1) Augustine. What do you think we wish to accomplish when we speak?

Adeodatus. As it appears to me now, it is either to teach or to learn.

Aug. I see, and I agree with one of these. For it is clear that by speaking we wish to teach, but how is this so with learning?¹

Ad. How do you think we learn, except by asking questions?

Aug. Even then I think that we want to teach. For I ask you, do you ask someone a question for any other reason than to show that person what you want to know?

Ad. What you say is true.

Aug. Then you see that by speaking we only seek to teach.

Ad. I do not see that clearly. If speaking is nothing other than saying words, then I see that we do that when we sing. But since we often sing by ourselves, with no one around to learn, I don't think that we want to teach anything.

Aug. But I think there is a kind of teaching, a really important kind, through recollection,² which our discussion of this topic will reveal. But if you don't think that we learn when we recall something, or that someone who reminds us does not teach, I will not disagree with you. So now I accept two reasons for speaking: either to teach, or to remind either others or ourselves of something. We do this even when we sing. Or does this not seem so to you?

Ad. Not really. For very seldom do I sing in order to remind myself of something, but usually just for pleasure.

Aug. I see what you mean. But haven't you observed that what delights you in singing is a certain rhythmic quality of sound? Since this can be added to words or taken from them, is not speaking one thing and singing another? For a song can be played on the pipes or lute, and birds sing, and sometimes we make musical sounds without words. This sound can be called singing, but not speaking. Or do you disagree with any of this?

Ad. Nothing really.

2) Aug. Then does it seem to you that speech is engaged in for any other reason than to teach or to remind?

Ad. It would seem so, except that it bothers me that when we pray we are really speaking, but it is not right to believe that God is either taught or reminded of anything by us.

Aug. I think that you are unaware that the command to pray in our secret chambers,³ which means within the mind, was given to us only for the reason that God does not need to be reminded or taught by our speech in order to grant our wishes. For one who speaks announces his or her desire by a distinct sound. But God is to be sought and prayed to in the secrecy of the rational soul, which is called the inner person,⁴ for this he wished to be his temple. Have you not read in the Apostle, "Do you not know that you are God's temple and God's spirit dwells in you,"⁵ and "Christ dwells in the inner person"?⁶ And have you not noticed in the prophet, "Speak in your hearts and be sorry in your chambers. Offer a just sacrifice and hope in the Lord"?⁷ Where do you think a just sacrifice is be offered, except in the temple of the mind and the chambers of the heart? And where one sacrifices, there one should also pray. Therefore, speaking out loud is unnecessary when we pray, unless perhaps it is to show, as priests do, what is in our minds, not so that God may hear, but so that people may hear, and by this reminder they may be supported by God in harmony. Or do you think otherwise?

Ad. I agree completely.

Aug. Then it doesn't bother you that the greatest teacher, when he taught the disciples to pray, taught them certain words?⁸ He seems to have done this only in order to teach them how one ought to speak when praying.

Ad. That doesn't bother me at all. For he did not teach them words, but by means of words he taught them the things themselves, so that they might remind themselves for what and to whom they were praying when they prayed within the mind, as you described.

Aug. You understand correctly. I believe that you notice at the same time, that as hard as we may try not to make a sound when we think, nonetheless, because we are thinking of the words themselves, we are speaking within the soul. So any speech results only in reminding, because memory, where words abide, by going back over them, brings to mind the things themselves, which the words signify.

Ad. I understand and follow you.

3) Aug. Then we agree that words are signs?

Ad. It is agreed.

Aug. Unless a sign signifies something, can it be a sign?

Ad. It cannot.

Aug. How many words are in this verse: Si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui?⁹ [If it please the heavens that nothing remain of so great a city.]

Ad. Eight.

Aug. Therefore there are eight signs.

Ad. There are.

Aug. I believe you understand this verse.

Ad. Well enough, I think.

Aug. Tell me what each word signifies.

Ad. I see what si [if] signifies, but I find no other word which can explain it.

Aug. But at least you can find where it is, whatever this word signifies.

Ad. It seems to me that it signifies doubt, and where is doubt except in the soul?

Aug. I accept that for now. Go on to the others.

Ad. What does nihil [nothing] signify except that which does not exist?

Aug. Perhaps what you say is true, but what keeps me from agreeing is that you admitted before that something is not a sign unless it signifies something. But what does not exist cannot in any way be something. Therefore, the second word in this verse is not a sign, because it does not signify something, and we have wrongly concluded either that all words are signs, or that every sign signifies something.

Ad. You press me too hard. But it would be stupid for us to pronounce a word when we have nothing to signify. However, I believe that as you speak to me now you are not making useless sounds, but that by everything which comes from your lips you give me sign by which I may understand something. Therefore, you should not pronounce these two syllables when you speak, unless you signify something by them. But if you see that a necessary proposition is made by them and that they teach or remind us of something when they are heard by the ear, then you will really see what I wish to say but cannot express.

Aug. Then what shall we do? When the soul does not see something, yet finds, or thinks that it finds, that the things does not exist, perhaps then we should say that this word signifies a condition of the soul, rather than a thing which does not exist?

Ad. Perhaps that is just what I was struggling to explain.

Aug. Then let us pass over his question, however it may be, so that a most absurd thing will not happen to us.

Ad. What is that?

Aug. That "nothing" holds us back, and we are delayed by it.

Ad. That really is ridiculous, and although I don't know how, I do see that it can happen; indeed, I see clearly that it has happened.

4) Aug. God willing, we will understand more clearly this type of inconsistency at another time. For now, go back to that verse and try, as best you can, to show what the other words signify.

Ad. The third is the preposition ex [from], for which I think we can say de [from]. Aug. I am not asking you to say one common word in place of another equally common word which signifies the same thing, (if indeed it does signify the same thing, which we can grant for now). Certainly, if the poet had said de tanta instead of ex tanta urbe, and I were to ask you de signifies, you might say ex, since these are two words, or signs, which you think signify some one thing. But I am asking about the one thing itself, whatever it is, which these two words signify.

Ad. It seems to me to signify some kind of separation of one thing from something in which it had been, so that it is said to be "from" that thing. This can be said, whether that thing no longer remains, as in this verse, where some Trojans can be said to be "from" Troy, even though the city does not remain; or where it does remain, as when we say that there are traders in Africa "from" the city of Rome.

Aug. I agree with that, and will not list how many examples may be found which don't fit your rule. But certainly you must easily notice that you have explained words with words, signs with signs, and common things with equally common things. But I want you, if you can, to show me the very things of which these are signs.

5) Ad. I am surprised you do not know, or rather pretend not to know, that my response cannot possibly give you what you want, since we are in a discussion where we cannot answer except with words. But although you are seeking things which, whatever they are, certainly are not words, you nonetheless ask me about them with words. You must first question me without words, and I will then answer in the same way.

Aug. I admit that you are justified in doing this. But if I were to ask what the three syllables of the spoken word paries [wall] signify, could you not show it by pointing with your finger, so that I would see the thing itself, of which this three-syllable is a sign? Thereby you would show it to me without saying any words.

Ad. I admit that this could be done, but only for nouns which signify bodies, if the bodies are present.

Aug. We don't call color a body, do we, but rather a quality of bodies?

Ad. That is so.

Aug. Then why can't this be expressed with your finger? Do you also count the qualities of bodies as bodies, since these, if present, can also be shown without words?

Ad. When I said bodies, I meant it to be understood as everything bodily, that is, everything which is perceived in bodies.

Aug. But consider whether even in this you should make some exceptions.

Ad. You do well to remind me. I should not have said everything which is bodily, but everything which is visible. For I admit that sound, odor, taste, weight, heat, and other things which relate to the other senses, although they cannot be perceived without bodies and are therefore bodily, they nonetheless cannot be pointed at with a finger.

Aug. Have you not seen how people have a conversation of sorts with deaf people by using gestures, the deaf themselves also using gestures to ask questions and to reply, to teach and to show everything they want to, or at least most everything? When this happens, they show without words not just visible things, but also sounds and tastes and other such things. And actors in the theaters present and recount entire plays in pantomime, without any words.

Ad. I disagree with nothing in that, except that neither I nor even a mime could show you without words what ex signifies.

6) Aug. Perhaps what you say is true. But let's imagine that he can. I think that you do not doubt that with whatever bodily motion he may try to show me the thing which this word signifies, it will not be the thing itself, but a sign. Therefore, although he does not explain one word with another, he nonetheless explains one sign with another. The monosyllable ex and the gesture will signify one thing, which I want to be shown to me without someone making a sign.

Ad. How can you get what you seek, I ask you?

Aug. In the same way as it was possible with the wall.

Ad. Not even that can be shown without a sign, as the argument thus far has made clear. For the extending of the finger is surely not the wall, but it gives a sign by which the wall can be seen. Therefore, I see nothing which can be shown without signs.

Aug. What if I were to ask you what walking is, and you were to get up and walk? Would you not be showing me what walking is by means of the thing itself, rather than by words? Or would you use any other signs?

Ad. I admit that this is so, and I am embarrassed that I did not see such an obvious thing. From this example, thousands of things now occur to me which can be demonstrated by themselves and not by signs, such as eating, drinking, sitting, standing, shouting, and any number of others.

Aug. Then proceed to explain this. If I knew nothing of the meaning of this word and I were to ask you, while you were walking, what walking is, how would you show me?

Ad. I would walk somewhat quicker, so that you would notice this new thing which came after your question; even so, the only thing that would be happening would be the thing that needs to be shown.

Aug. Don't you know that walking is one thing and hurrying another? One who walks does not necessarily hurry, and one who hurries does not necessarily walk, for we speak of hurrying in writing and reading and any number of other things. So if you took what you were doing and did it quicker after my question, I would think that walking is just hurrying, because that would be the new thing you added, and I would be deceived by that.

Ad. I admit that we cannot show a thing without a sign if we are doing it at the same time as we are asked about it. For if we add nothing to our activity, the questioner will think that we are unwilling to show him, and that we are insulting him by continuing what we are doing. But if he asks about things we can do, as long as we are not doing them when he asks, then we can show him what he asks about by doing the thing itself after his question, rather than by a sign. Although this may be difficult if he were to ask me what speech is while I am speaking, for whatever I would say in order to teach him. I would have to speak. In that case, I will teach him until I make clear to him what he wants to know, without departing from the thing itself which he wants to have shown to him, and without searching for signs other than the thing itself with which to show it.

7) Aug. You really are most astute. Then see whether we are in agreement now that the following things can be demonstrated without signs: those things we are not doing when asked about them, but can do at once, or the things we do which themselves are perhaps signs. For when we speak we make signs, which is why it is called signifying.

Ad. We are in agreement.

Aug. When asked about some signs, they can be shown by signs. But when asked about things which are not signs, these can be shown either by doing them after the question, if they can be done, or by giving signs by which they can be perceived.

Ad. That is so.

Aug. Then in this three-fold division, let us first examine, if it's all right, those signs that are shown by signs. For surely not only word are signs?

Ad. No.

Aug. It seems to me that when we speak our words signify either words themselves or other signs, as when we say "gesture" or "letter," for the things signified by these two words are also signs. Or else the words signify something else which is not a sign, as when we say "stone." For this word is a sign, because it signifies something, but the thing it signifies is not itself a sign. But this type, where things that are not signs are signified by words, does not belong to the division which we are now discussing. For we started out to examine those signs that are shown by signs, which we have found to be of two kinds, since by signs we teach or remind someone of either the same signs or other signs. Does this not seem so to you?

Ad. It is clear.

8) Aug. Then tell me: signs which are words relate to which sense?

Ad. To hearing.

Aug. And gestures?

Ad. To sight.

Aug. And what about words we find written down, are they words? Or are they better understood as signs of words? A word is a thing with some meaning produced by an articulate voice, and a voice can be perceived only by the sense of hearing. So when a word is written, it is then a sign to the eyes, a sign which brings to the mind something which relates to the ears.

Ad. I agree completely.

Aug. I think you will also agree that when we say "noun" we signify something.

Ad. That is true.

Aug. What is it?

Ad. Indeed, that which something is named, such as Romulus, Rome, virtue, river, or any number of other things.

Aug. Don't these four names signify things?

Ad. Indeed they do.

Aug. And is there not a difference between these names and the things they signify?

Ad. A great difference indeed.

Aug. I would like to hear from you what it is.

Ad. First, the former are signs, and the latter are not.

Aug. Would it be acceptable if we give the label "signifiable" to those things which can be signified by signs, but are not signs, just as we give the name "visible" to things which can be seen? In this way we can discuss in order these things more easily.

Ad. That is perfectly acceptable.

Aug. Can the four signs you mentioned a little while ago be signified by any other signs?

Ad. I am surprised that you think I have forgotten that we found that when things produced by the voice are written down, they are the signs of signs.

Aug. Tell me what differs between them.

Ad. The latter are visible, the former audible. Why shouldn't we allow the name "audible" if we allow the name "signifiable"?

Aug. I do allow it, with thanks. But I ask you again, can these four signs be signified by any other audible signs, rather than by visible signs, as you have recalled?

Ad. I recall that this was also said recently. I answered that a noun signifies something, and placed those four into this category. I know that "noun" and those four nouns are audible when produced by a voice.

Aug. Then what is the difference between an audible sign and the audible things signified, which are themselves signs?

Ad. I see the following difference between what we call a noun and these four which we place in that category. The former is an audible sign of audible signs, while these four, although they are truly signs, are not signs of signs, but signs of things, some of which are visible, such as Romulus, Rome, and river, some of which are intelligible, such as virtue.

9) Aug. I can accept and approve of that. But do you know that all things which are produced by an articulate voice and have some meaning are called words?

Ad. I know that.

Aug. Then a noun is a word, since we see that it is produced by an articulate voice and has some meaning. And when we say that an eloquent man uses good words, he is also using good nouns. When the slave in Terence's play said to the old master, "Good words, please,"¹⁰ it was because he had said many nouns.

Ad. I agree.

Aug. Then you agree that when we say verbum [word], these two syllables which we pronounce also signify "noun," and that the former is a sign of the latter.

Ad. I agree.

Aug. I want you to answer this too. "Word" is a sign of "noun," and "noun" is a sign of "river," and "river" is a sign of a thing which can be seen. You said that there is a difference between this thing and its sign, "river," and between this sign and its sign, "noun." What do you think is the difference between the sign of "noun," which we found to be "word," and "noun" itself, of which "word" is the sign.

Ad. I understand them to differ in this way. Things which are signified by "noun" can also be signified by "word," for "noun" is a word, just as "river" is a word. But not all things which are signified by "word" can be signified by "noun." For "if," which is at the beginning of the verse you mentioned, and "from," on account of which we have come to these things by following the lead of reason for a long time, are both words, but not nouns; and many such words can be found. Therefore, since all nouns are words, but not all words are nouns, I think it is clear that the difference between a word and a noun is the difference between the sign of a sign which does not signify other signs, and the sign of a sign which signifies still other signs.

Aug. Do you agree that every horse is an animal, but not every animal is a horse?

Ad. Who would doubt that?

Aug. Then there is the same difference between "noun" and "word" as between "horse" and "animal." But perhaps you are kept from agreeing because we speak of "word" [verbum] in another way, by which we signify verbs that are conjugated through the tenses: I write, I have written, I read, I have read. Clearly, these are not nouns.

Ad. You have stated exactly what was making me doubt.

Aug. Don't let this bother you. For we generally speak of signs as anything which signifies something, and we find words in this category. We also speak of military signs, which are properly called signs, but words do not belong to this category. Yet if I were to say to you that just as every horse is an animal but not every animal is a horse, so too every word is a sign but not every sign is a word, I think that nothing would make you doubt it.

Ad. Now I understand and completely agree that there is the same difference between the general usage of "word" and "noun" as between "animal" and "horse."

10) Aug. Do you also know that when we say "animal," this three-syllable name which is made by the voice is one thing, and what it signifies is another?

Ad. I already agreed to that for all signs and things which are signifiable.

Aug. Does it seem to you that all signs signify something other than what they are, so that when we say the three syllables of "animal" this does not in any way signify itself?

Ad. Certainly not, for when we say "sign," it signifies not only other signs, whatever they are, but also itself, for it is a word, and all words are surely signs.

Aug. Doesn't something similar happen when we say the two syllables of verbum [word]? For if these two syllables signify anything which has some meaning and is produced by an articulate voice, then they also are included in this category.

Ad. That is so.

Aug. But isn't "noun" also like this? For it signifies nouns of all types, and "noun" itself is a neuter noun. For if I were to ask you what part of speech "noun" is, could you answer correctly except by saying "noun"?

Ad. What you say is true.

Aug. Then there are signs which, along with the other things they signify, also signify themselves.

Ad. There are.

Aug. When we say the four-syllable sign coniunctio [conjunction], does it seem to you to be of that sort?

Ad. Not at all, for it does not signify nouns, but it is a noun.

11) Aug. You really have been paying attention. Now see whether we can find signs which reciprocally signify one another, so that the one is signified by the other in the same way as that one is by the first. For there is not this relation between the spoken four syllables of coniunctio, and the things signified by them, such as "if, or, for, indeed, except, therefore, since," and the like, for they are signified by this one term, but it is not signified by any one of them.

Ad. I see, and I want to know what signs do reciprocally signify one another.

Aug. Then you so not know that when we say "noun" and "word" we are saying two words?

Ad. I know that.

Aug. Then do you not know that when we say "noun" and "word" we are saying two nouns?

Ad. I know that too.

Aug. Then you know that "noun" is signified by "word," and "word" by "noun."

Ad. I agree.

Aug. Can you tell me how they differ, other than being written and pronounced differently?

Ad. Maybe I can, for I see that it is the same difference I mentioned earlier. When we say "words," we signify everything which is produced by an articulate voice and has some meaning. So every noun is a word, even "noun" itself, but not every word is a noun, even though "word" itself is a noun.

12) Aug. What if someone were to assert and prove that every noun is a word and every word is a noun, could you find any difference between them, other than the different sound of the letters?

Ad. I could not, and I think there is no difference between them.

Aug. What if all things which are produced by an articulate voice and have some meaning are both words and nouns, but are words for one reason and nouns for another? Will there be no difference between a noun and a word?

Ad. I don't understand how there could be.

Aug. You can at least understand this, that every colored thing is visible and every visible thing is colored, even though these two words signify distinct and different things.

Ad. I understand that.

Aug. Then how can it be that every word is a noun and every noun is a word, even though these two nouns or words - "noun" and "word" - have different meanings?

Ad. I see now that it can happen, but I am waiting for you to show me how it happens.

Aug. I think you notice that everything which is produced by an articulate voice and has some meaning must both strike the ear in order to be perceived, and be retained in the memory in order to be known.

Ad. I have noticed that.

Aug. Then two things occur when we produce something by such a voice.

Ad. That is so.

Aug. What if "words" are so named because of one of these two occurrences, and "nouns" because of the other: "words" [verba] from "striking" [verberando], "nouns" [nomina] from "knowing" [noscendo]? What if the first got its name because of the ears, the second because of the soul?

13) Ad. I will agree to that when you show how we can rightly call all words nouns.

Aug. That is simple. I believe that you have agreed and remember that a pronoun is so called because it takes the place of a noun, although it gives the thing a less complete meaning than does a noun. I think that this is the definition you learned from your teacher: a pronoun is a part of speech that takes the place of a noun and means the same thing, though less completely.

Ad. I remember that and approve of it.

Aug. Then you see that according to this definition pronouns serve only for nouns and can take the place of them only. When we say, "this man, the king himself, the same woman, this gold, that silver," "this, himself, same, this," and "that" are pronouns, and "man, king, woman, gold," and "silver" are nouns, by which the things are signified more completely than by pronouns.

Ad. I see that and agree.

Aug. Now mention a few conjunctions, any you like.

Ad. And, and, but, and. [Et, que, at, atque.]

Aug. Don't all of these which you have said seem to you to be nouns?

Ad. Not at all.

Aug. Didn't I at least seem to speak correctly when I said, "all of these which you have said"?

Ad. Correctly indeed. Now I understand how remarkably you have shown me that I was mentioning nouns, for otherwise you could not have said correctly, "all of these." But I am still afraid that what you said seemed correct to me because I cannot deny that these four conjunctions are words, so that one could rightly say "all of these," because "all of these words" is rightly said. But if you ask me what part of speech is "words," I can only answer that it is a noun. So perhaps it is the coincidence of the pronoun with this noun that makes what you said correct.

14) Aug. You are quite mistaken. But so that you may stop being mistaken, pay closer attention to what I say, if indeed I can say it as I wish. For using words to deal with words is as confusing as entangling and rubbing one's fingers together, where it can hardly be distinguished, except by the one doing it, which fingers itch and which help the itch.

Ad. You have my complete attention. This comparison has made me most intent.

Aug. Clearly, words are composed of sound and letters.

Ad. That is so.

Aug. Therefore, so that we may primarily use that authority which is most dear to us, when Paul the Apostle said, "There was not in Christ `is' and `is not,' but in him was `is,'"¹¹ I do not think that we should suppose that the three letters which we pronounce when we say "est" [is] were in Christ, but rather what is signified by these three letters.

Ad. What you say is true.

Aug. Then you understand that he who said, "`is' was in him," only said, "what is in him is called `is.'" Likewise, if he said, "power was in him," it would mean the same as, "what was in him is called `power.'" We should not think that the two syllables which we pronounce when we say "power" were in him, but rather what is signified by these two syllables.

Ad. I understand and follow you.

Aug. Do you not also understand that it doesn't matter whether one says, "is called power," or "is named power"?

Ad. That is clear.

Aug. Then it is also clear that it doesn't matter whether one says, "what was in him is called `is'" or "is named `is.'"

Ad. I see that this also makes no difference.

Aug. Now do you see what I want to show you?

Ad. Not really.

Aug. Do you not see that a noun is that by which something is named?

Ad. Certainly; I see that most clearly.

Aug. Then you see that "is" is a noun, since what was in Christ is named "is."

Ad. I cannot disagree.

Aug. But if I were to ask you what part of speech is "is," I do not think that you would say it is a noun, but a verb, even though reason has shown it is also a noun.

Ad. It is exactly as you say.

Aug. Do you still doubt that the other parts of speech are nouns in the same way as we have shown?

Ad. I don't doubt it, since I admit that they signify something. But if you were to ask what each individual thing they signify is called or named, I could only answer that they are those very parts of speech which we do not call nouns, even though I see that we have shown that they are nouns.

15) Aug. Then it doesn't bother you at all that someone might disturb our reasoning by saying that the Apostle's authority applies to things, but not to words, so that this belief is not as firmly established as we think? Isn't it possible that Paul, although he lived and taught most correctly, might nonetheless have spoken incorrectly when he said, " `is' was in him," especially since he himself admitted that he was unskilled in speaking.¹² How do you think this could be refuted?

Ad. I can make no reply, but I ask you to find someone whose skill is acknowledged by those who are trained in the use of words, so that by his authority you can better accomplish what you want.

Aug. Then it seems to you that if authorities are lacking, reason itself will be unable to show that something is signified and labelled by every part of speech; if labelled, then named; and if named, then certainly named by a noun. This is easily demonstrated in different languages. For anyone can see that if one asks what is the Greek name for what we name "who," the answer is tis; the Greek name for "wish," the answer is thelo; the Greek name for "well," the answer is kalos; the Greek name for "writing," the answer is to gegrammenon; the Greek name for "and," the answer is kai; the Greek name for "from," the answer is apo; the Greek name for "woe," the answer is oi. The one who asks about all these parts of speech just listed speaks correctly, and this would not be possible unless they were nouns. Therefore, since we can prove by reason that Paul the Apostle spoke correctly, even without any authorities on speech, why should we search for someone to support our statement?

16) But someone who is more stupid or immodest might not admit this, and will only agree with those authorities who by common consent decide the rules of words. If so, can anyone more excellent than Cicero be found in the Latin language? But in his best orations, called the Verrines, he gave the label "noun" to the preposition (or in this passage an adverb) "before."¹³ Although it is possible that I do not understand this passage well enough and that I or someone else may explain it in some other way, I think there can be no answer to it. The greatest masters of debate teach that a complete sentence is composed of a noun and a verb, and it may be either affirmed or denied. Tullius somewhere calls this type a "proposition."¹⁴ They also speak rightly when they say that if the verb is in the third person, then the noun should be in the nominative case. If you reflect with me, I think you will agree that when we say "the man sits" or "the horse runs," these are two propositions.

Ad. I agree.

Aug. You see that there is one noun in each: "man" in one and "horse" in the other; and one verb: "sits" in one and "runs" in the other.

Ad. I see that.

Aug. Then if I were to say only "sits" or "runs," you would rightly ask me "who" or "what," and I would answer "man," or "horse," or "animal," or something else by which the noun can be joined to the verb to complete the proposition, which is a sentence that can be affirmed or denied.

Ad. I understand.

Aug. But pay attention to the rest. Suppose we see something far away and aren't sure whether it is an animal or a stone or something else, and I say to you, "Because it is a man, it is an animal," would I not speak carelessly?

Ad. With complete carelessness; but you would certainly not be careless if you said, "If it is a man, then it is an animal."

Aug. What you say is correct. The "if" in your statement satisfies me as well as you, while the "because" in mine dissatisfies both of us.

Ad. I agree.

Aug. Then see if these two sentences are complete propositions: " `If' satisfies," "`Because' dissatisfies."

Ad. They are absolutely complete.

Aug. Now tell me which words are the verbs and which are the nouns.

Ad. I see that the verbs are "satisfies" and "dissatisfies," and what are the nouns besides "if" and "because"?

Aug. Then it is sufficiently demonstrated that these two conjunctions are also nouns.

Ad. Quite sufficiently.

Aug. Can you by yourself show this same rule with the other parts of speech?

Ad. I can.

17) Aug. Then let us leave this matter. Now tell me this: we found that all words are nouns and all nouns are words; does it also seem to you that all nouns are names [vocabula] and all names are nouns?

Ad. I really see no difference between them except for the sound of the syllables.

Aug. At the moment I do not object to that, although there are some who distinguish between their meanings, but it is not necessary to consider that idea now. But certainly you have noticed that we have now found those signs which reciprocally signify one another. They differ only in sound and signify themselves along with all the other parts of speech.

Ad. I don't understand.

Aug. Then you don't understand that "noun" is signified by "name" and "name" by "noun," and that, besides the sound of the letters, there is no difference between them in regard to the general use of "noun." But when we say "noun" in the special sense of one of the eight parts of speech, then it does not include the other seven.

Ad. I understand.

Aug. But that is what I said: "name" and "noun" reciprocally signify one another.

18) Ad. I comprehend that, but I ask why you said that they signify themselves along with the other parts of speech?

Aug. Hasn't reason already shown us that all parts of speech can be called both nouns and names, that is, they can be signified by both "noun" and "name"?

Ad. That is so.

Aug. What about "noun" itself, the sound expressed by the two syllables [nomen]? If I ask how you label it, would you not rightly answer me "noun"?

Ad. That is correct.

Aug. But when we say "conjunction" [coniunctio] by pronouncing its four syllables, this sign doesn't signify itself in this way, does it? For this noun cannot be counted among the things which it signifies.

Ad. I admit that.

Aug. Then it is as we said: "noun" signifies itself along with the other things which it signifies. The same goes for "name," as you yourself can perceive.

Ad. Now it is easy. But now it occurs to me that "noun" is used in both a general and a particular sense, while "name" is not included among the eight parts of speech. Therefore I think they differ in this way, as well as differing in sound.

Aug. Do you think that "noun" and onoma differ in any way besides their sound, which is what distinguishes between the Latin and Greek languages?

Ad. I really perceive no other difference.

Aug. Then it has been concluded that some signs signify themselves; some reciprocally signify one another; some signify the same thing; some differ only in sound. We have just found this fourth kind; the first three are seen in both "noun" and "word."

Ad. All of that has been concluded.

19) Aug. Now I want you to review what we have concluded in our discussion.

Ad. I will do what I can. I remember that first of all we asked about the reason why we speak, concluding that we speak either to teach or to remind. Even when we ask questions, we do it only so that the one we are questioning may learn what we want to hear. Singing, which we seem to do for pleasure, is not really characteristic of speech. When praying to God, whom we cannot conceive of being taught or reminded, words enable either us to remind ourselves, or others to be reminded and taught by us. Then, when it was sufficiently established that words are only signs, and that which does not signify something cannot be a sign, you offered a verse, so that I might try to show what each word signified. It was, "If it please the heavens that nothing remain of so great a city." Although the second word [nihil] is very familiar and obvious, we could not determine what it signifies. And since it seemed to me that it is not carelessly inserted by us in our speech, but that by it we teach something to the listener, you answered that perhaps this word indicates the state of mind when it seeks something and finds, or think it finds, that the thing does not exist. But because I did not understand the depth of the question, you avoided it with a joke and put off explaining it for another time. (But don't think that I have forgotten this commitment.) Then, when I had great difficulty explaining the third word of the verse, you urged my not to do it with another word that means the same thing, but rather by showing the thing which is signified by the word. When I said that this cannot be done in our discussion, we came to those things that can be shown to any questioners by pointing the finger. I thought these were all corporeal things, but we found they were only visible things. I'm not sure how, but we then came to deaf people and actors, who signify by gesture and without speech not only things that can be seen, but also many others, almost everything that we can say. Nevertheless, we found that gestures themselves are signs. Then we began again to ask how we could show, without any signs, the things themselves which are signified by signs, since a wall or a color or any other visible thing which is shown by pointing the finger has been shown to be indicated by some sign. I was mistaken when I said that no such thing could be found, and we finally agreed that those things can be shown without a sign which we are not doing when we are asked about them, but which we can do after we are asked. However, speaking is not of this type, because if we are asked what speaking is while we are speaking, it is quite clear that we can easily show it by means of itself.

20) This reminded us that some things are signs which are shown by signs, while other things which are not signs are shown by signs, and still other things are shown without a sign, because we can do them after being asked about them. We then began to examine and discuss more carefully the first of these three. This discussion showed that some signs cannot in turn be signified by the signs which they signify, as when we say the four syllables of coniunctio [conjunction]. But some signs can reciprocally signify one another, for when we say "sign," we also signify "word," and when we say "word," we also signify "sign," because "sign" and "word" are both two signs and two words. But it was shown that in the type of signs which reciprocally signify one another, some are unequal, some are equal, and some are identical. For when we say the two syllables of signum [sign], it signifies everything by which something can be signified. But when we say "word," it is not a sign of all signs, but only of those which are pronounced by an articulate voice. So it is clear that although "word" [verbum] is signified by "sign" [signum] and "sign" by "word," (that is, the first two syllables by the latter two and the latter two by the former two,) "sign" nonetheless means more than "word," for the first two syllables signify more than the latter two. But in general usage, "word" means as much as "noun" [nomen]. Reason has shown that all parts of speech are also nouns, because pronouns can be substituted for them, they can all be said to name something, and any one of them can make a complete proposition by adding a verb to it. But although "noun" means as much as "word," because all words are also nouns, nonetheless they are not identical. It was argued that they are quite probably called "words" for one reason, and "nouns" for another. It was found that the former derives from its "striking" the ear, and the latter from being "known" in the memory of the soul. This can be shown by the fact that when speaking, we say, "What is the name [nomen] of this thing?" when we want to commit it to memory, whereas we do not usually say, "What is the word of this thing?" We also found that "noun" and onoma signify not only as much as one another, but are identical except for the difference in the sound of the letters. I forgot that in the type of signs which reciprocally signify one another, we found no sign which did not signify itself as well as the other things which it signified. I have recounted these things as best I can. Since I think everything you said in this discussion was clear and certain, please see now whether I have arranged this well and in the right order.

21) Aug. You have sufficiently recalled from memory everything that I wanted. I admit to you that these distinctions seem much clearer to me now than they did when we together pulled them from their secret hiding places through examination and discussion. But at this point it is hard to say what I am struggling to reach with you by so many detours. Perhaps you think that we are playing around and diverting the soul from serious things with childish little questions, or that we are seeking some unimportant or ordinary goal. Or, if you think that this discussion will lead to something important, you want to know now what it is, or at least to hear what it is. But I want you to believe that I have not introduced petty jokes into our discussion, although we may perhaps engage in some humor, as long as it is not done in a childish way; nor should you think that our goal is unimportant or ordinary. Nevertheless, if I say that there is a life which is happy and eternal, to which I long for us to be led by God's guidance, that is to say, by truth itself (through stages appropriate to our weakened condition), I am afraid I may appear absurd, because I have begun such a journey by considering signs, rather than the things themselves which they signify. Therefore, be patient with my preparatory banter, which is not for the sake of humor,¹⁵ but for exercising the strength and sharpness of the mind, by which we can not only stand the heat and brilliance of that land where the happy life exists, but can also love the true.

Ad. Proceed as you have begun, for I do not judge as worthless that which you think is worth saying or doing.

22) Aug. Then come, let us now consider those signs which do not signify other signs, but those things we call signifiable. First, tell me whether man [homo] is man.

Ad. Now I don't know whether you're serious or joking.

Aug. Why is that?

Ad. Because you think I need to be asked whether man is something other than man.

Aug. Then I believe you would also think that i was joking if I were to ask whether the first syllable of this noun is something other than ho, and the second something other than mo.

Ad. I certainly would.

Aug. But when these two syllables are put together, they are "man." Or do you disagree?

Ad. Who would disagree with that?

Aug. Then I ask now, are you these two syllables when they are put together?

Ad. Not at all, but I see where you're heading.

Aug. Then tell me, so that you do not think that I'm insulting you.

Ad. You think the conclusion is that I am not a man.

Aug. Why don't you think the same, since you agreed that all the previous points are true, from which this was concluded?

Ad. I will not tell you what I think until you first answer me this: when you asked whether man is man, were you asking me about those two syllables, or about the thing itself which they signify?

Aug. Rather, you should tell me in what way you have interpreted my question. For if it is ambiguous, you should have been careful and not answered me before you were sure how I meant the question.

Ad. But why should this ambiguity embarrass me, when I have answered both implications? Man [homo] is indeed man. These two syllables are nothing other than these two syllables, and what they signify is nothing other than that which it is.

Aug. Indeed, that is so, but why have you taken only the word "man" in two ways, and not the others which we have said?

Ad. I'm not sure that I did not take the others in this way also.

Aug. Ignoring any others, if you had taken my first question entirely in the sense of how the syllables sound, you would not have answered me, for I would have seemed to you to ask nothing. But now, when I pronounced the three words, repeating the middle one, by saying, "utrum homo homo sit" [whether man is man], you took the first and last words not as signs, but as the things which they signify. This is clear because you immediately, with certainty and confidence, thought that you should answer my question.

Ad. What you say is true.

Aug. Then why did it seem right to you to take only the middle one [homo] both as it sounds and as what it signifies?

Ad. Well, now I take all of it in the sense of what it signifies. I agree with you that we are completely unable to have a discussion unless we hear words and direct the soul towards the things of which they are signs. Now show me how I was misled by this reasoning into concluding that I am not a man.

Aug. No, but I will ask you again, so that you yourself may find where you went wrong.

Ad. That will be fine.

23) Aug. Then I will not ask you the same question again, because you have already answered it. Now look more carefully at whether the syllable ho is anything other than ho, and whether mo is anything other than mo.

Ad. I really see no difference.

Aug. Now see whether man is made by joining these two syllables.

Ad. I do not accept that. For we agreed, and rightly so, that when a sign is offered, we will give our attention to what it signifies, and by considering it, affirm or deny what is said. But since these two syllables, when pronounced separately, are sounds without any signification, it was agreed that they are only sounds.

Aug. Then you agree and are certain in your soul that one should answer questions only in terms of the things which the words signify.

Ad. I see nothing wrong in that, as long as the words are indeed words.

Aug. I would like to know how you would refute that man, whom we often hear about in jokes, who proved that a lion came out of his opponent's mouth. When asked whether the things we say come out of the mouth, his opponent could not disagree. Then he easily got his opponent to say "lion" while speaking. With this accomplished, he began to insult his opponent and make his point: because his opponent had admitted that whatever we say comes out of the mouth, and he could not deny that he had said "lion," he seemed to have spit out such a vicious beast, although he himself was not so awful.

Ad. Really, it would be very little trouble to refute this clown, for I would not admit that whatever we say comes out of the mouth. When we speak, we signify things. What comes out of the speaker's mouth is not the thing which is signified, but the sign which signifies it (except for those signs that signify themselves, a type which we treated earlier).

24) Aug. In this way you would have been well prepared for him. Nonetheless, what would you answer me, if I asked whether "man" is a noun.

Ad. What else, except that it is a noun?

Aug. Then when I see you I see a noun?

Ad. No.

Aug. Then do you want me to say what follows from this?

Ad. No I do not. For I myself say that I am not the "man" that I said was a noun, when you asked whether "man" is a noun. But it was agreed that when we affirm or deny what is said, it is in relation to the thing which is signified.

Aug. But it does not seem to me that you chose that answer by chance, for the very law of reason, established in our minds, overcame your caution. If I were to ask what man is, you might answer "an animal." But if I were to ask what part of speech "man" is, you could give no correct answer other than "noun." From this it follows that since man is found to be both a noun and an animal, the former is said in relation to "man" as a sign, the latter in relation to the thing signified. So when someone asks whether "man" is a noun, my only answer is that it is, since it is clear that he wants to hear about "man" in so far as it is a sign. If he asks whether man is an animal, I will agree even more easily. And if he asks only what man [homo] is, with no mention of noun or animal, then according to the accepted rule of speech, my soul would quickly move on to what is signified by these two syllables, and the only answer would be "an animal," (or I might say the whole definition: a rational, mortal animal). Or does it seem otherwise to you?

Ad. It seems perfectly clear. But when we agree that "man" is a noun, how do we avoid that most outrageous conclusion, in which we are show not to be men?

Aug. How do you think, except by showing that this is not according to the sense of "man" which we agreed upon with the questioner? Or if he admits that he did draw the conclusion from the other sense of "man," this need not trouble us. Why should I be afraid to conclude that I am not a man [hominem], in the sense that I am not those three syllables?

Ad. Nothing could be more true. But why does it offend the soul when it is said, "Therefore you are not a man," even though, according to what was just agreed upon, nothing more true could be said?

Aug. Because I cannot keep from thinking that the conclusion refers to what is signified by those two syllables, as soon as the words are pronounced; and according to a naturally very strong law, our attention is drawn by the audible sounds to the things signified.

Ad. I agree with what you say.

25) Aug. Then I want you to understand that things which are signified are to be regarded more highly than signs. For anything that exists on account of something else must be worth less than that on account of which it exists. Or do you see it differently?

Ad. It seems to me that one should not agree to this carelessly. For when we say "dirt" [caenum], I think that the noun is far better than the thing it signifies.¹⁶ What makes it distasteful to us when we hear it is not related to the sound of the word itself, for the noun "dirt" [caenum] becomes "heaven" [caelum] by changing just one letter. But we do see a big difference between the things these nouns signify. Therefore, what we dislike in the thing signified should not be attributed to its sign. I rightly prefer the sign to the thing, for we are more willing to hear the sign than to deal with the thing by any sense.

Aug. You really are on your guard. Then it is false that all things are to be regarded more highly than their signs?

Ad. So it seems.

Aug. Then tell me what you think was the purpose of those who gave a name to such a disgusting and base thing. Do you approve or disapprove of them?

Ad. Really, I do not dare either to approve or disapprove of them, nor do I know what their purpose was.

Aug. You must at least know what you mean when you say the noun.

Ad. Indeed I do. I wish to signify something to the one with whom I am speaking, so that I will teach or remind him of something, about which I think he should be taught or reminded.

Aug. But what you teach or recall, or are taught or reminded of, whether rightly you show it or are shown it by this name, isn't that more important than the noun itself?

Ad. I agree that the knowledge itself which results from this sign is better than the sign, but I do not think this is also the case for the thing itself.

26) Aug. Then in our opinion, although it is false that all things should be considered better than their signs, it is not false that everything that exists on account of something else is worth less than that on account of which it exists. Indeed, the idea of dirt, on account of which the noun "dirt" was created, is more important than the noun itself, which we found is better than dirt itself. This idea is better than the sign we previously discussed only because it was concluded that the latter exists on account of the former, and not the former on account of the latter. So when a certain glutton and worshipper of the stomach,¹⁷ as the Apostle calls him, said that he lived in order to eat, a moderate man who heard and could not bear it said, "Wouldn't it be better to eat in order to live?" although both of them spoke according to this same rule. The glutton was wrong only because he valued his life so little that he thought it less important than the pleasure of gluttony, saying that he lived in order to feast. And it is right to praise the other man, only because he understood which of these two should be done for the sake of the other, that is, be dependent on the other, reminding us that we should eat in order to live, rather than live in order to eat. Likewise, if some yammering lover of words were to say, "I teach in order to speak," you or any other discerning person would answer, "Man, why don't you instead speak in order to teach?" If this is true, as you know it is, then you really must see how words are much less important than that on account of which we use them, and even the use itself of words is more important than the words. For words exist in order for us to use them, and we use them to teach. Therefore, teaching is better than speaking, just as speaking is better than words. So instruction is far better than words. But I want to hear what you think might be wrong with this.

27) Ad. Indeed, I agree that instruction is better than words. But I'm not sure whether there may not be some objection to that rule which says that everything which exists on account of something else is inferior to that on account of which it exists.

Aug. We will treat that matter more suitably and more carefully at another time. For now, what you have agreed to is enough for what I am trying to prove. You grant that the idea of things is more important than the signs of things. Therefore, the idea of things which are signified is better than the idea of their signs. Or does it not seem so to you?

Ad. Did I agree that the idea of things is superior to the idea of signs, or superior only to the signs themselves? Therefore I am afraid to agree to this point. For what if, just as the noun "dirt" is better than the thing it signifies, so too the idea of this noun is preferable to the idea of that thing, even though the noun itself is inferior to the idea? There are, in fact, four parts to this problem: the noun, the thing, the idea of the noun, and the idea of the thing. Since the first is better than the second, why can't the third be better than the fourth? And even if it is not better, must it therefore be worse?

28) Aug. I see that you have quite impressively recalled what you agreed to, and also explained how you discerned it. But I think that you understand that when we say the three syllables of "vice" [vitium], it is better than the thing it signifies, although the idea itself of the noun is worth less than the idea of vices. So even though you established and considered these four parts of the problem - the noun, the thing, the idea of the noun, and the idea of the thing - we rightly judge the first to be better than the second. For when this noun is placed in the poem where Persius says, "a man dazed by vice,"¹⁸ it not only does not worsen the verse, it even adorns it. But when the thing itself which the noun signifies is in someone, it does make him worse. So we see that the third is not better than the fourth, but the fourth is better than the third. For the idea of this noun is worth less than the idea of vices.

Ad. Then you think that this idea is better, even when it makes people more miserable? For of all the torments invented by the cruelty of tyrants or caused by their greed, this Persius gives as first that which tortures people who are forced to acknowledge vices which they cannot avoid.

Aug. In this way you could also deny that the idea of virtues is better than the idea of the noun "virtue," since to see virtue and not to have it is suffering. (This same satirist wanted tyrants to be punished in this way.)¹⁹

Ad. May God keep such madness from us. Now I understand that when the best of all disciplines instructs the soul, it is not the ideas themselves that are to blame. Rather, they are to be thought the most miserable of all (as I suppose Persius thought), who are afflicted by a disease so great that there is no cure for it.

Aug. You understand the matter well. But what is Persius' opinion to us? In these matters we are not under the authority of the satirists. Also, it is not easy to explain whether one idea is better than another. I am satisfied that it has been established that the idea of things which are signified is better than the signs themselves, even if it is not better than the idea of the signs. Then let us discuss much more thoroughly that type of things which we said can be shown by means of themselves, without signs, such as speaking, walking, sitting, lying down, and others of this type.

Ad. Now I remember the things of which you speak.

29) Aug. As for the things that we can do as soon as we are asked about them, doe sit seem to you that all of them can be shown without signs, or are there some exceptions?

Ad. I have considered everything of this type, and I find nothing that can be shown without a sign, except perhaps speaking, and perhaps teaching (if someone were to ask what teaching itself is). I see that whatever I do after the question to make him learn, he does not learn from the thing itself which he wants to have shown to him. For as was said, if someone asks me what walking is when I am not moving or doing something else, and I try to show him what he asked without a sign by immediately walking, how can I make sure that he doesn't think that walking means the distance I walked? If he thought that, he would be wrong, and he will not think that someone who walked farther or less far than I did was walking. And what I said about this one word applies to all the things which I agreed could be shown without a sign, excluding the two exceptions we made.

Aug. Indeed, I accept that. But doesn't it seem to you that speaking and teaching are two different things?

Ad. Clearly, it seems so. For if they were the same, no one would teach except by speaking. But since we teach many things with signs other than words, who would doubt that there is a difference?

Aug. Are teaching and signifying the same, or different?

Ad. I think they are the same.

Aug. But isn't it correct to say that we signify in order to teach?

Ad. That is correct.

Aug. But if it is said that we teach in order to signify, isn't that easily refuted by the previous statement?

Ad. That is so.

Aug. So if we signify in order to teach, but do not teach in order to signify, then teaching and signifying are different.

Ad. That is true. My answer that they are the same was not correct.

Aug. Now answer this: if someone teaches what teaching is, does he do it by signifying, or in some other way?

Ad. I do not see how he could do it another way.

Aug. Then you were wrong when you said before that if one is asked what teaching itself is, the thing can be shown without signs. Now we see that not even this can be done without signifying, since you have agreed that signifying and teaching are different. If they are different, as it now seems, and the latter is shown only by means of the former, then teaching is not shown by means of itself, as it previously seemed to you. So nothing has yet been found which is shown by means of itself, except speaking, which signifies itself, as well as other things. Nevertheless, since this also is itself a sign, there is still nothing which seems capable of being taught without signs.

Ad. I have no reason to disagree.

31) Aug. Then it has been proved that nothing is taught without signs, and that the idea itself is better should be more important to us than the signs by which we know it, although some things which are signified can be inferior to their signs.

Ad. So it seems.

Aug. Do you remember what a roundabout way it took to get to such a minor conclusion? From the time we started throwing words back and forth, which we have been doing for some time, our effort has been to find three things: whether anything can be taught without signs; whether some signs are better than the things they signify; and whether the idea itself of things is better than their signs. But there is a fourth point that I wish to find out from you briefly: do you think that these findings are such that now you cannot doubt them?

Ad. Indeed, I wish we had come to certainty, given such roundabout and intricate ways. But your question bothers me in some way and keeps me from agreeing, for I see that you would not have asked me this, unless you were going to make some objection. Further, the intricacy of these things keeps me from seeing the whole question or giving a sure answer, for I am afraid that something may be hidden in such shrouds that the sharpness of my mind cannot bring it to light.

Aug. I gladly accept your hesitation, for it shows that there is little foolhardiness in your soul, and this is the greatest guardian of peace. It is extremely difficult not to be disturbed when things we thought had an easy and clear proof are rocked by counter arguments and, in a way, wrenched from our hands. For just as it is right to give in to reasons that have been well examined and explored, so it is dangerous to think that unknown things are known. When things which we assumed would firmly stand and endure are often destroyed, there is a danger that we may come to hate or fear reason, so that it might seem we shouldn't believe even an obvious truth.

32) But come, let us now briefly reconsider whether you were right to doubt these things. Suppose someone who knew nothing about catching birds (which is done with reeds and birdlime) came upon a bird-catcher who was walking along, carrying his equipment, though not catching birds right then. Upon seeing him, he walks faster, following the bird-catcher. With wonder he considers and asks himself the meaning of the man's equipment. The bird-catcher, seeing the other watching him, show his skill by using the reeds and, seeing a small bird nearby, he uses his pipe and hawk to catch and seize it. Wouldn't the bird-catcher have taught the one watching what he wanted to know without any signification, but by means of the thing itself?

Ad. I am afraid that this is like the case I mentioned before, where someone asks what walking is; I do not see how bird-catching has been shown in its entirety.

Aug. It is easy to relieve your anxiety. I would say further, that if the one watching were intelligent enough, he could infer the entire art of bird-catching from what he saw. It is enough for our purpose if some people can be taught some things (if not all things) without a sign.

Ad. To that I can further add this: If someone is very intelligent, he will know what walking is after being shown just a few steps.

Aug. I not only do not object to your addition, I even approve of it. Now you see that it has been proved by both of us that some people can be taught some things without signs; further, what seemed true to us a little while ago - that nothing at all can be shown without signs - is false. From these examples, there is not just one or two, but thousands of things that come to mind, which are shown by means of themselves without the use of any sign. And I ask you, why should we doubt this? Let us pass over the countless spectacles in every theater of men presenting the things themselves without signs. Consider the sun and the light that pours over and covers all things; the moon and other celestial bodies; the lands, the seas, and the countless things which come forth from them: surely God and nature display and show these by means of themselves to those who behold them.

33) If we examine this more carefully, perhaps you will find that nothing is learned by means of its signs. For when a sign is shown to me, if I do not know the thing of which it is a sign, it can teach me nothing; but if I already know the thing of which it is a sign, how can I learn from the sign? For example, the word does not show me the thing it signifies when I read, "And their sarabarae were not changed."²⁰ If this noun means some kind of head-coverings, do I learn what a head is, or what coverings are, by hearing this word? I knew these before, and I got my knowledge of them by seeing them myself, not by hearing others name them. When my hears first heard the two syllables of "caput" [head] spoken, I did not know what they signified, any more than I did when I first heard or read "sarabarae." But when "head" was said to me again and again, I found, by noting and observing when it was said, that it was the term for something well known to me by sight. But before I found this out, the word was only a sound to me. I learned that it was a sign when I discovered the thing of which it is a sign. And as I said, I learned this not by any signification, but by seeing it. Therefore, we learn the sign by means of the already-known thing, rather than learning the thing by means of receiving the sign.

34) So that you may understand this more clearly, imagine that we now hear "head" for the first time, and not knowing whether it is just a sound or whether it signifies something, we ask what "head" is. (Remember, we want to grasp the idea of the sign itself, and not the thing it signifies; but we really don't have this idea, as long as we do not know what it signifies.) But if, while asking about it, the thing itself is indicated to us by pointing at it, then it is by seeing the thing that we learn the sign, which we had heard before without understanding it. But the sign has two aspects - its sound and its signification. Clearly, we do not perceive the sound by means of the sign, but by its vibration in the ear; and we perceive the signification by seeing the thing itself which it signifies. For the pointing of the finger can signify only what the finger points at, and it did not point at the sign, but at that part of the body which is called the head. So by this pointing, I did not come to know the thing itself, because I already knew that, nor did I come to know the sign, because the finger did not point at that. But I don't want to dwell on this pointing of the finger, for it seems to me that it is more a sign of the act of showing than of the things shown. It is like the adverb "ecce" [behold, look at]. We often accompany this adverb with a pointing of the finger, in case one sign is not enough to show what we mean. But most of all, I am trying to persuade you (if I can) that we learn nothing from those signs which are called words. For as I said, it is more a case of learning the meaning of the word (that is, its signification, which is hidden in the sound,) by recognizing the thing it signifies, than it is of perceiving the thing by means of some signification.

35) And what I said about "head" I could also say about "coverings" and countless other things. But although I already know these things, I do not know what "sarabarae" are at all. If someone were to signify them to me by a gesture, or were to draw them, or were to show me something similar to them, I would not say that he did not teach me (although I could easily say that, if I wanted to speak a little longer), but I would say what is most relevant to our discussion: he did not teach me with words. Suppose someone just happens to be looking at these sarabarae when I am nearby and calls my attention to them by saying, "Look, sarabarae." I will learn something I didn't know before, but it will not be by means of the words spoken, but by looking at the thing, which will make me know and grasp what the noun means. For when I learned the thing itself, I did not trust someone else's words, but my own eyes. Yet perhaps I did trust words, for they got my attention, allowing me to see what could be seen by looking.

36) So the most I will grant is that words can remind us to search for things; but they cannot show them to us, so that we may know them. Someone teaches me something if he presents what I want to know to my eyes, or to any bodily senses, or even to my mind itself. So by means of words we learn only words (or rather, only the sound and clatter of words). For if all words must be signs, then even if I have heard a word, I do not know that it is a word, until I know what it signifies. Therefore, knowing things leads to knowing their words, but words are not learned by hearing words. For we do not learn words we already know, nor can we say that we have learned those we do not know, unless we have perceived their signification; this happens not by hearing their sounds, but by knowing the things they signify. Indeed, it is absolutely reasonable and true to say that when words are pronounced, we either know or do not know what they signify. If we know, then we are being reminded, rather than learning; but if we do not know, then we aren't even reminded, although we may be encouraged to investigate.

37) But you might say that we cannot know the head-coverings (whose name is only a sound to us), except by seeing them, and we cannot know more about the name itself, except by knowing the things themselves. But we do accept that those boys triumphed over the king and the flames by their faith and piety, that they sang praises to God, and that they won honors even from their enemy himself.²¹ How have we learned these things, except by words? I answer that everything signified by those words was already in our minds. I already understood what three boys are, what fire is, what a king is, what "unharmed by fire" is, and everything else that those words signify. But Ananias, Azarias, and Misael are as unknown to me as sarabarae; those names did not help me know them, nor could they ever help. I admit that I believe, rather than know, that everything I read in that story happened at that time as written. Further, these writers whom we believe also knew this distinction. For the Prophet says, "Unless you believe, you will not understand," which he surely would not have said unless he thought they were different. Therefore, what I understand, I also believe; but I do not understand everything that I believe. Everything that I understand, I know; but I do not know everything that I believe. However, I am not unaware of how useful it is to believe many things that I do not know, and I count the story of the three boys as useful in this way. So although there are many things I cannot know, I nonetheless know how useful believing is.

38) But when we understand all these things, we do not consult the speaker who gives the outward expression, but the truth that rules within the mind itself, though perhaps the words reminded us to consult it. The one who is consulted is the one who teaches; he is Christ, who is said to dwell in the inner person.²² He is the unchangeable power of God and eternal wisdom,²³ which every rational soul does indeed consult, although it is revealed according to each one's ability to accept it, depending on the evil or goodness of his or her will. If sometimes one is deceived, this is not because of some defect in the truth consulted, just as it is not because of some defect in the external light that the bodily eyes are often deceived; and we admit that we consult this light concerning visible things, so that it may show them to us, as far as we are able to perceive them.

39) Now, about colors, we consult light; about the other things which we sense by means of the body, we consult the elements of this world and those bodies which we sense; about these, we consult the senses themselves, which the mind uses as interpreters to know such things; and about things which are understood, we consult the inner truth by means of reason. Given all this, what could be said that would make it more clear that we learn nothing by means of words, except the sound which strikes the ear? For everything we perceive, we perceive either by a bodily sense, or by the mind. We call the former sensible things, the latter intelligible things; or, to speak in the way our authors do, we can call the former carnal, the latter spiritual.²⁴ When asked about the former, we can answer if the things we sense are present, as when we are asked what the new moon is like or where it is while we are looking at it. If the one who asks the question does not see the thing, then he believes words, although often he does not; but he definitely doesn't learn anything, unless he himself sees the thing of which we speak. In that case, he does not learn by means of words, but by means of the things themselves and his senses. For the words sound the same to both one who sees and one who does not see. When asked about things we do not sense at the moment, but which we have sensed previously, then we do not speak about the things themselves, but about the impressions made by them and committed to memory.²⁵ I do not know how we can possibly speak of these as true when we acknowledge them to be false, unless it is because we are talking about what we have seen and sensed, rather than what we are seeing and sensing. So we carry these images in the inner depths of the memory as records of things previously sensed; contemplating them in the soul, in good conscience we speak of them without lying. But these records are ours alone. If someone who has sensed and experienced these things himself hears me, he does not learn from my words, but he recognizes the things from what he gathered from them and from his own images of them. But if he has not sensed these things, then he obviously believes rather than learns by means of words.

40) But when it is a matter of things which we understand with the mind, by intellect and reason, then we are speaking of things which we see clearly in that inner light of truth, by which the so-called inner person is given light and joy. But if our listener himself also sees those things with that inner and pure eye, then he knows what I'm talking about by his own contemplation, not by my words. Therefore, even when I say true things to one who sees they are true, still I do not teach him, for he is not taught by my words, but by the things themselves, which God reveals to him from within. If he were asked about these things, he also could answer. What would be more ridiculous than to think that my speaking had taught him, when he could have explained those same things even before I spoke, if he had been asked? But it often happens that someone who is questioned denies something, which he is then forced by other questions to affirm; this happens because of an inability to distinguish between things, so that he cannot consult that light about the whole matter. He is urged to do it piecemeal when asked about those parts that make up the whole, which he cannot discern in its entirety. Even if he is lead to do this by the words of the questioner, he still is not taught by the words; the inquiries only give him a way to seek, in so far as he is able, to learn from his inner light. For example, if I were to ask you about this very thing, about whether anything can be taught by words, it might appear ridiculous to you at first, if you weren't considering the whole question. Therefore, I should ask you in such a way that with your own powers you might listen to that inner teacher. I might say something like this: from where did you learn those things which you admitted were true when I said them, about which you are sure, and which you say you know? Perhaps you would answer that I had taught them to you. But what if I said further that I had seen a man flying? Would my words bring you the same certainty that you have when you hear that wise men are better than fools? Of course, you would deny this, and answer that you do not believe the former statement, or that even if you do believe it, you do not know it, whereas you know the latter statement with complete certainty. You must now understand that you learned nothing by my words: in the first case, you did not know what I was talking about; in the other, you already knew it perfectly well. Even if you were asked about these separately, you would swear that you did not know the former and did know the latter. Then indeed you would affirm everything you had denied, for you would recognize the clarity and certainty of its parts: whenever we say anything, either the listener doesn't know whether or not it is true, or he knows it is false, or he knows it is true. In the first of these three cases, he will either believe it, or guess about it, or doubt it; in the second, he will oppose and reject it; in the third, he will confirm it. In none of these case does he learn. Therefore, it has been proved that nothing was learned by our words: the first one does not know the thing, the second one knows that what he heard is false, and the third one could have answered the question by himself.

41) It follows from this that with things perceived by the mind, it is useless for someone who cannot perceive them to listen to the words of someone who does, unless they are things which it is useful to believe, even when they are unknown. But anyone who can perceive them is inwardly a disciple of truth, and outwardly a judge of the speaker, or rather of what is spoken. For often he knows what was said, even when the speaker himself does not. For example, suppose someone who believes in Epicurus and therefore thinks that the soul is mortal should give the reasons put forth by wiser men for its immortality. If someone who can reflect on spiritual things hears this, he will see that true things have been said, while the speaker does not know that the things he says are true; indeed, he considers them absolutely false. Is it conceivable then that he teaches what he does not know? But he does use the same words that one who understood them could use.

42) So, since the speaker may not know the things he says, words even lack the ability to indicate what is in the speaker's soul. Add to this the cases of liars and deceivers, and you will easily understand that not only do words not reveal what is really in the soul, they may even hide it. I do not doubt at all that truthful people's words try and in some way promise to show what is in the speaker's soul; and all agree that they would do this, if liars were not allowed to speak. Yet we often see, both in ourselves and in others, that words do not express one's thoughts. I see two ways that this can happen: either when a statement, committed to memory and often repeated, proceeds out of the mouth of someone who is thinking of something else, as often happens to us when singing a hymn; or when words jump out in place of others due to an unintentional mistake in speech, for in this case too, the sounds heard are not signs of what is in our soul. Even liars think of the things they say, so that, although we do not know if what they say is true, nevertheless we do know that what they say is in their soul, so long as neither of the two things I just mentioned happens to them. I will not disagree of someone states that these things happen infrequently, and are obvious when they do happen, although they are frequently unnoticed and when I hear them they often do deceive me.

43) But in addition to these, there is another type of words, quite common indeed, and the source of countless disagreements and disputes. This type is encountered when the speaker really signifies what he is thinking, but usually only to himself and a few others, while he does not signify the same thing to his listener or to others. If someone were to say to us that humans are surpassed in virtue by some animals, we would immediately be unable to tolerate such an assertion, and we would make every effort to refute such a false and revolting statement.²⁶ But perhaps he means "virtue" in the sense of bodily strength, expressing what he thought by means of this noun. He is neither lying, nor mistaken about the thing itself, nor stringing together words from memory while considering other things in his soul, nor saying something he did not mean to because of a slip of the tongue. He merely calls the thing he is thinking of by a different name than we would. We would immediately agree with him if we could read his thoughts, which his explanation and statement have been unable to show us by means of spoken words. They say that definition can remedy this kind of error. Thus, if the speaker in this case were to define what virtue is, they say it would be clear that the disagreement is over the word, not over the thing itself. But even if I grant that this is so, how many people who are good at defining can be found? Furthermore, there are disagreements about the science of defining; but it is not appropriate to discuss them at this point, nor do I completely agree with them.

44) I pass over the fact that we hear many things incorrectly, but argue long and hard about them, just as if we had heard them correctly. For example, you said not long ago that a certain Punic word, which I had said signified "mercy," actually signified "piety," and that you had heard this from those who know this language well. But I disagreed and insisted that you had completely forgotten what you had heard, because it seemed to me that you had said "faith" rather than "piety," even though you were sitting right next to me and these two nouns could not possibly deceive the ear by sounding similar. Yet for a long time I thought that you did not know what had been said to you, when it was really I who did not know what you had said. If I had heard you correctly, it would not have seemed strange at all to me that one Punic word would express both "piety" and "mercy." These things happen often, but, as I said, we will pass over them, so that I do not seem to be slandering words because of the hearer's carelessness or even deafness. The things I mentioned before are more disturbing when, even though we share the speaker's language and the Latin words are heard with perfect clarity, we still cannot know his thoughts.

45) But look, I grant and admit that when words are heard by one who knows them, he can know that the speaker has thought of the things they signify. But now the question is, does he therefore learn whether what the speaker said is true?

Do teachers assert that it is their own thoughts that are perceived and grasped, rather than the disciplines themselves, which they claim to pass on by their speaking? For who is so foolishly curious that he would send his son to school in order to learn what the teacher thinks? But all those disciplines that teachers claim to teach, even those of virtue and wisdom, they explain with words. Then those who are called students consider within themselves whether what was said is true, each consulting that inner truth according to his own ability. Thus they learn. And when they find within themselves that what was said is true, they praise their teachers, not knowing that they are really praising those who are taught, assuming the teachers know what they are saying. But people make the mistake of calling them "teachers" when they are not, just because there is usually no delay between the moment of speaking and the moment of knowing. And since the inner learning comes shortly after the speaker has reminded the students, they think they have learned from outside, from him who reminded them.

46) But we will, God willing, inquire at some other time into the usefulness of words, which is no small matter if it is looked into thoroughly. For now, I have warned you that we should attribute to words no more than is appropriate. Now we may not only believe, but also begin to understand that it has truly been written on divine authority that we are not to call anyone on earth "teacher," because there is one teacher of all in heaven.²⁷ But what "in heaven" means will be shown to us by him who guides us by means of human agents and external signs, so that we may learn to turn inward to him. To love him and to know him is the happy life; all claim to seek this, but so few ever rejoice at having found it. But now I want you to tell me what you think of my whole discussion. If you know that what was said is true, then you would have said that you knew each individual statement, if you had been asked about them. So you see from whom you have learned these things: not from me, for you would have answered everything, had I asked you. But if you do not know that these things are true, then neither he nor I have taught you: not I, because I can never teach; not he, because you cannot yet learn.

Ad. I indeed have learned by the reminding of your words that words only remind a person, so that he may learn. Also, it is clear that speech reveals only a very small part of a speaker's thoughts. But whether what was said is true, I have now been reminded that only he who lives within us, but who is spoken of externally, can teach us. And now, by his grace, I will love him so much more fervently as I progress in learning. Nonetheless, I am most grateful for your discussion, which you made without stopping, because it anticipated and resolved all the objections which I was ready to make. None of my concerns were missed by you, and that inner oracle that same answer as was stated by your words.

¹ Cf. Conf. 3,19.

² Cf. Sol. 2,35; Quan. An. 34; Retr. 7,2; Ep. 7,2.

³ Mt 6:6.

⁴ Cf. Rom 7:22; 2 Cor 4:16.

⁵ 1 Cor 3:16; cf. Rom 8:11.

⁶ Eph 3:16-17.

⁷ Ps 4:4-5 (Vulg. 4:5-6).

⁸ The Lord's Prayer, Mt 6:9-13; see also Serm. 56 and de Serm. Dom. in Mon. 2,15-37.

⁹ Aeneid 2,659.

¹⁰ Andria 204 (Act I, scene 2, v. 33).

¹¹ 2 Cor 1:19 (Vulg.).

¹² 2 Cor 11:6.

¹³ Cicero, In Verrem 2, 2, 104.

¹⁴ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1, 7, 14.

¹⁵ The ludo - praeludo (play - prepare) wordplay here cannot be conveyed in translation.

¹⁶ Discussions of dirt and mud were always problematic for Platonists: cf. Plato, Parmenides 130 B-D.

¹⁷ Rom 16:18; Phil 3:19.

¹⁸ Persius, Satura 3,32. The following exchange here relies on a wordplay between vitium, vitio, and vito (vice, weaken, avoid).

¹⁹ Satura 3,35-38.

²⁰ Dan 3:27 (Vulg. 3:94); the meaning of the Aramaic term sarabarae (Vulg. saraballae) is unclear, so it here serves Augustine's purpose of showing the obscurity of language.

²¹ Dan 3:19-30 (Vulg. 3:19-97).

²² Eph 3:16-17; cf. Lk 17:21.

²³ Cf. 1 Cor 1:24; Col 2:3.

²⁴ Cf. Rom 7:14.

²⁵ Cf. Sol. 1,1, and Augustine's fuller treatment of memory in Conf. 10,12-31.

²⁶ The following exchange relies on a wordplay between virtus and vis.

²⁷ Mt 23:10.