January 24, 2001
Los Angeles Times
Iraq's Saddam Hussein: He Never Went Away
By GRAHAM E. FULLER

George W. Bush must now figure out how to succeed in Iraq where his father failed in 1991.
Saddam Hussein, whom former President Bush failed to topple, is still the most vicious and
dangerousleader anywhere in the world today. The bad news is that it is probably too late for
the new administration to effect genuine change in Iraq at a price the United States is willing
to pay.

What might have been possible even five years ago is no longer possible today. Hussein is
stronger both politically and militarily than he has ever been since the Gulf War, and he is
pumping oil once again. The sanctions have lost nearly all international support and are
perceived to have caused widespread suffering, especially upon children. Anti-Western
feeling in Iraq has never been higher.

Meanwhile, the international scene has shifted dramatically against U.S. policy. Sanctions
are violated regularly. The French, Russians and many Arab states now operate flights into
Baghdad.

Weapons inspection regimes are over. Except for Kuwait, no Gulf state has the stomach for
further sanctions, and they are increasingly uncomfortable with U.S. military missions over
Iraq. Even the British now suggest that they are about to back off from supporting any more
"no-fly zones" in southern Iraq, the sole part of the country where serious anti-regime
operations occur. The Kurds in the north have long since lost faith in the ability of the U.S.
to protect their autonomous region over the long run and have reestablished serious working
relations with Hussein as insurance.

Meanwhile, the Arab-Israeli peace process has collapsed, and anti-American feeling is
running high in the Arab world. The Palestinians, embittered by their own impotence,
revere any Arab leader with the guts to stand up to the U.S. and Israel. Other Arab autocrats
fear their own populace and have little stomach for supporting what they see as unpopular
U.S. adventurism against  an over-demonized Arab strongman.

The people of the region now range from cool to hostile toward any U.S. military presence
on their shores. The U.S. presence in the Gulf is resented at a time when the U.S. needs Gulf
goodwill in an environment of high oil prices. Everybody knows that Hussein is vicious, but
they will no longer lend support to bringing him down. More to the point, except for Kuwait,
they do  not feel imminently threatened.

Over the past decade, despite elaborate plans, Clinton policies have succeeded only in
containing Hussein, denying him the chance to unleash campaigns of intimidation or war
against yet more neighbors. His development of nuclear weapons has been severely retarded
but not definitively terminated. This modest but significant holding operation may be the
best we can hope for. All else has failed.

The new Bush team inherits a mess while holding virtually no cards. As repugnant as it is to
contemplate, U.S. policy now must come to terms with the reality of Hussein's presence-until
some Iraqi eliminates him.

The U.S. is not going to invade Iraq. Coup plans have repeatedly foundered and are
discredited; opposition groups are divided and penetrated. Radio broadcasts and
opposition pinpricks are to no avail. A seriously armed opposition army in the north requires
full Turkish cooperation, which will not be forthcoming.

All Bush can do at this point is to maintain consensus on blocking the sale of war materiel to
Iraq.

More important, when signs of production and deployment of nuclear weapons are clear,
Washington must be prepared to take unilateral action to eliminate them. And can, or
will, Washington even protect the Kurds if Hussein marches against them inside his own
country? That is  the real litmus test.

To build a more serious anti-Iraqi coalition requires near Herculean change in our Middle
East policy: adoption of new policies perceived to be truly balanced in the peace
process; a peace process shared at the international level with the EU and the U.N.;
improving ties with Iran, a state that can seriously influence events in Iraq and the Gulf;
gradual steps toward building a Gulf  security forum and a willingness to listen to--not just
lecture--regional leaders on what should  be done regarding Hussein.

After all, U.S. concerns about Hussein cannot be more vital than those of  the people who
live next to him.
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Graham E. Fuller Is a Former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the
CIA
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The Kurdistan Observer
www.kurdistanobserver.com