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Who’s
Driving Islamic Militant Groups?
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Laksamana.Net
May
24,
2002 05:42 PM, Editor |
Laksamana.Net -
Two Americans are in two minds about terrorism in Indonesia.
Paul Fujimura, US State Department expert on counter-terrorism,
said Thursday (23/5/02) there was evidence that al-Qaeda had
already established itself in sanctuaries in Indonesia.
Meanwhile Indonesian observer Dr Jeffrey Winters says the problem
in dealing with terrorism in Indonesia is that the lion’s share
of terror in this country occurs at the hands of the military.
And rather than fighting supposed al-Qaeda cells and violent
extremists, elements of the military, either active or retired,
play cynically with “terrorists” in the pursuit of various
domestic political agendas (Laksamana.Net, Tuesday 21/5/02).
Fujimura did not elaborate which Islamic group he might have been
referring to or what kind of political outlook influenced
terrorist organizations allegedly connected to al-Qaeda. This
makes it impossible to disclose whether the alleged organizations
have close links to military hardliners or are purely acting in
the name of Islam.
As far as terrorism in Indonesia is concerned, there are at least
two events in history which give a clear picture of how involved
the military and intelligence elements have been in masterminding
terrorism in Indonesia.
Two prominent military figures stand out as the principal actors
in state-sponsored terrorism in Indonesia: Colonel Zulkifli Lubis
in the 1960s and General Ali Murtopo in the 1970s.
A convenient starting point is the attempt to assassinate founding
President Sukarno in 1956, an incident popularly known as the
Cikini affair.
On November 30, 1956, as Sukarno was visiting his children’s
school in Cikini, hand grenades were thrown in an attempt to
assassinate him. Though Sukarno was unharmed, 11 people were
killed and at least 30 seriously injured, mostly children.
The chief suspect behind the assassination attempt was Colonel
Zulkifli Lubis, a former Army intelligence chief and deputy chief
of staff who had been among the contenders for the position of
chief of staff in 1955, when General Abdul Haris Nasution was
appointed to the post.
Lubis was strongly connected to Islamic militant groups, and he
established an underground organization led by men from the
strongly Islamic Dompo area of the eastern Indonesia island of
Sumbawa.
While the group had no connection with the Islamic-based Masyumi
Youth Organization (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia – GPII), it
drew a number of its members from the organization. Others had
ties to the West Java Darul Islam movement led by nationalist
freedom fighter Marijan Kartosuwiryo.
According to Audrey and George Kahin in their book Subversion
as Foreign Policy, Lubis’ organization ran parallel to his
efforts to build a Jakarta-based anti-communist paramilitary group
known as Gerakan Anti-Kommunis (GAK).
This group was against both Sukarno and Nasution. A key aide of
Lubis, Saleh Ibrahim, who headed the GAK and was a member of
Masyumi, escaped after the assassination attempt but three youths
involved were tried and executed. When asked why they attacked
Sukarno, the four youths had answered: “Allah told us to do
so.”
Lubis was widely believed to be the puppet master behind the
Cikini Affair. He was forced to go underground, soon emerging in
West Sumatra.
His presence there is often linked to the West Sumatra rebellion,
the PRRI, which broke out in 1958. Also involved was economist
Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo, who had fled to West Sumatra to avoid a
police investigation concerning his alleged involvement in corrupt
practices.
Ali Murtopo’s role as a practitioner of state-sponsored
terrorism is a different story. As personal assistant to President
Suharto and deputy head of intelligence directly responsible to
Suharto, Murtopo was assigned to curtail and cripple the political
opposition that represented a threat to Suharto’s regime and his
political base, Golkar.
In the run up to the 1977 general election, Suharto was disturbed
by an assessment made by the National Defense and Security Council
(Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional).
According to the council’s finding in 1975, if the electoral
contest was completely fair, Golkar would only get 45%. To Suharto
and his key presidential assistant, this meant that the
Islamic-based party United Development Party (PPP) would be the
real threat.
An intelligence operation to influence the outcome of the 1977
general election was brought into action. What followed led many
to believe that Suharto and Golkar had decided to create a
“special situation.”
The emergence of Komando Jihad (Holy War Commando) just weeks
before the 1977 election campaign gave rise to suspicions that it
was the creation of Murtopo and the intelligence community, aimed
at discrediting PPP politicians.
Leaders of Komando Jihad such as Ateng Jailani, Danu Subroto, Abu
Darda (a son of Kartosuwiryo, the original Darul Islam leader),
Ismail Pranoto, and Zainal Abidin, were former prominent figures
in Darul Islam, an organization known to have fallen under the
control of Ali Murtopo.
Other versions say that despite the Komando Jihad links to Murtopo,
they abused his trust. This argument is presented by, among
others, Hari Tjan Silalahi, a prominent actor in the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, also a creation of Murtopo.
Whatever the truth, it was clear enough that terrorism in
Indonesia was not wholly driven by ideology, nor did it have
mainstream support from the Muslim community.
Instead, terrorist acts have most often been driven by internal
military tensions or by government bids to cripple opposition.
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