Chronology of Cambodian History
ZHOU
ENLAI AND LE DUAN, PHAM VAN DONG AND LE THANH NGHI
Beijing, 5 June 1973
Zhou Enlai: The world is now in a state of chaos. In the period after the
Paris Agreements, the Indochinese countries should take time to relax and
build their forces. During the next 5 to 10 years, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should build peace, independence, and neutrality.
In short, we have to play for time and prepare for a protracted struggle.
Each country has enemies of its own. So each has to prepare, both by
increasing production and training armed forces. If we are not vigilant, the
enemy will exploit our weakness. If we are well-prepared, then we will be
ready for any move by the enemy.
At present, the cease-fire is well observed. The Cambodian problem is not
solved. Yet, the people, after 20 years of fighting, wish to relax. So it is
necessary that you restore production and effectively use the labor forces.
These are big things to do. We agree with you that we have to restore production
and train armed forces at the same time.
Le Duan: The US was aiming at political objectives when fighting in Vietnam.
Strategically speaking, they did not use a consistent strategy. Instead, in
this neocolonial war, they changed several strategies, from one of special
war to limited war and "Vietnamization." Their objective was not
only to turn South Vietnam into their colony, but also to realize their
global strategy in Vietnam. That means, they wished to control the South,
then attack the North of Vietnam, thus damaging the defense system of
socialism in Southeast Asia and threatening the national independence
movement in the world.
Zhou Enlai: So you fought, and were not patient as Lin Biao advised. Patience
is the maxim of Lin Biao's strategy. He knew of nothing else.
I would like to share with you some intelligence information that we have
just received. The US wants Saigon to decrease fighting. [US envoy William]
Sullivan2 has to fly to Saigon to tell the same thing that he told
Tran Van Huong3 --Saigon's Ambassador to Washington: Nixon is in
trouble and Saigon should not make the situation more complicated. This is
true, because it explains why Kissinger wants to have a joint declaration
with you.
I also would like to stress that the US should definitely drop Lon Nol to let
the Cambodian people solve the problems themselves. This is a Cambodian civil
war so the US should leave Cambodia. As for FUNK, this war is
to punish Lon Nol. So we have to consult with Prince Sihanouk whether to
negotiate. We at the same time are not representing GRUNK.4
Le Duan: Cambodian comrades are making much progress. They are doing very
well.
Zhou Enlai: There is still uncertainty in the situation. I recall that last
year, Lon Nol went to China for the 20th anniversary celebration of the
Chinese National Day and met with comrade Pham Van Dong. He was so confident.
At that time, he still controlled all the transportation of materiel for
South Vietnam.
Pham Van Dong: We did not anticipate that things would change in a very short
time afterward. But he deserved it.
Zhou Enlai: Things always happen beyond our wishes. At that time, you had
military and medical bases in Cambodia and we did not know about
this. But Lon Nol did. And when Lon Nol asked for road fees for transportation
of materiel via Cambodia, we had to pay.
Le Duan: We would like to talk about our policy in the South. The situation
will be clear in three or four years' time. At any rate, the government there
eventually must be a democratic and nationalist one. This government can
exist for ten or 15 years. And then the name can be changed. So we are not in
a hurry to turn South Vietnam into a socialist entity.
Pham Van Dong: In this struggle, our objective is independence and democracy.
We are not in a hurry with the goal of national unification. One thing we
should do is to highlight the NLF role and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government with a neutral foreign policy.
Zhou Enlai: And the main problem is the leadership of the Party.
Pham Van Dong: That is correct. Lenin also discussed this problem in his book
entitled "The Two Strategies." The whole problem is the leadership.
We will highlight the NLF role both in internal and external policies.
Le Duan: In carrying out "Vietnamization," the enemies are clearly
expanding the war. We hold that the US has great strength and it can accept
defeat to a certain extent. It is difficult to defeat the US because it is a
strong country. You have advised us to solve the problem of US withdrawal
first and solve the Saigon problem later. We think this is correct.
Notes:
2. William Healy Sullivan (1922-) was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
from the end of his term as US ambassador to Laos in 1969 until he became
ambassador to the Philippines in 1973; he later served as envoy to Iran until
the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79.
3. Tran Van Huong (1903- ), former mayor of Saigon who twice served as Prime
Minister in the Republic of Vietnam November 1964-January 1965, and
May-August 1969. Later became Vice President to Nguyen Van Thieu and served
as President for 7 days in April 1975
4. The Beijing-based Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Cambodia)
formed by Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge in 1970.
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Source:
Cold War International History Project
Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
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