WASHINGTON, March 3 (UPI) -- As the Bush administration reviews its Iraq policy, one
still unresolved question is whether the United States will fully support the Iraqi National
Congress, the main resistance organization.

In the decade since the Gulf War, U.S. intelligence support for Iraqi opposition groups has
dwindled. Aras Kareem is hoping for enough support to make the INC a real threat to
Saddam Hussein.

Kareem is the INC's chief of operations, and one of the last INC members to leave Iraq after
Saddam Hussein's troops seized the group's base of operations on Aug. 31, 1996. He taught
himself counter-intelligence techniques by reading books about the CIA. In the early 1990s,
he was one of the greatest assets for U.S. intelligence in Iraq when Washington prosecuted a
more robust campaign to remove Saddam from power. Today, he lives in London and is still
a target for Saddam's assassins. His cousin, Dr. Ali Karem, was detained in a California
immigration jail because of his connection Kareem, after the underground leader had
protested the CIA's decision to pull back support for the INC.

Recently, he has been meeting with Pentagon officials on training matters. Kareem was in
Washington on Feb. 21, when he spoke with UPI.

Q. What is your background?

A. My father was the secretary general of the Kurdistan Democratic Party from 1966 to
1975. He has remained in the leadership since then. He was nominated to be the vice
president of Iraq from 1970 to 1974. But this didn't happen, there was fighting.

After the Kurdish revolution collapsed in 1975, we went to Iran. From Iran we went to
Lebanon and then Egypt, and then we went back to Iraq. When I went back to Iraq, because
my father was a senior figure, I went to a primary school where the principal was Saddam's
first wife, Sajeda. She gave me an exam for primary school, where her own sons and
daughters were with us. Later on I scored very high marks in high school and it allowed me
to go to engineering college. The civil engineering department at the University of Baghdad
is considered an elite college, so all the senior figures in the government send their sons and
daughters there. My classmates included the son of (Deputy Prime Minister) Tariq Aziz
Ziad. He is not such a bad guy. Saddam's son Uday was also there.

I trained as a civil engineer, and in 1992 joined the INC. At that time we established
something called the IBC, the Iraqi Broadcasting Corporation. We broadcast news from all
over Iraq, including the areas outside Saddam's control. Later, we did a lot to recruit people,
Iraqis in the army, even officers working in the Iraqi intelligence.

Q: You went to primary school and technical college with Uday Hussein and the children of
other prominent Iraqis. How did this help you make contacts later on when you were
working against the government for the INC?

A: I knew a lot of people whose fathers are in the government, so I found it very easy to just
talk to them and get whatever I wanted from them because they were friends. I would go to
the Hunting Club where Uday would go always.

You are not doing something suspicious to get information. A lot of them, they like you. I
have many contacts who used to work for the Iraqi special security organization. They are
my friends and they are helping me because I am their friend, not because they are my
agents. If you know those people, life in Iraq is easier. For example, I was out of the army
during the Gulf War because I had the right papers. If you have the right papers in Iraq, you
can do anything.

Q: What was the recruiting process?

A: We used to broadcast from the north to the areas under Saddam's control, and encourage
officers and soldiers to desert their units and come and join us in northern Iraq. When
officers would join the INC they would send for their families. I must say we were very
successful in attracting even very senior officials in the regime to the northern zone.

Q: Who did you recruit?

A: I'll give you examples. For example, in 1994 one of the officers working for us in the
Iraqi military intelligence sent us a message saying Iraq planned a military buildup for
another attempt to invade Kuwait. That was in 1994. On the same day, another officer who
worked in the headquarters of the army 5th corps sent us another message saying they had
been ordered to the Kuwaiti border. So we put this out to the news, and the Pentagon at first
denied it. Twelve hours later, the Pentagon sent about 30,000 troops to Kuwait.

U.S. intelligence wanted a copy of the Salahuddin, an encryption device made in Iraq that
could be attached to the military radio communications system. The device had a range of
more than 124 miles. We provided them with some of the units -- actually they asked us just
for the motherboard. In less than a week we had given them four of these units. We got the
device from the Republican Guard. We had sympathizers in the Iraqi Republican Guard.
The actual units are very small.

Q: Can you give other examples of how you were able to help U.S. intelligence?

A: The CIA requested any information about the coaxial telephone and television cable
linking Iraqi's main cities. We were able to bring them two parts of the cable. It's a metal
cable, it is very fat and it is underground. A week later we brought them the physical cable.
After another week we brought them the whole contract for the cables containing all the
details.

Q: You were one of the last INC leaders in Iraq when Saddam attacked your base of
operations in Irbil on Aug. 31, 1996. Can you tell me about what happened that day?

A: The attack happened at 4:50 AM in the morning. While it was going on I gave interviews
about the battle to reporters on a satellite phone. Every 20 or 30 minutes I used to give two
or three interviews. I remember the last interview was with an Arabic magazine. He phoned
and at the same time one of my bodyguards said "(The Iraqi army) are very close, we have
to withdraw to another headquarters. We have 10 minutes." So I told this guy I cannot do it.
There were huge shellings. The house was on the corner. The Republican Guard's tanks
were close by on the main street, and there was a crowd shouting how they loved Saddam
and how they were ready to kill themselves for Saddam. They were shooting like crazy. The
Kurdish forces allied with Saddam were closing in from the other side. I was talking on the
phone, I said: 'I don't know if I will be alive or not, so just goodbye. If I don't call you again,
that's it, I'm done.'

We changed houses again, taking the back streets to another house. We were six senior
figures from the INC. I went to my friend's house and made some arrangements. The Iraqis
began to surround the areas from the street and search house by house. In front of the house
where I was hiding in there was a minibus. The army thought we were hiding in that bus, so
they began to shoot at it with machine guns. But apparently nobody was there.

A soldier entered the hall of the house. I was just behind the door. The soldier went inside the
house, and I had a pistol. I was standing behind the door in the house and I thought I will kill
him and then I will kill myself.

Q: Why would you have to kill yourself?

A: If they would capture me it would be a disaster for many people. I know a lot, I know a
lot of people inside Iraq, a lot of officers working with the INC. They would torture me and
force me to say things I do not want to say. That was a decision we took, the six main senior
people, before we are captured we will kill ourselves.

There were two ladies with a baby girl just two days old in the house. So those two ladies
went to the people outside and told them, 'We are here, we are only ladies in this house.'
They spoke in the same accent as the Kurdish peoples allied with Saddam. While they were
talking to them a soldier entered. The head of the force told the soldier, 'There is no one in
the house.' The soldier said, 'No, we have information that they are in this house.' The
commander said, 'I am ordering you to get out of the house. This house is for our people.' So
the soldier left. And here I was behind the door, waiting for him.

Q: What kind of activities do you envision in the future for the INC and what resources will
you need from the American government?

A: In my opinion, if we are able to send information teams, we can send them tomorrow. If
the United States offers us combat training that is wonderful. If not, how can we do it?
Everybody knows how to shoot, but how to organize the shooting is another story.

Q: What about these conversations you are having with the Pentagon?

A: We are having conversations with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which
provides training for different countries all around the world. We have sent more than 133
trainees to the United States. We were discussing what the INC will need, plus training
issues, uniforms, that kind of stuff.

Q: Can you talk about Saddam's son, Uday Hussein?

A: Uday is a nut, he is a crazy guy. He will drive in a new Mercedes -- with a new
registration number. The next day he will drive another new car with a new number. One
day he came to the university with a rifle on his shoulder and entered the class. When he
raised his hand in class, the teacher and the professor will say, 'yes my master.' Uday is the
student, can you imagine that. Uday will decide what is the appropriate time for the exam
and how long it will last, and the examiners will give him the questions and the answers. It is
up to him what to write, but he will get the full degree. In the history of the college of
engineering, nobody scored 98.9 as an average. Even Einstein if he came to the College of
Engineering would not score that. But Uday scored 98.9. If Uday talks to a lady, nobody
should talk to her later on because the body guards will beat you. If Uday goes to a club or
alhotel, nobody should park their car near his. If a daughter or son of a minister parks
his car near Uday's car, they will beat him.
*****************
The Kurdistan Observer
www.kurdistanobserver.com