Chronology of Cambodian History

Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State

Phnom Penh, June 3, 1964, 4 p.m.

1238. Sihanouk's departure on June 1 for what may prove to be six week stay in France provides convenient occasion for broad survey Cambodia's present situation and status its relations with the United States. With Sihanouk out of country, unlikely any major decisions or changes will occur locally, all the more so since he has taken with him his closest political and economic advisers. If any important decisions are made during his absence, they will be made by him from wherever he happens to be, and we cannot rule out such decisions relating, for example, to current Cambodian case in UNSC, negotiation for French aid, and Cambodian attitude toward developments affecting Laos and Viet-Nam.

On internal scene, we expect period of inactivity. As he has done prior to his previous visits abroad, Sihanouk attempted during weeks immediately preceding his departure frighten all possible disaffected elements into immobility. We suspect General Lon Nol, Minister for Education Sirik Matak, and Minister of National Security Kou Roun have been given mandate to deal speedily and decisively with any sign of internal dissension. While this means that no overt acts of internal opposition are likely to occur, it does not mean there are no problems; Sihanouk is long way from having found solutions to problems of government finance, foreign trade, unemployment, agriculture marketing, and dissatisfaction among educated youth which have been the subject of reporting by Embassy in past six months. In his predeparture speech on May 31, Sihanouk admitted that gap created by withdrawal American aid has not been filled and is source anxiety to him. He made clear once more his intention seek from France wide range and substantial quantities of aid as wherewithal to fill part of that gap, but Embassy has seen little evidence his expectations will be fully borne out. It is fairly safe estimate that same internal problems which have been plaguing RKG in past six months will continue to face it after Sihanouk's return from Europe.

Compared with his internal problems, Sihanouk's external concerns can be stated in relatively simple terms: He must make sure that his small, relatively defenseless country does not end up on the losing side of whatever emerges from the current turmoil in SEA and he must do this without exposing Cambodia to serious injury during period while events are still in doubt. As has been pointed out frequently, he is faced with a delicate problem of timing which requires him to make gestures of friendship to what he believes will be winning side (Communists) while not going so far in this direction as to invite reprisals from losing side (free world) while latter still has ability strike seriously at him.

Special mention needs to be made in any survey of this nature of Cambodia's relations with France. We here are obviously not in position (if, indeed, anybody is) to speculate on what France is aiming at in its current policy line in SEA. On Cambodian side problem is easier: France represents to Sihanouk his last effective link with free world, his best hope of substantial military and economic assistance, and his potential protector in political settlements which he expects will be inevitable outcome of present strife in SEA. In light these considerations, would be unwise anticipate (as some French themselves appear to be doing) sharp deterioration Franco-Cambodian relations if forthcoming economic and financial talks in France do not result complete satisfaction Cambodian aspirations. As long as Sihanouk believes he stands to gain political benefits from holding to France as his great and dear friend, he will greet even meager amounts French aid as proof France's unbounded generosity and unfaltering solidarity with Cambodia.

Cambodian-US relations are at lowest point since Cambodia achieved independence, and there seems little prospect for improvement as long as Sihanouk believes we are neither capable of insuring survival non-Communist regimes in SVN and Laos nor willing provide guarantees he desires for Cambodia's independence, territorial integrity, and neutrality whatever may happen to remainder SEA. On other hand, in view his problem of timing mentioned above, Sihanouk unlikely break off relations entirely by ordering or forcing Embassy out until he judges Communist victory at hand and Cambodia has nothing to fear in way of retaliation. Should it appear, contrary to his expectations, that GVN has turned corner in its struggle against Viet Cong and is on way to defeating them, we might expect cautious gestures in direction better relations. If it should be considered judgment of USG that use being made of Cambodian territory by VC is significant enough to warrant all-out action prevent such use, even at risk bringing Cambodia fully over to side of VC, then, of course maintenance of any sort of Cambodian-American relations would probably be negligible consideration for both parties.

To sum up:

A. Nothing is likely to develop inside Cambodia during Sihanouk's absence which will significantly affect either country's internal or external orientation.

B. Basic motivation Sihanouk's policies, both foreign and domestic, is to achieve viable adjustment to coming shape of affairs in SEA as he foresees it.

C. Character our relations with Cambodia will be largely determined by developments outside this country and by Sihanouk's reaction to them.

Source: [21]