The current Bolivian crisis
June 8, 2005
- With
the inauguration of Eduardo Rodriguez as the new Constitutional President
of Bolivia,
the country is beginning to overcome the institutional and political
crisis that determined the ousting of President Sánchez
de Lozada in October 2003.
- President
Mesa´s reluctance to impose the rule of law by
coercion increased the power of interest groups and populist movements up
to the point where too many people felt that opening conflicts would be
enough to obtain some return, be it the expropriation of foreign capitals
or the replacement of the school principal in a small neighborhood.
- The
number of conflicts, as an indicator of governance (dis)ability,
escalated since Gen Banzer´s inauguration, in
1997, reaching now a level similar to the Siles Zuazo´s government in the mid 1980s (more than 50
conflicts per month).
- To
understand the current situation it is crucial to learn from the Banzer period (1997-2001). Haunted by his
authoritarian past, Banzer presented himself as
a compassionate politician, giving concessions to protesters after
promising to overcome poverty (by State action and international
cooperation) during his electoral campaign. The high expectations he
created combined with hidden desires for revenge from his old opponents,
pushed the government against the rock. In April 2000 the Banzer administration tried to react with a State of
Emergency, but it was unprepared to impose it and new political groups
acquired greater strength to take advantage of the weakness of the
government, more apparent than ever since the “water war” (April 2000) and
the road blockades in the highlands (September 2000).
- This
emerging political groups are, paradoxically, extremely conservative. The Coordinadora del Agua (now
focusing on hydrocarbons), the cocaleros and his
party MAS, the ethnic Aymara movement, as well
as traditional unions such as school teachers and mining workers are all
moved by nostalgia for the old interventionist, patrimonialistic
type of State and the fear for the social, economic and political opening
carried on by the modernization reforms of the 1990s. Some may have been
hurt by the structural reforms which, however, improved the situation of
the majority of the population.
- As a
matter of fact, it is hard to find economic or structural causes of this
process of mounting protests. A human rights report requested by the
Ombudsman found relevant advances in every field between 1985 and 2003. In
some areas there were more advances than in others, but progress was
perceivable in all indicators: health, education, political and cultural
rights, income, poverty, etc. Overall inequality expanded but mostly due
to stagnation in the rural, traditional economies resisting market
relationships, rather than within the more integrated, modern sectors of
the economy. In spite of ideological claims, social change was underway
for the good of the poorest. (Since the report questioned with hard data
ideological claims shared by the current Ombudsman with the emerging
political movement, it was quietly removed from circulation).
- A
very strong populist ideology, anchored in the social, historical
experience in Bolivia,
provided an umbrella to these expressions and captured the imagination of
politicians and authorities as much as of social leaders. But even though
most shared the basic populist idea that it is authentic and fair whatever
comes from the grassroots or is presented in the name of the people, there
were no specific political project capable to integrate the widely
dispersed demands and aspirations. Rejecting modernization, labeled as “neoliberal”, was the only unifying theme of the
emergent populism.
- The
international cooperation, both governmental and non governmental, played
an important role in this process. Every time that a “social
participation” conditionality was imposed to projects, the ability of
democratic institutions to be recognized as representative of the common
interest was eroded. The National Dialogues and the PRSP required by the
HIPC initiative had the unintended consequence of institutional weakening.
Just as much as the explicit criticisms of the marginal parties against
the established system and the international NGOs transferring
frustrations and idealism to Bolivia.
The politics of populism was therefore well supported, often as an
unexpected outcome of a naïve policy.
- The
main reason why populist, critical ideologies succeeded in Bolivia
could probably be found in the rapidly growing expectations, against which
those advances seemed too small. The gap between expectations and reality,
and the adversarial, competing nature of democracy, where differences are
exacerbated, created a political environment where radical minorities
could easily fill the political arena.
- Carlos
Mesa´s lack of experience was apparent from the
beginning of his government. Unable to establish a political alliance, he
often alienated institutions and organizations presuming that political
surveys showing citizen´s support are a measure
of political strength and enough to implement policies.
- In
his search for support, he irresponsibly mobilized anti-Chile feelings to
gain strength, as he was when appealed to regionalistic
sentiments to confront the Santa Cruz
movement. It was also irresponsible to call for referendum with ambiguous
questions, written to obtain a supporting “Yes” to his government but
leaving unsolved the problems of hydrocarbons policy. Moreover, most of
his promises and his proposals to overcome critical situations put
pressure on Congress, weakening even more an already weak institution of
democracy.
- Congress
was summoned to meet in the Bolivian Capital, Sucre,
to decide Mesa´s successor. According to the
National Constitution, there was no election. As the President´s
resignation was accepted, the President of the Senate declined as also did
the President of he Representatives, which made the
President of the Supreme Court the last resort to keep the system.
- Hormando Vaca Diez, a skilled and smart politician, had suggested
that he was to accept what the Constitution says,
unifying all dispersed groups against his supposed ambition. Since he is
realistic, he declined the Presidency as it did Mario Cosío,
the next in line. The challenge reached Eduardo Rodriguez who will have to
run a short and difficult transition.
- Rodriguez
received a wide support but it is less for himself that in rejection of Vaca Diez. Neighborhood
organizations, peasant unions and former mining workers decided to keep
their blockades and pressures and the coca leader Evo
Morales called for a national insurrection to oppose the Senator and
Mayors went into hunger strike with the same goal, sharing all a similar
disrespect with the rule of law.
- A
serious constitutional problem remains. According to the current text, Rodriguez
must call for new elections for President and Vicepresident
but only for the remaining time of the period, that is, until 2007. But
social demands are calling for a new, complete period of five years, as
well as for the renewal of Congress. There is nothing in the Constitution
regarding advanced general elections neither anything about collective
resignation of members of Congress or a self imposed closure.
- But
even more challenging for Rodriguez will be how to restore order and to impose
the rule of law in defense of the poorest citizens, whose jobs and daily
lives are in greater risk because of the social upheaval. He received the back
support of the protesters in part because they are probably betting on the
chance of obtaining more from a weak government than from a stronger one,
and the certainly presume Rodriguez´s will be
weaker than Mesa and even more
than Vaca Diez´s. That
is why is crucial for the new government to send a clear message right at
the beginning. If Rodriguez concedes to social pressures, he may end up
devoured by social turmoil even before reaching elections. If he negotiates
a truce or sends the military, order will not be restored immediately or
automatically, but it will be a starting point.