Does the Future Belong to China?
未来属于中国吗?
A new power is emerging in the East. How America should handle unprecedented new challenges, threats—and opportunities.
一个新兴的大国正在东方崛起。美国应该怎么应付这史无前例的新的挑战,威胁和机会?
By Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek 美国新闻周刊 佛利德 扎卡利亚 撰写
Americans admire beauty, but they are truly dazzled by bigness. Think of the Grand Canyon, the California redwoods, Grand Central Terminal, Disney World, SUVs, the American armed forces, General Electric, the Double Quarter Pounder (With Cheese) and the Venti Latte. Europeans prefer complexity and nuance, the Japanese revere minuteness and minimalism. But Americans like size, preferably supersize.
美国人崇拜美, 但真正使他们震撼的却是大。想想大峡谷、加利福尼亚海底红杉林、纽约中央火车站、迪斯尼世界、运动型四轮驱动越野车(SUVs), 美国军队, 通用电器, 双倍份量的加奶酪的汉堡包（Double Quarter Pounder）和大杯的含炼乳的咖啡(the Venti Latte)。欧洲人喜欢复杂细微, 日本人崇尚微型艺术。但美国人喜欢大, 最好是超大。
That's why China hits the American imagination so hard. It is a country whose scale dwarfs the United States—1.3 billion people, four times America's population. For more than a hundred years it was dreams of this magnitude that fascinated small groups of American missionaries and businessmen—1 billion souls to save; 2 billion armpits to deodorize—but it never amounted to anything. China was very big, but very poor. All that is changing. But now the very size and scale that seemed so alluring is beginning to look ominous. And Americans are wondering whether the "China threat" is nightmarishly real.
这就是为什么中国能激起美国人对这个国家无穷遐想的原因.这是个规模使美国相形见拙的大国 --- 其十三亿人口是美国人口的四倍.一百多年来也正是因为中国的如此庞大令一些美国传教士和商人神魂颠倒 – 想想有十亿个灵魂等待拯救,二十亿个胳肢窝要喷除臭剂 – 但这一切都无果而终. 中国很大, 但很穷。不过这一切却正在改变.曾经令美国人神往的中国之庞大开始使美国人有不祥之兆的感觉.美国人开始怀疑 “中国威胁”是否正在变成恶梦般的现实.
Every businessman these days has a dazzling statistic about China, meant to stun the listener into silence. And they are an impressive set of numbers. China is now the world's largest producer of coal, steel and cement, the second largest consumer of energy and the third largest importer of oil, which is why gas prices are soaring. China's exports to the United States have grown by 1,600 percent over the past 15 years, and U.S. exports to China have grown by 415 percent.
现在每个商人都有一串令人咋舌的关于中国的数字(专门用来使听者听后目瞪口呆). 这些数字确实惊人. 中国现在是世界上最大的煤炭,钢铁和水泥生产国, 第二大能源消耗国和第三大石油进口国(这就是为什么油价飞涨的原因). 在过去的15年里中国向美国的出口量增加了1600%; 美国对中国的出口量增加了415%.
The most astonishing example of growth is surely Shanghai. Fifteen years ago, Pudong, in east Shanghai, was undeveloped countryside. Today it is Shanghai's financial district, eight times the size of London's new financial district, Canary Wharf, in fact only slightly smaller than the city of Chicago. And speaking of Venti Lattes, last week Starbucks CEO Howard Shultz noted on CNBC that in three years the company would probably have more cafes in China than in the United States.
中国经济快速增长最令人瞠目的例子当然要数上海. 15年前, 沪东的浦东还是一片未开发的乡村. 今日的浦东已经是上海的金融区, 其面积是伦敦新建的金融区金丝雀码头的八倍,仅稍小于芝加哥市. 说起 Venti Lattes, 上周美国星巴克咖啡连锁店的总执行官哈沃德-苏尔茨在CNBC电视频道声称再过三年该店将在中国拥有比美国还要多的咖啡店.
At the height of the Industrial Revolution, Britain was called "the workshop of the world." That title surely belongs to China today. It manufactures two thirds of the world's copiers, microwave ovens, DVD players and shoes. (And toys, my 5-year-old son would surely want me to add. All the world's toys.)
在其工业革命鼎盛期, 英国曾被称为 “世界的工场”. 而今日这个称号非中国莫属. 当今世界上三分之二的复印机, 微波炉, DVD播放机和鞋子都是中国生产的.(还有玩具. 我那五岁的儿子当然要我加上玩具.全世界的玩具.)
To get a sense of how completely China dominates low-cost manufacturing, consider Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is America's—and the world's—largest corporation. Its revenues are eight times those of Microsoft, and make up 2 percent of America's GDP. It employs 1.4 million people, more than GM, Ford, GE and IBM put together. It is legendary for its efficient—some would say ruthless—efforts to get the lowest price possible for its customers. In doing this, it has used technology, managerial innovation, but, perhaps most significantly, China. Last year Wal-Mart imported $18 billion worth of goods from China. Of Wal-Mart's 6,000 suppliers, 5,000—80 percent—are in one country, and it isn't the United States.
要想知道中国如何垄断低成本制造业, 不妨看看沃尔玛连锁店. 沃尔玛是美国, 也是世界最大的跨国公司. 它的利润是微软公司的8倍, 占美国国民总产值的2%. 它雇佣140万员工, 比通用汽车公司, 福特汽车公司, 通用电器公司和IBM 员工的总数还要多. 它以最低价格吸引顾客所显示的高效率(或者说残酷无情)极具传奇色彩. 除了采用了高科技, 改革了管理方法外, 最重要的是它利用了中国.
But the statistic that wins this contest, that conveys the depth and breadth of the challenge the United States faces, is surely the one about the Intel Fair. Intel sponsors a Science and Engineering Fair, which is the world's largest pre-college science competition, open to high-school students from around the world. Last year was a good one for Americans: 65,000 participated in the local fairs that are used to select finalists. In China the number was 6 million.
Yes, Chinese fairs are not as good as American fairs, the standards are different, and you can't compare apples and oranges. But still, 6 million oranges!
China's rise is no longer a prediction. It is a fact. It is already the world's fastest-growing large economy, and the second largest holder of foreign-exchange reserves, mainly dollars. It has the world's largest army (2.5 million men) and the fourth largest defense budget, which is rising by more than 10 percent annually. Whether or not it overtakes the United States economically, which looks to me like a distant prospect, it is the powerful new force on the global scene.
中国的崛起已不再是预言，而是一个事实了。它已经是世界上发展最快的大型经济体，而且还是世界上外汇储备——主要是美元——居第二的国家了。它拥有世界上人数最多的一支军队（250万人），军费开支在世界上排名第四，而且每年都以10％以上的幅度增长。不论它是否会在经济上超越美国——在我看来还显得非常遥远，它现在都是世界舞台上一支新的强大力量。
China's growth has obvious and amazing benefits for the world, and in particular for America. A Morgan Stanley report shows that cheap imports from China have saved American consumers more than $600 billion in the past decade. They have saved manufacturers even more. The Economist magazine notes that "it was largely thanks to China's robust growth that the world as a whole escaped recession after America's stockmarket bubble burst in 2000-01." And by buying up U.S. Treasury bills, China—along with other Asian countries—have allowed Americans and their government to keep borrowing and spending, and thus to keep the world economy going.
中国的经济增长给世界——尤其是给美国——带来了显而易见的巨大好处。据摩根士丹利公司的一份报告说，过去10年，廉价的中国商品为美国消费者节省了6000多亿美元。另外，中国与其它亚洲国家一起购买美国国债，因而使得美国人及其政府能够不断借款消费，进而使得世界经济得以持续增长。
There have been two great shifts in global power over the past 400 years. The first was the rise of Europe, which around the 17th century became the richest, most enterprising and ambitious part of the world. The second was the rise of the United States, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when it became the single most powerful country in the world, the globe's decisive player in economics and politics.
大约在17世纪前后，欧洲成为了世界上最富裕、最具创新精神和最雄心勃勃的地区。第二次是美国的崛起，发生在19世纪末、20世纪初，它当时成为了世界上惟一的最强大国家，在世界经济和政治事务中发挥着决定性作用。
For centuries, the rest of the world was a stage for the ambitions and interests of the West's great powers. China's rise, along with that of India and the continuing weight of Japan, represents the third great shift in global power—the rise of Asia.
几个世纪以来，世界其它地区都是西方列强施展抱负和争夺利益的地方。如今中国的崛起，外加印度的崛起和日本持续的影响力，标志着全球力量的第三次巨大变化，即亚洲的崛起。
Great powers are not born every day. The list of current ones—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia—has been mostly the same for two centuries. The arrival of a new one usually produces tension if not turmoil, as the newcomer tries to fit into the established order—or overturns it to suit its purposes. Think of the rise of Germany and Japan in the early 20th century, or the decline of the Ottoman Empire in that same period, which created the modern Middle East.
大国并非一天之内产生的。当今的大国——美国、英国、法国、德国和俄罗斯——200年来一直基本保持着目前的状况。新大国的到来通常会引发紧张气氛，即使不是动乱，因为它总是试图适应老的秩序，或者为了自身目的而打乱这种秩序。请想象一下20世纪初德国和日本崛起后的情况。
Great-power conflict is something the world has not seen since the cold war. But if it were to begin, all the troubles we worry about now—terrorism, Iran, North Korea—would pale in comparison. It would mean arms races, border troubles, and perhaps more. Even without those dire scenarios, China complicates international life. Take relations between the United States and Europe. Iraq was a temporary problem. But differing attitudes on the rise of China are likely to produce permanent strains in the Western Alliance.
自冷战结束以来，世界上没有再发生过大国间的冲突。但是，一旦发生这种冲突，我们眼下所担心的所有问题，如恐怖主义、伊拉克问题和朝鲜问题等，都将显得微不足道了。它意味着军备竞赛、边界争端，或许还有其它更严重的事情。即使不存在这种可怕的情况，中国的崛起也使国际形势复杂化了。请看一下美欧之间的关系，伊拉克问题仅仅是它们之间的短暂问题。围绕着中国崛起所产生的不同态度可能会给西方联盟留下永久的裂痕。
Inevitably, the China challenge looms largest for the United States. Historically, when the world's leading power is challenged by a rising one, the two have had a difficult relationship. And while neither side will ever admit it publicly, both China and the United States worry and plan for trouble. To say this is not to assume war or even conflict, but merely to note that there is likely to be tension between the two countries. How both sides handle it will determine their future relations—and the peace of the world.
毋庸置疑，对美国而言，中国的挑战无疑是最大的挑战。从历史上看，当世界一个主要强国面临一个正在崛起的强国的挑战时，两强之间的关系是很难相处的。尽管双方都不愿公开承认这点，但中国和美国都因此而忧心忡忡，而且都在未雨绸缪。这样说并非意味着要爆发战争或发生冲突，而仅仅是为了指出，这两个国家之间的关系可能会出现紧张。双方如何处理好这一问题将决定它们的未来关系，以及将影响到世界和平。
What Does China Want? 中国想要什么？
When people talk about China today they inevitably mention its unique culture. Confucianism is said to be at the heart of the nation's psyche, and it is this tradition—of discipline, learning and devotion to elders—that explains China's extraordinary success. But Confucianism has been around for centuries, during much of which China was poor, backward and stagnant. Indeed, in the early 20th century, when the German scholar Max Weber wanted to explain China's unsuitability to capitalism, he pointed to its Confucian culture. (Cultures are complex and you can usually find in them what you want.) China began growing in the early 1980s not because of its culture, which has been relatively unchanging, but because of its policies, which went through a dramatic transformation.
当人们谈到中国时，总免不了要提到它独一无二的文化。孔孟之道的儒家思想被认为是中华民族的灵魂。正是这独特的文化传统 --- 勤学苦练，尊重长辈 --- 可以解释中国为什么能有今日的辉煌。但儒家思想在中国已经流传了几个世纪，中国在此期间却一直贫穷落后，经济发展停滞不前。其实早在20世纪初，德国著名学者麦克斯-韦伯就把中国不适合搞资本主义的原因归结于儒家文化。（文化的内涵复杂，谁都可以从中找到自己需要的东西。）中国的腾飞起步于80年代初。这种腾飞的起因并不是中国文化的变化（中国文化在此期间相对于社会发展并没有多大变化），而是中国政府政策的变化。而这种政策的变化则是巨大的。
When historians look back at the last decades of the 20th century, they might well point to 1979 as a watershed. That year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, digging its grave as a superpower. It was also the year that China began its economic reforms. They were launched at a most unlikely gathering, the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in December 1978. Before the formal meetings, at a working-group session, the newly empowered party boss, Deng Xiaoping, gave a speech that turned out to be the most important one in modern Chinese history. He urged that the regime focus on development and modernization, and let facts—not ideology—guide its path. "It doesn't matter if it is a black cat or a white cat," Deng often said. "As long as it can catch mice, it's a good cat." Since then, China has done just that, pursued a modernization path that is ruthlessly pragmatic and nonideological.
当历史学家回顾20世纪的后几十年时，他们可能指出1979年是一个分水岭。那年苏联入侵阿富汗，无异于这个超级大国自掘坟墓。也是在这一年，中国开始进行经济改革。中国的经济改革措施是在一次人们想象中认为最不可能的会议上提出来的，那就是1978年12月举行的中共十一届三中全会。在正式开会前的一次工作小组会议上，新上任的共产党领导人邓小平发表了讲话，这次讲话成为当代中国历史上最重要的一次讲话。邓小平敦促中央将工作重点放在经济发展和现代化建设上，让事实而非意识形态引导中国的前进道路。邓经常说：“不管白猫黑猫，能抓住老鼠就是好猫。” 从此，中国走上了一条极其务实而淡化意识形态的现代化道路。
The results have been astonishing. China has grown around 9 percent a year for more than 25 years, the fastest growth rate for a major economy in recorded history. In that same period it has moved 300 million people out of poverty and quadrupled the average Chinese person's income. And all this has happened, so far, without catastrophic social upheavals. The Chinese leadership has to be given credit for this historic achievement.
（改革的）结果是惊人的。20多年以来，中国每年的经济发展速度一直保持在9％左右，这是在有记录的历史中一个大国经历的最快发展速度。与此同时，中国使3亿人脱离了贫困，并使中国人的平均收入翻了两番。迄今为止，所有这一切都是在没有爆发灾难性的社会骚乱的情况下发生的。中国领导集体因取得这一历史性的成就而赢得了声誉。
There are many who criticize China's economic path. They argue that the numbers are fudged, that corruption is rampant, that its banks are teetering on the edge, that regional tensions will explode, that inequality is rising dangerously and that things are coming to a head. For a decade now they have been predicting, "This cannot last, China will crash, it cannot keep this up." So far at least, none of these prognoses has come true. And while China has many problems, it also has something any Third World country would kill for—consistently high growth.
不过也有许多人抨击中国的经济（发展）道路。他们认为（中国官方报道的）数字纯属捏造，腐败猖獗，银行摇摇欲坠，地区冲突随时有可能爆发，贫富差距已拉大到极为危险的地步，情况已到了紧要关头。十年来他们的预测一直是：“这不可能持续下去，中国将要崩溃，它不可能维持如此快的发展速度。” 但迄今为止，上述预言一条也没有变为现实。虽然中国存在许多问题，但是它拥有任何一个第三世界国家都梦想的东西，那就是经济的持续高速发展。
Central planning was not supposed to work. And in some sense it doesn't, even in China. The government is careful to give enormous power to the regions, to issue directives that are market-friendly, to open its economy to foreign investment and trade. It has used its membership in the World Trade Organization to force through large free-market reforms in its economy and society.
计划经济是行不通的。在某种意义上讲，就连在中国也行不通。（但）中国政府（虽然是小心翼翼地）给了地方很大的权力，下达了很有利于市场经济发展的指令，向外国资本和企业开放国内经济。它还借加入世贸的东风在国内经济领域以至全社会大力推行走向市场经济的改革。
And yet, it's clear that the Chinese government deserves much credit for its ability to plan and manage the country's development. Consider the often-made comparison with India. At a microlevel, many Indian firms are far more impressive than their Chinese counterparts. They are genuine private-sector enterprises, use capital efficiently and can compete with the best in the world. Chinese companies by contrast are often partially state-owned, funded or favored. They get easy access to foreign capital and thus use it inefficiently. And many sell only in the domestic market and could not compete at the highest global level. But on the macro side, China's government pushes development far more consistently and effectively than India's.
再者，显而易见，中国政府规划和管理国家经济发展的能力值得称赞。请考虑一下常常被拿来与中国比较的印度。从微观方面来看，许多印度公司远比中国公司给人留下的印象深刻。它们是真正的私营企业，能有效地利用资本，并能与世界上最好的企业竞争。而中国公司通常是部分国有制的，它们或得到资助或享受特权，能轻易获得外资，因而在利用外资时不讲效率，而且许多公司只在国内市场销售其产品，无法与全球最高水平的企业竞争。但在宏观方面，中国政府在促进经济发展的持续性和有效性方面远远超出印度政府。
Indian officials always point out that their Chinese counterparts don't have to worry about voters. "We have to do many things that are foolish in the long term," said a senior member of the Indian government. "But politicians need votes in the short term. China can take the long view." Of course there are many nondemocratic governments that have made catastrophic economic decisions; think of Marcos of the Philippines and Mobutu of Zaire. But that only makes the Chinese regime's performance more remarkable.
印度官员总是指出中国官员不必担心选民问题。印度政府的一位资深成员说：“我们不得不做许多从长远来看是愚蠢的事情，但政客们在短期内就急着要选票。中国则可以作长期打算。” 当然不少非民主国家的政府作出了灾难性的经济决策。比如菲律宾的马科斯和扎伊尔的墨博托。相比之下中国政府的政绩更显斐然。
"I've dealt with governments all over the world," says a senior investment banker, "and the Chinese are probably the most impressive." Many of his colleagues in the American business community would agree with this characterization. But then what explains the recent actions of this brilliant government in the realm of politics and foreign policy?
一个资深投资银行家说：“我和很多国家的政府打过交道。中国政府恐怕是最给人印象最深刻的。他的不少美国企业界的同行们也同意他的观点。那么又该怎样解释这个英明的政府最近在政治和外交领域的一连串举动呢？
In April, the Chinese government seemed to encourage anti-Japanese protests over history textbooks, only to find them mushroom into mob demonstrations, riots, stone-throwing at the Japanese Embassy and widespread calls to boycott Japanese goods. Last March it ushered through passage of an "anti-secession law" threatening Taiwan with military force if it dared to anger China in any way. The result, among others, was that the European Union postponed its plan to lift an arms embargo on China in June. Also in March, China warned Australia to rethink its alliance with the United States, which created a backlash among Australian officials. In July 2003, Beijing tried to effect passage of an "anti-subversion" law in Hong Kong, which produced the largest demonstrations in the city's history and created strong anti-Beijing political sentiment in a territory that was always apolitical. All these actions are making China's most powerful neighbors—Japan, Australia, India—pause. It is strengthening those in America who see China as a threat, not an opportunity. Is this so smart?
今年四月，中国政府看来鼓励了因为日本篡改历史教科书而在中国引起的反日抗议活动。结果这场抗议活动发展成暴民游行，骚乱，向日本驻华使馆扔石头以及广泛的抵制日货的行动。更早些时候的三月，它通过了《反分裂法》，威胁说如果台湾胆敢以任何方式挑衅大陆就会对台湾动武，结果导致欧盟推迟原定于今年六月实行的解除对华武器禁运。同样也在三月，中国警告澳大利亚，要该国重新考虑和美国结盟的问题，引起了该国官员的强烈反弹。2003年的7月，北京试图在香港通过《反颠覆法》，结果导致香港有史以来规模最大的抗议游行，使香港这个历来不关心政治的土地上出现了对北京的政治怨恨。所有这些举动都使中国周边的几个大国 ― 日本，澳大利亚和印度踌躇。这些举动加强了美国的那些把中国的崛起视为威胁，而不是机会的人们之间的联盟。这样的举动明智吗？
A New Kind Of Challenge 一种新的挑战
For the first decade of its development (the 1980s), China did not have a foreign policy. Or rather, its grand strategy was a growth strategy. China quietly supported (or did not oppose) U.S. policies, largely because it saw good relations with America as the cornerstone of its development push. And this nonconfrontational approach—"to hide its brightness"—still lingers. With the exception of anything related to Taiwan, even now its major foreign-policy moves are largely outgrowths of economic imperatives. These days that means a ceaseless search for continued supplies of oil and other commodities.
在中国经济发展的前十年（20世纪80年代），中国没有一套（完整明确的）外交政策。增长战略就是它的总体战略。中国默默地支持，或者说至少不反对美国的外交政策，应为它把良好的中美关系看作是中国经济发展的基石。今天，这种避免对抗，韬光养晦的策略仍影响着中国的言行。除了所有与台湾有关的问题，中国目前的重大外交举措主要是经济需要的产物。眼下，这意味着马不停蹄地寻找石油及其他商品的供应源。
But things are changing. In a paper titled "The Beijing Consensus," drawing heavily on interviews with leading Chinese officials and academics, Joshua Cooper Ramo provides a fascinating picture of China's new foreign policy. "Rather than building a US-style power, bristling with arms and intolerant of others' world views," he writes, "China's emerging power is based on the example of their own model, the strength of their economic system, and their rigid defense of ... national sovereignty" (http://fpc.org. uk/publications/123).
但形势在发生变化。乔舒亚·库珀·雷默对中国高层官员和著名学者进行了大量采访以后，撰写了一篇题为《北京共识》的文章。文章描绘了一幅有关北京新外交政策的迷人图画。他写道：“与拥有大量武器、对其他世界观难以容忍的美国式超级大国不同，正在崛起的中国是以自身模式的榜样作用、自身经济体系的影响力和对国家主权的坚决捍卫为基础的。”
China has followed a very different development strategy than Japan. Rather than focusing only on export-led growth to a few markets and keeping its internal market closed, China opened itself to foreign investment and trade. The result is that much of the world now relies on the China market. From the United States to Germany to Japan, exports to China are among the crucial factors propelling growth. For developing markets, China is the indispensable trading partner.
中国的发展战略也与日本截然不同。日本只是针对少数几个市场，集中发展以出口为主导的经济，同时保持国内市场的封闭，而中国向外国投资和贸易敞开了大门。结果，许多国家都对中国市场形成了依赖。从美国到德国，再到日本，对华出口已成为推动经济发展的关键因素之一。对发展中国家来说，中国是不可缺少的贸易伙伴。
In November 2004, President George W. Bush and China's President Hu Jintao traveled through Asia. I was in the region a few weeks afterward and was struck by how almost everyone I spoke with rated Hu's visits as far more successful than Bush's. Karim Raslan, a Malaysian writer, explained: "Bush talked obsessively about terror. He sees all of us through that one prism. Yes, we worry about terror, but frankly that's not the sum of our lives. We have many other problems. We're retooling our economies, we're wondering how to deal with the rise of China, we're trying to address health, social and environmental problems. Hu talked about all this; he talked about our agenda, not just his agenda." From Indonesia to Brazil, China is winning new friends.
2004年11月，美国总统布什和中国国家主席胡锦涛都对亚洲国家进行了访问。几周后，我来到这一地区。令我吃惊的是，几乎所有我接触到的人都认为胡锦涛的访问比布什的访问要成功得多。马来西亚作家卡里姆·拉斯兰解释说：“布什只知道谈论恐怖主义，他以同一个视角看待所有人。是的，我们也为恐怖主义忧虑，但坦率地说，这并不是我们生活的全部。我们还面临其他许多问题。我们要重整经济，我们不知道如何应对中国的崛起，我们还在努力解决健康、社会和环境问题。胡锦涛谈到了所有这些话题，他谈论了我们关心的事，而不是仅仅谈论他自己关心的事。”从印度尼西亚到巴西，中国正在结交新朋友。
There are a group of Americans—chiefly neoconservatives and Pentagon officials—who have been sounding the alarms about the Chinese threat. And they speak of it largely in military terms, usually wildly exaggerating China's capabilities. But the facts simply do not support their case. China is certainly expanding its military, with a budget that rises 10 percent or more a year. But it is still spending a fraction of what America does, at most 10 percent of the Pentagon's annual bill.
有一群美国人——主要是新保守派和五角大楼的官员——一直在宣扬中国威胁论。他们主要从军事角度谈论中国威胁，常常胡乱夸大中国的实力。但事实并不支持他们的说法。毫无疑问，中国在扩充军力，中国的军费预算每年增长10％或更多。但与美国相比，中国的军费开支显得微不足道，它最多相当于五角大楼年预算的10％。
The Chinese threat or challenge will not present itself in the familiar guise of another Soviet Union, straining to keep pace with America in military terms. It is more likely to be what Ramo describes as an "asymmetrical superpower." It will use its economic dominance and its political skills to achieve its objectives. China does not want to invade and occupy Taiwan; it is more likely to keep undermining the Taiwan independence movement, so that Beijing slowly accumulates advantage and wears out the opponent. "The goal for China is not conflict but the avoidance of conflict," Ramo writes. "True success in strategic issues involves manipulating a situation so effectively that the outcome is inevitably in favor of Chinese interests. This emerges from the oldest Chinese strategic thinker, Sun Zi, who argued that 'every battle is won or lost before it is ever fought'."
中国威胁或中国挑战不会以我们熟悉的苏联形式（即拼命争取在军事方面与美国并驾齐驱）出现。中国可能成为雷默所说的“不对称超级大国”，它会利用自身的经济优势和政治技巧去实现目标。中国不想武力侵占台湾，而会不断削弱台独力量的根基。这样北京可以逐步取得优势，拖垮对手。雷默写道：“中国的目标不是冲突，而是避免冲突。有效地处理局势，让结果必然对中国有利，这才是战略上的真正成功。这种思想源自中国古代的战略思想家孙子。”
At least that's the plan. The trouble is that while maintaining this long-term strategy, China often lapses into short-term behavior that seems aggressive and hostile. Perhaps this is because the rational decision-making that guides its economic policy is not so easily applied in the realm of politics, where honor, history, pride and anger all play a large role. So with Taiwan, last week Beijing was playing out its long-term plan, "normalizing" relations with the island's main opposition party, and smothering it with conciliation. But last month it passed the anti-secession law, which angered most Taiwanese and alarmed Americans and Europeans.
至少中国的战略是这样。但不幸的是，虽然中国稳步朝自己的长远目标迈进，但它却又不时地陷入短期行为之中，使自己看上去野心勃勃，充满敌意。这也许是因为主导经济发展决策的理性不容易被应用于政治领域。处理政治问题时，有诸多因素在起作用，国家的尊严，历史原因，民族自尊心，愤怒的情绪。所以在处理台湾问题上，上个星期北京按照长远目标，谋求和台湾主要反对党的关系正常化，充满了和解的善意。但上个月它却通过了反分裂法，激起了大多数台湾人的愤怒，引起了美国和欧洲的恐慌。
Or take its relations with Japan. It makes little sense for Beijing to behave as aggressively as it does with Tokyo. It only ensures that China will have a hostile neighbor, one with an economy that is still four times its size. A wiser strategy might be to keep ensnaring Japan with economic ties and cooperation, achieving dominance over time.
再以中日关系为例。北京大可不必对东京如此动怒失态。这样做无疑只会使自己增加一个敌对的近邻，而且这个近邻还是一个国民产值是自己四倍的经济强国。一个比较明智的策略恐怕是以经济纽带和合作关系稳住日本，逐步战胜它。
There are grounds for reconciliation. Japanese have not behaved perfectly, but they have apologized several times for their wartime aggression. They have given China more than $34 billion in development aid (effectively reparations), something never mentioned by the Chinese. Even in this latest standoff, the Japanese moved first to break the impasse.
中日关系尚有调和的余地。日本不是没有错，但是它已经多次为战争期间侵略中国道了歉。日本已经向中国提供了340亿美元贷款帮助中国发展经济，这足以赔偿中国了，而中国从未提起过这个。即使是在最近的中日关系紧张对峙中，也是日本主动打破僵局。
But for China, emotion seems to get in the way. Having abandoned communism, the Communist Party has been using nationalism as the glue that keeps China together. And modern Chinese nationalism is defined in large part by its hostility toward Japan. Mao is still a hero in China despite his many catastrophic policies because he unified the country and fought the Japanese. And as China advances economically, Chinese nationalism only gets more intense. Scratch a Shanghai Yuppie and you will find a virulent nationalist—on Taiwan, Japan and America.
但中国好像太感情用事了。摒弃了共产主义的理念以来，中共一直利用民族主义把中华民族凝聚在一起。而现代中国的民族主义则是以仇视日本为主要特征的。毛泽东的错误决策虽然给中国带来很多灾难，但他在中国仍然被看作英雄，其原因就是他统一了中国打日本。随着中国经济的发展，中国的民族主义愈演愈盛。在上海的年轻专业人士中，对台湾，日本和美国充满敌意的民族主义者比比皆是。
Beijing assumes it can handle popular sentiments but it might well be wrong. After all, it does not have much experience in it, not being a democracy. It deals with public anger and emotions cagily, unsure whether to encourage them or clamp down for fear of where they might lead. So it does not know what to do with a group like the Patriots Alliance, an Internet-based hypernationalist group that has organized the biggest demonstrations in the country in six years.
北京以为它可以控制民众的情绪，但它很有可能错了。作为一个非民主的国家的政府，北京在这方面毕竟缺少经验。它小心翼翼地应付公众愤怒的情绪，不知道该是鼓励还是压制这样的情绪，因为不知道这种情绪将把民众引向何方。所以在处理一个在网上活动的叫做爱国者联盟的组织（该联盟曾组织了六年来规模最大的抗议游行）时，就不知道该把它怎么样。
Experts say that the Chinese Communist Party has been seriously discussing political reforms and studying dominant single parties from Sweden to Singapore, to understand how it might maintain its position in a more open political system. "The smartest people in the government are studying these issues," a well-placed Beijing resident told me. But politics is often about more than smarts. In any event, how Beijing's mandarins end up handling their own people might have much to do with how China ends up handling the world.
专家们说中共正在认真讨论政治改革的问题，研究瑞典，新加坡等国由一个大党主政的模式，探索怎样在比较开放的政治体系中维持执政党的领导。“政府中最聪明的人正在研究这些课题。”一个颇有地位的北京市民告诉我。不过政治常常并不是谁聪明，谁不聪明的问题。不管怎么说，北京如何应付国内的民众最终将影响到它如何处理国际事务。
What America Needs to Do 美国该怎么办？
How to handle China? The best guide is to listen to what French President Jacques Chirac says, and do the opposite. Chirac, the tired old dinosaur who seems increasingly uncomprehending of today's world, recently denounced China's "brutal and unacceptable invasion" of Europe. He was referring to the fact that China's textiles have swarmed into the European (and American) markets following the abolition of textile quotas. Unfortunately, Chirac's advice, to reimpose quotas in some way, may soon be taken by both Europeans and Americans. (The textile issue is putting a damper on what has been a growing love affair between Europe and China.)
如何应对中国呢？最好的对策正如法国总统希拉克所说，是‘针锋相对’。希拉克这条疲倦了的老恐龙觉得今日世界越来越不可思议了。它最近谴责中国对欧洲的贸易是“残忍和令人不可接受的侵略 ”。他这里指的是中国加入世贸，欧洲解除了限制中国纺织品进口配额之后中国的纺织品一窝蜂地拥进欧洲和美国市场的事实。不幸的是，根据希拉克的建议，欧洲和美国将以某种方式对中国的纺织品重新设定配额。（纺织品的问题使原来正在不断升温的中国和欧洲友好关系的发展蒙上了一层阴影。）
It's an understandable impulse. Textile exports from China have soared since Jan. 1—a 534 percent increase in pullover-sweater sales in Europe for example—but this is largely the result of free trade, not unfair practices. More generally, tariffs and walls are not the way to prosper in the emerging global economy. It's not just China but India, Brazil, South Africa and Thailand, among others, that are all entering the global market with sophistication and skill. The answer for Western countries cannot be to shut themselves off from this new reality. After all, they benefit from the expansion of global commerce. The European Union's exports to China have risen 600 percent in the past 15 years. More broadly, countries that have tried to wall themselves off from the rest of the world in the past—to maintain their economy or culture—have stagnated. Those that have embraced change have flourished. China is simply the biggest part of a new world. You cannot switch it off.
欧洲和美国这样的反应是可以理解的。自从今年元旦以来，中国的纺织品出口量急剧增加。以套头毛衣为例，它在欧洲的销售量就增加了534%。但这主要是自由贸易的结果，而不是不公平竞争的结果。总的来说，增加关税和贸易壁垒的做法不利于全球经济一体化的实现。以缜密的思考和娴熟的技巧进入全球市场参加竞争的不光是中国，还有印度，南非和泰国。我给西方国家的回答是他们不应该对现实视而不见，因为他们毕竟是全球贸易发展的得益者。在过去的15年中，欧盟向中国的出口增加了600%。从更广泛的意义上讲，历史上所有闭关自守保护本国经济和文化的国家结果都停滞不前。而那些积极应变的国家则繁荣昌盛。
What you can do is be better prepared. For Americans, this means a renewed focus on the core skills that have propelled the American economy so far: science and technology. The United States has been slipping badly in all global rankings of these fields. Its research facilities are dominated by foreign students and immigrants—but a growing number of them are staying home or going home. Without a massive new focus in these areas, America will find itself unable to produce the core of scientists, engineers and technicians who make up the base of an advanced industrial economy. China and India already produce many more engineers than does the United States. In five years, China will produce more Ph.D.s than the United States. They may not be as good as American Ph.D.s, but numbers do matter.
你可做的事情只有准备迎接挑战。对美国人来说，这意味着重新把重点放在迄今推动美国经济发展的核心技术——科学技术——上。美国在所有这些领域的全球排名中的名次急剧下降。美国的研究机构中大都是外国学生和外国移民，但现在他们中正有越来越多的人选择不出国或返回国内。如果不对这些领域给予新的重视，美国将会发现自己难以产生作为中坚力量的科学家、工程师和技术人员，而这些人却是先进工业经济的基础。中国和印度培养的工程师人数已经大大超过美国。五年后，中国培养出来的博士人数将超过美国。这些博士的质量也许赶不上美国培养的博士，但数量上的优势却不可忽视。
For the American government, the free ride may be coming to an end. It has run irresponsible fiscal policies, knowing that foreign governments and people would provide it with unlimited credit. But that credit comes at a price. When China holds huge reserves of dollars, it also holds the power to damage the American economy. To do so would certainly hurt China as much or more than it would America, but surely it would be better if U.S. policy were less vulnerable to such possibilities. Fiscal responsibility at home means greater freedom of action abroad.
对美国政府来说，搭乘免费车的日子可能正在结束。美国政府一直实行不负责任的财政政策，因为它知道外国政府和人民会向它提供大量的贷款。但是，这种贷款是有代价的。当中国拥有巨额美元储备时，它也拥有了破坏美国经济的力量。如果中国那样做的话，对中国造成的损害肯定会大于美国，但是，如果美国能够不易受到这种可能性的打击，那岂不是更好？在国内实行负责的财政政策意味着在国外能有更大的行动自由。
In foreign policy, Washington will face two possibilities. The first is that China will push its weight around, anger its neighbors and frighten the world. In this case, there will be a natural balancing process by which Russia, Japan, India and the United States will come together to limit China's emerging power. But what if China is able to adhere to its asymmetrical strategy? What if it gradually expands its economic ties, acts calmly and moderately, and slowly enlarges its sphere of influence, hoping to wear out America's patience and endurance?
在对外政策方面，华盛顿将面临两种局面：第一种是中国恃强凌弱，挑衅周边国家，威胁世界和平。在这种情况下，俄罗斯，日本，印度和美国将携手遏制中国的发展壮大。但是如果中国能够恪守韬光养晦的“不对秤 ” 战略，那美国又该怎么办? 如果中国逐步扩大其经济关系，稳扎稳打，逐渐扩大其势力范围，以期耗尽美国的耐心和耐力，那又怎么办？
The United States will then have to respond in kind, also working quietly and carefully, also adopting a calibrated and nuanced policy for the long run. This is hardly beyond its capacity. America has been far more patient than most recognize. It pursued the containment of the Soviet Union for almost 50 years. American troops are still on the banks of the Rhine, along the DMZ in Korea and in Okinawa.
在这种情况下，美国必须采取相应对策，也不动声色，谨慎行事，按照长远目标不断修正和调整自己的策略。这完全没有超出美国的能力范围。这些年来，美国所表现出来的耐心已超出世人所料。他所推行的围堵前苏联的战略就坚持了半个世纪。美国军队至今还驻扎在莱茵河畔，南北韩之间的非军事区和日本的冲绳岛。
A world war is highly unlikely. Nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence, globalization all mitigate against it. But beneath this calm, there is probably going to be a soft war, a quiet competition for power and influence across the globe. America and China will be friends one day, rivals another, cooperate in one area, compete in another. Welcome to the 21st century.
现在爆发一场世界大战的可能性微乎其微。核威慑、经济上的相互依赖性和全球化等都是降低这种可能性的因素。但在这种表面的平静下，也许一场软战争正在进行中，一场为争夺全球权力和影响的竞争正在悄悄展开。美中两国将有时互为朋友，有时又互为对手，双方在一个领域互相合作，在另外一个领域又互相竞争。（中国，）欢迎你来到21世纪！
With Melinda Liu in Beijing, Christian Caryl in Tokyo, Karen Lowry Miller in Brussels, Rukhmini Punoose in New York and John Barry in Washington, D.C.
© 2005 Newsweek, Inc.