Vaisesika or the philosophy of Atomistic Pluralism

1. Introduction

The origins of the Vaisesika philosophy, involving the atomism and atomic theory etc., are found in rudimentary form in the Vedas. Some people also believe that the Vaisesika is directly related to the Mimamsa because of some similarities in the two systems (such as the eternality of sound and the Vedas). As the humans progressed and became generally aware of their surroundings, they began to inquire into the natural phenomena using reason, which led to the establishment of scientific methods and theories for investigating the physical world. For example, as indicated in the Rig Veda (8/61/16; 8/90/13), they knew that the ordinary light had seven constituents of different colors indicating that the white sunlight itself was composed of lower components. Similarly, their ideas about the total absence of existence and non-existence prior to the creation (Rig Veda: 10/129/1), and the existence arising from the non-existence (Rig Veda: 10/72/2-3) indicate the profoundness of their thought even during the earliest times. It seems thus that they had understood the presence of building blocks (units), even as invisible or belonging to different (lower) categories, in constituting the natural objects.

The Vaisesika system takes its name from visesa, or particularity. The philosophies of Vaisesika (or Atomism) and Nyaya (or Logicism) deal with the analysis of the world of experience, with the former (older of the two systems) concentrating on the particulars while the latter looking at the reality in more general sense. Both the systems agree in their essential principles, such as the nature and qualities of the self and the atomic theory of the universe, yet the classification and characterization of the categories and the development of the atomic theory give to the Vaisesika its distinct interest and value. It basically views the world as cosmologically atomistic and ontologically pluralistic. The Vaisesika insists that it is in the particulars of the world, pre-eminently in the particular imperceptible souls and atoms that true individuality is to be found. Though the particular selves have cosmic and social relations, through which alone they can realize themselves, yet they retain their selfhood in spite of these relations. Thus its standpoint is more scientific than speculative, and more analytic than synthetic. The Vaisesika basically uses the bottom-up approach in the study of physical reality through its constituents (building blocks) and their characteristics.

Since the Vaisesika preceded the Nyaya system, the Nyaya literatures (e.g. Sutra of Gautama and the Bhasya of Vatsayana etc.) are considerably influenced by it. The atomic theory as well as the classification of substances and the acceptance of the two means of knowledge strongly suggests that the Vaisesika is at least as old as the time of Buddha and Mahavira (sixth-fifth century B.C.). The first systematic exposition of the Vaisesika philosophy (known also as Aulukya Darsana) is found in the Vaisesika Sutra of Kanada. This work is divided into ten books. Book I discusses the five categories of substance, quality, action, generality and particularity. Book II deals with the different substances, excepting soul and mind, which, along with the objects of the senses and the nature of inference, are treated in Book III. The atomic structure of the universe is the central topic of Book IV. Book V is devoted to a discussion of the nature and kinds of action, while ethical problems are considered in Book VI. Book VII discusses the questions of quality, self and inherence. Books VIII, IX and X are mainly logical, and treat the problems of perception, inference and causality. In addition to Kanada, contributors to the Vaisesika also include Prasastapada, Candra and Sridhara et al.

2. Theory of Knowledge

The logic of the Vaisesika differs only slightly from the Nyaya logic. Knowledge, which is the problem of logic, assumes various forms, since its objects are endless. Four kinds of valid knowledge are admitted, which are perception (pratyaksa), inference (laingika), remembrance (smrti), and intuitive knowledge (arsajnana). Perception enables a person to apprehend substances, qualities and actions. Gross substances, which are made up of parts, are within the reach of perception, while atoms and dyads are not. The Vaisesika admits yogic perception, by which the perpetual cognition of the soul (atma-pratyaksa) arises.

The Vaisesika brings comparison (upamana), tradition (aitihya), and verbal Knowledge (sabda) under inference. The validity of scriptural statements is an inference from the authoritative character of the speakers. While the Nyaya bases the validity of the Vedas on the ground of the direct communication from seers who had realized the eternal truths and laws, the Vaisesika infers it from the unimpeachable veracity of the inspired seers. The scriptures give real knowledge and not mere speculation. It is the knowledge of things as they are, and in this sense has no beginning, though it is always directly known and realized by some beings in its entirety and by others in part. Abler minds realized the truths and communicated them to later generations. The Vedas, as the collection of the sentences, presuppose intelligent authors. The authoritativeness of the Veda follows from its being the source of knowledge (from intelligent authors) which is eternal (Sanatana) or as having stood the test of time. Thus the Vedas are also eternal (or Sanatana) and as inspired by God or as the word of God. The meanings of the words and sentences must be understood before a person gains knowledge from them. Since the understanding of meanings depends on the recognition of universal concomitance, verbal knowledge is therefore a case of inference. Cesta (gesture), arthapatti (implication), sambhava (inclusion), and abhava (negation) are all brought under inference. Smrti (remembrance) is given an independent place. Arsajnana is the insight of seers. If remembrance is ignored, since it only reproduces what has already been experienced, and if intuitive wisdom (of seers and others) is brought under perception, then, according to the Vaisesika, there are only two sources of knowledge -- intuition (perception) and inference.

Four varieties of invalid knowledge are mentioned, which are samsaya (doubt), viparyaya (misconception), anadhyavasaya (indefinite cognition), and svapna (dream). Sivaditya reduces these four to two, doubt and error, and brings under the former (i.e. doubt) conjecture, indeterminate knowledge and indirect reasoning. Sridhara justifies the separate mention of dreams on the ground that "it occurs only in a particular condition of the body."

3. Padartha and its Categories

The Vaisesika presupposes the deliverance of the empirical consciousness, which deals first and last with real and separate things. The simplest and the widest spread of the characters of reality is that of things and relations between them. As soon as one looks outside, he sees before him a material world with its different things and arrangements, on which thought can exercise itself; and when he looks within he finds a non-material one with its terms and relations. Sound philosophy requires a person to confine his attention to the things of experience, the objects of knowledge, and accept only such hypotheses as are found to be indispensable for the explanation of the order of experience. In deriving towards an accurate philosophy, the results of the Vaisesika analysis are found set forth in the doctrine of the padarthas.

Padartha means literally the meaning of a word. A padartha is an object which can be thought (artha) and named (pada). All things which exist, which can be cognized and named, in short, all objects of experience, and not merely the things of the physical world, are padarthas. The Vaisesika padarthas (categories) include not only things predicable of another, but also subjects capable of having things predicated of them. The intimate relationship between name and thing is recognized in the Vaisesika. The Vaisesika originally had adopted a sixfold classification of padarthas into substance (dravya), quality (guna), activity (karma), generality (samanya), particularity (visesa), and inherence (samavaya), to which a seventh non-existence (abhava) was added later. The inclusion of non-existence under padarthas suggests the transformation of an ontological into an epistemological scheme. A belief is positive or negative, and not a thing which exists. In its initial stages, the Vaisesika endeavored to determine the general characteristics which apply to existence as a whole, but soon turned its attention to the nature of beliefs and inquired what sort of beliefs were true and what not. That something is, that something exists, is the first proposition of the Vaisesika philosophy. But nothing can simply be. So one must push ahead and assert that a thing is because it possesses certain properties besides mere existence. Whatever exists does so because it has certain qualities. Substances exist and have qualities. There are two kinds of qualities, those which reside in a plurality of objects and those which are confined to individuals. The former are general qualities (samanya), while the latter are distinguished as permanent (guna) and transitory (karma). Inherence is a special kind of relation.

The first three categories of substance, quality and action possess a real objective existence. They are called artha and it is possible to have an intuition of them, even such as during the yogic insight. The others, generality, particularity and inherence, at least, are products of intellectual discrimination. They are logical categories possessing timelessness and non-causal character. Though they are products of abstraction, they are regarded as more real than the things from which they are abstracted.

Every substance has its unique essence (visesa), its qualities (guna), and its modes of behavior (karma). Everything real is either a substance or attribute of it. The attributes are dependent aspects of reality incapable of existing on their own account, and they imply a more ultimate form of living substance, to which they belong.

3.1 Substance

For the Vaisesika, the category of substance is the most important against the idealistic systems. Substance denotes the feature of the self-subsistence of things. What is vaguely called being is nothing more than a series of things variously conditioned in time and space and distinguished from one another by different properties. Reality presents us with substances marked by the possession of qualities and parts. In other words, a substance is the basis of qualities, actual or potential, present or future. Similarly, the qualities of a substance are to be predicated and not qualities of qualities. Nor can it be said that one quality be predicated of a group of qualities.

A distinction is made between eternal and non-eternal substances. Whatever depends on something is not eternal. Compound substances are dependent and transitory. Simple substances have the characteristics of eternity, independence and ultimate individuality. They are neither caused nor destroyed. Non-eternal substances are caused and destroyed not by themselves but by something different from themselves.

Earth, water, light, air, akasa (ether), time, space, soul and manas (mind) are the nine substances intended to comprise all corporeal and incorporeal things. The Vaisesika is not a materialism, though a realistic scheme, since it admits non-material substances like souls, and regards as real not the gross material substances but their minima. Of the nine substances, earth, water, light, air, soul and manas have many individuals. These, with the exception of soul, are extended, have relations of distance and proximity, are capable of action and possess speed. Akasa, time and space are all-pervading, have the largest dimensions and are common receptacles of all corporeal things. Soul and manas, akasa, time and space, air and ultimate atoms are not ordinarily perceptible. A distinction is made between corporeal (murta) and elemental (bhuta) substances. The formers have definite dimensions, and they act and move. Elemental substances, singly or in combination, become the material causes and products of the world. Manas, though atomic, does not produce anything else, while akasa, though all-pervading, produces sound. Earth, water, light and air are both corporeal and productive.

The Vaisesika theory of the soul is practically identical with that of the Nyaya, though a direct perception of the self where the self is both the perceiver and the perceived is not admitted. Comparison in this case does not help. Agama (revelation) and inference are helpful sources of knowledge regarding this. The existence of the self is inferred from the fact that consciousness cannot be a property of the body, sense-organs or the manas. In addition to the qualities of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition and knowledge, evidence for the existence of the self includes the facts of expiration and inspiration, the closing and opening of the eyelids, the healing of bodily injuries, the movement of the mind and the affections of the senses. In its natural state the self is devoid of intelligence, as in pralaya (dissolution). It has cognitions of things when it is connected with the body. Consciousness is sustained by the atman, though it is not an essential or inalienable characteristic of it. By means of manas the soul knows not only external things but also its own qualities. Though the soul is all-pervading, its life of knowing, feeling and activity resides only where the body is.

Plurality of souls is inferred from the differences in status and the variety of conditions. Each soul undergoes the consequences of its own deeds. It remains one throughout the series of its experiences. The freed souls are conceived as eternally existing with specific differences. Though each soul is supposed to be distinguished by a peculiarity (visesa), it is impossible for people to know what it is. The differences among souls are due to their connections with bodies. Individuality of a soul is also derived due to its connection with manas. A distinction is made between the individual soul and the supreme soul, jiva and Isvara. The two are similar but not identical.

Akasa, space and time have no lower species and reflect the names of individuals. To account for the variety of experience, their single entities are assumed. All phenomena take place in them. Space and time are the instrumental causes of all produced things. Reality is a process or a passage, and exists spatially and temporally. Space leads to the sense of direction (east and west, etc.) and maintains things in their relative positions.

The form of time is essential to the concrete changes of nature, such as production, destruction and persistence of things. It is the force which brings about changes in non-eternal substances. It is not the cosmic power which causes the movements, but is the condition of all movement. All perceptible things are perceived as moving, changing, coming into existence and as passing out of it. Discrete things have no power of self-origination and self-movement. If they had, there would not be that mutual relation of things, which persists in spite of all change. The movement is ordered, which means that there must be a reality which has a general relation to all changes. Time is regarded as the independent real pervading the whole universe and making the ordered movement of things possible. It is the basis of the relations of priority and posterity, simultaneity and non-simultaneity, and the notion of soon and late. There is only one time which is omnipresent in dimension, individual in character, and has the qualities of conjunction and disjunction. In Vaisesika, time is an eternal substance and the basis of all experience. It is not known what time is as itself, but various experiences are cast in the form of time. It is the formal cause of the relations of priority and posterity, while their material cause is the nature of objects, as jar, cloth, and the like. Time, which is one, appears as many on account of its association with the changes that are related to it. Conventional notions, as moment, minute, hour, year, etc., are derived by abstraction from concrete time. Note that space deals with coexistence, time with successions, or more accurately, space deals with visible objects, while time deals with things produced and destroyed. Things move by virtue of time and hold together by virtue of space.

Akasa (ether) is a simple, continuous, infinite substance, and is the substratum of sound. The qualities of color, taste, smell and tangibility do not belong to it. Sound is considered as the distinguishing quality of akasa. It is inactive. All corporeal objects are found conjoined with it. The atoms, which are infinitely small, cannot make up a magnitude by coming together or touching each other. If they stand apart from one another and yet are joined somehow so as to constitute a system, it can only be through the medium of akasa. The atoms unite, but not continuously. That which binds together the atoms, though not itself atomic, is the akasa. Akasa is eternal, omnipresent, supersensible, and has the qualities of individuality, conjunction and disjunction. Akasa fills the space, though it is not space itself. Akasa is regarded as the material cause of the special quality of sound, space is the general cause of all effects.

Matter, commonly occurring, is a mixture of five elements or substances (earth, water, light, air and akasa), containing one or the other in a predominant degree. The five phenomenal products (bhutas) are the five states of matter, solid (earth), liquid (water), gaseous (air), luminous (light), etheric (akasa). The earth possesses the four qualities of smell, taste, color and tangibility; water the three qualities of taste, color and tangibility; light the two of color and tangibility; and while air has the quality of tangibility, akasa has the quality of sound. The predominant quality of earth is smell even though it has other qualities as well. Similarly, the special qualities of water, light and air, respectively, are taste, luminosity and temperature. Things made of earth are of three kinds: bodies, sense-organs and objects of perception. The ultimate constituents of the concrete things of earth, air, light and water are called atoms.

3.2 Quality

While substance is capable of existing independently by itself, quality or guna cannot so exist. It abides in substance and has itself no qualities. The Vaisesika recognizes the following twenty-four qualities (including both mental and material properties): color (rupa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparsa), number (samkhya), size (parimana), individuality (prthaktva), conjunction (samyoga), disjunction (vibhaga), priority (paratva), posterity (aparatva), knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (dukha), desire (iccha), aversion (dvesa), effort (prayatna), heaviness (gurutva), fluidity (dravatva), viscidity (sneha), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), sound (sabda), and faculty (samskara). The last seven (heaviness through faculty) belong mainly to atomic substances.

The qualities that belong to eternal substances are called eternal, and those of transient ones non-eternal. Those that subsist in two or more substances are said to be general, while those residing only in one substance are said to be specific. Thus color, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, natural fluidity, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, faculty and sound are special qualities which help to distinguish objects possessing them from others. Qualities like number, dimension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posterity, heaviness, caused fluidity, and velocity are general qualities belonging to substances in general, and are notional in their character. They are not as objective as other qualities. Number, for example, is regarded as subjective. The same object may be viewed as either one or many. Number, dimension, individuality, conjunction and disjunction belong to all substances. While time and space possess no other qualities, akasa has sound also. Manas has seven qualities of the atomic substances along with velocity. God has knowledge, desire and effort in addition to five general qualities. Pleasure, pain, desire, hatred and effort, as well as knowledge, are qualities of soul. Dharma and adharma are also qualities of the soul by virtue of which it enjoys happiness or suffers misery. Adrsta is the unseen power produced by souls and things, which brings about the cosmic order and enables the selves to reap the harvest of their past experiences. Sometimes adrsta is viewed as the vehicle through which God's will operates in creation etc. Faculty (Samskara) is of three kinds: velocity (vega), which keeps a thing in motion; mental impressibility (bhavana), by which the soul is able to remember and recognize things already experienced; and elasticity (sthti-sthapaka), by virtue of which a thing reverts to its original state even when it is disturbed. Velocity is produced in the corporeal substances by action or motion, and is counteracted by the conjunction of tangible solid substances. Elasticity subsists in substances which contract and expand.

3.3 Karma or Activity

Karma, or movement, is regarded as an irreducible element of the universe. It is neither substance nor quality, but an independent category itself. All movements belong to the substances as much as their qualities. Unlike a quality of substance, its activity is a transitory one. Thus the heaviness of the body is a quality, while its falling is an accident. Qualities which continue to exist are called guna, while those that cease to exist are called karma. Karma in all its forms is transient, and comes to an end either by a subsequent conjunction or destruction of its basic substance. Akasa, time, space, soul -- though substances -- are devoid of action, since they are incorporeal.

3.4 Samanya or Generality

The idea of samanya is motivated by the desire to distinguish the unchanging from the changing. A property residing in many things is called samanya (or general). If the property is regarded as distinguishing those things from others, it is called visesa (or particular). Generality is regarded as the eternal, one, and residing in many things belonging to the group of substance, quality or action. Kanada suggests that generality and particularity are relative to thought, intellectual devices by which the variety of phenomena are classified. Thus jarness is samanya (or generality) when it is regarded as residing in many objects, and visesa (or particularity) when used to distinguish jars from other things. Similarly, conjunction and duality are intimately related to many things, but are not eternal, and therefore cannot be regarded as samanya. Akasa, though eternal, is not related to many things. Likewise particularity is not samanya, since then it would lose its nature and become confused with the latter.

There are two kinds of generality, higher and lower. Note that although satta or being (existence) is a different object from substance, quality and action, it possesses the highest generality. It covers the largest number of things. It includes all and is not included in anything. It is not a species of any higher genus. While being is the only true universal, the true particulars are the individuals themselves and between the two there are universal-particulars. This extension determines the grade of generality. The universal is eternal and one, while the individuals come and go. Men are born and die, but man remains. Universals, individuals and relations do not exist in the sense in which substances, qualities and actions do. The distinction between the universal and the particular is real, since the relation is said to be one of intimate union (samavaya).

3.5 Visesa or Particularity

By means of visesa (or particularity) one is able to perceive things as different from one another. It is the basis of exclusion. Whatever is individual is unique and single. Kanada makes particularity as much dependent on thought as generality. Prasastapada makes it an independent reality residing in eternal substances distinguishing them from one another. Empirical objects are distinguished by means of the parts of which they are composed. And if is seen, in reality or during analysis, that a group of simple substances have no parts to help in their distinguishing from one another, then it must be assumed that each simple substance has a quality, which makes it distinct from all others. Atoms, time, space, akasa, souls and manas all have their particularities, which are not qualities of classes but only of individuals. These distinctive particularities are the final facts beyond which there is no more information available. Note also that if the things are fundamentally different, then it is impossible to find a common character in them.

3.6 Samavaya or Inherence

Kanada means by inherence the relation between cause and effect. Prasastapada defines it as the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained, and being the basis of the idea, "This is in that." Thus virtue and pleasure are not related by inherence, though they reside in the self, since they have no relation like that between the container and the contained. Similarly, the relation between the word and the thing signified is not one of inherence, since one is not contained in the other. The fruit may be on the ground, but as the two are not inseparable, they cannot be said to be related by way of inherence. Generally the relation which binds a substance and its qualities, a whole and its parts, motion and the object in motion, individual and universe, cause and effect, is that of samavaya (inherence). The members related are so unified as to represent one whole or one identical real.

Inherence is said to be eternal. Samavaya, or necessary connection, is distinguished from samyoga, or accidental conjunction, which is quality of things. While objects conjoined have a separate existence prior to conjunction, the members related to samavaya are inseparably connected. The relationship of samavaya is not caused by the action of one of the members related. Conjunction terminates as soon as there is a disjunction of the members conjoined, while the connection is indestructible. Again, the conjunction takes place between two independent substances, while the members related by way of inherence stand in the relation of the container and the contained. Two things in relation of samavaya cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. Samavaya is thus eternal in the sense that it cannot be produced or destroyed without producing or destroying the product. Its eternity is thus relative. The relation of samavaya is not perceptible, but only inferential from the inseparable connection of things.

3.7 Abhava or Non-existence

The concept of negation (abhava) is necessary for the dialectical representation of the universe (Rig Veda: 10/72/2-3; 10/129/1). To give a coherent account of experience, the abhava is helpful. Thus, when the jar is on the ground, its existence is perceived, and its non-existence is perceived when it is removed from the ground. Note that the non-existence was there all the time, though it was hidden when the jar was on the ground. Thus the absolute non-existence of everything is at all times present everywhere, though it is hidden for the time and in the place the thing happens to be.

4. The Atomic Theory

Atomic theory represents the conceptual scheme adopted to explain the facts of nature. In the annals of human thought, it is a step forward from animism. It can be traced to the Vedas and Upanisads. The latter generally regarded all material things as made up of the four elements of light, water, air and earth. Akasa is left out, since it has a peculiar character of its own and does not enter into combination with the other elements. But the four elements of light, water, air and earth are themselves changeable and divisible, while the real, comprising them, may be regarded as unchangeable and eternal. Thus the atomic theory tries to investigate the unchangeable, indivisible and eternal constituent particles.

All the materials and the compounds (even those containing the elements of light, water, air and earth) are non-eternal, while the component particles which are not produced are eternal. The invisible eternal atoms are incapable of division into parts. The atom marks the limit of division in the Vaisesika. The changes in the volumes of the bodies are determined by the accession and withdrawal of the atoms composing them. The atoms are the material causes of effects. Though they are supersensible, they can be classified, though not from the standpoint of size, shape, weight and density. The qualities, which they produce in the different forms of sensible things, help in the classification of atoms. Leaving aside the general properties of sensible things, such as impenetrability, which are perceived by more senses than one, the special qualities are odor, flavor, luminosity and temperature. These differ in kind and not merely in degree. It is assumed that there are four classes of paramanus (basic particles), answering to the four great classes of material objects, earth, water, light and air. These four classes of paramanus are said to produce the four senses of touch, taste, sight and smell, and that is why each special sense reveals a single quality, however excited. Though the qualities of earthly things -- as color, taste, smell and tangibility -- vanish on the destruction of the thing itself, they are always found in their respective atoms, though in earth and atoms of earth some qualities may be produced by heat. Water, light and air do not suffer a similar change.

The qualities of all products are due to the atoms of which they are composed. These atoms possess the five general qualities of all substances, as also those of priority and posterity. In addition to these, earth has the special quality of odor and the other qualities of taste, color, touch or temperature, heaviness, velocity and fluidity. Water has the special quality of viscosity and the other qualities of earth except smell. Light has the usual seven, and temperature, color, fluidity and velocity, while air has only touch and velocity in addition to the seven common qualities. These qualities are eternal in the atoms but transient in the products.

The individual atoms combine with others to form a product. They may continue in that co-operative existence for some time and again disintegrate into their original solitary being to form new combinations. This process of grouping and separation goes on endlessly. According to the Vaisesika, atoms do not exist in an uncombined state in creation. During creation they are said to possess a vibratory motion (parispanda). Singly the atoms are not productive. Moreover, as the atoms are different than their products, so the building blocks for things should comprise dyads (composed of two primary atoms). Similarly, as some of the things may be dyadic in composition, which indicates that the basic building unit is dyad itself and not even a triad (containing three atoms). Both single atoms and dyads are minute and invisible. The magnitude of the product depends on the magnitude of the parts or their number or arrangement. As the number of dyads increases, there is a corresponding increase in the dimension of the product. The things produced by the union of atoms are not mere aggregates but wholes. Even though the atoms by themselves are imperceptible, their collection is perceptible. In this, the whole and the parts are related by way of inherence.

The atoms, which are the material causes of the dyads, are eternal and cannot be destroyed. The dyads are destroyed, not by the destruction of the primary atoms, but by the destruction of the conjunction of the primary atoms. The Vaisesika conceives two kinds of destruction, an avamtarapralaya (or intermediate dissolution), where only tangible products are destroyed, and amahapralaya (or universal destruction), where all things material and immaterial, are resolved into atoms. Srsti (creation) and pralaya (destruction) are the phases of potentiality and explication of the eternal substances.

Thus, according to the Vaisesika, atom is the imperceptible unit. Atoms, generally at rest, are different in kind, each possessing its own distinct individuality (visesa). They are also qualitatively different, and possess one, two, three or four of the ordinary qualities according as they are atoms of air, fire, water, and earth; and they have no connection with sound. The qualitative differences of objects depend upon the qualities of their constituting atoms. It follows that the Vaisesikas believe in the secondary qualities being inherent in the atoms, and distinguish souls from atoms and regard them as co-eternal existences. The souls and the atoms (or their products) may however be brought together by adrsta. Vaisesikas make the principle of the adrsta (moral law or dharma) central to their whole system. Their atomistic view thus seems to be influenced by a spiritual tendency.

Although the passage of time and the evolution in science brought drastic changes in succeeding cultures to the basic Vaisesika concepts of atoms (building blocks) and the atomic theory, the initial contribution of this system in analyzing the world through its components and their intermediary relations cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the ideas and methods of the Vaisesika, developed long time ago, still are applicable for solving, through the pluralistic approach, a variety of present problems involving individuals and the societies.

5. Ethics

The Vaisesika makes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary activities, and holds that moral distinctions apply only to the former. Acts due to organic life are involuntary, while those which spring from desire and aversion are voluntary. The former have organic ends in view, while the latter aim at realization of human values. Dharma, according to the Vaisesika, treats of the attainment of worldly prosperity as well as spiritual good. While the former is the product of ceremonial piety, the latter is the result of spiritual insight. The highest kind of pleasure is the pleasure of the wise, which is independent of all such agencies as the remembrance of the object, desire, reflection, and is due to their knowledge, peacefulness of mind, contentment, and the peculiar character of their virtue.

Thirteen universal duties according to the Vaisesika include: faith (sraddha), non-violence (ahimsa), kindly feeling for all beings (bhutahitatva), truthfulness (satyavacana), integrity (asteya), sexual purity (brahmacarya), purity of mind (anupadha-bhavasuddhi), renunciation of anger (krodhavarjana), personal cleanliness through bathing (abhisecana), the use of purifying substances (sucidravyasevana), devotion to the deity (visistadevatabhakti), fasting (upavasa), and non-neglect of duties (apramada). It is also admitted that sannyasin (hermit or swami) is not one who gives up the world to itself, but one who takes the vow of universal benevolence. The observance of above duties results in virtue (dharma) when they are done, without a desire for gaining thereby any visible results (as wealth, etc.), and with the utmost purity of motive. Spiritual growth requires suppression of self. It is said: "to the unrestrained (ayatsya), exaltation (or abhyudaya) does not accrue from eating what is pure, since there is no self-restraint." Yoga as a means of self-control is allowed. It is not mechanical conformity to the rules but inner goodness that counts.

Dharma is not only the content of morality to the Vaisesika, but also the power or quality which resides in the human being and not in the action performed. A selfless insight into the truth of things can secure the final release (moksa). So long as a person is dominated by desire and aversion, he stores up dharma and adharma or adrsta, and the results of his deeds force on him an embodied existence. The body is the seat of enjoyment (bhogayatanam). Union with adrsta and its effect of body is samsara; separation from it is moksa. According to the Vaisesika, the soul in the state of liberation is absolutely free from all connection with qualities, and subsists like the sky free from all conditions and attributes, while according to the Nyaya, the state of freedom is one of bliss and wisdom.

Activity motivated by the feeling of separate self-existence is based on ignorance of the truth of things. When it is realized that the objects which look so attractive and repulsive are only temporary compounds of atoms, they cease to be significant and having power over the person. Similarly, when he realizes the true nature of the atman, which is distinct from this or that form of its existence, he shall know that all souls are alike. When the true knowledge dispels the motive of self-interest, self-activities cease, no potential worth is produced, and there will be no more birth. The bliss of deliverance is regarded as the result of divine grace, and the rules of dharma as the expression of the will of God.

All the time the soul is in samsara, it is incarnate in some body or other, which is subtle in pralaya (dissolution) and gross in creation, and there is never a state when the atman is devoid of adrsta, since there is no beginning for the series of incarnations. The time, place, and circumstances of birth, etc., are determined by the adrsta. Each soul is allowed the chance to reap the harvest of its past deeds. Note, like other Hindu systems, the Vaisesika admits that it is possible for a person to rise to a superior order of existence through good effort or fall into a subhuman one through neglect.

6. God

In the Vaisesika God (Isvara) is the efficient cause of the world, while the atoms are the material cause. The Vaisesika believes in the eternal and uncreated nature of souls and atoms, and accounts for their varying states by the principle of adrsta (under God's will). Vedas are authored by intelligent beings, under the guidance of an eternal omniscient, all-holy spirit. There is only one God and his intelligence, desire and effort are eternal. God is distinguished from souls by his omniscience and omnipotence, which qualify him for governing the universe. He is never entangled in the cycle of existence. He sets the world under certain laws, lets it go, and does not interfere with its course.
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Compiled from: The Rig Veda; and Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, by S. Radhakrishnan, ISBN 019563821-4, pp. 176-247.
by: Dr. Subhash C. Sharma
Email:
[email protected]
Date: June 24, 2004

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