PART THREE OF JOHN LOCKE BY KENNETH SCOT STREMSKY I have comments after some of the excerpts. I may add text to this page dealing with John Locke. The excerpts on this page comes from John Locke's Two Treatises of Government edited by Peter Laslett. The excerpts come from John Locke's The Second Treatise of Government. The following excerpt comes from pages 370 and 371 of Two Treatises of Government. "It may be demanded here, What if the Executive Power being possessed of the Force of the Commonwealth, shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the Legislative, when the Original Constitution, or the publick Exigencies require it? I say using Force upon the People without Authority, and contrary to the Trust put in him, that does so, is a state of War with the People, who have a right to reinstate their Legislative in the Exercise of their Power. For having erected a Legislative, with an intent they should exercise the Power of making Laws, either at certain set times, or when there is need of it; when they are hindr'd by any force from, what is so necessary to the Society, and wherein the Safety and preservation of the People consists, the People have a right to remove it by force. In all States and Conditions the true remedy of Force without Authority, is to oppose Force to it. The use of force without Authority, always puts him that uses it into a state of War, as the Aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly." The following excerpt is from pages 371 and 372 of Two Treatises of Government. "The Power of Assembling and dismissing the Legislative, placed in the Executive, gives not the Executive a superiority over it, but is a Fiduciary Trust, placed in him, for the safety of the People, in a Case where the uncertainty, and variableness of humane affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule. For it not being possible, that the first Framers of the Government should, by any foresight, be so much Masters of future Events, as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the Assemblies of the Legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the Exigencies of the Commonwealth; the best remedy could be found for this defect, was to trust this to the prudence of one, who was always to be present, and whose business it was to watch over the publick good. Constant frequent meetings of the Legislative, and long Continuations of their Assemblies, without necessary occasion, could not but be burthensome to the People, and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniences, and yet the quick turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present help: Any delay of their Convening might endanger the publick; and sometimes too their business might be so great, that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the publick of that benefit, which could be had only from their mature deliberation. What then could be done, in this case, to prevent the Community, from being exposed sometime or other to eminent hazard, on one side, or the other, by fixed intervals and periods, set to the meeting and acting of the Legislative, but to intrust it to the prudence of some, who being present, and acquainted with the state of publick affairs, might make use of this Prerogative for the publick good? And where else could this be so well placed as in his hands, who was intrusted with the Execution of the Laws, for the same end? Thus supposing the regulation of times for the Assembling and Sitting of the Legislative, not settled by the original Constitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the Executive, not as an Arbitrary Power depending on his good pleasure, but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the publick Weal, as the Occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whether settled periods of their Convening, or a liberty left to the Prince for Convoking the Legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the least inconvenience attending it, 'tis not my business here to inquire, but only to shew, that though the Executive Power may have the Prerogative of Convoking and dissolving such Conventions of the Legislative, yet it is not therebt superior to it." The following excerpt is from pages 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, and 380 of Two Treatises of Government. "WHere the Legislative and Executive Power are in distinct hands, (as they are in all moderated Monarchies, and well-framed Governments) there the good of the Society requires, that several things should be left to the discretion of him, that has the Executive Power. For the Legislators not being able to foresee, and provide, by Laws, for all, that may be useful to the Community, the Executor of the Laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common Law of Nature, a right to make use of it, for the good of the Society, in many Cases, where the municipal Law has given no direction, till the Legsilative can conveniently be Assembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the Law can by no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him, that has the Executive Power in his hands, to be ordered by him, as the publick good and advantage shall require: nay, 'tis fit that the Laws themselves should in some Cases give way to the Executive Power, or rather to this Fundamental Law of Nature and Governments, viz. That as much as may be, all the Members of the Society are to be preserved. For since many accidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of the Laws may do harm; (as not to pull down an innocent Man's House to stop the Fire, when the next to it is burning) and a Man may come sometimes within the reach of the Law, which makes no distinction of Persons, by an action, that may deserve reward and pardon; 'tis fit, the Ruler should have a Power, in many Cases, to mitigate the severity of the Law, and pardon some Offenders: For the end of Government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent. This Power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called Prerogative. For since in some Governments the Law-making Power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to Execution: and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern the publick; or to make such Laws, as will do no harm, if they are Executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all Persons, that may come in their way, therefore there is a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe. This power whilst imployed for the benefit of the Commonwealth, and suitably to the trust and ends of the Government, is undoubted Prerogative, and never is questioned. For the People are very seldom, or never scrupulous, or nice in the point: they are far from examining Prerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree imploy'd for the use it was meant; that is, for the good of the People, and not manifestly against it. But if there comes to be a question between the Executive Power and the People, about a thing claimed as a Prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such Prerogative to the good or hurt of the People, will easily decide that Question. It is easie to conceive, that in the Infancy of Governments, when Commonwealths differed little from Families in number of People, they differ'd from them too but little in number of Laws: And the Governours, being as the Fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the Government was almost all Prerogative. A few establish'd Laws served the turn, and the discretion and care of the Ruler supply'd the rest. But when mistake, or flattery prevailed with weak Princes to make use of this Power, for private ends of their own, and not for the publick good, the People were fain by express Laws to get Prerogative determin'd, in those points, wherein they found disadvantage from it: And thus declared limitations of Prerogative were by the People found necessary in Cases, which they and their Ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to the Wisdom of those Princes, who made no other but a right use of it, that is, for the good of their People. And therefore they have a very wrong Notion of Government, who say, that the People have incroach'd upon the Prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive Laws. For in so doing, they have not pulled from the Prince any thing, that of right belong'd to him, but only declared, that that Power which they indefinitely left in his, or his Ancestors, hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a thing, which they intended him, when he used it otherwise. For the end of government being the good of the Community, whatsover alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an incroachment upon any body: since no body in Government can have a right tending to any other end. And those only are incroachments which prejudice or hinder the publick good. Those who say otherwise, speak as if the Prince had a distinct and separate Interest from the good of the Community, and was not made for it, the Root and Source, from which spring almost all those Evils, and Disorders, which happen in Kingly Governments. And indeed if that be so, the People under his Government are not a Society of Rational Creatures entred into a Community for their mutual good; they are not as have set Rulers over themselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an Herd of inferior Creatures, under the Dominion of a Master, who keeps them, and works them for his own Pleasure or Profit. If Men were so void of Reason, and brutish, as to enter into Society upon such Terms, Prerogative might indeed be, what some Men would have it, an Arbitrary Power to do things hurtful to the People. But since a Rational Creature cannot be supposed when free, to put himself into Subjection to another, for his own harm: (Though where he finds a good and wise Ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary, or useful to set precise Bounds to his Power in all things) Prerogative can be nothing, but the Peoples permitting their Rulers, to do several things of their own free choice, where the Law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct Letter of the Law, for the publick good; and their acquiescing in it when so done. For as a good Prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the good of his People, cannot have too much Prerogative, that is, Power to do good: So a weak and ill Prince, who would claim that Power, which his Predecessors exercised without the direction of the Law, as a Prerogative belonging to him by Right of his Office, which he may exercise at his pleasure, to make or promote an Interest distinct from that of the publick, gives the People an occasion, to claim their Rights, and limit that Power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they were content should be tacitly allowed. And therefore he, that will look into the History of England, will find, that Prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best Princes: because the People observing the whole tendency of their Actions to be the publick good, contested not what was done without Law to that end; or if any humane frailty or mistake (for Princes are but Men, made as others) appear'd in some small declinations from that end; yet 'twas visible, the main of their Conduct tended to nothing but the care of the publick. The People therefore finding reason to be satisfied with these Princes, whenever they acted without or contrary to the Letter of the Law, acquiesced in what they did, and, without the least complaint, let them inlarge their Prerogative as they pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their Laws, since they acted conformable to the Foundation and End of all Laws, the publick good. Such God-like Princes indeed had some Title to Arbitrary Power, by that Argument, that would prove Absolute Monarchy the best Government, as that which God himself governs the Universe by: because such Kings partake of his Wisdom and Goodness. Upon this is founded that saying, That the Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the Liberties of their People. For when their Successors, managing the Government with different Thoughts, would draw the Actions of those good Rulers into Precedent, and make them the Standard of their Prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the People, was a right in them to do, for the harm of the People, if they so pleased; it has often occasioned Contest, and sometimes publick Disorders, before the People could recover their original Right, and get that to be declared not to be Prerogative, which truly was never so: Since it is impossible, that any body in the Society should ever have a right to do the People harm; though it be very possible, and reasonable, that the People should not go about to set any Bounds to the Prerogative of those Kings or Rulers, who themselves transgressed not the Bounds of the publick good. For Prerogative is nothing but the Power of doing publick good without a Rule. The Power of calling Parliaments, as to precise time, place, and duration, is certainly a Prerogative of the King, but still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the Nation, as the Exigencies of the Times, and variety of Occasions shall require. For it being impossible to foresee, which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in, and what the best Season; the choice of these was left with the Executive Power, as might be most subservient to the publick good, and best suit the ends of Parliaments. The old Question will be asked in this matter of Prerogative, But who shall be Judge when this Power is made a right use of? I Answer: Between a Executive Power in being, with such a Prerogative, and a Legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no Judge on Earth: As there can be none, between the Legislative, and the People, should either the Executive, or the Legislative, when they have got the Power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave, or destroy them. The People have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no Judge on Earth, but to appeal to Heaven. For the Rulers, in such attempts, exercising a Power the People never put into their hands (who can never be supposed to consent, that any body should rule over them for their harm) do that, which they have not a right to do. And where the Body of the People, or any single Man, is deprived of their Right, or is under the Exercise of a power without right, and have no Appeal on Earth, there they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven, whenever they judge the Cause of sufficient moment. And therefore, tho' the People cannot be Judge, so as to have by the Constitution of that Society any Superior power, to determine and give effective Sentence in this case; yet they have, by a Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of men, reserv'd that ultimate Determination to themselves, which belongs to all Mankind, where there lies no Appeal on Earth, viz. to judge whether they have just Cause to make their Appeal to Heaven. And this Judgement they cannot part with, it being out of a Man's power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy him; God and Nature never allowing a Man so to abandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: And since he cannot take away his own Life, neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation for Disorder: for this operates not, till the Inconvenience is so great, that the Majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended. But this the Executive Power, or wise Princes, never need come in the danger of: And 'tis the thing of all others, they have most need to avoid, as of all others the most perilous." The following quote is from pages 393 and 394 of Two Treatises. "Every Man is born with a double Right: First, A Right of Freedom to his Person, which no other Man has a Power over, but the free Disposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a Right, before any other Man, to inherit, with his Brethren, his Father's Goods." MY COMMENTS The previous quote is one of the reasons the estate tax should be eliminated. Government should not benefit financially from the death of a citizen. The following quote is from page 394 of Two Treatises. "For no Government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it: which they can never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of Liberty to chuse their Government and Governors, or at least till they have such standing Laws, to which they have by themselves or their Representatives, given their free consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to be Proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own consent, without which, Men under any Government are not in the state of Free-men, but are direct Slaves under the Force of War." The following excerpt is from page 395 of Two Treatises of Government. "Their Persons are free by a Native Right, and their properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or else it is no property." The following excerpt is from pages 395 and 396 of Two Treatises of Government. "I will not dispute now whether Princes are exempt from the Laws of their Countrey; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the Laws of God and Nature. No Body, no Power can exempt them from the Obligation of that Eternal Law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of Promises, that Omnipotency it self can be tyed by them. Grants, Promises and Oaths are Bonds that hold the Almighty: Whatever some Flatters say to Princes of the World who all together, with all their People joined to them, are in comparison of the great God, but as a Drop of the Bucket, or a Dust on the Balance, inconsiderable nothing!" MY COMMENTS I know what God's Laws are. I have had and continue to have a significant religious education. I know that I am not above God's Laws and someday I will probably be held to a far higher standard than most people who have ever lived because I do know what God's Laws are. I also realize that I am human and that humans need Liberty and essential freedoms. I realize humans are mortal. Many years ago, I asked myself if I was willing to risk rotting in hell for all eternity because I believed women should have the Liberty to have abortions. I decided that I was willing to rot in hell for all eternity to increase the probability that women would have Liberty over their own bodies. Personal responsibility is something our society does not care enough about. The greatest responsibility that a human being has involves the creation of human life. I hope people will only engage in a sexual activity that may result in pregnancy when they want to have children. The only time I think a woman should have an abortion is when her health is significantly harmed by pregnancy. If I get a woman pregnant and her health is severely harmed by the pregnancy, I will ask her to choose abortion because her life is more important to me than the life of my child while my child is inside of her body. Government should not have the power to keep women from having abortions. Society should not have the power to keep women from having abortions. I do not have a problem with government asking women to choose adoption instead of abortion. I do not have a problem with society asking women to choose adoption over abortion. The following excerpt is from pages 398 and 399 of Two Treatises of Government. "AS Usurpation is the exercise of Power, which another hath a Right to; so Tyranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right, which no Body can have a Right to. And this is making use of the Power any one has in his hands; not for the good of those, who are under it, but for his own private separate Advantage. When the Governour, however inituled, makes not the Law, but his Will, the Rule; and his Commands and Actions are not directed to the preservation of the Properties of his People, but the satisfaction of his own Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other irregular Passion." The following excerpt is from pages 400 and 401 of Two Treatises of Government. "Thus that Learned King who well understood the Notions of things, makes the difference betwixt a King and a Tyrant to consist only in this, That one makes the laws the Bounds of his Power, and the Good of the Public, the end of his Government; the other makes all give way to his own Will and Appetitite. 'Tis a Mistake to think this Fault is proper only to Monarchies; other Forms of Government are liable to it, as well as that. For where-ever the Power that is put in any hands for the Government of the People, and the Preservation of their Properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the Arbitrary and Irregular Commands of those that have it: There is presently becomes Tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many. Thus we read of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, as well as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable Dominion of the Decemviri at Rome was nothing better. Where-ever the Law ends, Tyranny begins, if the Law be transgressed to another's harm. And whosoever in Authority exceeds the Power given by the Law, and make use of the Force he has under his Command, to compass that upon the Subject, which the Law allows not, ceases in that to be a Magistrate, and acting without Authority, may be opposed, as any other Man, who by force invades the Right of another." The following excerpt is from pages 401 and 402 of Two Treatises of Government. "For the exceeding the Bounds of Authority is no more a Right in a great, than a petty Officer; no more justifiable in a King, than a Constable. But is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed from the advantages of Education, imployment, and Counsellors to be more knowing in the measures of right or wrong. May the Commands then of a Prince be opposed? May he be resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not Right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all Polities, and instead of Government and Order, leave nothing but Anarchy and Confusion. To this I Answer: That Force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful Force; whoever makes any opposition in any other Case, draws on himself a just Condemnation both from God and Man; and so no such Danger or Confusion will follow, as is often suggested." The following excerpt is from pages 407 and 408 of Two Treatises of Government. "Besides this over-turning from without, Governments are dissolved from within, First, When the Legislative is altered. Civil Society being a State of Peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the State of War is excluded by the Umpirage, which they have provided in their Legislative, for the ending all Differences, that may arise amongst any of them, 'tis in the Legislative, that the Members of a Commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living Body. This is the Soul that gives Form, Life, and Unity to the Commonwealth: From hence the several Members have their mutual Influence, Sympathy, and Connexion: And therefore when the Legislative is broken, or dissolved, Dissolution and Death follows. For the Essence and Union of the Society consisting in having one Will, the Legislative, when once established by the Majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that Will. The Constitution of the Legislative is the first and fundamental Act of Society, whereby provision is made for the Continuation of their Union, under the Direction of Persons, and Bonds of Laws made by persons authorized thereunto, by the Consent and Appointment of the People, without which no one Man, or number of Men, amongst them, can have Authority of making Laws, that shall be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make Laws, whom the People have not appointed so to do, they make Laws without Authority, which the People are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new Legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without Authority would impose any thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own Will, when those who had by the delegation of the Society, the declaring of the publick Will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place who have no such Authority or Delegation." MY COMMENTS The United States Supreme Court does not have the power to make Laws. When the United States Supreme Court makes Laws, Congress, the President of the United States of America, and citizens of the United States of America do not have to listen to the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court has the power to interpret laws. The United States Supreme Court has the power to decide if laws are constitutional. The United States Supreme Court has the power to decide if regulations are constitutional. The United States Supreme Court has the power to decide if executive orders made by the President of the United States of America are constitutional. The United States Supreme Court has other powers according to Article Three of the United States Constitution. The following excerpt is from pages 408, 409, 410, and 411 of Two Treatises of Government. "First, That when such a single Person or Prince sets up his own Arbitrary Will in place of the Laws, which are the Will of the Society, declared by the Legislative, then the Legislative is changed. For that being in effect the Legislative whose Rules and Laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed; when other Laws are set up, and other Rules pretended, and inforced, than what the Legislative, constituted by the Society, have enacted, 'tis plain, that the Legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new Laws, not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental Appointment of the Society, or subverts the old, disowns and overturns the Power by which they were made, and so sets up a new Legislative. Secondly, When the Prince hinders the Legislative from assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends, for which it was Constituted, the Legislative is altered. For 'tis not a certain number of Men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also Freedom of debating, and Leisure of perfecting, what is for the good of the Society wherein the Legislative consists: when these are taken away or altered, so as to deprive the Society of the due exercise of their Power, the Legislative is truly altered. For it is not Names, that Constitute Governments, but the use and exercise of those Powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he who takes away the Freedom, or hinders the acting of the Legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes away the Legislative, and puts an end to the Government. Thirdly, When by the Arbitrary Power of the Prince, the Electors, or ways of Election are altered, without the Consent, and contrary to the common Interest of the People, there also the Legislative is altered. For if others, than those whom the Society has authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in another way, than what the Society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the Legislative appointed by the People. Fourthly, The delivery also of the People into the subjection of a Foreign Power, either by the Prince, or by the Legislative, is certainly a change of the Legislative, and so a Dissolution of the Government. For the end why People entered into Society, being to be preserved one intire, free, independent Society, to be governed by its own Laws; this is lost, whenever they are given up into the Power of another. Why in such a Constitution as this, the Dissolution of the Government in these Cases is to be imputed to the Prince, is evident: because he having the Force, Treasure, and Offices of the State to imploy, and often perswading himself, or being flattered by others, that as Supream Magistrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a Condition to make great Advances toward such Changes, under pretence of lawful Authority, and has it in his hands to terrifie or suppress Opposers, as Factious, Seditious, and Enemies to the Government: Whereas no other part of the Legislative, or People is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the Legislative, without open and visible Rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of; which when it prevails, produces Effects very little different from Foreign Conquest. Besides the Prince in such a Form of Government, having the Power of dissolving the other parts of the Legislative, and thereby rendering them private Persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his Concurrence, alter the Legislative by a Law, his Consent being necessary to give any of their Decrees that Sanction. But yet so far as the other parts of the Legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the Government, and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest Crime Men can be guilty of one towards another. There is one way more whereby such a Government may be dissolved, and that is, when he who has the Supream Executive Power, neglects and abandons that charge, so that the Laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to Anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the Government. For Laws not being made for themselves, but part of the Body Politick in its due place and function, when that totally ceases, the Government visibly ceases, and the People become a confused Multitude, without Order or Connexion. Where there is no longer the administration of Justice, for the securing of Mens Rights, nor any remaining Power within the Community to direct the Force, or provide for the Necessities of the publick, there certainly is no Government left. Where the Laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no Laws, and a Government without Laws, is, I suppose, a Mystery in Politicks, unconceivable to humane Capacity, and inconsistent with humane Society. In these and the like Cases, when the Government is dissolved, the People are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new Legislative, differing from the other, by the change of Persons, or Form, or both as they shall find it most for their safety and good. For the Society can never, by the fault of another, lose the Native and Original Right it has to preserve it self, which can only be done by a settled Legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the Laws made by it. But the state of Mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this Remedy, till it be too late to look for any. To tell People they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new Legislative, when by Oppression, Artifice, or being delivered over to a Foreign Power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them they may expect Relief, when it is too late, and the evil is past Cure. This is in effect no more than too bid them first be Slaves, and then to take care of their Liberty; and when their Chains are on, tell them, they may act like Freemen. This, if barely so, is rather Mockery than Relief; and Men can never be secure from Tyranny, if there be no means to escape it, till they are perfectly under it: And therefore it is, that they have not only a Right to get out of it but to prevent it." The following excerpt is from page 412, 413, and 414 of Two Treatises of Government. "There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby Governments are dissolved, and that is; when the Legislative, or the Prince, either of them act contrary to their Trust. First, The Legislative acts against the Trust reposed in them, when they endeavor to invade the Property of the Subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the Community, Masters, or Arbitrary Disposers of the Lives, Liberties, or Fortunes of the People. The Reason why Men enter into Society, is the preservation of their Property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a Legislative, is, that there may be Laws made, and Rules set as Guards and Fences to the Properties of all the Members of the Society, to limit the Power, and moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the Society. For since it can never be supposed to be the Will of the Society, that the Legislative should have a Power to destroy that, which every one designs to secure, by entering into Society, and for which the People submitted themselves to the Legislators of their own making; whenever the Legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience, and are left to the common Refuge, which God hath provided for all Men, against Force and Violence. Whensoever therefore the Legislative shall transgress this fundamental Rule of Society; and either by Ambition, Fear, Folly or Corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit the Power, the People had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, who have a Right to resume their original Liberty, and, by the Establishment of a new Legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are in Society. What I have said here, concerning the Legislative, in general, holds true also concerning the supreame Executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the Legislative, and the supreme Execution of the Law, Acts againts both, when he goes about to set up his own Arbitrary Will, as the Law of the Society. He acts also contrary to his Trust, when he either imploys the Force, Treasure, and Offices of the Society, to corrupt the Representatives, and gain them to his purposes: or openly pre-ingages the Electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has by Sollicitations, Threats, Promises, or otherwise won to his designs; and imploys them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand, what to Vote, and what to Enact. Thus to regulate Candidates and Electors, and new model the ways of Election, what is it but to cut up the Government by the Roots, and poison the very Fountain of publick Security? For the People having reserved to themselves the Choice of their Representatives, as the Fence of their Properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act and advise, as the necessity of the Commonwealth, and the publick Good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their Votes before they hear the Debate, and have weighted the Reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an Assembly as this, and endeavor to set up the declared Abettors of his own Will, for the true Representatives of the People, and the Law-makers of the Society, is certainly as great breach of trust, and as perfect a Declaration of a design to subvert the Government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add Rewards and Punishments visibly imploy'd to the same end, and all the Arts of perverted Law made use of, to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the Liberties of their Country, 'twill be past doubt what is doing. What Power they ought to have in the Society, who thus imploy it contrary to the trust that went along with it in its first Institution, is easie to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted." The following excerpt is from pages 426, 427, and 428 of Two Treatises of Government. "Here, 'tis like, the common Question will be made, Who shall be Judge whether the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust? This, perhaps, ill affected and factious Men may spread amongst the People, when the Prince only makes use of his due Prerogative. To this I reply, The People shall be Judge; for who shall be Judge whether his Trustee or Deputy acts well, and according to the Trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him have still a Power to discard him, when he fails in his Trust? If this be reasonable in particular Cases of private Men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment; where the Welfare of Millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the Redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous? But farther, this Question, (Who shall be Judge?) cannot mean, that there is no Judge at all. For where there is no Judicature on Earth, to decide Controversies amongst Men, God in Heaven is Judge: He alone, 'tis true, is Judge of the Right. But every Man is Judge for himself, as in all other Cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a State of War with him, and whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jephtha did. If a Controversie arise betwixt a Prince and some of the People, in a matter where the Law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great Consequence, I should think the proper Umpire, in such a Case, should be the Body of the People. For in Cases where the Prince hath a Trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary Rules of the Law; there, if any Men find themselves aggrieved, and think the Prince acts contrary to, or beyond that Trust, who so proper to Judge as the Body of the People, (who, at first, lodg'd that Trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if the Prince, or whoever they be in the Administration, decline that way of Determination, the Appeal then lies no where but to Heaven. Force between either Persons, who have no known Superior on Earth, or which permits no Appeal to a Judge on Earth, being properly a state of War, wherein the Appeal lies only to Heaven, and in that State the injured Party must judge for himself, when he will think fit to make use of that Appeal, and put himself upon it. To conclude, The Power that every individual gave the Society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the Individuals again, as long as the Society lasts, but will always remain in the Community; because without this, there can be no Community, no Common-wealth, which is contrary to the original Agreement: So also when the Society hath placed the Legislative in any Assembly of Men, to continue in them and their Successors, with Direction and Authority for providing such Successors, the Legislative can never revert to the People whilst that Government lasts: Because having provided a Legislative with Power to continue for ever, they have given up their Political Power to the Legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they have set Limits to the Duration of their Legislative, and made this Supreme Power in any Person, or Assembly, only temporary: Or else when by the Miscarriages of those in Authority, it is forfeited; upon the Forfeiture of their Rulers, or at the Determination of the Time set, it reverts to the Society, and the People have a Right to act as Supreme, and continue the Legislative in themselves, or erect a new Form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good." MY COMMENTS I may discuss John Locke more in the future. I hope my discussion of John Locke's The Second Treatise of Government has allowed you to see the world the way that I see it. I realize that individual Liberty on some matters needs to be paramount. I realize many people think I am nuts when I say people who are at least 18 years old should be allowed to be prostitutes, have sex with prostitutes, and use illegal drugs. My answer to them is simple. I believe in limited government and do not trust Government when Government has absolute power over individual choices that do not harm other people. I realize abortion is the murder of the child the woman is carrying. The government should not have the power to keep a woman from having an abortion when the child is growing inside of her body. People usually do not have the right to take the Law into their own hands when they live in society. If most people did have the Liberty to take the law into their own hands, our country would have shoot outs on a daily basis on most city streets at noon. If most people had the ability to take the Law into their own hands, a lot of innocent people would be punished for crimes they have not committed. A person who is at least 18 years of age has a right to hit himself in the head repeatedly with a baseball bat. A person does not have the right to hit someone else in the head with a baseball bat when defense is not involved. Sometimes, society needs to take away some Liberty from people for a time to insure the society's survival. The quarantine of people after a biological attack is an example of this. Our country should be wary when the Federal Government, state governments, and local governments take private property without just compensation. This happens on a regular basis especially because of the War on Drugs. Our country should be wary when Congress taxes people too much which Congress is doing now. Our country should be wary when Congress gives the President of the United States of America more power than the Constitution allows the President of the United States of America to have. Many members of Congress throughout our nation's history have given Presidents of the United States of America powers that are supposed to belong solely to Congress according to Article One of the United States Constitution. One of the main reasons I think our country will be an empire within 50 years is because Congress keeps giving the President of the United States of America more power in war time and peace time than the President of the United States of America is supposed to have. If the United States of America becomes an empire that does not have many civil liberties, the people mainly to blame for this will be the people who usually did not vote when they were able to vote. Many of the amendments that I recommend on my website I believe will decrease significantly the possibility that our country will become an empire. The amendments would allow people to remove elected officials from office before the terms of the elected officials have expired. The amendments would give people and state legislatures a lot more power than they have now. I hope that people will read John Locke The Second Treatise of Government before and after they read the amendments I recommend. I also hope voters will study the history of the Roman Republic, the history of the Roman Empire, and the history of what happened in Western Europe after the Western Roman Empire ended.