With the crisis in Menelmacar, a lot of interest has been shown recently among micropatriologists who have raised a lively debate on a topic that hasn't been seen much in the micronational community -- international intervention. It is a foreign policy bullet point that is derived from Woodrow Wilson's moral crusade to preserve America's interests abroad, have a humanitarian appeal and keep law and order around the world. Some have argued recently that the Menelmacari crisis requires international intervention in order to secure an amiable conclusion to the situation.

To justify intervention, the act of other countries inserting themselves in another's situation, one must believe that states are in their nature, and can act as, a moral agent. That is, as long as the intervention is borne from lofty, respectable intentions -- peace, humanitarian need, and the like. Usually, intervention is undertaken for all the wrong reasons, like America's intervention into Russia from 1917-1920. Their goal was to keep Russia in the first World War, and prevent a governmental system from coming to power that will threaten American capitalist interests in Russia. When George F. Kennan, a foreign policy expert with the Department of State wrote in [i]Russia Leaves the War[/i] (1956), he stated that Wilson was "a man who never had any particular interest in, or knowledge of, Russian affairs. He had never been to Russia. There is no indication that the dark and violent history of that country had ever occupied his attention..." As extensive knowledge is necessary in intervening in a foreign nation, only those with that knowledge should be directing such, if any efforts.

Or often, as we have seen in cases like Nicaragua, humanitarian interventions were not, in any way, humanitarian.

One will remember the international intervention for the Kingdom of Morovia in 2001, where Tymaria, Babkha, and other nations tried to protect the crisis-stricken Morovia from the obnoxious interloper Emperor Jacobus, a breakaway Republic lead by non-Morovians wanting to pirate the legacy, and a chimera under the psuedonym "Generalissimo P. Hickey." Instead of actually making progress, the intervening parties, each raising the ire of original Morovians who wanted "let us deal with our own affairs", ended up battling each other.

Intervention carries with it paternalistic overtones, as the concept was born from a man who thought it was America's role to raise less civilized nations in its own image, like a father's role to a son. Some have argued that this interventionist policy undertaken for the last 85 years by the United States has ignited hatred for all things American, and recently overt terrorist acts against America.

With Menelmacar, it is the opinion of this paper that some sort of intervention action is necessary, not just to restore order, but to institute a controlled arbitration to the issues at the crux of this crisis. However, there is not a viable, or even seriously-taken structure to be an umbrella to intervention actions. The League of Secessionist States is about as useful as a wet-towel, and almost all other organizations are not received with the solemn respect necessary to be effective in such a delicate procedure. What is also absent is a mechanism to prevent the intervening powers from battling each other in what would be an unfortunate repeat of the First Morovian Crisis.

Maybe the micro-world needs a new, powerful, and respected United Nations-styled organization. And in a situation like this, peacekeeping forces, observers, and other instruments of a peaceful, humanitarian intervention could be deployed to quell the hostilities between bellicose parties, to seek positive and effective solutions, and actually bring a respectable aura to sections of the microworld that now emote only the impression of immaturity.

The fate of micronationalism, and of micro-national stability, depends on the answer we offer to this crisis.