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A
conspiracy of silence
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The
Sydney Morning Herald January
22, 2003
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A conspiracy of silence
A hundred days after the Bali
bombings police have gathered a huge amount of evidence but cannot
identify the culprits. Philip Cornford reports from Bali.
After arresting 17 Islamic fundamentalists, including five accused
major plotters who face the death penalty, police have yet to
resolve the central criminal act of the Bali bombings: who
detonated the bomb outside the Sari Club, the bomb which did most
of the killing?
So far, police say, three terrorists - Amrozi, 39, his brother Ali
Imron, 30, and the operational commander Imam Samudra, 35, a
veteran terrorist who had spent two years in Afghanistan - have
confessed to roles in the bomb attacks on October 12, but all have
denied they exploded the Sari bomb. Although they are otherwise
boastful about what they did, none is claiming this poisoned
chalice. Ali Imron and Samudra were in action that night. They
were the men in command. Are they protecting themselves?
The Sari bomb was the biggest and most destructive of three
detonated, 1000 kilograms of explosives packed into a filing
cabinet which was put into a van which was driven to Jalan Legian,
the tourist strip at Kuta, and parked outside the packed nightclub
around 11.30pm. It was a Saturday night, and across the narrow
street, jammed with tourists, motorbikes and cars, Paddy's Bar was
also doing a roaring business. The bomb had four triggers, three
of them backups to the first-choice device, a mobile telephone.
Whichever trigger was used, the result was a catastrophe which
replaced Australian complacency with fear and suspicion. The blast
and the resulting conflagrations destroyed the Sari Club and
Paddy's, killing almost 200 people were killed that night, almost
all tourists, including 88 Australians.
The next morning, according to police, Samudra, Ali Imron and
another plotter, Idris, 35, drove to the smouldering ruins and
observed with satisfaction their handiwork. Police said Ali Imron
told them he "felt happy" that so many had died. Yet
when it comes to naming the man who detonated the bomb, he is not
helpful, although there can be little doubt that he knows the
culprit.
So far, police have one suspect, Dulmatin, a 32-year-old Javanese
electronics wizard who is allegedly a bomb maker for Jemaah
Islamiah (JI), the regional terrorist group which is blamed for
ordering the attack. Dulmatin was named as the triggerman by
Amrozi, the first suspect arrested, on November 5, who gave police
the names of most of the key conspirators and their roles. But
Amrozi was not in Bali on October 12, having returned to East Java
several days earlier after performing his mission - buying the van
and the explosives and delivering them to Bali. Amrozi was at home
in Tenggulun, a village 200 kilometres from Surabaya, watching
boxing on television when the bombs were detonated.
Amrozi told police Dulmatin made the mobile-phone triggers for all
three bombs. It was a complex task, especially for the Sari bomb.
The backup triggers, according to more recent testimony by Ali
Imron, were a device which would be activated by a radio signal,
another activated by a battery and the last, a protective device
which would be activated by pressure if anyone tried to disarm the
bomb.
Another expert, Wayan, 35, who had previous experience assembling
bombs for JI, helped Dulmatin. Amrozi claimed Dulmatin punched in
the three SMS messages which individually activated the three
mobiles, sending electrical charges to the detonators, exploding
the bombs.
Dulmatin, Wayan and Idris, key players, have yet to be captured
and their versions still to be told. But when police tested
Amrozi's testimony against that of his brother and Samudra, they
found inconsistencies which strongly indicate the plotters are
telling the truth only when it suits them.
From the alleged confessions of Samudra and Ali Imron, police have
scenarios for two of the bombs. Both say Dulmatin assembled the
triggers and helped make all three bombs. But unlike Amrozi,
neither Samudra nor Ali Imron said Dulmatin detonated the Sari
bomb.
Ali Imron's testimony is the most recent, given to police on
Thursday night after he was flown to Bali from East Borneo, where
he was arrested on Monday. He took police to a boarding house in
Denpasar which was the headquarters for the bomb plot. Police knew
it existed, but not its location. Ali Imron still had the key to
the front door. He told police that he and Samudra had paid a
year's rent in advance, posing as cargo agents and telling the
landlord they were from Sumatra.
It was to this house that Amrozi delivered the van and explosives.
Ali Imron's story is that he and Idris helped Dulmatin make the
bombs, promoting Idris, who hitherto had been described by police
as a quartermaster who arranged accommodation and supplied the
mobile phones. They combined potassium chloride, TNT and an
unidentified black powder and tested a small bomb in the garage.
Alarmed neighbours where told an electrical implement had
exploded. They believed the explanation, but the plotters had
taken an alarming risk which would have horrified better
disciplined terrorists.
When it comes to events on the night of the attack, important
elements of Ali Imron's testimony are hard to believe.
Police say Ali Imron told them that Samudra, the overall
commander, remained in the safe house in Denpasar. Ali Imron
described himself as the "field commander". He said he
and another plotter drove the van with the bomb to Jalan Legian.
Who was the other man? Ali Imron wasn't sure. He thought his name
was Jimmy, which might be an alias for Iqbal. This is farce.
Police have never heard of Jimmy before. Ali Imron was the
"field commander" of a conspiracy about to commit mass
murder, he was transporting the bomb - and he didn't know the
identity of the man sitting next to him. "He's lying,"
police said.
Police said Ali Imron claims he stopped the van 800 metres from
the Sari Club, got out and was picked up by Idris, who had been
following on a motorbike. The van drove on, Ali Imron and Idris
returned to Denpasar to the al-Ghorobah mosque near the safe
house. Their roles ended, they prayed for success and were in the
mosque when the bomb exploded. They expressed their joy.
Three days later, Ali Imron changed his story, claiming that Idris
detonated the Sari bomb. By then however his testimony had little
credence, containing too many inconsistencies. Police believe he
is lying to minimise his role. By escalating the role of Idris
from quartermaster to master bomber, it is possible that Ali Imron
is sacrificing a more expendable Idris to protect someone else,
possibly himself.
Ali Imron says Iqbal or Jimmy parked the van outside the Sari Club
and went into Paddy's. This links neatly with what already has
been established by DNA on body parts recovered from Paddy's and
which were identified as belonging to Iqbal. He took a backpack
bomb into the bar and was killed when it exploded. How this
happened is a matter of intense speculation.
Samudra, when caught on November 21, boasted that Iqbal was a
suicide bomber, which Indonesian police never tire of denying,
justifiably afraid of allowing the conspirators to claim a martyr
as a role model for their "Jihad".
Police claim Ali Imron's account supports their version of an
accidental early detonation. This is that Samudra used a mobile
phone to detonate the third bomb near the American consulate in
Denpasar. The signal prematurely detonated the Sari and Paddy's
bombs, catching Iqbal unawares.
But there is no evidence to back this theory, and even the police
have no idea how one mobile could activate three mobiles
simultaneously with a single message. Another version is that the
mobile message to activate the consulate bomb somehow
"crossed over" into the two other mobiles, although
police once again are unable to explain how this could happen.
These attempts at explanation lack credibility, especially since
Amrozi is insistent that the three mobiles had to be activated
individually.
The consulate bomb harmed no one. It was clearly a symbolic attack
on the United States. "Destroy America," Samudra shouted
when he was arrested. But Samudra has made no reference to this
bomb.
So is Ali Imron telling only part of the truth to conceal a
greater guilt by his mentor? Why give only this pathetic gesture
to Samudra? He was their inspirational leader, the toughest and
most experienced terrorist among them, a religious zealot who had
fought in Afghanistan, and who, police say, has confessed to
participating in a series of bomb attacks in Indonesia in December
2000.
Why give Samudra only one bomb, and the least important? Why not
all three, especially the Sari bomb, which was what the plot was
all about? He was the fittest, the most deserving to deliver such
a devastating message to their enemies. He was also in command,
the man most willing and able.
More light needs to be shone into this world of shadows, to
establish what are truth, deception and lies. In only three
months, the Indonesian police have done a remarkable job, and
there is every reason to accept their confidence that they will
arrest the suspects still at large, especially those they want
most: Idris, Dulmatin, Wayan and another bomb expert, Dr Azhari, a
Malaysian.
They have struck a significant blow against JI in Indonesia. One
of their prisoners is Mukhlas, another brother of Amrozi, and he
is their most important captive so far. Mukhlas, 42, a religious
teacher and veteran terrorist who spent more than 10 years in
Malaysia, is said to be JI's operations commander for South-East
Asia, the No. 3 man in the hierarchy. Like Samudra, another big
loss for JI, Mukhlas went to Afghanistan and is accused of
initiating the plan for the bomb attacks and ordering its
execution.
Another prisoner is Mubarok, who was captured with Ali Imron.
Mubarok played no direct role in the bombings but on Mukhlas's
orders financed the operation, using part of the $90,000 which a
separate cell got by robbing a jewellery store in Serang, East
Java, two months before the bombing.
The arrests give an alarming insight into JI's capabilities. The
group was able to provide a cadre of committed, experienced
terrorists with sophisticated technical skills, along with the
resources to finance and plan the operation. But they exposed a
fatal weakness: a reliance on passionate amateurs to be the ground
troops, in recruiting Islamic fundamentalists from religious
schools.
Mukhlas recruited two blood brothers, Amrozi - whose carelessness
in buying the van in his own name gave police their initial
breakthrough - and Ali Imron, plus two stepbrothers.
A difficult task for JI will be replacing the veterans Mukhlas and
Samudra. But there is no shortage of eager volunteers among the
fundamentalist Islamic religious schools of Indonesia and
Malaysia.
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