Chronology of Cambodian History

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam

Washington, July 30, 1964, 1:33 p.m.

299. Ref: USUN 235, info Saigon and Phnom Penh 21. SC Mission Report. We have developed following tentative strategy re SC Mission Report on Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border question on which appreciate receiving addressees prompt comments.

Despite Correia's efforts, Report is unbalanced in favor of Cambodia. Its failure to mention explicitly Viet-Cong use of Cambodian territory, its endorsement that Observer Group should be limited to Cambodian territory, and its tendency toward rigid definition of how Observer Group should function (in effect endorsing some of Sihanouk's conditions), present difficulties, though not necessarily insurmountable. Moreover, Report goes out of its way in patting Cambodians on back for proposal which it characterizes as a real contribution, sliding over fact that Sihanouk has injected some obviously unacceptable pre-conditions. Finally, Mission displayed poor judgment and poor taste by including gratuitous, if not insulting, Cambodian remark that cost of Observer Group should be borne by the "rich countries which say that they are anxious that Cambodia should not be used as a base for the Viet-Cong."

On the other hand, US and SVN have made it clear in SC meetings establishing Mission desire to have effective UN presence to deal with border problem. There are a number of constructive elements in Report which may make it possible to achieve a desirable result from any SC consideration. Mission has suggested parties get together to discuss re-establishment of relations and matters in dispute, including delimitation and marking of common frontier. It has recommended establishment of UN Observer Group in Cambodia. If we concentrate on the five principal recommendations in Report (USUN 235) they might offer us sufficient flexibility to explore whether progress can be made.

Our choice is to push for an acceptable UN Observer Group or otherwise place onus on Sihanouk for failure to find practical way to implement UN recommendations. Our judgment is that best possible result of negotiations in UN would be Observer Group along lines described para 8 of USUN 216 repeated Saigon 16 and Phnom Penh 16: An Observer Group of about 100 or 150 personnel, stationed on Cambodian side, dispersed among several posts along sensitive border areas, highly mobile, with freedom to travel on its own initiative to any point of its own choosing on Cambodian side of border, and with own means for rapid communication with GVN and RKG authorities. (GVN could, for example, appoint liaison officer who might be in contact with UN Observer Group.)

Before making final determination our attitude such an Observer Group and our strategy, we wish Saigon's and Phnom Penh's assessment urgently its military and political relevance to US objectives in SVN and SEA generally. This is key question in influencing our strategy, since if such a Group is considered useful, it will put us in good position to try achieve this result--or if we fail do this, our opposition to an Observer Group would be on strong political grounds that RKG conditions so stringent as to make impracticable establishment of a UN presence.

Our tactics in New York would be:

a. To ascertain whether SYG would be willing initiate informal consultations to work out agreed detailed arrangements for UN involvement on border with interested parties before any formal SC consideration; and

b. If SYG unwilling do so, we or possibly SC President could undertake such consultations within context of normal behind-the-scenes discussions among SC members and principal parties concerned. Both Narasimhan's visit to area and SYG's meeting here in Washington (August 6) will give us opportunity to determine clearly whether SYG is willing to play kind of pre-Council role we envisage.

Above consistent with recommendations contained in USUN 246, received this morning.

Source: [21]