Chronology of Cambodian History

Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, January 24, 1964.

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the British Ambassador, January 24, 1964

The British Ambassador is calling on you to discuss the differences between us on handling the Soviet proposal for a conference on Cambodian neutrality in April. (See Memo of Conversation below) There is some urgency because the Foreign Office expects a question on this subject to arise in parliament on Monday. The substance of the US position, as set forth in our telegram of yesterday,* was given to Mr. Trench of the British Embassy yesterday afternoon. Upon learning of the differences in our positions, Trench stated that he was under instructions to seek an appointment with you for his Ambassador.

* Telegram 4457 to London, January 23. Its contents are summarized below under the heading, "US Position."

Probable British Position

The Soviet proposal, which has also been passed to Prince Sihanouk, changes the situation and will generate increasing pressures for a conference. The British believe that any indication on their part of turning back now might "set Sihanouk off again."

US Position

The position already given the British Embassy is that their proposed reply is in effect a commitment to attend a Geneva Conference in April. This is not significantly affected by certain drafting changes which the British have proposed to their own note. It would be ill-advised to talk of the holding of a conference, unless the agenda and subject matter are thoroughly discussed and texts agreed to beforehand by all parties concerned. We proposed that the British tell the Soviets that it is premature to set a date for a conference unless the subject matter is agreed beforehand. We specifically proposed using the co-chairmen machinery to reach agreement on texts, using the British draft. Recognizing that a new British approach to a conference might "set Sihanouk off", we said it would be better to take this risk now rather than later, when the conference process was even further along and Sihanouk's reaction would be more violent.

Recommendation

That you seek to persuade the British Ambassador of the importance that the US and UK coordinate their actions in such a way as to avoid a conference. Our opinion is that the best tactic to achieve this would be our suggestion of utilizing the co-chairmen machinery to obtain agreement of interested countries to neutrality agreements on Cambodia. We would propose that this matter be discussed in more detail with Mr. Peck in the preliminary talks which you suggested in your letter to Mr. Butler. In the meantime, we would hope the British will take no definitive position with respect to the Soviet draft.

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 24, 1964, 12:05-12:33 p.m.

SUBJECT: Cambodian Neutrality Proposal

PARTICIPANTS

The British Ambassador
Mr. Nigel Trench, Counselor, British Embassy

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Wm. C. Burdett, Deputy Asst. Secy for European Affairs
Mr. H. L. T. Koren, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs

The Ambassador said he thought their draft answer(not further identified) to the Soviet proposal for a Cambodian neutrality conference date and place was sufficiently vague that it was not inconsistent with the US position, and would keep Sihanouk happy as well. The Secretary stated once again the US position opposing a conference unless the results expected were understood and agreed to beforehand. He pointed to the experience of the Laos Conference where we were under heavy attack for the first few days simply because there had been no advance agreements. He also emphasized our heavy responsibility in SVN and Thailand. We simply could not ask them to come to a conference clearly aimed at them as this one had been. The chances were practically nil that the US would come to a conference to debate. The Ambassador suggested that in view of Sihanouk's vanity and how much depended on indulging that, a short conference would be a small price to pay to keep him happy.

The Secretary said it was first imperative to wait until we could see what results could be obtained and if none could be agreed upon, there would be no conference as far as the US was concerned. He added that if we were going to have trouble with Sihanouk, as we very well might, it would be better to have it now rather than at a conference. The Ambassador remarked again he thought the UK draft safeguarded our position. The Secretary replied that he thought there would have to be more language on the need for a pre-agreement of desired results. The Secretary spoke of very real fear in Vietnam of pressure for neutralization and its effect internally. We had too much at stake in Vietnam to risk this. Besides we did not have much in the way of relations with Sihanouk and we did not have much to lose. If the results were fully agreed to it should be possible for Ambassadors to sign at Phnom Penh.

The Ambassador asked whether we were adamant on this position because they didn't feel that they could stall with the Soviets. The Secretary said that we did not want to draft their reply for them. But we would not come to a conference if the results were not agreed in advance and even then we must take Thai and Vietnamese views and interests into account. We would not even be very happy about just a signing conference.

Source: US State Department

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XXVII
Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

Department of State