From experience, I can confirm that misunderstandings abound among some Christians about the Just War Tradition and the arguments central to it. In my own limited circle there are Christian believers falling into a spectrum anywhere from a strict aversion to violence of any kind to an open embrace of the adage 'All's fair in love and war.' Opinions and justifications follow in an even more confusing assortment, leaving us in a moral quandary regarding the Christian stance on war. Clearly there is a need for Christians to be reacquainted with the basics of pacifism and Just War Tradition in order for the church to speak out for or against the current military action, specifically the War on Terrorism.

Recognizing the importance of pacifism in the history of Christianity, this paper will explore a modern application of the Just War Tradition, "an understanding of statecraft in which the use of force in the service of justice is both permitted and restrained," (James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (Binghamton: Vail-Ballou Press, 1999) 70) to the War on Terrorism. Primarily because it began recently and is still continuing, the facts given will not necessarily reflect reality, but the facts Americans have been told; yet because the Just War Theory takes into account the difficulty of accurate knowledge about a war, this should not cause any problems.

Before examining any conflict situation, we must begin with the understanding that war in general should be abhorred and, therefore, resisted. This seems to be common sense as "taken on the whole, the people of one country never have the genuine desire to make war on the people of another country" (David S. Oderberg, Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 182). However, with the actions that cause armies of people to leave their families and inflict harm often on strangers, it is easy to push aside the natural horror of war. Atrocities and sufferings accompany even the noblest of wars; consequently, the government should resort to military action solely out of necessity and never out of desire. We see this in the example of the surgeon, who cuts a patient only because it is a necessary means of restoring well-being to the body (Andrew Goddard, When is War Justified? (Cambridge: Grove Books Limited, 2003) 16). Indeed, no one who has the desire to inflict pain should become a surgeon due to the danger of making the patient worse off than he or she already was. It is only with this mindset of love and peace-making that we may begin the exploration of morality in war.

The principal insight of the Just War Tradition is that it stipulates when it is right to go to war, not how to justify war. If the spirit of the Just War Tradition is not kept close at hand, it can easily be "reduced to a shopping list of test criteria against which any conflict is measured" (Andrew Goddard, When is War Justified? (Cambridge: Grove Books Limited, 2003) 3) instead of a number of checks to ensure morality even in the possible context of military action. The Just War Tradition must not be used, but followed, which becomes complex when a nation is provoked to go to war.

The September 11th terrorist attack on the US was the catalyst not only for US military action against Afghanistan, but for a declaration of the War on Terrorism. This War on Terrorism is and will be in need of a Christian voice to proclaim the limits of its morality, as its duration is uncertain, but most likely will be long. "There is no silver bullet, no single event or action that is going to suddenly make the threat of terrorism disappear. This broad-based and sustained effort will continue until terrorism is rooted out" ("Frequently Asked Questions," The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/faq-what.html). It is arguable that such a goal is impossible to reach, leaving us with a war that could last indefinitely, but this will be addressed later.

Aquinas' three designations for a just war continue to be the essentials we follow today: sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention (Aquinas Summa Theologiae II/II, q40). The recognition of the US government by its people on the whole as sovereign authority gives it the power to declare a war in the cause of justice. As we learn from Romans 13, subjection to a sovereign government is a duty for Christians, so as we scrutinize the necessity of war, we must maintain submission to those in authority. However, there is also the emphasis for a soldier's refrain from fighting any war he or she truly sees as unjust because otherwise, "the soldiers who crucified Christ, ignorantly following Pilate's order, would be excused" ("On the Law of War in Vitoria, Politcal Writings," q26 http://www.constitution.org/victoria/victoria_5.txt). Hence, we need a careful analysis to prevent immoral acts even when following the government's decisions.

A key question of authority in the modern era is the role of the United Nations to authorize or prohibit war. Paul Ramsey likens the U.N. to "a babbling if erudite assemblage of the representatives of nations, whose common interests and agreements are perilously poised over diverse particular concerns none will or should give up entirely," and concludes by turning his audience to the better alternative of Just War Tradition instead (Paul Ramsey, The Just War (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983) 181). The U.N. cannot be sought after as sovereign authority because it "is not a recognized governing power whose writ runs within a political community" (Goddard, 17). While the Just War Tradition does not require a state to follow decisions made by the U.N. in matters of war, its existence is helpful for discovering other possible responses and having a broader understanding of the implications of a given war.

Although the destructive weapons of the twentieth century have compelled a general conviction that defense is the only just cause for military attack, the Just War Tradition also upholds the necessity of military action as punishment for refusing to recompense for wrongs inflicted by its subjects or return what it has seized unjustly (Aquinas, q40). James Turner Johnson makes the case that instead of deeming the latter two reasons unjust, morality in warfare has absorbed them in its broad classification of defense. "A retaliatory second strike, for example, would classically have been called 'punishment of evil;' today it is categorized as 'defense'" (Johnson, 31). The deliberate planning of the September 11th attacks against non-combatants is potentially a crime punishable only by war, but we must first judge if there is a possibility that it was just. As Aquinas states from Exodus 23:7, it is unlawful to kill the innocent (Aquinas, q64). Granted, there are conditions when killing the innocent is accepted as an unintentional result of an attempted attack, but in general, it is immoral and should be actively avoided. Even accepting the reasoning behind the assault against the US in the first place, the fact that it was solely against non-combatants made it an illegitimate attack. The use of terrorism to send a message or destroy an oppressive regime is always wrong (Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1977) 205). So far, it seems clear that the US had a just cause for declaring the War on Terrorism.

Nevertheless, we cannot be too hasty to assume this, especially in light of the recent War on Iraq. Although the attack was placed under the umbrella of the War on Terrorism, its cause was not so clear-cut. In last year's State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush listed Iraq as one of the "regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction" ("President Delivers State of the Union Address," The White House, 29 Jan. 2002 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/iraq/20020129-11.html). Eight months later, in a response to a question of the 'actual target' in the possibility of war, he emphasized a regime change ("President Bush, Prime Minister Discuss Keeping the Peace," The White House, 7 Sept. 2002 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraq/20020907-2.html). In a meeting with Congress two months later, his focus was clearly on disarming Iraq ("President Stresses Need for Strong Iraq Resolution," The White House, 1 Oct. 2002 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/iraq/20021001-2.html). In this year's State of the Union address, he asked America to visualize an image of Saddam Hussein arming another nineteen hijackers because "chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained" ("President Delivers 'State of the Union,'" The White House, 28 Jan. 2003 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/iraq/20030128-19.html) Although entire books could be written on the subject, two problematic issues arise when regarding these preliminary remarks.

First is the relationship of the military campaign in Iraq with the War on Terrorism. As Ari Fleischer referenced President Bush stating, "This enemy is nameless; this enemy is faceless; this enemy has no specific borders" ("Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer" The White House, 13 Sept. 2001 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-12.html) Although one of the reasons for the war was Iraq's link to terrorism, many people did not have a clear understanding of this link, which is crucial to maintain the integrity of the War on Terrorism. Furthermore, since the focus of the war was concentrated on weapons of mass destruction, it did not seem to fit into the War on Terrorism as directly as military action in Afghanistan or the Philippines. Lastly, the selectivity of bombing Iraq while negotiating with North Korea in spite of its government's overt efforts to develop nuclear weapons leaves further suspicions concerning the justice of its cause. It appears that due to widespread and continuing fear among Americans and the unclear boundaries of the War on Terrorism, this military action may have been carried out under the contrived and borrowed cause of preventing terrorism.

The second issue at hand is the pre-emptive characteristic of the war. Many of those against military action in Iraq were so mostly because it was aggressive. As we have seen, the fact that the US led an offensive campaign does not necessarily mean the war was unjust; however, a pre-emptive strike does have stipulations. While some threats are serious enough to reveal a need for a pre-emptive strike, "the kind of military preparation that is a feature of the classic arms race�unless it violates some formally or tacitly agreed-upon limit" (Walzer, 80) does not count as one of them. As weapons inspections were taking place and remained unfinished in their determination of the status of Iraq's arms, the alarming but unchecked threat of weapons of mass destruction was not serious enough for a pre-emptive strike. Here we see military action with an unjust cause within a broader war that presumably has a just cause.

It is already overwhelmingly clear that the lack of clear causes, enemies, and goals for the War on Terrorism creates a considerable barrier for its critique. The US government and the American people can easily distort it (as we have seen in the case of Iraq) since its only defined aspect is 'terrorism.' Furthermore, short of an extremely detailed definition of terrorism (which it does not have), too much flexibility is possible in a war against an abstract enemy.

Next, we turn to the intentions for war. The positive intention of the War on Terrorism, such as putting an end to terrorist action and in doing so promoting peace, the Just War Tradition upholds. However, we must also ensure that no negative intentions are mixed in with the positive ones, at which point we meet potential difficulties. A description of Al-Qaeda from the White House website tells us that, "Al-Qaeda is a movement defined by hatred. They hate progress, and freedom, and choice, and culture, and music, and laughter, and women, and Christians, and Jews, and all Muslims who reject their distorted doctrines. They love and worship only one thing, and that is power -- power they use without mercy to kill the innocent." ("The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days," The White House, Dec. 2001 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html.) This perhaps best exemplifies the outpouring of loaded language the government has used for discussing the War on Terrorism. Though arguable, an objective read shows at the very least a hyperbolic condemnation of the US enemy. It no doubt shatters almost any possibility of common ground for the two sides (such as laughter or music), which would be conducive for the promotion of loving Al-Qaeda as a neighbor. Rather than "cherishing the spirit of a peacemaker," (Augustine, "Letter 189," qtd. in O. O'Donovan and J. L. O'Donovan,eds., From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought (Grand Rapids: 1999) 135) such language lends itself to "fierce and implacable enmity," (Augustine, "From Book 22," qtd. in O. O'Donovan and J. L. O'Donovan,eds., From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought (Grand Rapids: 1999) 117) a negative intention for declaration of war.

In order to further prevent acceptance of an unjust war, four more criteria have been added to the Just War Tradition since the time of Aquinas: hope of success, proportionality, last resort, and end of peace. The first, hope of success was no doubt assessed by the US government, as we see in President Bush's March 19th address to the nation as regards the military campaign against Iraq: "I assure you, this will not be a campaign of half measures, and we will accept no outcome but victory" ("Bush Addresses the Nation," The White House, 19 Mar. 2003 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/iraq/20030319-17.html). The American people were and are so confident in fact that the possibility of defeat is largely ignored in the War on Terrorism. The unexpected brevity of the 1991 Gulf War and minimal number of American casualties seems to have instilled the mindset that the American military is invincible, which is only compounded by the fact that its enemies are generally fewer in number and less established.

With the overconfidence of success in the War on Terrorism and an assurance of such from the U.S. government, there has been a great deal of pressure for a short, decisively successful war. The best guarantee for this of course is rapid application of as much force as possible. This correlation is clear in President Bush's preamble to his March 19th quote about the success of the war: "Now that conflict has come, the only way to limit its duration is to apply decisive force" (Ibid.). Again, because there were multiple reasons for attacking Iraq, the war went beyond attacking terrorist targets to the aim of overturning an oppressive regime. If the goal of the war was to disarm Iraq or cut its ties to terrorism, the US government should have attacked proportionately to that end. A nation must absolutely avoid the chance to flex its military muscle, as 'lust of power' is an evil of war (Augustine, "From Book 22").

Another issue in the conduct of the war on terrorism is the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Those held in the prison are being called 'unlawful combatants' instead of prisoners of war, (George Edmonson, "Permanent Prison mulled for Guantanamo Bay," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 11 Jun. 2003 http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/attack/125966_guantanamo11.html) and their treatment has rarely been reported as moral. Amnesty International sent a memorandum to President Bush over a year ago requesting that the detainees be considered as prisoners of war and expressing alarm that the prisoners were being treated inhumanely and denied rights such as access to a lawyer, reasons for detention, and presumption of innocence ("Amnesty International's concerns regarding post September 11 detentions in the USA," Amnesty International, 14 Mar. 2002 http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510442002? OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\USA?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\USA). The mistreatment of hundreds of prisoners, some of whom are most likely innocent, is a considerable allegation that needs an answer from the US government as to its justice. Not only do laws in the US call for an assumption of innocence, but also the issue of discrimination of combatants and non-combatants in the Just War Tradition requires dedication to the protection of the innocent. Furthermore, while the Just War Tradition allows for punishment and justice, it also praises mercy, specifically for the imprisoned: "As violence is used towards him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the vanquished or the captive, especially in the case in which future troubling of the peace is not to be feared" (Augustine, "Letter 189").

In the past two examples of disproportionate means and inhumane treatment of captives, we see the possibilities of the US using fear-strategies of its own, posing the suspicion that one method of preventing terrorism is making examples of those who do. In other words, the US is causing potential terrorists to fear violent consequences for their land, social group, and innocent members of their society. This may seem perfectly fair in light of the injustice terrorism entails, but if we keep in mind the idea of a surgeon, it has probably gone beyond the goal of restoring well-being to an end of a violent demonstration of power and status.

Another important check before going to war is the consideration of other, less violent, and more productive possibilities. It is here that I find a flicker of promise in the War on Terrorism. As stated earlier, it is not a war in the traditional sense, so it "is being fought at home and abroad through multiple operations including: diplomatic, military, financial, investigative, homeland security and humanitarian actions" ("Frequently Asked Questions"). As terrorist attacks with many casualties need considerable financing, the realization that cutting money flow is an effective 'weapon' is granted, more time-consuming and less power-displaying, but a more loving and precise means of preventing terrorism. More focus of this kind on why and how terrorism occurs may be a superior strategy to concentrate on than attacking those seen as threats.

Finally, does the War on Terrorism seek an end of peace? The only clear end it seeks is actually limitless: 'to root out terrorism.' This is an end neither of peace nor of justice. Augustine was of the viewpoint that world-order utopianism is idolatry (Johnson, 16). A further insight into the danger of such an end is that "it cannot be their purpose, as it is the purpose of domestic police work, to stamp out illegal violence, but only to cope with particular violent acts. Hence the rights and limits fixed by the argument for justice: resistance, restoration, reasonable prevention" (Walzer, 121).

"The existence of twilight does not mean you cannot distinguish day from night" (Oderberg, 217). In spite of the presence of gray areas, the suspicions and hopes we have concerning the War on Terrorism show that it has gone out of the realm of justice. This is not to say that it was unjust from the beginning. However, in light of the shifting causes and intentions, the disproportionate means and indiscriminate treatment of prisoners, and the unrealistic goal, adherents of the Just War Tradition will probably continue to seriously doubt the morality of the War on Terrorism despite its sovereign authority. Yet, where is the prophetic voice of the church in the midst of a war that calls so many aspects of the Just War Tradition into question? If the church does not speak out against an unjust war, what point is there to having a Just War Tradition at all? Instead of giving the church realistic, but restrictive guidelines, it has unfortunately become a Christian justification of war. This could not be further from the spirit of the Just War Tradition: "Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in peace" (Augustine, "Letter 189").

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