a right without question

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (127). So begins the United States Declaration of Independence, penned on July 4th, 1776, by a group of Colonial gentlemen irate at the unfair behavior of their King in matters of Colonial government. Even as these stirring words thunder in the American patriotic consciousness, they raise questions of a very fundamental nature. What is a right? How does such a right rise to the status of 'unalienable,' uncontested and undeniable?

One of the hottest points of contention in the continuing debate over human rights is the very definition of a right. Of unquestionable truth is that a right is some form of protection or a claim which people are properly due. By affixing "human" to the term, it is implied that the right is accorded to everyone simply by nature their humanity. The primary question lies in whether or not rights exist independently of their manifestation in society. That is to say, do rights exist before they are claimed by individuals? Coming from a background in the natural sciences, the author prefers to think that rights are transcendental, omnipresent forces, much like gravity, that exist independently of recognition by mere mortals. It is, however, all a matter of perception, and also a matter largely incapable of proof. For the purposes of this discussion, this point is largely irrelevant, though it will be assumed that any rights discussed herein have been previously claimed by the members of the society in question.

Of further interest is the issue of incontestability. Search for a right that is entirely without controversy - without question as to its unequivocal status as a human right - and there will be few, if any, that fit the description. The right to keep and bear arms, for example, is contested on the grounds of the dangers it poses by allowing the private ownership and use of deadly weapons. Of an even more controversial nature is the right to privacy. Unlike some rights that have an element of black and white clarity, like the right to vote, the right to privacy covers a hotly contested grey area fraught with moral dilemmas and lacking absolutes entirely. In order for a right to be considered uncontested, it must be able to answer all questions raised in opposition to said status. There can be little or no room for argument against the instatement of that right for all people, and all objections against said instatement must be met and defeated. There are, indeed, very few rights so fundamental as to meet these criteria. The purpose of this discussion is to examine the process by which a right becomes incontestable on logical grounds. Pragmatic implementation is another matter entirely and will not be addressed here. The administration of rights within society is frequently a point of contention in rights battles, as it was during the civil rights movement. The question in that matter was not the existence of rights, nor was it the validity of rights, but rather the extension of those rights to all people, regardless of race, creed, or color. In this discussion, the right to life will be used as a model to illustrate the arguments and reasoning presented below.

The road to uncontested right status has three primary checkpoints, all of which must be passed before recognition is attained. First, the claim in question must be proven a right, a just claim, of the people. This may be accomplished by examining such diverse sources as cultural history, political philosophy, and current social practice. A closer examination of these media lead to the second checkpoint, the proving of a just claim as fundamental enough to be considered a human right, as opposed to a civil or political right. Finally, the third and most rigorous checkpoint demands that a human right defeat all reasonable objections to its recognition as uncontested. These objections may be raised on either philosophical or pragmatic grounds, though the philosophical questions are most important for this discussion.

Life is all we have when we enter this world. We do not come with education, wealth, talent, spirituality, or any of the other trappings of mature human existence. All that is there is a tiny spark of biological independence that breathes possibility into the realization of human potential. What better place than life, then, to begin a discussion of things that are fundamentally merited by every animate being who may properly be called human? First, we must consider the status of life as a right. From the very beginnings of modern cultural and religious thought, life is a universal theme. It remains constant across the boundaries of faith, geography, and time. We see it in the Bible, in the Ten Commandments handed down to Moses, "Thou shalt not kill" and in the celebrated Golden Rule "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Bible 2-3). Even though these writings come from the Torah, the Holy Book of Judaism, Christians also respect and follow it, even as Saint Paul said in his Letter to the Romans, "Gentiles who do not possess the law…display the effect of the law inscribed on their hearts" (Paul 37). Similar edicts are expressed in Buddhist writings. A Bodhisattva is always to avoid causing suffering in other creatures. He exists "for the sake of saving beings" (Mahayana Buddhism 5), not to kill or injure them. In fact, such an individual is expected to take the pain and suffering of all creatures into himself so that all living things may enjoy a harmonious existence (Mahayana Buddhism 6). The same sentiments are seen in the Koran, where Muslims are encouraged to seek peace and harm others only if the defense of self and faith require it (Koran 47). Blood feuds are to be avoided, and weak and unfortunate are to be treated with care (Koran 42). All three of these religious works mark their origins in such dim reaches of antiquity that the exact dates of their appearances are unknown. Even in diverse faiths like Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, the respect for life is universal. Life is not to be taken lightly, because it is a fundamental and proper claim of every person. Through these religious traditions, the respect of life as a right is given a sound cultural basis. Any claim of the people must have some grounding in cultural beliefs to have any validity. If a claim is not respected by the society as part of its mores and customs, it has little chance of being recognized as a justifiable due of the people.

Secular philosophy also holds life as a right in high acclaim. The social contract philosophies of the 17th and 18th centuries all start off with a 'state of nature,' or condition of mankind outside the bounds of civilized society. It is a primitive state, one of distrust, fierce individualism, and insecurity, where everybody has the right to everything he can get his hands on or provide for himself, with no assurances that said right and its fruits will remain unscathed. Everyone is at war with everyone else. The social contracts offered by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jaques Rousseau all posit that people come together in societies for the purpose of protecting their lives and interests (Hobbes 84-85, Locke 93-94, Rousseau 114). Beginning with Hobbes' Leviathan of 1652, a view of Nature and the 'law' inherent therein present the very reasonable position that the essential occupation of every human being is the "preservation of his own…life - and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto" (84). It is a somewhat bleak view of human existence, the presumption that everyone is most concerned with saving his/her own skin first. Everything else that follows, like the desire for education or property or liberty, is but a means to achieving that end and enjoying the right to life in as secure circumstances as is reasonably possible. According to Hobbes, people form states and governments for the sole purpose of insurance against those that would rive life from them in an attempt to better their own existences (84-87). In short, mutual fear of life and limb drives people together for protection. In such a social compact, the participants agree to lay down their rights to the jurisdiction of the state. Such renunciation of unbridled individual rights by members of a state guards against the danger of arbitrary abridgment by other persons in the state of nature.

John Locke's The Second Treatise of the State of Nature was written in 1690, just as the Age of Enlightenment was getting underway in Europe. While Hobbes' work deals primarily with the formation of societies for the purpose of remaining alive, Locke focuses more on justice, which is to be expected due to the changing climate of the times. The Hobbesian absolute monarchy was being replaced by democratic or republican forms of government by the people. Locke presents a state of nature similar to Hobbes, but he holds that even in the state of nature, no one has the liberty to destroy life, either his own or that of another (94). This prohibition arises from the omnipresent Law of Nature. Though the Hobbesian view presents this law as basic, primal survival instinct, the Lockeian position has the Law of Nature taking on a sense of justice and fair play. Because of this altered view of basic human behavior, Locke holds that people band together not only for the protection of life, but for the protection of property, as well (99-100). Still, the fundamental idea is there. Life and the protection thereof by individual and society is a major motivation for the formation of governments. Rousseau's emphasis on life is considerably smaller that Hobbes' or Locke's, understandable due to the time of publication - nearly a century after Locke's Treatise. By that time, several governments had begun to recognize human rights, and those that were lagging behind, Britain and France, for example, would have their governments toppled to one degree or another within 40 years. He does, however, point out that people seek each other's aid in meeting their needs and providing for their continued survival (114).
Thomas Paine's work The Rights of Man is also a testament, however indirect, to the importance of life as a right. Natural rights, he says, "are those which appertain to man in right of his existence" (134). Even though he does not mention life explicitly, it is clearly implied here that life is counted among man's natural rights. Paine also makes the significant observation that, "Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured" (134). This statement confirms and supports the view of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau that people have an entirely warranted concern for the protection of their lives, and they do not enter into society if there are not sufficient measures implemented for this purpose. These political philosophies, all developed at the time when rights-minded societies had their beginnings in Europe and America, demonstrate that life is not only to be considered a just claim of the people, but a natural foundation of human existence and human society. In these cases, it is apparent that rational, as well as cultural, grounds for granting rights status to a claim are certainly helpful and usually necessary. Without some form of recognized and respected philosophical backing, a demand of the people has a slim chance at best of recognition as a right. It could, for example, be argued that every person has a right to a million dollars. We see from our cultural traditions that money is respected and provides access to a score of advantages that improve the quality of life. Out of respect for the worth of every individual, such a sum of money is properly due the people so that they may participate in the highest standard of human existence. Nowhere, however, will be found a rational, philosophical argument that provides a logical premise for the granting of this right. Without that support, a right must fail.

Looking beyond cultural tradition and political philosophy, many rights also see their origins in more practical sources. Social practice is a powerful driving force in the workings of justice. A claim with a strong tradition of social acceptance, support, and protection is nearly always recognized as a right. Beginning with Alexander the Great's Magna Charta of 1215, protection of citizens' lives received written guarantee in a social contract, "No freeman shall be…in any way molested" and "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice" (58). The lives of freemen, then, were to be respected, not thrown away on the whims of the powerful. Proceeding onward through history, the English Bill of Rights (93), the United States Declaration of Independence (127), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (138), the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (408), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Eight Protocols (411), the American Convention on Human Rights (441), and the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (474) all present guarantees of the protection of life, security of person, or at least a guarantee that justice shall not be arbitrary and laws shall not be enacted against the people without their express consent. The social practice of protecting life as a right spans nearly 800 years and is seen in nearly every area of the world. Such a tradition is not to be taken lightly and, combined with its cultural and philosophical bases, gives life clear status as a right. Indeed, any petition of the people that can claim even a fraction of the recognition that life commands ought to be viewed as a right. Having shown life to be a justifiable claim of the people, its first checkpoint is passed. The right to life must now show itself to be so fundamental and necessary to humanity that it must be considered a human right.

Civil and political rights change from era to era and society to society without noticeably affecting the 'personhood' of the people that enjoy those rights. They do not require as rigorous a test before recognition as "rights" of the people. The right to vote in the United States is an example. It began as the right of white male landowners over the age of 21 to vote in elections. Over time, it was extended to non-landowners, then Black males over 21, then women over 21, then people over 18 by the promptings of society. The beneficiaries of these rights fought long and hard for well-deserved suffrage, to be sure, but their lives would in no wise have been considered entirely desolate without it. Denial or infringement of a basic human right leads to a serious violation of human dignity and by definition, sub-human treatment. Consider for a moment the nature of rights and their enjoyment by all individuals living under conditions protective of those rights. All rights, from free speech, to privacy, to the right to keep and bear arms are meaningless if the holder of these rights is not alive. Much as we are prone to sentimentally attach 'human' status to people who have shuffled off this mortal coil, the fact of the matter remains that a corpse is nothing more than inanimate organic matter. As such, it is no more capable of enjoying rights than a stone, and like a stone, has no rights whatsoever. Without protection of the right to life, the preservation of other rights becomes a pathetic farce. Freedom of speech means nothing to one who must constantly attend to his own survival. Indeed, without protection of the right to life as a fundamental human right, we return to the state of nature, reduced from civilized human beings to creatures scarcely more than animals, constantly concerned with staying alive. Thomas Hobbes presents the right to life as unalienable, one of the few rights which people cannot renounce in the formation of the social contract (85-86). "As, first, a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life" (Hobbes 86). Today, one of the most monstrous and repugnant acts to rights-minded individuals is the slaughter of prisoners and innocents in politically motivated executions and massacres. It is one of the highest indignities exercised on people, and it is decried in every corner of the world. Without protection of the right to life, people become subhuman, treated like chattels and worthless animals. The right to life, then, passes its second checkpoint and must be considered a true human right. Any right seeking status as an incontestable human right must meet similar criteria. People must become subhuman in its absence for it to gain this distinction.

Finally, the right to life must answer all objections against it to be declared unalienable. To this end, we must consider the situations in which life could be denied with some apparent justification. These include self-defense, state-sponsored capital punishment, and just war. It must also answer a question regarding suicide: If all people have to right to live, why do they not then also have the right to end that life of their own free will? Self-defense, without excessive brutality and in response to an attempted infringement of individual rights, is entirely warranted. Recall that it was Thomas Hobbes who wrote that no one may give up their right to defend their person against injurious and potentially fatal attack (86). Even one who staunchly upholds the right to life for all people without exception cannot possibly claim that an attack upon one's life is to be met with meek submission. Indeed, when a criminal decides he wishes to take the life of another, he breaks his end of the social contract - to follow the edicts and laws of society, including the respect of human rights. In so doing, he repudiates his claim to government protection of his own rights. He is effectively cast out of society back into the state of nature, where it is everyone against everyone else and human rights are not in any way assured. Similarly, when the rights of an innocent person are threatened and the government cannot immediately intervene on his behalf, the victim is likewise temporarily released from the social contract. As in most cases of personal attack, the governmental machinery cannot be set in motion fast enough to provide effective protection. In effect, though through no fault of its own, the government falls short of its social contract responsibilities. Thus, in a self-defense situation, there are two individuals released from their contractual obligations, one by choice and the other by force. Both parties being temporarily in a 'state of nature,' it is expected that the victim defend himself. This philosophy is echoed in Locke's Treatise which holds that transgressors of contractual responsibilities can and should be punished by the people of the society, certainly by magistrates and by the people directly if necessary (94-96).

The right to life has also to answer the question of state-sponsored capital punishment. The same arguments used in the case of self-defense may be used here. In this case, however, the key difference is that the victim was unsuccessful in his efforts of self-defense and perished at the hands of the attacker. The state, acutely attuned to a sense of justice, seeks redress for its fallen citizen. By infringing on one's right to life, the perpetrator suddenly and irrevocably removes himself from the ranks of humans that may properly enjoy human rights. The removal of his right to life is not an abridgment of justice, but a consequence of a conscious decision on his part. He is treated as subhuman by the state because he treated the victim as subhuman. A heinous crime is justifiably due a severe punishment. In the words of John Locke, "a criminal who, having renounced reason [by murdering another] has, by the unjust violence and slaughter he has committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed" (95). The state, then, takes the position of the victim in the state of nature, as one who is perfectly entitled to destroy those with murderous intent in self-protection. Some, notably Cesare Beccaria, argue that capital punishment is neither called for nor necessary, and that prolonged denial of individual liberty is far more effective as a deterrent to other potential criminals (123-124). Though such sentiments have merit, it cannot be denied that the state is within the bounds of justice to demand a life for a life. Such retaliation is even sanctioned in the Bible (2-3) and the Koran (47-48). Granted, enlightened society might wish of its own accord to abolish the death penalty as a sign of moral development and advanced civilization and use other, more humane forms of punishment, it still does not make capital punishment any less justified.

The right to life must also answer to the questions regarding war. It is not the purpose of this discussion to justify causes to engage in warlike activity, but to justify the taking of life in a war already determined to be just. The matter of justification of war is addressed by St. Thomas Aquinas (60-61) and Hugo Grotius (79-80). When a just war is engaged by the government of a state, it calls upon the social contract. Citizens who enter into the social contract seek governmental protection of their rights. In return, the government requests their support in defense of the state and its just causes. Fighting a war unfortunately but unfailingly involves the killing of others. In situations of war, the governments involved throw themselves into the state of nature. Just as men war with each other in the state of nature, so do states in their own 'state of nature.' In a just war, the citizens of the state become to the state as tools are to an individual, for use in protecting self and interests. Any killing that takes place then, is not a violation of human rights, any more than a struggle between two individuals in the state of nature is such a violation. It is rather, the preservation of the social contract in the championing of a just cause.

Finally, the right to life must answer to a seeming paradox in that individuals have the right to live, but they lack the right to end the life that they strive so hard to possess. As people grow, they gain individual knowledge and experience. As people come and go from the society, their individual knowledge and experience becomes part of the cumulative knowledge of that society. It is in this way that the society as a whole learns from the mistakes and experiences of its members. If each individual had this collective knowledge at his disposal, then a logical decision would be made in nearly every situation. This collective knowledge, however, is more than any one individual can know. It would be best for both the individual and the society to take advantage of as many benefits of that knowledge as possible. This prevents people from duplicating the mistakes of their predecessors and protects them from dangers about which they are ignorant. This is good for the society in that, as a collective, the society has better sense than any individual ever could. If humans were perfect, logical courses of action that protect personal safety would always be chosen, but people sometimes make decisions that are not fully rational. This is so in the case of suicide. Suicide is never in the best interests of anyone, especially not the unfortunate victim. Just as John Locke pointed out, no one has the right to destroy a life, not even his own (94). The wish to take one's own life is most often transient, as the society has collectively learned. That knowledge is used to protect people from fleeting desires that would lead them to irrevocably damage the rights the state is pledged to protect. A prohibition against suicide, then, is not a violation of rights, but rather a protection of them, by the protection of the most fundamental right of all, the right to life.

The right to life can thus meet all the reasonable objections against it and passes its third and final checkpoint on the road to uncontested right status. Indeed, if any right is unalienable, it must be the right to life since without it, other rights mean nothing. In order for any right to be considered and uncontested human right, it must pass such a test as that which passed the right to life. In an uncertain world where justice is not always done and the public good not always served, there are few things indeed which have any hope of attaining this high status. The right to life, however, shows that those things that fundamentally make us human can triumph over all doubt and establish themselves as just causes and just claims, properly merited by all human beings.