# of Evangelicals of this People in this Country: 25
% Evangelicals of this People in this Country: 0%
Latitude, Longitude: 6.4443, 101.6261
GMI Map Code: MFA-THA-EPY
ROPAL Code: MFA00
Affinity Block Name: Malay Peoples
People Cluster: Malay
The Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand
In the case of the Malay-Muslims, their relationship with the Thais and the Thai state is unfriendly and often hostile. While the Malay-Muslims view the Thais unfavorably, the attitudes of the Thais toward the Malay-Muslims are described in the pejorative khaek which literally means "guest" or "visitor" in Thai. However, the term khaek is generally used to identify a group of people with dark skin, specifically those from South Asia, such as Indians, Pakistanis, etc., and those from the Middle Eastern region or those who Thais perceive to be Muslim (including Malaysian Muslim). In the eyes of Thais, khaek are "ethnocentric, lusty (male), lazy, dirty, selfish, untrustworthy, poor, narrow-minded, cruel, uncooperative, stupid, unfriendly, and very religious."
Unlike the Sino-Thai relations, the Malay-Muslim-Thai relations started with conflicts and hostility. While the Chinese and Thais interact in a relatively "equal" terms, the Malay-Muslims perceive their relationship with the Thai state as one of the conqueror and the conquered. Historically, the Sultanate of Patani was forcefully incorporated into the Siamese state from the sixteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Pattani was cut off from the Malay states. In 1909, while the Raja of Patani was removed, Patani was split into seven states and later reorganized into three provinces, Patani, Yala and Narathiwat, the current home of the Malay-Muslim, and local Malay rulers were replaced by Thai officials onward.
The Malay-Muslims constitute roughly sixty percent of the whole Muslim population in Thailand. On the contrary to the "Thai-Muslims:--non-Malay Muslims or Muslims who have assimilated to Thai culture—the Malay-Muslims see themselves as an "outgroup" in their own land governed by "foreigners." Their strong adherence to Malay language and Islam, coupled with the geographic distance from the central Thailand present major barriers in their relations with the Thais. Furthermore, the attempt by the government to integrate them into the Thai society is regarded as an expansionist threat. Several long-term government policies only worsened the situation.
According to Uthai Dulyakasem, the expansion of secular education into Malay-Muslim areas has not only failed to bring about peaceful assimilation, "but it also intensified, if not created, ethnic conflict between the Muslim Malays and the central government." (20) During the first half of the twentieth century, administrative centralization, the expansion of secular education, Thai language and Buddhist ethics provoked resistance from the Muslim community. Since the 1932 revolution there have been several separatist movements. Organizations such as the BNPP (National Front for the Liberation of Patani), PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization) and BRN (National Revolutionary Front) were established during the 1960s. Even after the government adopted more conciliatory and accommodationist approach toward the Malay-Muslims in the 1970s (as a response to the separatist movements), hostility still persists.
Indeed, besides historical, cultural and religious differences, and the conflict of autonomy, some observers regard economic deprivation of the mostly rural and poor Malay-Muslims as an important factor in the cleavages. The argument is supported by the fact that separatist agitation increased when the economic condition deteriorated in the 1940s and 1960s.
Conclusion
In summary, these three cases of ethnic minorities roughly represent an overall picture of ethnic communities in Thailand. It is evident that except for the comparatively successful Sino-Thai relations, the historically assimilationist policies of the Thai government toward minorities in the case of the Malay-Muslim and the Hmong minorities have backfired. Whereas the Chinese fit well into the Thai society due to their significant role in the economy and the compatibility of the two cultures, the Hmong and the Malay-Muslim remain second-class citizens. Many Hmong still do not have legal title to their land or possess clear legal rights to citizenship.
Any attempts to ease the conflicts by the Thai government will not succeed as long as they still deliver cultural and religious insensitivity. For instance, according to a prominent Thai-Muslim politician Surin Pitsuwan, a mosque in the lotus shape built as a gesture to promote Islam cannot be seen as anything but a symbolic affront to the Islamic crescent. As for the Hmong, the main connection that keeps the Hmong-Thai relations peaceful now is King Bhumipol whose personal patronage is highly respected by the hill-tribal communities.
The relationship between the Thai state and the ethnic minorities will not improve under assimilationist approach. In fact, the 1992 August burning down of 34 schools in the South, for which the BRN and PULO were automatically accused to be responsible by authorities, reflected the still much alive tension and mistrust between the two parties. And whether or not the torching was done by the Malay-Muslim separatists or by the old power Army clique to destabilize the government, the underlying message is that this ethno-religious conflict begs more serious attention and certainly the implementation of more sensitive government policies toward minorities in Thailand.
References
1) Nicholas Tapp, The Hmong of Thailand: Opium People of Golden Triangle, Report No. 4 (Anti-Slavery Society: Indigenous People and Development Series, 1986), p. 60.
2) David Brown, "The State of Ethnicity and the Ethnicity of the State: Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1989: 47-62.
3) Cynthia H. Enloe, "Ethnicity in the Evolution of Asia’s Armed Bureaucracies," in De Witt C. Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnicity and the Military in Asia (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981, p. 2, cited in David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, Spring 1988, p. 55.
4) Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," p. 55
Mizan Khan (103), 01/04/95
Updates
Deepa Khosla, February 1996
Kathie Young, September 1999
Muslims in Thailand
Total Area of Thailand: 514,000 sq. km
Capital: Bangkok
Country Population: 60,037,000 (U.S. Census Bureau estimate 1998)
Group Population: 1,801,000 (3%) Patani Malays
Overview
Adherents of the Islamic faith currently comprise 3% of the population of the Buddhist state of Thailand (around 1.75 million people). Of these, nearly 80% are ethnic-Malays who live in the southern provinces along the border with Malaysia: Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkhla. While all Muslims in Thailand are excluded from full participation due to the infusion of Buddhist ritual in the Thai state, it has been the Malay-Muslims of the south who have been the most adamant in their refusal to be subject to Buddhist authority or to identify with the Thai nation. Even among Malay-Muslims there are different modes of response to Thai sovereignty. The Malay-Muslims to the west, in Satun province, speak mainly Thai and are fairly well integrated into Thai society, whereas those to the east, centered on Patani, speak mainly Malay and have waged a continuous, though sporadic, resistance to Thai authority since the early 20th century.
The southern provinces of Thailand remained an economically neglected area well into the 1970s. Prior attempts at establishing Thai regional administration in the "Patani" provinces through coercion and policies of assimilation had stimulated strong, though unorganized, local resistance. As the central government expended greater effort to bring this area under control, the resistance became better coordinated. By 1981, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) were able to field a formidable force (around 1,600) against Thai troops.
A change in government policy in the mid-1980s toward regional autonomy, greater social and economic development, and religious toleration, combined with a clemency program, was mostly successful in stemming the tide of the insurgency. In 1988 there were less than 300 armed "bandits" operating in the Muslim provinces. Religion-based conflict, however, has not been resolved. There were reports of ethnic demonstrations and renewed terrorist activity in the south in 1988 as a result of religious controversies between Malay-Muslims and Thai authorities. Violence erupted again in the late 1990s, but the separatist guerillas seemed to receive much attention from the general Islamic Thai public.
Demands for cultural and religious autonomy have mostly replaced the separatist demands of the 1970s and early 1980s, although the much smaller armed resistance has tended to become more radical and fundamentalist. These more modest demands have met with some degree of success in the southern provinces, as Thai officials have begun to adapt policies to fit better to Islamic teachings. It is, however, unlikely that full integration of the Malay-Muslims will be accomplished as long as Buddhism retains its preeminent status in the Thai state.
Chronology
1990
March: Thai police arrested a Muslim suspected of involvement in the murder of three Saudi diplomats in Bangkok in early February.
June: Libya has denied backing Muslims in southern Thailand. The denial was conveyed to a Thai Ambassador attached to the Foreign Ministry by a Libyan envoy based in Manila. Although Thailand and Libya established diplomatic relations back in 1977, they have not yet set up permanent embassies in their respective capitals. Libya categorically denied reports of training Thai Muslims in sabotage tactics. Libya stated that it granted scholarships and job training to a large number of Thai Muslims, but it was not aware if some of them were bad elements.
1991
February: In predominantly Buddhist Thailand, some leaders of the minority Muslims who mainly live near the southern border with Malaysia, have denounced Saddam Hussein's action in Kuwait. However, in a split among the ranks, some Muslims endorsed Iraq's &pi0;holy war', defying the leaders. Gradually a Muslim backlash has developed against the Gulf war. On February 3, the Bangkok Post wrote the following editorial: "Much against Thais' wishes, it now looks like this country has become embroiled in the Gulf war -albeit in an indirect manner....To avoid complication, the central government in Bangkok should open a serious dialogue with the Thai Muslim population in the South to assure them that Thailand is not - and does not want to be - a direct party to the Gulf conflict" (02/03/91).
July: Kelantan's Parti Islam state has reportedly been giving shelter to rebel Thai Muslims.
December: For the first time, the new Thai Constitution recognizes the right of minorities to practice and propagate their languages. It also provides support for the administration of Islamic affairs and the teaching of minority languages. In the past, Thai Muslims had to contend with the rigidly assimilationist policies of successive Thai governments. Muslim minorities form a large majority in the four southern provinces: Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Satun.
1992
September: For the first time in Thai politics, four Muslims were elected to the national Parliament under the general elections that resulted in the formation of a coalition government. In the Democratic Party-led new government, headed by Chuan Leekpai, an ethnic Chinese, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament were chosen from the Muslim community.
December: The police suspect that Thai Muslims were behind a bomb blast in a Bangkok bus terminal. Investigators found a piece of paper with a message in Jawi, a script used by Thai Muslims in the south.
1993
July: Malaysia's Prime Minister paid an official visit to Thailand. Mahathir Mohamad assured his Thai hosts that the "Malaysian government never supported the gangs of bandits or terrorist movements operating inside Thailand".
September: The Thai military has blamed rebel Muslims for three attacks involving arson at schools, the ambushing of trains and buses and the fire-bombing of a Buddhist temple in provinces bordering Muslim-dominated Malaysia. The regional commander of the Fourth Army based in southern Thailand says "the BRN (National Revolutionary Force) were responsible for the violence"(IPS, 09/03/93). However, Thai political analysts and observers reject such claims. Their rejection is reinforced by a muted and unusually restrained response to the crisis on the part of the military.
1994
April: A bomb blast at a railway station in southern Thailand killed three people and seriously injured more than a dozen. Most of the victims were women and girls standing near a noodle stall.
Update 02/24/96
September: A senior member of the PULO has been arrested by police forces. Daud Krongpinang is reported to be behind most of the major sabotage incidents in the south (BBC, 09/21/94).
September 29: A brief gun-battle with Thai soldiers has resulted in the deaths of at least three members of the Barison Revolution National movement. (Reuters, 09/29/94).
October 21: A former leader of Thailand's small Shi'ite community has been jailed for 31 years on charges of sedition and insulting the Thai monarch. The charges against Sorayuth Sakunasantisart (Dr. Shamsuddin) stem from disturbances in southern Thailand in 1990. Sorayuth is alleged to have led a campaign in the province of Patani to protest government plans to designate a local mosque as a historical site and tourist attraction (Reuters, 10/21/94).
1995
January: Security for Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and other national VIPS has been increased following an apparent sabotage attempt in Hat Yai. Two suspected saboteurs died when a home-made bomb they were carrying accidently went off. Police have discovered further explosives at the house of one of the victims (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/05/95).
January 9: There is still much confusion over which organization was responsible for the bomb blast at Hat Yai on January 5. The Special Branch claims that the New PULO was responsible for the blast while other officials believe it was the work of Shi'ite Muslims who were seeking revenge for the imprisonment of their leader, Sorayuth Sakunasantisart (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/09/95).
January 11: Thai army intelligence reports claim that a new dissident group known as the New PULO was formed in 1993. The leader of this new organization is reported to be Harun Muleng. The government blames the New PULO for the torching of more than thirty schools in Yala, Patani, and Narathiwat in August, 1993 (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/11/95).
January 16: The Malaysian government has warned Thai Muslim separatists living in Malaysia to halt terrorist activities against Thailand or face expulsion. Malaysia has been known as the safe haven for groups such as the BRN (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 01/16/95).
February: A bomb planted near the provincial governor's residence in Yala was defused yesterday. A letter left at the scene stated that the New PULO was concerned over the government's response to an incident at Yala Teacher College last year when female Muslim students wearing the hijab (traditional Muslim dress) were barred from attending classes. The government conducted an investigation but did not remove the teacher involved despite the recommendations of local officials. Yala religious leaders do not believe that the New PULO was behind the bombing attempt and instead attribute it to other forces who are seeking to create tension in the area (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 02/01/95).
February 19: A government soldier was injured during a clash between a government patrol and members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional in Yala (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 02/19/95).
March: Reports indicate that the Thai military will be providing anti-insurgency advice to the Burmese junta. Relations between the two countries have been improving despite frictions over cross-border incursions by the Burmese army fighting the Karen rebels (UPI, 03/03/95).
March 26: Security measures have been increased in Thailand's five southern provinces in order to counter possible subversive activities by Muslim separatists. A highly-placed source (who was not named) states that the BRN has declared its intention to form independent Islamic states in the areas of Songkhla, Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun. The BRN is also alleged to have set up a Muslim Commando Unit to conduct non-violent separatism in both rural and urban areas (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 03/26/95).
April 14: Old tires were burned on fourteen bridges and roads in Thailand's southern provinces and officials believe that a new Muslim separatist organization is responsible. The organization, the Tentera Jihad Islam (TJI) claimed responsibility for the attack. The TJI is reported to have begun its campaign in January when its men attacked a police station. Officials state that the TJI is a loose organization comprised of disgruntled members of the New PULO and the BRN. The BRN are reported to be less active due to its internal conflicts, defections and government suppression (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 04/14/95).
May: Three members of the Border Patrol Police in Yala province were seriously injured when they stepped on a landmine. Police believe that the mine was planted by the BRN (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 05/20/95).
June: A clash between government forces and Muslim separatists in Yala resulted in the death of one soldier. It is not known if the rebels were members of the BRN, which is known to be active in the area (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 06/28/95).
July: Snap elections were held on July 2 following splits within Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai's five-party coalition government. The Chart Thai emerged as the single largest party, winning 92/391 seats. Banharn Silparcha was appointed Prime Minister; he heads a seven-member coalition called the Thai Development Front (Reuter Textline: Business Monitor, 12/22/95).
August: A military unit was reportedly attacked by members of the BRN in Yala. One soldier was wounded (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 08/02/95).
October: During the past month, several Muslim separatist groups are reported to have demanded protection fees from local businesses in the southern provinces (Reuter Textline: Bangkok Post, 10/31/95).
August 1996: Days after police defused a 15-kilogram bomb in Yala, another bomb exploded at a school in Narthiwat. Those who claimed responsibility for the bombs pledged allegiance to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). Despite pledges from the Thai army that security would be heightened in the southern provinces, the Muslim residents of this region expressed great concern over the events. (South China Morning Post, August 14)
1997
April 3, 1997: Thai paramilitary forces killed four members of the separatist National Revolutionary Front (BRN) in Narathiwat. Officials and members of the press in Thailand referred to the rebels as communists rather separatists. (AFP, April 24)
April 24, 1997: Approximately 10 rebels claiming to represent a new Muslim separatist faction in southern Thailand executed 4 workers at a rubber planatation in Yala and took a fifth female worker hostage. Later reports indicated that the rebels were members of the PULO. (AFP, April 24, May 4)
May 4, 1997: Border patrol police in Yala killed two New PULO members during a clash with a group a rebels. About 15 guerillas had seized food and supplies from local villages prior to the deadly clash. (AFP)
October 1997: The King signed into law a new constitution which guaranteed "the most sweeping free press laws in Asia," according to an organization for journalists' rights and protection. (AFP, March 26, 1998)
October 16, 1997: Leading Thai Moslems elected former Bangkok parliamentarian Sawasdi Sumalayasak to be the Advisor to the Thai King on Islamic Religious Affairs. (AFP)
November 12, 1997: Officials for the country's Interior Department announced that security had been enhanced in southern Thailand following the resumption of local bombings by Muslim separatist groups. (AFP)
December 1997: A series of small bombs exploded throughout southern Thailand, including one bomb on a major bridge and one near a police station. No person or group immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks, and officials blamed "miscreant teenagers" and "drug traffickers" for the bombings. Local residents, however, suspected that bands of Muslim separatists were responsible for the incidents. The Prime Minister called for heightened security in the area and increased intelligence gathering. (AFP, December 15)
December 30, 1997: A bomb exploded at a school fair being held in the province of Yala and left 3 teenagers dead and another 12 people injured. Police suspect that the blast was retaliation for the arrest earlier in the week of four men associated with the PULO. The Minister of the Interior called for security in the region to be taken over by the military rather than local forces. (AFP)
1998
January 1, 1998: Police killed one terrorist after he and a colleague had thrown a hand grenade at a police post in Narithwat. (AFP)
January 4, 1998: During a meeting in Malaysia, the Thai foreign minister warned that the international economic development zone in southern Thailand could be jeopadized by suspected Muslim separatist violence. (AFP)
January 16, 1998: The Thai army launched a large-scale security operation in the Muslim-dominated provinces of the country, incorporating both military and police officials. (AFP)
January 18, 1998: Thai Muslim leader Sawasdi Sumalayasak visited with local Muslim chiefs in the country's southern provinces in an effort to ease simmering ethnic tensions ignited by recent bombings. Sawasdi Sumalayasak called on Muslims to work together and with Thai officials to insure security in the region. (AFP)
January 22, 1998: Officials arrested three men, allegedly connected to the New PULO, as suspects in the recent terrorist attacks in southern Thailand. The three men confessed to a series of attacks and encouraged New PULO members to end the campaign of violence. A fourth suspected leader was arrested three days later. (AFP, January 22, January 23, January 25)
January 24, 1998: A village leader in Narthiwat was shot six times as he approached a mosque. Authorities believe that the attack was carried out in retaliation for the apprehension of separatist terrorists earlier in the week, as the victim was an alleged New PULO informant. (AFP)
February 8, 1998: In an effort to ease ethnic tensions in southern Thailand, the country's police chief met with Muslim leaders and assured them that corrupt officers in the southern provinces would be removed from duty. Some Muslim leaders allege that recent terrorist attacks in the region were in retaliation for corrupt and discriminatory police behavior and were not part of a Muslim separatist movement. (AFP)
February 14, 1998: Two police officers in Yala suffered injuries during a grenade attack on their car. The assailants escaped, nobody claimed immediately responsibility for the attack. (AFP)
February 16, 1998: A gang of men armed with AK47s attacked seven Thai police officers in Yala. Authorities arrested three Muslims suspected to be involved in the attack the following day. (AFP)
February 22, 1998: Suspected leaders of the Muslim separatist group New PULO in southern Thailand are believed to have escaped to Malaysia, en route to European and Middle East destinations. (AFP)
March 9, 1998: Reports indicate that separatist terrorists in hiding in Malaysia told Thai Muslims in Malaysia that they would be subject to arrest if they returned to Thailand, spreading concern and confusion among the Thai communities. (Bangkok Post)
March 10, 1998: In anticipation of the expiration of an offered amnesty offer, fifty Moslem separatists--not suspected of specific terrorist acts--from BRN surrendered to Thai authorities, but the Thai interior minister noted that over 100 rebels remained at large. (AFP, March 12)
March 15, 1998: A bomb exploded near a busy market in the province of Patani, leaving 5 women and a 2 year-old girl wounded. No one claimed responsibility for the explosion at the time of its detonation. (AFP)
March 23, 1998: A delegation of Islamic diplomats expressed optimism that a peaceful resolution would be reached in southern Thailand after the officials toured the provinces. Leaders from the region offered their support for a peace plan between the Muslim separatists and officials in Bangkok. (AFP)
April 4, 1998: Reports indicate that Thai Rangers shot and killed a separatist guerilla in the mountainous region of Narathiwat during a firefight. (AFP)
June 13, 1998: Three BRN gunmen executed a 24 year-old they suspected to be a government informant in southern Narathiwat. (AFP)
June 15, 1998: A gunfight broke out between police in Narathiwat and suspected Moslem separatist rebels. It was unclear whether the rebels were members of BRN (AFP)
December 8, 1998: On approaching the fiftieth anniversary of the UN's Declaration on Human Rights, analysts praised Thailand, relative to its regional neighbors, for its progress on ensuring and respecting the rights of all people. (AFP)
1999
January 28, 1999: The state-run Thai Government Savings Bank announced plans to open additional Muslim bank counters in the south of the country after pilot projects proved to be a success. The policies of the Islamic counters reflect Muslim principles; for instance, the bank is "interest free," providing customers instead with periodic dividends. (AFP)
July 1999: After months of troubles, a European ratings agency announced that all six of Thailand's major banks were "on the road to full rehabilitation." (AFP, July 1)
Risk Assessment
The Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand apparently has lost much of the momentum that drove it in the 1980s. While violence has flared up in the region because of BRN activities, the flare-ups have been relatively short-lived and have had little success in gathering public support. As one Islamic leader in the country noted, "The Malay/Muslim community in the south no longer supports its [separatist] cause because of a fundamental shift in government policy in the last few years to be more sensitive to the needs of the Malay residents and their religion." (Abdul Halim Ismail, in AFP, March 23, 1998). And while the various Muslim separatist organizations are often the most likely suspects in violent attacks in the south, it is not always clear that the Muslims have been responsible. Overall, observers doubt that any separatist organization has the ability to engage in a large-scale campaign.
As noted, the decline of the intensity of and support for the separatist movement is related to (if not caused by) efforts led and/or supported by officials in Bangkok to reduce the marginalization of Islamic communities in the country. These efforts have been lauded by leaders of the Islamic community and by outside observers. But Muslims in Thailand would be quick to point out that members of the community still face systematic problems. Especially troubling are reports of police mistreatment aimed at Muslims.
Concern arose that discriminatory behavior in the country might rise when Thailand's economy went into deep recession, but this outcome seems to have been mostly avoided. The economy is now in recovery, which should provide solid conditions for the government to continue its efforts to improve the conditions of Muslims--and all other residents--in the country.
References
Daipi, Hawazi, "Thai Muslims: A Community in Transition," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 24, 1996.
Daipi, Hawazi, "Thai Muslims Take Steps to Preserve Malay Identity," The Straits Times (Singapore), July 1, 1996.
The Europa Yearbook, Far East and Australasia 1993.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1990-93.
Keesings Record of World Events, 1990-93.
Nexis Library News, 1990-99.
Phase I, Minorities at Risk, overview compiled by Monty G. Marshall, 07/89.
US Dept. of State, Human Rights Report 1993 and 1994.
Joshua Project 2000 - Unreached People Profile
Patani Malay
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Patani Malay
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People Group Information (Source PIN):
Country: Thailand
Language Spoken: Malay, Patani
Population of People in this Country:
2,384,000
Population of Language Speakers in the World: 2,384,000
% Christians of this People in this Country: 0%
# of Evangelicals of this People in this Country: 25
% Evangelicals of this People in this Country: 0%
Latitude, Longitude: 6.4443, 101.6261
GMI Map Code: MFA-THA-EPY
ROPAL Code: MFA00
Affinity Block Name: Malay Peoples
People Cluster: Malay