Chronology of Cambodian History
ZHOU
ENLAI AND PHAM VAN DONG
Beijing, 4:20 pm, 21 March 1970
Zhou Enlai: France is concerned that if Sihanouk tilts toward us Cambodia will be another battlefield. French interests,
therefore, will be affected. So France wants to win Sihanouk's sympathy.
France also wants to win the Soviets' sympathy. France may explain to the
Soviet Union that Lon Nol is not entirely pro-American, that he is pro-French
and he is following the policy of neutrality. The Lon Nol government, therefore,
can be recognized.1 France may also promise that it will advise
the Lon Nol government not to attack North Vietnamese and the NLF troops.
These can be seen in the context of the last two days' developments: the Lon
Nol government promised a policy of neutrality, respect to the treaties Cambodia had signed before. It especially ordered security
measures to protect Chinese and Soviet Embassies in Phnom Penh.
We should support Sihanouk for the time being and see how he will act. We
should support him because he supports the anti-American struggle in Vietnam,
because the Indochinese countries opposed the Japanese [and] French in the
past and because we have been supporting him after the [1955] Bandung
Conference [of nonaligned nations]. We will also see whether he really wants
to establish a united front to oppose the US before we support him. But
because of the circumstances he may change his position. However, the more we
can win his sympathy the better. It is what we initially think.
I think that Lon Nol's coup d'etat against Sihanouk is approved by both the
French and Americans. Of course, when talking about it, he mentioned only the
Americans, not the French. However, according to Rayer [?] who had a talk
with the Chinese writer—Hanzi—France does not believe in Sihanouk anymore. So
both France and the US supported the coup.
The fighting capability of the Sihanouk faction cannot match yours. So if
Sihanouk agrees to establish a united front, Cambodian forces can be
stronger. But France advises him not to with the reason that if he allows the
Vietnamese to enter Cambodia, they will not leave.
France, at the same time, thinks that Sihanouk does not entirely listen to
France, so France wants to replace Sihanouk by Lon Nol. Yet, Sihanouk is
tilting to the Soviet Union and China, thus reducing French influence. For
his part, Lon Nol does not want to displease China and the Soviet Union. On
March 18, after the coup, Lon Nol did not attack your forces in the border
areas and he did not press us to solve this problem. On March 18, they
destroyed houses of Chinese and Vietnamese living in Svay Rieng province. On
the 19th, however, they stopped these acts. And on the 20th, they issued a
special order not to damage the Chinese and Soviet embassies in Phnom Penh. Lon
Nol is also afraid that the Khmer people will rise up against him and at the
same time, afraid that if he attacks [forces in South] Vietnam, North Vietnam
will fight back. China will support North Vietnam. In that way, the war will
broaden. War has broken out in Laos. A similar situation can occur in Cambodia. Thus the situation in Indochina will return to
the one before the Geneva Conference of 1954. I am sure that you still
remember what comrade Mao told President Ho: "Indochina is united as a
bloc. This situation was created by the French." If the situation
develops that way—which is what the US actions will lead to—Indochina will
become a united battlefield.
I do not know whether the forces of Um Savuth2 have reached
Rattanakiri, and have they contacted Vietnamese forces?
Pham Van Dong: We received information that they have. These forces may turn
against Lon Nol. We also got the information that troops in Seam Reap are
opposing Lon Nol.3
Zhou Enlai: In the talk with him, you raised the possibility of cooperation
between the Khmer People's Party Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk's forces. You also
mentioned the principle of no interference into the domestic affairs of Cambodia. We have the feeling that Sihanouk wants us to
help on that. Therefore, we would like very much to hear from our Khmer
comrades before we advise Sihanouk.
Pham Van Dong: We stated clearly that contacts should take place on both high
and lower levels in order to have good cooperation at the grass roots.
Zhou Enlai: What was his reaction?
Pham Van Dong: He said nothing except giving general consent. He did not
mention what he wanted us to do. Maybe he will ask you. That will be good, as
both China and Vietnam will help.
Zhou Enlai: We can exert political influence, but they, as Khmers, have to
deal directly with each other.
Pham Van Dong: It will not be difficult if we agree on the guiding
principles. In this situation, we can ask both sides to cooperate. Sihanouk
is now waiting for your reply to his requests, isn't he?
Zhou Enlai: Yes. Because I told him that I will answer them after my meeting
with you. At first, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak4 will negotiate with
both North and South Vietnam. How will you solve this matter?
Pham Van Dong: Before I came here, we discussed this. We held that negotiations
would not bring about any results, because they would eventually fight
against us. But we are not to be defeated. So what is the use of
negotiations? However, at present when we are still talking with you and with
Sihanouk to see how the situation will develop, we ask our comrades to wait,
explore their attitude, and play for time. As for Sihanouk, our attitude is
affirmative and our position on other issues will be based on that.
Notes:
1. Prime Minister Lon Nol had led a coup against Sihanouk on March 18, while
the Prince was abroad.
2. Um Savuth, a Lt.-Col. In the Royal Armed Forces, was stationed in
Rattanakiri in 1970. He did not "defect," but remained in the Armed
Forces of the Khmer Republic, in which he was promoted to Colonel, and later
fought in the Chen La II campaign in Kampung Thom against combined Vietnamese
and Khmer Rouge forces.
3. Several rebellions against the central government in Cambodia
had broken out in early 1969. Some of these rebels later joined the Khmer
Rouge or the Vietnamese forces.
4. Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia, close associate of Lon
Nol.
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Source:
Cold War International History Project
Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars
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