DI 1. �What, according to Dretske, is the difference between bodily movement and behavior? Use an example to provide an argument for his claim that these are different.� Bodily movement is a broad category that includes not only behavior but also things that happen to a person caused by outside forces. Anything can cause a bodily movement in a person, including another person. If a single person is being observed, and it is noted that the person moves their head to the side, it may be assumed that the person is exhibiting a behavior. However, if two people are observed in the same scenario, and it turns out that they are involved in a fistfight, and the second person has actually caused the motion in first person�s head by striking him, then it is apparent that the bodily movement was not a behavior. A behavior, instead, is a bodily movement that is caused by an intention within the person that is experiencing the bodily movement. So, if the two people are observed again, and the first person�s head moves to the side, but in this case he is anticipating being hit, then it is a behavior, since the first person did not desire to be injured, and avoided the advances of his opponent. (This is not to say that the first person cannot be struck, therefore be subject to bodily movement without intention, but at the same time be exhibiting a behavior in which he is also trying to avoid being struck. In this case, two separate bodily movements are being observed, one intentional, one externally caused.) DII 1. �Consider a representation system of type II, a gas gauge. Suppose that the needle is stuck on �full� and the tank is actually empty. A) Does it indicate, falsely, that the tank is full? Give the definition of �r�s being G indicates s�s being F� and use it to argue for your answer. B) Explain how, nevertheless, it can misrepresent the level of the gas tank as full.� ��R�s being G indicates s�s being F� is one of the formulas for information. If the probability that s has F, given that r has G, is 1, then the system encodes information. However, the probability in this case, that the needle�s being on full indicates the gas tank�s being full is not 1, as it is �currently� stuck on full, by some means other than the fullness of the tank. Therefore, the system does not encode information; it merely performs a function to which we assign a meaning. In this way it can misrepresent the tank�s being full by our own misinterpretation of the system or lack of knowledge of the system�s reliability. DIII 1. �Give an example of each of Dretske�s three types of systems of representation and say what makes each an example of its type.� I. A Type I system is anything that we give, conventionally, the power to represent something else. This includes arbitrary objects representing a situation, like coins and glasses representing a basketball game, or any other similar scenario. II. A Type II system is one which we give the power to indicate something which meets our needs, but already has the power to indicate something. What makes it a Type II system is that we interpret the meaning of it. The same gas gauge from DII 1 is included in this type of system, as it already possesses the power to indicate something, (it is a working system), but we interpret the system as meaning a gas tank is full or empty. III. A Type III system is that which with or without our perception, mean something. They are also called natural signs. Animal tracks are an example of this type of system. With or without our conventions, they encode the information that a deer has passed, if the tracks are in fact from a deer. Natural signs are the only type which encode information, as they are the only type which have but one meaning. That meaning, unlike a type II system, can be interpreted not only by humans, but also by other animals. DIII 2. ��It is easy to see how the meaning of a representation explains behavior. Sentences are representations that have a meaning, and their meaning explains the behavior of speakers and listeners. E.g., if I say to a taxi driver, �I�d like to go to Lincoln Center, 66th and Broadway,� I�ve uttered a representation that has a meaning-that I�d like to be driven to Lincoln Center�and if the driver understands English, the driver will take me there. The explanation for why he or she did so is that my meaning was understood by the driver.� Why is Dretske unhappy with that sort of account of how the meaning of sentences explain behavior?� Dretske says that neural structures respond solely to symbols, but the patterns of them, rather than the meaning. Similarly, Dretske also believes that the semantics of a sentence do not explain bodily movement, but rather that the syntax does. So instead of the assumption that the response on the driver�s part is caused by the meanings in the sentence, Dretske thinks that the response is caused by the syntactic use of symbols in the sentence, but that at the same time, the meaning can in fact explain the behavior, just not cause it. EC 1. �What is the difference between what Dretske calls an analog vs. a digital encoding of information? Illustrate with an example.� Digital encoding would occur when a piece of information and nothing more specific is presented. It encodes the most specific piece of information. Analog encoding is when that same piece of information presented, but also something more specific is encoded as well. An easy example is that of a digital and analog watch, which are aptly named. The digital watch shows that the time is 2:30, but because the analog version has a second hand, it shows that the time is in fact 2:30 plus it shows that 14 seconds have passed. This extra piece of information is the characterizing point that determines which sort of information encoding is occurring. Provided that the digital watch have an additional 2 digits to show the seconds passed, and the analog watch be missing it�s second hand, then the names would be rendered inept, and the digital would become analog, and the analog digital. Ultimately digital and analog encoding is relative to the information which is being measured or relayed. �Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained?� from �The Conscious Mind� by David Chalmers The Chalmers excerpt seems to have one clear point, which is expressly presented in the title�the reductive explanation of consciousness. To be a little more clear, Chalmers focuses on consciousness and whether or not it can be explained in physical terms. Some of the arguments that he uses are: 1. The logical possibility of zombies. Chalmers argues that since zombies are logically possible, that is, we can conceive of their existence, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that some may exist. And if they do exist, then consciousness being tied to the body certainly isn�t the case. 2. Epistemic asymmetry shows that what we do know about consciousness is all from a first-person experience. Therefore we have no conclusions about consciousness, no facts. 3. Absence of analysis is another way in which Chalmers argues against the reductive explanation of consciousness. This is more of an argument toward the opposing side. He claims that a theory of the reductive explanation must involve an account of how the physical and the consciousness interact. But since we know nothing about consciousness, there is no analysis to be had. |
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