Chronology of Cambodian History

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, November 15, 1964, 1:42 p.m.

2817. Subject: US-Cambodian Relations. Following is based on uncleared memcon, Noforn, subject to review and FYI.

Calling at his request November 13, Ambassador Alphand informed Secretary GOF had done its best in intervening with RKG to eschew rash and unwarranted action in relations with US over recent frontier troubles./2/ He felt "at least worst had been avoided and door not closed".

/2/Those incidents included Cambodia's shooting down of one of three U.S. C-123 aircraft that strayed into Cambodian territory on October 24. Eight U.S. crewmen died in the crash. A second incident was the accidental bombing of the Cambodian village of Anlong Kres by the South Vietnamese Air Force on October 20. The third major incident occurred on October 22 when a fire fight erupted between a Vietnamese unit with two U.S. advisers and the Viet Cong across the Cambodian border near the village of Banteay Chakrey. Three Vietnamese soldiers and one U.S. adviser were killed. (Circular telegram 839, November 5; ibid., POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S)

Secretary thanked Ambassador for helpful French efforts and said troublesome feature in US-Cambodian relations seems to stem from loss of contact with Sihanouk who refused receive our Ambassador or Charge. Secretary wondered if such genuine misunderstandings as exist between two countries might perhaps be dispelled by discreet, unpublicized meeting between specially designated US and Cambodian representatives in some appropriate capital. Commenting that on whole Sihanouk has done constructive job within Cambodia, Secretary thought it would be unfortunate if he came to grief as result misguided action against Vietnam under influence of ChiCom poison and ancient national rivalries. U.S. at such meeting could, for instance, help assure Cambodia its real or pretended fears about Vietnam or Thailand aggression are groundless in absence of provocative or unneutral acts. In view French expertise on Cambodian matters, we would appreciate benefit of Quai's views whether quiet US-Cambodian talks might be useful.

Ambassador stated he glad obtain Quai reaction without, however, approach to Cambodians, and inform Secretary of results. He agreed meeting to be effective would have to be confidential, which posed problem given Sihanouk's impetuous, mercurial nature. He felt Sihanouk, however, not entirely disingenuous, did not wish become Communist or satellite and while he still favored 14 Power Conference, it was to settle Cambodian problems and not as preliminary to some Communist inspired conference.

Secretary thanked Ambassador for offer sound out Paris on matter./3/

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