before we went on over the ridge. 'We found an old German dugout, which was useful, except that
the entrance faced the Germans, but it was big enough for four of us and we built a wall in front of
the entrance.
'There were other similar small units like mine spaced out along the ridge overlooking the Germans,
and when a shower of mortars fell, we had to take the time of flight, then get an angle on the small
crater in order to pinpoint the position of the minenwerfer, which were mobile and as soon as they
had discharged their 20 barrels moved away smartly.
'All the units such as mine were in radio contact with brigade or Army HQ and from the information
sent immediately by us, they could put down a concentration of artillery at once and hopefully catch
the Germans before they could move.
'When the mortars were not falling, we had the nasty experience of being shelled by 88mm guns -
with their flat trajectory and high muzzle velocity. It was not pleasant, especially as we had a pile of
German mortars a little distance from our dugout. They were probably booby-trapped, so we dared
not try to move them. However, we survived, and I believe relieved the infantry casualties from
mortar attacks.'
Jack Prior recalled how the counter-mortar system - though seemingly makeshift - worked
remarkably well right from the beginning, especially because of the radio link-up. 'It had, of course,
to be practised before it worked every time. But within a few hours, the German mortar crews
suddenly found themselves being bombed or strafed by our Typhoons or Spitfires.
'Naturally, the mortar crews speeded up their delivery and then tried to hide in nearby woods, but
the RAF pilots were not easily fooled and it was very rewarding for us when we sent in a target and
saw within seconds that the enemy was under severe attack from the air as a result of our efforts.'
As the counter-mortar units pioneered by the 92nd became more experienced and successful, they
formed a vital element of the division and were eventually afforded the status of a distinct unit. Later,
in Holland, they also targeted V2 launch sites along the Maas and Rhine - helping alleviate some of
the destruction the rockets were wreaking on London and the South East of England. On July 21, as
Goodwood developed, more elements of 92nd LAA - including F Troop, back from its rest area -
crossed the Orne and deployed in the neighbourhood of Ranville and Herouvillete, with RHQ at
Escoville. Two days later, 317 took up positions at Escoville, 318 at Le Mariquet and Herouvillette
and 319 at Cuverville. Units also deployed on the Butte de la Hogue.
Bombing attacks continued, and on July 25, BSM Joseph Connor and Gunner Arthur Greaves
were killed when four 500lb bombs were dropped on F Troop area, collapsing their dugout on top
of them. Corporal Wright and Gunners Connor - the sergeant's brother - Hardwick and Furniss
were wounded. The blasts also destroyed all F Troop stores and several vehicles, including a water
carrier.
bombing during which three 1,000-pounders fell around 317 headquarters. But an FW 190 was
shot down and 318 and 319 took part in a night barrage on the Hermanville Ridge under the control
of 40th LAA Regiment.
This period was `singularly unpleasant,' Captain Almond noted. Bedevilled by lone JU 88s
which dropped anti-personnel and high-explosive bombs - as well as propaganda leaflets advising
the British to surrender - the regiment countered by starting night barrages. `All ranks enjoyed these
barrages, which were fired along likely bomber run-ins. At first sight, they appeared a trifle chancy,
as early warning consisted largely of the whistle of the first bomb. But they worked very well and
there was an appreciable slackening of the enemy's air effort.'
The night barrages were controlled by a command post back near the beaches, with orders
transmitted by radio. Each gun had a set bearing and elevation for a particular 'box' - or sector - of
the sky, which was named or numbered.
'The command centre gave its orders over the radio and operators such as myself would relay them
to someone who shouted the details to the gun,' said Jim Holder-Vale. 'The area was plagued with
mosquitoes, which we tried to keep away by continuously smoking - as we were in a tarpaulin-
covered hole, we could scarcely breathe. We were also issued with anti-mosquito cream, a
pleasant-smelling green Vaseline-like stuff.'
Another experiment by the 92nd around this time proved to have its share of hazards - instant
excavation of gunpits. 'We soon cottoned on to the fact that there was quicker way of producing a
large deep hole than by merely using a pick and shovel,' recalled Jack Prior. 'This was to get hold of
some anti-tank mines and set one of them off in the desired location. We tried this several times and
it worked a treat, so long, of course, as one took ample cover while the debris was being flung to
the four corners.
'Of course, there is always one idiot in any group of people, and when one chap suggested it would
save us even more digging if we used two mines one on top of the other, we decided to give it a go.
A brave "volunteer" dug a suitable small hole, put the mines in, fitted a detonator, tamped down and
withdrew to join the rest of us before winding the handle. Unfortunately, we had all overlooked the
synergetic effect, and on this occasion one plus one certainly equalled more than two.