Chronology of Cambodian History

Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts

Washington, December 3, 1964, 8:27 p.m.

1081. We conceive of the forthcoming talks at New Delhi between Cambodian and US representatives as affording opportunity for broad exchanges of views on whole range of relations between two countries. We have avoided setting formal agenda both in order allow maximum flexibility and to deny to Cambodians pretext for preconference statement of position which might reduce usefulness these talks. (Sihanouk, however, has attempted set preconference conditions on his own initiative in recent public statements, as anticipated.)

In general we view conference as providing opportunity for discussions following items:

A. Invitation to resumption more normal RKG/US relations, including assignment RKG representative to Washington and lifting of restriction on social contact by Cambodians with US personnel in Cambodia.

B. Renewed statement US determination prevent communist take-over SVN with view convincing RKG its anticipation imminent or eventual Viet Cong victory unjustified.

C. Renewed assurances to Cambodians that we do not support Cambodian dissidents and that we have not sought and do not seek overthrow of present Cambodian government

D. Make clear to RKG that formal recognition by it of DRV or NLFSVN would inject grave new element into situation and cause us re-examine whole status US/RKG relations while making it more difficult continue exercise restraining influence on GVN.

E. Exploration possibility resumption GVN/RKG talks broken off last March by Chantrea incident; we are prepared offer good offices this connection while avoiding becoming involved substantively.

We assume that RKG delegation will raise points which Sihanouk has put on record in recent speeches and press conference and which were outlined in RKG note (Phnom Penh's 350). Since USG proposed conference, we anticipate RKG tactic may be wait for our initiatives and use these points in countering.

Recognizing that our inability offer very much in way concrete proposals in line expressed RKG desires severely limits results we can except from New Delhi talks, following is list of objectives we might attempt to achieve.

1. Resumption normal diplomatic relations with RKG involving staffed missions in both capitals as well as normal contact between US Embassy personnel Phnom Penh and Cambodian public.

2. Resumption, possibly though our good offices, of bilateral RKG/GVN talks with view resolving as first step questions indemnification for damage caused by GVN incursions for which GVN has offered compensation, marking agreed frontier, and arranging for appropriate RKG/GVN collaboration to prevent VC use of border area.

3. Avoiding RKG recognition of DRV or NLFSVN.

4. RKG willingness to discuss indemnification for damage to US property resulting form March 11 demonstrations.

5. RKG willingness allow our Embassy continue in Phnom Penh (assuming point one could not be achieved) i.e., RKG would not carry out threat to break relations completely.

6. Emergence from Delhi conference with acceptable public position and placing of blame on RKG for current and future deterioration US/RKG relations.

Points 5 and 6 may prove to be mutually exclusive, inasmuch as our attempt, as minimum result of conference, to achieve world understanding and approval our position may require us make public statements which could provoke Sihanouk into ejecting Embassy forthwith. (We would, of course, make further effort at talks to get Cambodian agreement to regard talks as confidential, but are not hopeful they will agree.)

In any discussion with friendly powers of US views on New Delhi talks, extreme care should be taken avoid any possibility of leaks (especially in regard to point D above) which might reach RKG and cause immediate public reaction prejudicing success of talks.

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