Chronology of Cambodian History

Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State

Phnom Penh, March 11, 1964.

908. Embassy under heavy demonstration and rock throwing attack from 9 am this morning and attack still going on at time this message being sent. First signs impending demonstration noted 0820. Informed presence crowds arriving given instructions by older men, report reached Embassy thru local employee. Demonstration scheduled for 10 am.

Actual demonstration started 9:00 a.m. led by group bearing placards indicating it was from Ministry Information of Cambodian Government. Just before demonstration began, men carrying red paint tins and brushes painted sign "US go home" on Embassy and USIS buildings. Police who were standing by in increased numbers made no effort interfere with them. SecState for Agriculture Chau Seng observed directing traffic of procession two blocks away from Embassy. SecState for Information Tim Dong observed taking prominent part in organization of procession, which included pre-printed placards and banderolles. After about twenty minutes of peaceful procession past Embassy, violence began with rock throwing. Within twenty minutes, violence had increased to point where virtually every window in Embassy and USIS broken, and at least one official vehicle completely destroyed. At time drafting this, no one has yet been able to venture out of building attempt assess total extent of damage.

No Embassy employees injured, and no indication demonstration has spread to residential portions of city, although at this moment telephone communications outside Embassy cut off. There can be no possible doubt this demonstration occurred with knowledge and permission, if not actual cooperation, RKG. At 8:25, suspecting demonstration was in wind, I spoke on telephone to highest ranking FonOff official I could reach, Director of PolAffrs Chan Youran. He said SecState FonAffrs Sambath not available but he (Chan Youran) would attempt convey to Sambath soonest my communication. At 9:28, with telephone communication still possible, I again telephoned FonOff and spoke with Sambath's private secretary (he was reported still unavailable), protesting in strongest terms against failure police give Embassy protection required by international law and practice. Private secretary again promised he would attempt convey my message to Sambath.

At 9:45, with violence at its peak and all personnel inside Embassy building gathered for protection into most secure area, police began making feeble efforts hold demonstrators back. At present time (11:14) demonstration has ended and police are holding back crowds at some distance. Quick survey reveals massive damage ground floor of Embassy into which demonstrators penetrated by breaking down front doors. Further reports damage will be sent soonest.

I shall continue my efforts see Sambath and shall, unless Department immediately instructs otherwise, repeat to him strongest protest against this demonstration.*

Spivack

* Spivack reported that he met with Huot Sambath, Cambodia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at 6 p.m. on March 11. Sambath immediately stated that Cambodia regretted the violence against the U.S. Embassy and offered compensation for the damage. Spivack said he would inform the Department of Sambath's expressions of regret and offer of compensation, but he had to protest the fact that the demonstration had at least Cambodian Government's approval. (Telegram 914 from Phnom Penh, March 11; Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CAMB)

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia

Washington, March 11, 1964, 9:52 p.m.

632. Following is text of memorandum/2/ setting out Department's current thinking re immediate reaction sacking Phnom Penh Embassy and USIS. Comments addressee posts requested urgently./3/

Begin text:

1) Our general posture--Our posture during the next few days or until Sihanouk has clarified his intentions should contain the following elements:

a) Public and official expressions of shock and dismay.

b) Disappointment over RKG official connivance in attacks (not for attribution).

c) Request for enlightenment from RKG regarding its future policies toward United States and toward quadripartite conference.

d) Establish our own continued willingness to negotiate under proper circumstances but do not run after the Cambodians.

e) Maintain the open door but leave the initiative to the RKG to walk through.

2) Letter from Secretary--(See separate telegram)./4/

3) Liaison with UK--Maintain close contact with the UK, coordinating our actions with theirs whenever possible. Take no further initiative on quadripartite conference beyond Secretary's letter.

4) Thailand and South Vietnam--Brief them on recent events and our attitude. State that we hope to hold the question of a quadripartite conference in abeyance pending further developments. Neither we nor Thailand nor South Vietnam should take any action which could be used by Sihanouk to place the onus for preventing the conference on us. Request that Thailand and South Vietnam issue no public statements at this juncture on quadripartite conference and that they play down events in Cambodia. We should not provide Sihanouk with any external event which he can use as a diversion to focus attention of Cambodian people away from what may be a considerable negative internal reaction to the attacks. In short we prefer to await further developments before becoming committed to a future course.

5) RKG compensation--We should leave the initiative to the RKG on the question of compensation for destruction of property. Go slow on clean up and repair, allowing considerable evidence of damage and debris to remain for time being as reminder. Let the word get out informally that we are uncertain of the future and are still considering the shape of our future relations with Cambodia. If RKG pursues question of compensation we should discuss it, since a refusal to accept compensation might cause the RKG to stop payment on the Vinnell road machinery (approximately $1.8 million).

6) Contingency planning--Undertake urgent exploration, coordinating with other agencies and with UK future courses of action to follow in Cambodia.

End text.

Rusk

/2/The memorandum from Trueheart to Hilsman, March 11, is ibid.

/3/The Embassy in Phnom Penh stated in telegram 929, March 13, that it "found little to add" since the suggestions represented "the only reasonable courses of action." The Embassy saw "little scope left for useful diplomatic initiatives in our relations with Cambodia." (Ibid.)

/4/Telegram 631 to Phnom Penh, March 11, in which Rusk informed Sambath of his shock and concern over the attacks and reminded him that U.S. draft proposals for the four-power conference were not intended as a substitute for those of Cambodia. Finally Rusk asked for assurance that American lives and property could be protected in Cambodia. (Ibid.)

Source: [21]