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L-I: Fw: STRATFOR: Kosovo, one year later
I am forwarding here a recent Stratfor report on Kosovo.
FWIW, but some consider Stratfors assesment as the gospel on imperialists
intentions. In the light of recent speculations I think it should be noted,
how Stratfor analyses the contradictions between NATO and the KLA.
Johannes
> > STRATFOR.COM's Weekly Global Intelligence Update - 20 March 2000
> >
> > SPECIAL REPORT
> >
> > Kosovo: One Year Later
> >
> > Nearly one year after NATO first intervened in Kosovo, it appears
> > the alliance has failed to fulfill its chief objectives, both in
> > waging the war and keeping the peace.
> >
> > http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreports/special26.htm
> > __________________________________________
> >
> >
> > STRATFOR.COM Weekly Global Intelligence Update
> > 20 March 2000
> >
> > Balkan Futures
> >
> > Summary
> >
> > Nearing the anniversary of the Kosovo war, it is time to consider
> > winners and losers. Things are not as clear as they were a year
> > ago. President Slobodan Milosevic has survived his defeat and the
> > territorial integrity of the rest of Belgrade's domain appears
> > intact. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is eager to establish an
> > Albanian state in Kosovo but is blocked by NATO. And the alliance -
> > unable to suppress the guerrillas, unable to withdraw and unwilling
> > to negotiate with Milosevic - is devoid of options. A year later,
> > Milosevic seems both secure and hopeful that events are moving his
> > way. In an odd parallel to Saddam Hussein's experience, being
> > defeated by the West may open doors rather than close them.
> >
> > Analysis
> >
> > It's been almost a year since the beginning of the Kosovo war and
> > it is time to take stock. In many ways, it is easier to understand
> > what has happened than what is going to happen, not only because
> > the future is inherently unknowable, but because the future of the
> > Balkans is particularly opaque. It is made opaque by three facts.
> > First, NATO has enabled the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to come
> > close to its goal of creating an Albanian state in Kosovo. Second,
> > NATO has failed to break the Serbian nation and to deprive it of
> > the means to influence events in Kosovo. Third, NATO does not want
> > to see an Albanian state in Kosovo nor does it want to see Serbian
> > power re-emerge.
> >
> > In short, the two national competitors, Serbs and Albanians, remain
> > in place while NATO stands opposed to both of their national
> > aspirations. To further complicate matters, since it lacks the
> > necessary military power NATO is neither in a position to impose
> > its will, should it actually redefine its policy, nor is NATO in a
> > position to withdraw. Thus, we are in a three-player game in Kosovo
> > in which none of the parties will or wishes to abandon the field
> > and none can prevail. NATO has maneuvered itself into a position
> > where it threatens the national aspirations of both Serbs and
> > Albanians simultaneously, yet lacks the force to govern directly.
> > This is a prescription for chaos.
> >
> > To fully appreciate the danger of the situation, we need to
> > understand that both the Albanians and Serbs find themselves in
> > very similar strategic positions. Both sides have achieved the
> > underlying preconditions necessary to move from a defensive to
> > offensive position. Each side is probing the others' (and NATO's)
> > weaknesses. Thus, each side is daily becoming more aggressive.
> >
> > A year ago, the Albanians as a whole and the KLA took advantage of
> > what Serbia was providing, an image of an ethnic population
> > undergoing massive violations of human rights. The goal of this
> > campaign was to trigger a NATO intervention against Yugoslavia. The
> > Albanians had a fairly sophisticated understanding of the
> > consequences of NATO intervention. NATO's actions would expel
> > Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, which in turn would force at
> > least a partial withdrawal of the Serbian population, who would
> > make one of two assumptions:
> >
> > 1. That NATO was in favor of a Kosovo cleansed of Serbs and that it
> > was, in effect, a full ally of Albanian national aspirations.
> > 2. That NATO, whatever its intentions, was ineffective in defending
> > the Serbian population from KLA attacks.
> >
> > The KLA took advantage of Serbian actions, Western perceptions and
> > political realities within NATO capitals. NATO intervention allowed
> > the KLA to lay the foundation for an effective strategy toward some
> > clear goals.
> >
> > Let's consider the KLA's strategic goals:
> >
> > 1. Becoming the preeminent political force among Albanians in
> > Kosovo.
> > 2. The creation of a KLA-dominated government in Kosovo.
> > 3. The unification of Kosovo with Albania proper under a government
> > dominated by the KLA and its allies.
> > 4. The extension of Albania to all areas populated by Albanians.
> > 5. The creation of an Albanian entity that is secure, regionally
> > dominant and that controls the primary trade routes from Turkey to
> > central Europe.
> >
> > The KLA achieved its first goal when the United States and NATO
> > were forced to rely on it to enable ground operations in Kosovo.
> > NATO depended on the KLA for intelligence, to pin Serb ground
> > forces down during the bombing operation and to enable NATO's
> > special forces to carry out operations in the region. This
> > dependency gave the KLA three advantages. First, as a primary
> > intelligence source for NATO, the KLA was able to shape NATO's
> > understanding of what was happening on the ground. This, in turn,
> > shaped NATO operations in favor of the KLA not only in relation to
> > the Serbs, but also in relation to other, non-KLA Albanian
> > political forces. Second, by supplying and supporting KLA forces
> > during the conflict, NATO strengthened the KLA in relation to other
> > Albanian factions, while providing the KLA with a political
> > imprimatur as NATO's anointed. Finally, in relying on the KLA for
> > civil administration after the war, NATO made the KLA the de facto
> > government of Kosovo.
> >
> > Having achieved its first goal, the KLA is now engaged in pursuing
> > its second: the creation of a KLA-dominated government in Kosovo.
> > This has led to an interesting reversal. NATO, the KLA's enabler
> > in its first phase, is now the KLA's primary block in achieving its
> > second goal. NATO cannot tolerate the KLA achieving its second
> > strategic goal for domestic political and geopolitical reasons.
> > Domestically, an Albanian state in Kosovo, with the inevitable
> > ethnic cleansing of Serbs, would provide armed political opponents
> > of NATO governments. Some of these countries, like the United
> > States, are currently in the midst of elections that are devoid of
> > international content. The triumph of the KLA would give George
> > Bush a weapon that Clinton must deny him.
> >
> > There is also a deeper geopolitical reason. The creation of an
> > Albanian Kosovo would inevitably lead to its integration with
> > Albania proper. It would create the demand for border
> > rectifications with countries like Macedonia that have Albanian
> > populations, making Albania a dominant regional power. Although
> > Albania is one of the most impoverished areas of Europe it must be
> > remembered that there is a massive throughput of narcotics that
> > could provide resources for improving Albanian military capability,
> > if not standards of living. This is not something that other
> > countries in the region want to see. In particular, Greece and
> > Italy, both NATO members with important national interests in the
> > Balkans, would be upset with this evolution. Therefore, NATO,
> > having helped the KLA achieve its first strategic goal, must now
> > act to block its second strategic goal.
> >
> > Complicating the situation dramatically is the fact that the Serbs
> > themselves now find themselves in a much more favorable strategic
> > position than they were just a few months ago. Consider Milosevic's
> > strategic interests:
> >
> > 1. Stay in power in Belgrade.
> > 2. Prevent the further disintegration of the Yugoslavian
> > Federation.
> > 3. Reclaim lost territories and integrate areas that are
> > predominantly Serbian.
> > 4. Make Serbia the preeminent power in the Balkans.
> >
> > It seems clear, a year after the war began, that like Saddam
> > Hussein, Milosevic is not going to fall. The facile assumptions
> > made after the war that he could not survive his humiliation by
> > NATO have proven false. Milosevic was certainly despised by many
> > factions for leading his country into war and being outmaneuvered
> > by NATO, but he retained substantial support. NATO's persistent
> > anti-Serbian policy had persuaded many Serbs that NATO, for some
> > uncertain reason, meant to obliterate the Serbian nation. Milosevic
> > was seen as a champion of Serbia and as NATO's victim. He presented
> > himself as a man who had thwarted NATO's true ambitions by
> > confining Serbia's defeat to Kosovo.
> >
> > At the same time, the democratic opposition that NATO had
> > fantasized about was neither as democratic as NATO believed, nor as
> > united. Certainly, it was not as powerful as NATO believed.
> > Whatever bitterness there was toward Milosevic's mishandling of the
> > war, the opposition was perceived as being opportunists, or worse,
> > as tools of NATO. His opponents were made to look like traitors.
> > Therefore, in spite of intense efforts by NATO to topple Milosevic
> > after the war, all that it achieved was to flush Milosevic's
> > opposition out into the open, and force it to display its
> > impotence. This substantially strengthened Milosevic's hand. As
> > with Saddam, the mere fact that Milosevic survived helped restore
> > his credibility.
> >
> > Milosevic then was able to block the further disintegration of
> > Serbia by outmaneuvering Montenegrin separatists until even NATO no
> > longer had any confidence in them. Milosevic's ability to sustain
> > the presence of Federal forces in Montenegro was the first step.
> > When Montenegro's political evolution led to its remaining inside
> > the Yugoslav federation, the logic of disintegration was aborted.
> > Vague discussions of Vojvodina's seceding to Hungary, the entry of
> > NATO forces into Serbia proper and other territorial fantasies
> > petered out over the year. The breaking point came recently. When
> > the KLA tried to generate anti-Serb actions among Albanians still
> > living inside Serbia, NATO itself was forced to protect the Serb
> > frontier. During raids carried out last week, it actually struck at
> > KLA bases along the border. NATO is now protecting the territorial
> > integrity of the rest of Serbia. The main threat to Serbia's
> > territorial integrity, NATO's covert and overt operations, has
> > dissolved. What is left of Belgrade's domain will survive.
> >
> > That leaves Milosevic with his third goal: reclaiming lost
> > territories, beginning with Kosovo. Milosevic now sees time on his
> > side. Milosevic never understood the alliance between NATO and the
> > KLA. He never understood that there was no deep, geopolitical
> > community of interest between the two, but that what bound them was
> > NATO's domestic political situation and the KLA's ambitions. He
> > did not expect NATO and the KLA to split because he never
> > understood how shallow the ties were. Milosevic is undoubtedly
> > delighted by his new understanding of the situation. As the KLA
> > pressed forward with its second strategic mission, it forced a
> > split with NATO that directly benefited Serbia.
> >
> > NATO's entire mission is now based on a rapidly dissolving
> > foundation. Unless NATO can convince the KLA to abandon any further
> > strategic ambitions-which is unlikely-it is going to find itself
> > trapped between the absolutely unforgivable Milosevic and the
> > utterly ungrateful KLA. NATO cannot withdraw without being made to
> > look imbecilic and it can't stay without great danger.
> >
> > From where Milosevic sits, this is an ideal situation. If NATO
> > leaves, the Serbs still enjoy military superiority over the
> > Albanians and will be in a situation to intervene. On the other
> > hand, the longer NATO remains, the less sympathy in the West for
> > the Albanians. If NATO stays, it will inevitably become dependent,
> > at least covertly, on Serbs in Kosovo, and perhaps on the other
> > side of the border as well.
> >
> > The KLA cannot hold back. They have their own intense credibility
> > problem. NATO is now clearly going to try to create a non-KLA
> > political alternative among the Albanians. More important, NATO
> > has a strategic card to play against the KLA. We give substantial
> > credence to reports that not only is KLA a critical part of the
> > global narcotics traffic system, but that it is using Kosovo as a
> > transshipment point. NATO does not have sufficient forces in
> > Kosovo to bring peace, but it has sufficient capability to
> > interrupt parts of the drug trade. If the KLA hangs back it risks
> > the emergence of new political forces under NATO sponsorship. If
> > it strikes at NATO, NATO can strike back at a fundamental interest
> > of the KLA. In either case, the KLA cannot pursue its other
> > strategic interests while NATO is still there.
> >
> > The KLA always wanted NATO out, but expected it to destroy the Serb
> > Army for them. That hasn't happened and that has created a
> > tremendous dilemma for the KLA. It cannot tolerate NATO in Kosovo
> > and it is not yet in a position to defend against Serbia. It can no
> > longer expect NATO to finish off the Serbs and it can no longer
> > expect NATO to ignore KLA operations. The KLA has been trying to
> > get NATO to strike across the border, but instead NATO struck at
> > the KLA.
> >
> > NATO is desperately signaling the KLA to rein itself in. But if
> > the KLA complies then its dream of a KLA-dominated Kosovo must be
> > abandoned and the narcotics trade that finances it will be
> > vulnerable to NATO pressure. It can't make the deal that NATO has
> > offered: temporary control over part of Kosovo at the discretion of
> > NATO. It just isn't enough.
> >
> > The winner, at this rate, is going to be Milosevic. If NATO and
> > the KLA come to blows, then time is entirely on his side. Either
> > NATO will increase its presence in Kosovo in order to crush or cow
> > the KLA - unlikely - or NATO will have to open lines of
> > communication or coordination with the Serbs. Alternatively, NATO
> > can withdraw, in which case the correlation of forces will favor
> > the Serbs against the Albanians.
> >
> > A year after the war began, Milosevic remains in power in Belgrade
> > and time appears to be on his side.
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