 Chronology of
Cambodian History
Telegram From the
Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State
Phnom Penh, February 19, 1964, 7 p.m.
808. Embtel 804.(See tele 515
below) Sihanouk's new proposal provides further proof his penchant for
public diplomacy and inability refrain from uselessly irritating
preliminaries, even when he has something to say which offers constructive
possibilities. Despite presumptuous summoning to U.S., Thai and Vietnamese
plenipotentiaries at Phnom Penh within short time limits and his offensive
and unjustified accusation U.S. has been active enemy Cambodian neutrality
and has instigated plots aimed at destroying neutral Cambodia, believe
Sihanouk's present initiative represents backward step for him and is worth
consideration as offering possible alternative to ultimatum he issued
February 15 (Embtel 790).*
* In telegram 790 from Phnom Penh,
February 15, the Embassy reported that Sihanouk threatened to recognize North
Vietnam (DRV), sign defensive agreements with the DRV and the People's
Republic of China (PRC), and break relations with the United States.
(Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S)
Advantages we see in Sihanouk's new proposal are:
1)
It provides way for U.S., Thais, and SVN to avoid
attending conference without incurring risk (which country team considers
real one) Sihanouk will do what he says he will do--namely recognize Hanoi,
abandon neutrality, enter defensive agreements Hanoi and Peiping, and break
relations with U.S. and possibly U.K.
2)
Settlement Cambodia's borders with its neighbors
would be essential element in any easing of tensions; in effect Sihanouk
reverting to earlier position reconciliation and with his neighbors
contingent upon recognition for present borders. While we aware Thai
reluctance subscribe formal recognition document and difficulties inherent in
attempting establish border between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, we believe
might be worth exploring possibility opened by Sihanouk's initiative for
useful negotiations toward eventual settlement.
3)
New proposal apparently does not require U.S. provide
guarantees but it would commit Cambodia not to make military alliances and to
deny use its territory to Viet Cong, commitment which would be backed by
activity expanded ICC.
Disadvantages seen are:
1)
Proposal extremely vague and, unless spelled out
before actual proposed meeting, subject to last minute introduction
undesirable elements and interpretations arising from Sihanouk's fertile
imagination and unprincipled gamesmanship.
2)
U.S. required pay cost of expanded ICC as well as
cost of tractors to be furnished under grotesque Castro-like "gentlemen's
agreement" as compensation for Cambodian deaths as result border
incidents.
3)
Proposal does not eliminate Geneva Conference but
would simply excuse U.S., Thailand and Viet-Nam from attending. (However, if
agreement of type proposed reached among four countries, UK might take
position no real reason remains for conference.)
We recognize that Sihanouk's new and startling proposal
unlikely prove attractive to GVN and, especially, RTG. However, seems to us,
given strong possibility only alternative may be carrying out Sihanouk's
threats of February 15, would be in interest our SEA allies as well as
ourselves at least attempt explore further just what kind of four-power
agreement Sihanouk has in mind (including any texts he may already have drawn
up) with view ascertaining whether any real possibility for negotiation to
produce desired result of re-establishment relations between Cambodia and its
neighbors, denial Cambodian territory to Viet Cong, and continued neutrality
this country. Subject views Embassies Bangkok and Saigon, Department may wish
authorize them discuss Sihanouk's new proposal with respective governments
with view ascertaining whether they agreeable to our attempting seek further
clarification from RKG, including text draft which would expose RKG hand, in
context of possible willingness on part U.S., RTG, and GVN negotiation along
lines suggested if agreement can be reached on objectives and procedures. We
would strongly oppose holding negotiations under such proposals in Cambodia,
where Sihanouk could disrupt or stage manage conversations through press
conferences, broadcasts or other means to suit his whims. Perhaps Kuala
Lumpur might be most satisfactory locale if talks should take place, as Tunku
has expressed interest in assisting settlement difficulties between RKG and
its neighbors.
Sprouse
Telegram From the
Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia
Washington, February 19, 1964, 9:42 p.m.
551. Sihanouk's new proposal (Embtel 804),** while confused and in certain parts
unacceptable, suggests he may be seeking a way off the course to which he had
apparently committed Cambodia. This may reflect his realization of
difficulties in carrying out alignment with Chicoms (although insistence on
March deadline indicates he has his threatened timetable in mind). Whatever
his motivations, we see the possibility of shifting focus from thorny Geneva
conference proposal to more promising negotiation between Cambodia and its
neighbors, together with US. Dept. desires exploit opportunity quickly before
new events overtake it.
** On February 19 Sihanouk
published in Cambodia's official news bulletin a solution to Cambodia's
problems with the United States, South Vietnam, and Thailand that Sihanouk
claimed would keep Cambodia neutral without a conference. The solution
entailed quadripartite (U.S., South Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia)
negotiations leading to an agreement recognizing Cambodia's neutrality and
borders. In return Cambodia would observe strict neutrality and prevent
"the passage or presence of rebel bands across or on its
territory." The solution envisioned normalization of diplomatic
relations and a "gentlemen's agreement" by the United States to
reimburse Cambodia in farm and heavy construction equipment for Cambodians
killed in error by South Vietnamese armed forces. Transmitted in telegram
804, February 19. (Ibid.)
Dept. plans to send within two or three days high-level
representative to discuss details Saigon, Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Our purpose
in so doing is to insure that if there is any possibility of reaching
agreement it not be allowed to slip by.
For Phnom Penh:
Harriman has telephoned Nong Kimny expressing US interest. You should seek
interview soonest to reinforce. Dept. would favor direct approach to Sihanouk
if possible. However leave matter of approach to your judgment. You should
commend Sihanouk on his imaginative initiative which appears to be a forward
step in resolution of the regional problems which have troubled him for so
long. While there are problems and details to be worked out, US is much
impressed with basic concept and principles, including recognition Cambodian
neutrality and territorial integrity as well as Cambodian acceptance of
responsibilities of neutrality and commitment to prevent use of its territory
by rebel bands. You should request Sihanouk to designate a representative
with whom you could work out modalities for a conference.
For Bangkok and
Saigon: You should discuss quadripartite proposals soonest with GVN and
RTG. State that US thinks all three of us should move quickly and positively,
to explore Sihanouk's proposal. Inform Thai and Vietnamese that we are
seeking further information and details from RKG and that we are seeking to
encourage RKG to develop Sihanouk's proposal further. Obviously we have no
intention of making any commitments until we have further information and
until we have consulted with RTG and GVN.
We recognize Sihanouk's statement is cast in a tone
objectionable to Thailand and Viet-Nam, as well as US, but we think we should
ignore the tone and respond positively to the substantive core; i.e., a
quadripartite solution of Sihanouk's problems. While Sihanouk says a Geneva
Conference could "underwrite" quadripartite agreement, it is
possible that successful conclusion of agreement would make conference
unnecessary.
We think the objectionable parts of Sihanouk's proposal
should be treated as problems to which we can suggest constructive solutions
at the proper time rather than as obstacles to negotiations. This would apply
to the question of recognition of frontiers and also to the problem of
enlarging the ICC. By working out such positive procedures, we would hope to
eliminate such things as Sihanouk's "Gentlemen's Agreement".
We urgently request Thai and Vietnamese views on how we
can exploit this opportunity. We will inform RTG and GVN of results
Ambassador Sprouse's inquiry to RKG.
For Bangkok only: In your talk with Thanat it might be
useful to refer to his "constructive idea" of a Southeast Asian
conference on Cambodia (Bangkok Tel 997 of January 2).(Not printed. (Ibid) Sihanouk's proposal would seem to provide
an opening for moving in this direction.
Source:
[21]
|