THIS SEARCH     THIS DOCUMENT     THIS CR ISSUE     GO TO
Next Hit        Forward           Next Document     New Search
Prev Hit        Back              Prev Document     HomePage
Hit List        Best Sections     Daily Digest      Help
                Doc Contents      [Part] Contents   CR Issues by Date

CHINA--TAIWAN DEVELOPMENTS (Senate - January 24, 1996)

[Page: S338]

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to take a moment to read a story in today's New York Times on proposed military actions by the People's Republic of China [PRC] against the Republic of China on Taiwan. I ask unanimous consent that this article appear in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. PRESSLER. According to the story, the People's Republic of China has finished plans for a limited missile attack on Taiwan--an attack that could come following Taiwan's first Presidential election, which is scheduled for March 23.

This revelation is the latest in a series of intimidating tactics that work to threaten Taiwan and destabilize East Asia. Between July 21 and July 26, the PRC conducted a series of ballistic missile test firings 85 miles off the coast of Taiwan. All the missiles were modern, mobile and nuclear capable. No country ever has held this level of field tests for nuclear capable missiles before.

The results of that action were predictable--the stock market and the local currency in Taiwan plunged. These ballistic missile exercises resumed on August 15, and continued through the fall leading up to last December's elections in Taiwan for the 164-seat Legislature.

Now comes word that the PRC has done more than just test its military capability. It has matched its hardware testing with military planning--a plan that calls for one ballistic missile to be launched each day for 30 days.

As was the case with the missile tests, this recent report can be seen as a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming Presidential elections in Taiwan. There could be more to this story. I believe this is an attempt to intimidate the Clinton administration and test our Nation's resolve in the Taiwan Straits. The fact that the PRC has advanced a limited but sustained missile attack plan indicates that it believes the Clinton administration may do nothing to strengthen Taiwan's defenses or come to its aid in the event of an attack.

It is not hard to understand why the PRC has come to this conclusion. The Clinton administration's policy with respect to the Taiwan-Mainland China issue is nothing short of confusing. The administration claims to be advancing a policy of deliberate ambiguity. For example, high level administration officials recently have been asked if the United States would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack from the PRC. Their responses were consistently and ominously vague.

The administration seems to believe that this ambiguity will be enough to deter Beijing. Today's report indicates that the exact opposite has occurred. I believe this policy of strategic ambiguity is wrong and has failed. It is not just dangerous for the people of Taiwan, it is potentially destabilizing for the entire East Asia region. It is an approach that clearly advances the PRC's interests and not our own. The administration's ambiguity policy has fueled the belief within the PRC that the United States will look the other way if PRC missiles are launched. Because of our ambiguity, the PRC believes that it can achieve its policy goals at the very least through intimidation and military posturing. Even if the PRC privately has no intention for a direct military confrontation against Taiwan, our ambiguity gives the PRC's military maneuvers greater credibility. It sends a signal of weakness. It fosters a belief that we can be pushed around by the PRC. It is a belief shared by many in Taiwan as well. Indeed, this ambiguity has troubled other Asian democracies in the region, compelling many--from Japan to the Philippines--to increase their defense budgets.

Mr. President, as I said last August, in response to the PRC's first ballistic missile exercise, the United States is faced with three choices: First, we can

do nothing, which appears to be the present course. I believe that is not in the national security interest of the United States. We must not allow Asia--a region of many thriving free market, democratic societies--to be dominated by an aggressive, nondemocratic power.


THIS SEARCH     THIS DOCUMENT     THIS CR ISSUE     GO TO
Next Hit        Forward           Next Document     New Search
Prev Hit        Back              Prev Document     HomePage
Hit List        Best Sections     Daily Digest      Help
                Doc Contents      [Part] Contents   CR Issues by Date

1
Hosted by www.Geocities.ws