Sign and the Question of the Arbitrary Assignment of Signifiers

 

The Miriam-Webster Dictionary defines “sign” as “a motion or gesture by which a thought is expressed or a command or wish made known… a fundamental linguistic unit that designates an object or relation or has a purely syntactic function… a mark having a conventional meaning and used in place of words or to represent a complex notion… something material or external that stands for or signifies something spiritual… [or] something indicating the presence or existence of something else.”  This definition works well on the surface without delving deeper into the true nature of a sign.  Further within, sign is more complex than this dictionary allows, and part of this paper shall be spent creating a workable but sound definition of sign.  However, one idea contradictory to what many authors present will also be presented and discussed:  The sound images of which signs are partially composed are not arbitrarily associated with concepts, but are connected with them on a deeper level.

Augustine is a good starting point for a proper definition of “sign”.  He defines it as “a thing which causes us [presumably people] to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the senses.”  (The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism page 188)However not everything communicating meaning is necessarily a sign, for he makes certain categorical distinctions.  First he distinguishes between “things” (nonsignifiers) and “signs” (signifiers).  Of course everything can signify meaning to some extent; nothing is without meaning.  For example, when one looks at a tree one can be reminded of various concepts, such as “life” because a tree is a living thing, “hard” and “brittle” because a tree’s bark is hard and brittle, and “bark” in the onomatopoeic sense of a dog’s bark, derived from homophonic association.  But, according to Augustine, a tree is not a “sign” but a “thing”, because it does not intentionally communicate meaning.  Thus one requirement for a thing to be a “sign” is that its signifying is intentional.  The statement “This dictionary is so boring!” when spoken by a human is an intentional “sign” conveying meaning that a certain dictionary is “so boring!” (Norton 189)

                Signs can be literal or figurative.  They are literal when they are used to designate those things for which they were instituted to designate and figurative when they are used to designate things beyond that which they were instituted to designate.  (Norton 190) The word “cheese” is a literal sign when it signifies a dairy product.  The word “cheesy” however possesses a figurative sense when used in conjunction with something tasteless or nonhumorous.  Kraft Macaroni is cheesy in the literal sense, but its commercials are cheesy in the figurative sense.

                According to Saussure, “sign” consists of psychological collectively approved associations.  Essentially, people within a culture or society agree upon a certain “signifier”for certain “signified.”  He also presents a more insightful definition of “sign”, stating that “sign” is a term which includes both “signifier” and “signified.”  The “signifier” is a psychological imprint of a sound, or the syllables comprising a sound while a “signified” is a concept (Norton 963).  Thus “sign” has two parts, sound-image and concept, which are linked to each other and mutually referential; the thought of a tree calls to mind the word “tree” which in turn calls to mind the sound-image represented by the written phonetic characters “tree.” (Norton 964)

                Lacan presents signs not only as individual signifiers of individual concepts, but as entities that communicate unconsciously social codes, conventions, and prohibitions.  “Computer” is not a mere signifier but a reminder of the technologization of society.  Signs above restroom doors indicate which room is for which gender and dictate the distinction between genders and the command that they be separated during such procedures.  Thus not only are signs used to represent the actual world, but they shape and guide our perceptions of our world. (Norton 1282)

Baudrillard furthers this observation with the term “simulacrum”, meaning counterfeit or fake.  According to him, contemporary consumer culture and Western science have made signs independent of actual noumena and phenomena, and instead self-referential and indicative of a false reality or “simulacrum.”  Our reality is dictated by the signs presented to us by the media and consumer industry because they present false images of things we do not need but perceive ourselves as needing because of their influence (Norton 1730).  An example of this is a child screaming that he needs a toy, when he does not in fact need a toy, but merely perceives it as so because commercials have linked his subconscious sense of self and social identity with a certain toy.  Another example is an adult buying a minivan because of what it is made to represent in commercials:  Youth, financial stability, and fondness for nature.  Their perception of reality is altered by certain signs presented by consumer culture.

Thus the definition for “sign” must include the following:  It involves sound-images, which are a psychological imprint of a set of syllables, and concepts.   They are used intentionally for communication and can be literal or figurative.  They are also collectively determined within a culture or people group.  Not only are signs representative of reality, but they can shape and alter perception of reality, which can involve simulacrum, the representation of a false reality.

                However, one aspect of the nature of sign can be questioned.  Saussure states that the bond between “signifier” and “signified” is arbitrary, which is not necessarily valid.  He demonstrates and/or attempts to prove this with the fact that different languages use different “signifiers” to signify the same “signified”, or to put it more simply and perhaps sacrifice some accuracy, different languages use different sound-images to represent the same concepts.  (Norton 964-965) For example, the English “love” is in French “amour”, and in Chinese and Japanese it is “ai” (in a phonetic rendition at least; written it is 爱 in Chinese and 愛in Japanese) This point, however, is not necessarily true in that different languages have different flavours or tones of meaning.

Take for example English “see you later”, the French “a tout a l’heure”, the Japanese “ja mata ne” and the Chinese “Zai-jian.”   They are all more or less equal according to literal translation.  But the English “see you later” can carry a tone of coolness, self-confidence, independence, and casualness in one tone of voice.  French is of course more sophisticated, romantic, flowery, and dramatic.  “See you later” would be more literally translated “until a later hour”, and its most plainly literal rendition is “au revoir” (au meaning ‘to the’ and revoir being the infinitive ‘to see again’).  The Japanese “ja mata ne” sounds different from “see you later” and conveys meaning of familiarity and informality to native speakers.  Chinese Zai-jian (literally again-see) can be formal or familiar, depending upon to whom it is said and how it is said, but it is very simple and direct without the grammatical complications of English.  Thus superficially their meanings are similar, but they carry very different tones and meanings on deeper levels of understanding.

                Evidences can be found in music as well.  Instrumental music is unconcerned with verbal syllables but rather with pitches, articulations, and tones.  Within different contexts the same notes can convey slightly different meanings, but different notes would certainly mean something different.  One would not include a rock guitar solo in Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto and convey the same meaning as one would with a clarinet cadenza; the idea is absurd.  Though loosely related to language, this shows that sounds themselves convey meaning, and that one cannot arbitrarily assign one sound to replace another.

Another evidence is in poetics.  Poetically, one would not use the word “light” to indicate elegance and luxury; rather one would use the French word “lumière.”   French itself is regarded as more elegant, refined, polite, and supercilious than other languages.  If all languages are merely arbitrary sound-images attached to concepts, then it would suffice to substitute words randomly from the dictionary.  It would make no different whether the word “light” or “lumière” was used, because both are random sound-images signifying the same concept.  There is an objection to this, however:  Variation in meanings of different words among languages can result from perceptions of another culture.  For example, French people can be seen as more elegant or snobby than Americans, thus their language can be perceived in a different light.  This would alter understanding of certain words through this association, which would mean that any such differences between arbitrary sound-images are associated, not necessary, and learned posteriori.

Thus whether the assignation of sound-images to concepts is arbitrary hinges on whether certain interpretations of sounds is learned by association due to factors external to mere comprehension of the sounds themselves.  No doubt sound-image interpretation is in part learned, for all things are of that nature to some extent.  But God has created the universe and all things within reason, and nothing is absurd or truly chaotic, so it would make sense that among other a priori knowledge is included the partial understanding and interpretation of sound.  Thus the sound images of which signs are partially composed are not arbitrarily associated with concepts, but are connected with them on a deeper level.