Chronology of Cambodian History
Note From the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Director
of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart)
Washington, June 30, 1964.
The attached is a proposed message to convey to Sihanouk
through an intermediary (Attach) [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. I think it is good as far as it goes. The only question in
my mind is whether--if the intermediary is sufficiently sophisticated--we
should say anything about the Khmer Serei or any other specific problem that
has haunted our relationship. Whether or not we put it in the letter, I
wonder where we do stand about the KS. Certainly Kidder should have a good
line to take on this subject before he walks into the lion's mouth.
Please give me a quick answer on the letter and let me
know at more leisure about the KS problem generally.
W.P.B. (Printed from a
copy that indicates Bundy initiated the original.)
Attachment
Memorandum From the
Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Neubert) to the
Director (Trueheart)
Washington, June 30, 1964.
The attached memo from Mr. Bundy covered a draft letter
from the Secretary to John McCone dictated by the Secretary himself. This had
to be returned promptly to the Secretary's office so we do not have a copy.
The letter suggested that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
go back to Sihanouk with a broad general view of Washington thinking on the
subject of Cambodia which the Secretary then outlined. He noted our desire
for good relations with Cambodia and restated our respect for Cambodian
independence and neutrality. He also mentioned our hope that Cambodian
relations with Thailand and South Viet-Nam could be improved and professed to
be unable to understand why Cambodia felt communism was the wave of the
future in SEA in view of our stated determination to help the countries of
the area defend themselves from communist aggression. He made the point that
once North Viet-Nam left its neighbors alone, US forces would leave the area.
He expressed the hope that the UN mission now in the area would be able to
obtain constructive suggestions from Cambodia and SVN on how to resolve the
problem of Viet Cong violation of Cambodian territorial integrity. In
closing, he noted the confusion which had been caused in the past by
diplomacy through public speeches and press releases and hoped that we would
be able to work out some way of having frank discussions on a personal
face-to-face basis. We would welcome any suggestion the Prince had for
achieving this. (I assume this may have been designed to enhance the
possibility of Kidder gaining useful contact with the Prince.)
I told Bundy that I agreed with him that the message was
well designed to make the broad general points which Sihanouk must understand
before the specific problems at issue between us can be attacked. If the
Prince were to accept the broad outlines of our policy, there should be no
difficulty with the minor details. Therefore, I thought the message should
avoid the contentious questions such as Khmer Serei, US aid termination, etc.
At some point we should get a come-back copy of the letter
as sent to McCone. (The following note by Trueheart is on the source text:
"JWN[eubert] 1. Fully agree. 2. Let's get definitive rundown on Khmer
Serei status. 3. All this should be brought to Kidder's attention. WT")
Source: US Department of State
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XXVII
Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
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